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## PLATO'S REPUBLIC

II

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IN THREE VOLUMES

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TRANSLATED BY E. V. Rieu

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY J. H. Brewster

AND A COMMENTARY BY J. H. Brewster

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# PLATO

## THE REPUBLIC

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WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY  
PAUL SHOREY, PH.D., LL.D., LITT.D.

LATE PROFESSOR OF GREEK, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO


IN TWO VOLUMES

II

BOOKS VI—X



CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS  
LONDON  
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD  
MCMXLII



PA  
H279  
RL  
1930?  
v. 2  
cop. 4

First printed 1935  
Reprinted 1942

Printed in Great Britain

## PREFATORY NOTE

WHILE actively engaged, so far as his failing strength would permit, in completing for publication this the second volume of his translation of the *Republic* of Plato, Professor Shorey passed away on April 24, 1934, in the seventy-eighth year of his life. In justice to him as well as to the many thousands of readers who will study and cherish this last and perhaps the greatest scholarly work of the distinguished Platonist, the Editors of the Loeb Classical Library desire to place on record here a brief statement of the pertinent facts relating to the composition and the proof-revision of this volume. Behind the bare narrative lies a record of unwavering courage in the face of fast-approaching death on the part of the veteran scholar and of dauntless determination both to achieve a long-cherished purpose and to fulfil an obligation entered into many years before with his friend Dr. James Loeb and his collaborators in the editing of the Library; and the Editors thought it right to offer this volume to the public as nearly as possible approximating to the condition in which the latest proofs passed under the author's eye.

The translation had been finished and was in Professor Shorey's hands in proof form for about two years and had been partially, though not finally, revised by him. The Introduction was dictated by him, paragraph by paragraph, in the scant hours of work permitted him by his physicians after his first break-down in December 1933. The same is true of those notes accompanying the translation which are of an interpretative, literary or philosophical character. The many notes on Platonic diction and on matters of Greek grammar and idiom were in large part compiled from Professor Shorey's jottings on the well-filled margins of his desk-copy of the *Republic* by his research secretary, Miss Stella Lange, who had assisted

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him in that capacity during the preparation of *What Plato Said*, to which important work she added many references in the notes of this volume. The critical notes under the text were added by Miss Lange during the revision of the proofs, often from notes made by Professor Shorey himself.

The assembling in the form of copy for the printer of all the material which is found in the Introduction and notes has been the work of Miss Lange, undertaken at the request of Mrs. Shorey; and she has read all the galley and page proofs of the volume in co-operation with Dr. Page and myself. Miss Lange's familiarity with her teacher's Platonic studies, his methods of work, his views on the interpretation of passages of peculiar difficulty has rendered her co-operation invaluable, and generous acknowledgements are due to her for her fidelity to the heavy task which she willingly undertook.

To the writer of these words it would have been a grateful task, had this been an appropriate place, to add a personal tribute to his colleague of many years at the University of Chicago. The familiar correspondence which grew out of their renewed relationship during the preparation of the two volumes of the *Republic* has illuminated for him in unexpected ways the life of tremendous and varied activities of the great scholar and humanist during the years which for the ordinary man would have been a period of decreasing labours. The literary and scholarly productivity of Professor Shorey in these later years falls little short of heroism. But the readers of this interpretation of the *Republic* who would know more about the remarkable man and his life are referred to the review of his career which introduces the July 1934 number of *Classical Philology*, the journal which he edited for twenty-five years, and especially to President George Norlin's eloquent appreciation of "Paul Shorey the Teacher," on pp. 188-191.

*For the Editors*

EDWARD CAPPS.

September 18, 1934.

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## INTRODUCTION

THERE is a sufficient outline of the *Republic* in the introduction to the first volume. Here it remains to consider more argumentatively certain topics of the last five books which were treated summarily there. They may be listed as (1) the theory of ideas and the idea of good, (2) the higher education and Plato's attitude toward science, (3) some further details of Plato's political theories, (4) the logic and psychology of the main ethical argument of the *Republic*, (5) the banishment of poetry, (6) the concluding myth.

Regarded as metaphysics, Plato's theory of ideas is, technically speaking, the deliberate and conscious hypostatization of all concepts—the affirmation that every abstract general notion of the human mind is also somehow, somewhere, in some sense, an objective entity, a real thing, outside of any mind. Some philologists and some sensitive aesthetic critics object to the use of the words concept and hypostatization in this connexion. They have a right to their personal distaste, but it contributes nothing to the interpretation of Plato. Both words convey definite meanings to students of philosophy and there are no words that can replace them. The Socratic dialogues are in fact largely concerned with the definition of concepts, general or abstract ideas,

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general terms, *Begriffe*, call them what you will, and some convenient synonym for this meaning is indispensable in any rational discussion of Plato's philosophy. The Platonic word *eidos* may have retained some of the associations of physical form, and the modern psychology of the concept may involve in some cases a more developed logic than Plato possessed. The word *eidos* or *idea* in Herodotus, Thucydides, Democritus, the Hippocratic *corpus* and Isocrates<sup>a</sup> may show the meaning *concept* or *Begriff* imperfectly freed from the association of physical form, but that does not justify the inference that it was never so freed in Plato. The terminology of the transcendental idea is indistinguishable from the terminology of the concept and the definition.<sup>b</sup> It is impossible to say at what point the metaphysical doctrine emerges in the minor dialogues, or—on the, I believe, mistaken hypothesis that the later dialogues abandon it—just when the change took place. The logic of the definition in the minor dialogues implies a practically sufficient notion of the nature of a concept,<sup>c</sup> and it is sophistry

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Shorey, *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, Munich, 1884, p. 1, and review of A. E. Taylor's *Varia Socratica*, in *Class. Phil.* vi., 1911, pp. 361 ff.; Ritter, *Neue Untersuchungen*, Munich, 1910, pp. 228-326; Lewis Campbell, *The Theaetetus of Plato*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1883, pp. 268-269; C. M. Gillespie, "The Use of *Eidos* and *Idea* in Hippocrates," *Class. Quarterly*, vi., 1912, pp. 178-203; Zeller, ii. 1<sup>4</sup>, pp. 658, n. 2 and 661, n. 1; Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. pp. 248 ff.; Friedländer, *Platon*, i. pp. 16 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 75.

<sup>c</sup> It is hard to understand the acceptance by several scholars of Stenzel's view that the concept and consequently the idea is a late discovery in the Platonic dialogues, a result in fact of the analyses of the *Sophist*. He must take concept

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to try to suppress so plain a fact by capitalizing the word Form and insisting that Plato always or till his latest works visualized the "Forms" as types. He did for some purposes and for others he did not, and he always knew what he was doing. The ideas, as I have often pointed out, are ideals, types, or hypostatized concepts or simply concepts according to the purpose and the context.<sup>a</sup>

Many interpreters of Plato seem to assume that philosophy is, like mathematics or chemistry, a pro-

in some very esoteric significance. For to common sense nothing can be plainer than that the concept is implied in Socrates' attempts to define ethical terms and that it distinctly emerges together with the terminology at least of the idea in the minor dialogues of Plato and especially in the *Euthyphro*. Stenzel's thought seems to be that the concept involves predication and that predication can be fully understood only after the analysis of sentence structure in the Sophist and the discovery of the meaning of "is." But surely the conscious analysis of sentence structure and the function of the copula is one thing and the correct use of predication, of propositions and the conversion of propositions and their combination in virtual syllogisms is another. All the elements of a sound logic are present in Plato's minor dialogues. They are correctly employed in inductive and deductive reasoning, in the quest for definitions and in the testing of them when found. If Stenzel means that the nature of the concept, of the general idea, of abstractions is not definitively understood in the minor dialogues his postulate proves or demands too much. The ultimate nature of the concept is still debated to-day. But for all practical purposes of common sense any one who consistently endeavours to define abstract and general terms and who applies a sound logic to the testing of the definitions proposed, has a sufficient notion of the concept. And anyone who apprehends the concept may go on to hypostatize it either by an instinctive tendency of human nature and speech, or with conscious metaphysics as Plato did.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 27 ff.

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gressive science ; that Plato, though a great artist, was a primitive thinker whose methods and opinions have only an historical interest to-day ; and that his doctrine of ideas is the endeavour of an immature mind to deal with a problem which modern psychology or the common sense of any dissertation-writing philologist can settle in a paragraph. These assumptions close the door to any real understanding of Plato's philosophy. The ultimate nature of general ideas, of abstract and conceptual thought in relation both to the human mind and to the universe is as much a matter of debate to-day as it was in the age of the schoolmen. This plain fact of literary history is not affected by the opinion of a certain number of materialists and behaviourists that the matter is quite simple and that there is or ought to be no problem. They may or may not be right. But the discussion continues, as any bibliography of psychology and philosophy will show. The entire literature of the "meaning of meaning" and of "imageless thought" is a renewal of the controversy in other terms.

A great many thinkers are not satisfied with the simple evasion of Aristotle that the human mind is "such" as to be able to experience this, namely the separation in thought of things inseparable in experience. They cannot find any enlightenment in the modern tautology that a general idea is an image of a particular idea plus a feeling of generality. And they are not convinced that the movements of the body, even if we concede that they run exactly parallel to the movements of the mind, really explain them. And if we turn to the other side of the problem we find that many of the leaders of modern

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physics and mathematics are unable to conceive and refuse to admit that there is nothing in the objective universe corresponding to the ideas, the concepts, the laws, the principles by which they get their results.

The Platonic theory of ideas is a convenient shorthand, symbolic expression of the opinions that I have thus summarized. If we disregard the rhetoric and physical imagery of the myths by which Plato exalts the importance of the doctrine or makes it the expression of the ideal for ethics, politics and aesthetics, all that it affirms is, first, that conceptual thought is a distinct and differentiated prerogative of man not sufficiently accounted for by the structure of his body and the sensations which he shares with the animals ; and second, that there must be something in the universe, something in the nature of things, that corresponds to our concepts and our ideals—to the principles, for example, of ethics and mathematics. These affirmations of Plato are primitive animism only in the sense in which the same could be said of the beliefs of some of the greatest mathematicians and physicists of to-day or of Matthew Arnold when he talks of a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness. This is not reading modern philosophies into Plato. It is merely giving him credit for knowing and intending what he in fact says. The opposite interpretation underrates his intelligence and really does read into his writings modern ideas, the notions, namely, of modern anthropologists as to how savages think. Gomperz' comparison of the doctrine of ideas to Iroquois animism (iii. 323 ; cf. iii. 1-2), Ogden and Richards' designation of the ideas as "name-souls" (*The Meaning*

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of *Meaning*, p. 45), Jowett's illustration of what he deems hair-splitting refinements in Plato by the "distinction so plentiful in savage languages," Cornford's fancy (*From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 254) that "the idea is a group-soul related to its group as a mystery-demon like Dionysus is related to the group of worshippers, his *thiasos*," and all similar utterances are uncritical, whatever airs of science or pseudo-science they assume. The relevant illustrations of Plato's doctrine of ideas are to be sought in the most subtle debates of the schoolmen, or in modern psychological and epistemological literature about the meaning of meaning.<sup>a</sup>

There were, of course, some other more special considerations that determined Plato's deliberate and defiant hypostatization of all concepts. It accepted a natural tendency of the human, and not merely of the primitive, mind, and rendered it harmless by applying it consistently to everything. If all concepts are hypostatized, the result for practical logic and for everything except metaphysics and ultimate epistemological psychology is to leave concepts where they were, as indispensable instruments of human thinking. The hypostatization of abstractions operated practically as a short answer to the sophisms of crude nominalists who obstructed ordinary reasoning by raising ultimate objections to the validity of all abstractions or general terms. This motive is distinctly apparent in Plato's writings and there is a strong presumption that he was conscious of it.

However that may be, Plato did in fact, partly as a matter of imaginative style, partly as a matter of

<sup>a</sup> See Shorey in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, pp. 579-583.



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metaphysics, speak of concepts as if they were real objects. He did, as his writings conclusively show, hypostatize all concepts, and all attempts to show that he hypostatized only a few of the sublimer or more dignified concepts are *a priori* improbable because they deprive the doctrine of all rational meaning and consistency,<sup>a</sup> and they are also refuted by the incontrovertible evidence of the dialogues themselves. Plato affirms this monstrous paradox, not because he is a naïve thinker unacquainted with the elementary psychology of abstraction and generalization,<sup>b</sup> but because, as we have said, he regards it as the most convenient expression of his rejection of all materialistic and relativistic philosophies<sup>c</sup> and of all crude nominalism.<sup>d</sup> He recognized that the doctrine is a paradox hard to accept but also hard to reject.<sup>e</sup> But he deliberately affirmed it as the most convenient alternative to unacceptable or unworkable philosophies.<sup>f</sup> He perhaps, as we have already suggested, justified this procedure to himself, and we may certainly justify it for him, by the reflection that the theory is no more of a paradox than that involved in every theology and ultimately in all science and philosophy except the crudest dogmatic materialism. And we may find further confirmation of this opinion in the fact that both the metaphysics and the transcendental physics of the past two decades discover

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 1043 b 21 and 991 b 6 ; Ross, i. pp. 192 and 199 ; and *What Plato Said*, p. 584.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Charmides* 158 E, *Phaedo* 96 B, *What Plato Said*, p. 533, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 47-48.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Cratyl.* 440 B-c.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 574.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 586, on *Parmen.* 135 c.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 39, 268, 574.

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more helpful analogies in the Platonic theory of ideas and in Plato's applications of it to the philosophy of nature than they do in any other philosophy of the past.

In disregard of these considerations many critics in every age, and notably Natorp and Stewart in ours, have tried to free Plato from the stigma of paradox or naïveté by trying to show that this uncompromising realism (in the proper medieval sense of the word) is not to be taken seriously, and that it was only a poetic and emphatic form of conceptualism. This, as we have seen, is at the best a half truth. All Platonic ideas are also concepts, but we cannot infer that they were only concepts.<sup>a</sup> For many purposes of logic, ethics and politics Plato practically treats them as concepts. Why not? No reasonable writer obtrudes his ultimate metaphysics into everything. And Plato is always particularly careful to distinguish metaphysical hypotheses and their imaginative embodiments in myth and allegory from the simple truths of a working logic and a practical ethics which are all that he dogmatically affirms.<sup>b</sup> But he always affirms the metaphysical idea when challenged. To this extent Natorp and those who agree with him are right. But they pay too high a price for their rightness on this point when they insist on deducing all Plato's opinions from his ontology, and obtrude the metaphysical idea into passages where the doctrine at the most lends rhetorical and poetical colouring to the practical affirmation of the necessity of concepts and the value of ideals.

<sup>a</sup> See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 30, *What Plato Said*, p. 585, on *Parmen.* 132 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Meno* 81 D-E and *What Plato Said*, p. 515, on *Meno* 86 B.



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An example will perhaps make these distinctions more plain. Plato in the *Republic* (501) says that his philosophic statesman will contemplate the divine pattern of justice as an artist looks away to his model, and that like the artist he will frequently glance from the copy that he is producing to the model and back again to the copy.<sup>a</sup> This may reasonably be understood as only a heightened way of saying that the true statesman must be guided by definite conceptions and strive for the realization of clearly apprehended ideals. The fact that Plato, the metaphysician, believed the transcendental reality of the idea to be a necessary assumption of ultimate epistemology adds nothing to the practical meaning of this passage. When in the *Phaedrus*, however (247 D, 249 B-C), Plato says that every human soul has beheld the idea of justice in pre-natal vision, since otherwise it would not have the power to reduce the confused multiplicity of sensation to the unities of conceptual thought, he is clothing in mythical garb an epistemological argument for the reality of the transcendental idea, and he is not, as in the *Republic* passage, thinking mainly of the explicit affirmation that the true statesman must have submitted to a higher education in conceptual thinking and have thus framed in his mind ideals to guide his practice. The historian of philosophy who, without calling attention to this distinction, merely cites the two passages together in a footnote, only confuses the uncritical reader.

But again in the *Parmenides* (135 A-C), the *Sophist* (246-247), the *Cratylus* (439 D f.; cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 266-267), the *Politicus* (283-284, *What Plato Said*, p. 309), the *Timaeus* (51-52 and *What Plato Said*, p.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 458, on *Euthyphro* 6 E.

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613 on 28 A-B), there are passages in which, without mythical dress, and with no specific reference to the practical value of concepts and ideals, Plato postulates the transcendental ideas as an epistemological necessity, and the only escape from materialism and the flux of relativity. No legerdemain of interpretation or speculations about the chronology of the evolution of Plato's thought can explain away these passages, and the interpreter who realizes that some virtual equivalent of the Platonic idea is still to-day the alternative to thorough-going and unequivocal materialism will not desire to explain them away.

All that is needed in order to understand Plato and to do justice to him as a rational philosopher is to remember again<sup>a</sup> that, though the doctrine of ideas is always in the background of his mind and would always be reaffirmed on a challenge, he is not always thinking explicitly of it when he is speaking of logic, ethics, or politics, and we need not think of it in order to enjoy his art or apprehend his meaning. The transcendental idea, for example, is not needed in the *Republic* except for the characterization of the philosophic mind and the higher education of the Platonic rulers.<sup>b</sup> It is not indispensable even there. The concept will serve. The philosopher is he who can think and reason consecutively in abstractions.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> See *supra*, p. xvi.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and *What Plato Said*, pp. 226-227. It is also used in an intentionally crude form to confirm the banishment of the poets. The poet does not deal in essential truth, he copies the copy of the reality. Cf. *infra*, p. lxii, on 596 A ff. and *What Plato Said*, p. 249. Stenzel's justification of this (*Platon der Erzieher*, p. 175) by the consideration that good joiners' work involves mathematics seems fanciful and is certainly not in Plato's text.

<sup>c</sup> *Supra*, Vol. I. pp. 516 ff.

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The curriculum of the higher education is designed to develop this faculty in those naturally fitted to receive it.<sup>a</sup> The thought and the practical conclusions will not be affected if we treat the accompanying symbolic rhetoric as surplusage. Such statements as that the philosopher is concerned with pure being,<sup>b</sup> dwells in a world of light,<sup>c</sup> is devoted to the most blessed part of reality,<sup>d</sup> satisfies and fills the continent part of his soul,<sup>e</sup> undoubtedly suggest the metaphysical background of Plato's thought and the emotional and imaginative connotations of his ideas. But in the context of the *Republic* they are little more than an expression of the intensity of Plato's feeling about his political and educational ideas.

It is obvious that the concept or idea is in many eloquent Platonic passages an ideal, a type, a pattern, to which aesthetic, moral and social experience may approximate but which they never perfectly realize, just as mathematical conceptions are ideals never actually met with in the world of sense.<sup>f</sup> It is possible, though not probable, that in some of the minor dialogues we get glimpses of a stage of Plato's youthful thought in which, though he already uses, in speaking of the concept or the definition, much of the terminology associated with the doctrine of ideas,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra*, Vol. I. pp. 516-517, 520-521, *What Plato Said*, pp. 233-234.

<sup>b</sup> 477 A ff., 479 E, 484 B, 486 A, 500 B.

<sup>c</sup> 517 B, 518 A, 518 C, 520 D.

<sup>d</sup> 526 E.

<sup>e</sup> *Rep.* 586 B, *Gorg.* 493 B.

<sup>f</sup> *Phaedo* 74 A. For the threefold aspect of the Platonic ideas in metaphysics, logic and aesthetics see my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 27, and T. E. Jessup, "The Metaphysics of Plato," *Journ. of Philos. Studies* (1930), pp. 41-42. See *supra*, Vol. I. pp. 504-505.

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he has not yet consciously and systematically hypostatized the concept.<sup>a</sup> These and similar qualifications and speculative possibilities do not in the least alter the fact that throughout the main body of his work Plato is ready to affirm the metaphysical theory of the hypostatized idea whenever the issue is raised,<sup>b</sup> and there is not an iota of evidence in his own writings that he ever abandoned or altered the doctrine, however much he varied the metaphors and the terms in which he expressed it. It is quite certain that he did not, except in obviously mythical or poetical passages, say more of the ideas than that they exist and that they are in some sense real.<sup>c</sup> He did not say that they are the thoughts of God.<sup>d</sup> There is no indication in his writings that he said that they are numbers.<sup>e</sup>

<sup>a</sup> See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 31, *What Plato Said*, p. 458.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. xvi and xviii.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 28 and p. 29, n. 188.

<sup>d</sup> This Neoplatonic doctrine—based on a misinterpretation of such passages as *Rep.* 597 b f.—was adopted by many Christian fathers and mediaeval scholars. Cf. Alcinous in Hermann, *Plato*, vi. p. 163; Baumgartner, *Philos. des Alanus de Insulis*, p. 54; Zeller ii. 1<sup>4</sup>, p. 664, n. 5; Taylor, *Mediaeval Mind*, ii. pp. 485-486; Webb, *Studies in the Hist. of Nat. Theol.* p. 241; Harris, *Duns Scotus*, ii. p. 195; C. G. Field, *The Origin and Development of Plato's Theory of Ideas*, pp. 21-22; Otto Kluge, *Darstellung u. Beurteilung der Einwendungen des Aristot. gegen die Plat. Ideenlehre*, p. 24.

<sup>e</sup> It is very difficult to argue with those who attribute this doctrine of ideas and numbers to Plato. Sometimes they seem to affirm it only on the authority of Aristotle, which they admit is in most cases hopelessly confused with his statements about Speusippus and Xenocrates and other members of the Academy. Sometimes they seem to admit that the doctrine is not to be found in Plato's extant writings. Sometimes they hint rather than say that certain passages of the *Philebus*

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And he never admitted that they are only thoughts in the human mind,<sup>a</sup> though for practical purposes, as we have said, they may usually be treated as such when no metaphysical issue is involved.

It ought not to be necessary to debate these questions further. The only question open to debate is the extent of Plato's consciousness of what some critics think the modern meanings that I have read into him. The question of course is not whether he

and the *Timaeus* suggest that Plato's mind was working in this direction, though they are usually too cautious now to affirm anything positive about *Philebus* 15-16 D, or *Timaeus* 53 B. I have more than once shown that there is no difficulty in treating numerical ideas precisely like other ideas in their relation to concretes. The number five is to five apples as redness is to red apples. It is present with them. I have repeatedly collected and interpreted the Platonic passages that probably misled uncritical students of the Academy (cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 605, and *infra* on 525 D, 526 A). And the distinction that there is only one idea while there are many numbers of the same kind is quite pointless. There is one idea of redness that is metaphysically or teleologically really present entire in many red things and there is one idea of five or fiveness which is similarly present in many groups of five. There is no more difficulty about the fives that are present as factors in ten, fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five than there is about any other ideas that may mingle with or enter into the definition of another idea. The whole theory is a piece of scholastic hair-splitting to which a sound interpretation of what Plato says lends no support. And there is no space and no need to transcribe here the exhaustive collections of Robin (*La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote*) or Ross's repeated summaries of them in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

If Plato's mind was really working towards such conclusions, why is there no hint of them in his huge work of the *Laws*, or—if we grant them genuine for the sake of the argument—in the *Epistles*?

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Parmen.* 132 B-C, and *What Plato Said*, p. 585, and *ibid.* p. 594 on *Soph.* 250 B, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 30.



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could feel all the associations and connotations of the modern words in which we have to express his meaning, but whether his meaning is on the whole substantially that which I have attributed to him.

The obvious conclusion is that we can infer nothing as to the composition or date of the *Republic* from the fact that the ideas are not mentioned where there is no reason for mentioning them, and that all hypotheses that different stages of the evolution of Plato's thought are indicated by the various aspects in which the ideas are presented when they are mentioned are uncritical.<sup>a</sup> There is no occasion for the metaphysical doctrine of ideas in the first four books. But the general concept, the type, the ideal are referred to in language which could be understood of the ideas. The fact that it does not necessarily have to be so understood is no proof that the doctrine was not present to Plato's mind at the time.

In the fifth, sixth, and seventh books the theory is explicitly enunciated,<sup>b</sup> illustrated by imagery and applied to education. There is even a much disputed but certain anticipation of the later doctrine that while the idea is a unity its relation to things and to other ideas seems to break it up into a plurality.<sup>c</sup>

The uncompromising statement of the subject in the tenth book is sometimes taken to represent an earlier and more naïve form of the doctrine. But the style of the passage is evidently that of a defiant affirmation of the whole length of the paradox, or rather perhaps of an expert explaining the matter to

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 560, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 35 and n. 238.

<sup>b</sup> 476 A f. Cf. Vol. I. pp. 516-517, 505 A ff., 517 B ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 476 A, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 34.

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laymen.<sup>a</sup> The fact that the argument of the third man is distinctly mentioned in the same connexion is in itself evidence that the passage does not represent an earlier and more primitive stage of Plato's thought. For the third man is mentioned in the *Parmenides*.<sup>b</sup> But there would not be much profit in further discussion of hypotheses that have no basis in the text of Plato or in the philosophical probabilities of the case.

All that has been said of the ideas in general applies to the idea of good. It is the hypostatization of the concept "good." Its significance in the Platonic system is that of its importance in human thought. In ethics it is what modern ethical philosophy calls the sanction. In politics it is the ideal, whatever it may be, of social welfare. In theology and the philosophy of nature it is the teleological principle, the design that implies a designing mind in the universe.

The Idea of Good.

The first of these meanings is predominant in the minor dialogues where all problems and all attempted definitions point to an unknown good so consistently and systematically that Plato must have been aware of the reference.<sup>c</sup> The second meaning is most prominent in the *Republic*, but there is explicit reference to the first and to the discussions of the minor dialogues. In any case, ethical and social good are not sharply separable in Plato.

The idea of good is nowhere defined, but its supreme importance and all of its meanings are symbolized in the images of the sun and the cave. Its main mean-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 597 A ὡς γ' ἂν δόξειε τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιοῦσδε λόγους διατρίβουσιν.

<sup>b</sup> 132 E-133 A. Cf. *infra* on 597 c.

<sup>c</sup> See *What Plato Said*, pp. 71-73, with marginal references there.

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ing for the *Republic* is the ideal of social welfare on which the statesman, as opposed to the opportunist politician, must fix his eye, and which he can apprehend only by a long course of higher education which will enable him to grasp it. Plato rightly feels that no other definition is possible or desirable unless the entire polity of the *Republic* was to be taken as its definition. The *Timaeus* is the poetical embodiment of the third meaning, though single phrases of the *Republic* glance at it.<sup>a</sup> If there is a beneficent creator, his purpose, his idea of good, is the chief cause of the existence of the world and the best key to the understanding of it.

I am not attributing these three meanings of the good to Plato by an imposed symmetry of my own. It is what Plato himself says and the chief problem of my interpretation is not to understand Plato but to account for the failure to recognize his plain meaning.

In view of my repeated expositions of Plato's doctrine of the idea of good there would be little point in attempting here once more to set it forth in a smooth, consecutive, literary statement.<sup>b</sup> It will be more to my purpose to enumerate in the briefest, baldest, most explicit fashion some of my reasons for feeling that I have been misunderstood, and that the definite issues raised by my arguments have never

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra*, pp. xxv and 102.

<sup>b</sup> See my paper, "The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic," *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. i. (1895), pp. 188-239; my article, "Summum Bonum," in *Hastings' Encycl. of Relig. and Ethics*, vol. xii. pp. 44-48; my review of Jowett and Campbell's *Republic*, *The Nation*, 61, 1895, pp. 83-84; *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 17 and n. 94; *What Plato Said*, pp. 71-72, 230 ff., 534 on *Phaedo* 99 A.



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been met. I have never intended to deny that Plato's language about the idea of good is in large part the language of poetry and religion, that he intends to suggest by it the ineffable and infinite unknowable beyond our ken, and that his eloquence has been a source of inspiration to many readers who care little for his dialectics and for the critical interpretation of his specific thought. What I have been trying to say is that the mere repetition of Plato's rhetoric or the attempt to better it in our own paraphrases will not contribute much to the interpretation of the precise meaning of the passages of the *Republic* in question, assuming that in addition to their inspirational value they are intended to convey some definite meaning and are not merely ejaculations thrown out at an infinite object.

In the first place, then, since all Platonic ideas are hypostatized concepts the hypostatization of the idea of good is presumably irrelevant to its main significance for the ethical and political thought of the *Republic*. It does, of course, suggest the metaphysical background of Plato's thought; there are a few sentences in which it involves the goodness which teleologists discover in the structure of the universe and in the designs of its creator, the theme of the *Timaeus*;<sup>a</sup> and since goodness is the chief attribute of God in religious literature from the New Testament to Whittier's hymn, there is a certain plausibility in identifying it with God himself. But the text of Plato, and especially the text of the *Republic*, does not justify any of these extensions of the idea if taken absolutely. The idea of good is undoubtedly the most important of ideas, but it is

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 508 B and 509 B; Zeller ii. 1<sup>4</sup>, pp. 687-688.

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not true that it is the most comprehensive in the sense that all other ideas are deduced from it,<sup>a</sup> as in some Platonizing pantheistic philosophies they are deduced from the idea of Being. There is no hint of such deduction in Plato's writings. It is only teleological ideas in ethics, politics and cosmogony that are referred to the idea of good as the common generalization or idea that includes them all. Even the ideas are not in Plato's own reasoning deduced from the idea of good. It is merely said that a scientific moralist, a true statesman, will be able so to deduce them, and that the higher education is designed to give him this ability. In *Republic* 534 b-c, the dialectician is he who is able *ἐκάστου . . . λόγον . . . διδόναι* and the idea of good is a special example of the *ἐκάστων*. It is not said that the man who does not know the idea of good does not know any other idea, but that he does not know *ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν*.

It is not even true that Plato's philosophic ethics is deduced from the idea of good. He only says that the ethics of the guardians will be so deduced. So far as Plato himself expounds a scientific ethics it rests on the preferability of the intellectual life and the comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of sense.<sup>b</sup> The idea of good in the dialogues is a regulative not a substantive concept.

Whatever its religious suggestions it cannot in any metaphysical or literal sense be identified with the Deity.<sup>c</sup> The idea of God was taken by Plato

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my review of Paul Hinneberg, *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, *Class. Phil.* vi. p. 108.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 24, and *infra*, pp. lvi f.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. my *Idea of Good*, pp. 188-189, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 94, *What Plato Said*, p. 231.

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from the religion of the Greek people and purified by criticism. The idea of good came to him on an altogether different line of thought. It is the outcome of those Socratic quests for definitions of ethical virtues and social ends which always break down because the interlocutors are never able to discover the sanction which makes the proposed virtue or end a good and desirable thing.<sup>a</sup>

When these misapprehensions are cleared away I trust that I shall not any longer be misunderstood if I say that the chief and essential meaning of the idea of good in the *Republic* is "precisely" that conception of an ultimate sanction for ethics and politics which the minor dialogues sought in vain. Plato does not profess to have discovered it in the *Republic* except so far as it is implied in the entire ethical, social and political ideals of his reformed state. He intentionally and wisely refuses to define it in a formula.<sup>b</sup> He merely affirms that it is something which can be apprehended only by those who have received the training and the discipline of his higher education.

<sup>a</sup> For the idea of good and God cf. also V. Brochard, "Les Mythes dans la philos. de Platon," *L'Année Philos.*, 1900, p. 11; Pierre Bovet, *Le Dieu de Platon*, Paris, 1902, p. 177; Raeder, *Platos philosophische Entwicklung*, pp. 237, 381 f.; Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 1<sup>a</sup>, p. 718, n. 1, pp. 667, 694, 707 ff.; *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics* (Eng. tr.), ii. p. 327; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iii. pp. 85 and 211; Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, ii. p. 126; Gustave Schneider, *Die plat. Metaphysik*, p. 109; Taylor, *Plato*, pp. 85-89; Adam, *The Vitality of Platonism*, pp. 22 and 132; *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp. 442 f., with my review in *Philos. Rev.* vol. 18, pp. 62-63; Apelt, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philos.*, Vorrede, p. vi.; H. Tietzel, *Die Idee des Guten in Platons Staat und der Gottesbegriff*, Progr. Wetzlar, 1894.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *infra* on 506 E, p. 95, note f.

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The consummation of this education is characterized briefly and soberly as a vision, just as in the *Symposium* the long ascent of the scale of beauty culminates in a vision which alone makes life worth living.<sup>a</sup> This language expresses the intensity of Plato's feeling about the intellectual life and his own ethical and social ideals, but it does not make him a visionary or a mystic in the ordinary sense of the words.

If the interpretation here outlined is in itself a rational sequence of thought and makes sense of what Plato says, it surely creates a presumption which cannot be rebutted by evading issues and charging me with insensibility to Plato's deeper religious and mystic meanings. It can be refuted only by giving specific answers to specific arguments and testing them by the texts. The interpretation of the images, symbols, allegories (the synonym does not matter) of the sun, the divided line and the cave, provides the chief test, as the too literal acceptance of them is perhaps the main cause of misunderstanding.

The aptness of the sun as a symbol of Plato's idea of good might be illustrated by many quotations from modern poetry and from the literature of sun-worship.<sup>b</sup> It would be interesting to compare what Plato says of the sun as the primal source of light, heat, life, growth, all things, with the language of modern science. Herbert Spencer, for example, innocently says (*First Principles of a New System of Philos.*, 1865, Amer. ed. p. 454): "Until I recently

<sup>a</sup> *Rep.* 516 B, 517 B-C, *Symp.* 210 B ff. Cf. *Rep.* 500 B-C.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *infra*, pp. 100-101, on 508 A.

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consulted his *Outlines of Astronomy* on another question I was not aware that so far back as 1833 Sir John Herschel had enunciated the doctrine that 'the sun's rays are the ultimate source of almost every motion which takes place on the surface of the earth.'" Another line of illustration would lead through the Latin poet Manilius and Plotinus to Goethe's "Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft."<sup>a</sup> This thought might be extended to include modern debates on the nice preadjustment of the eye to its function of vision. Does it, or does it not, imply a creator and a design? Lastly, Plato's statement that, as the sun is the source of light, but is not itself light (508 B), so the idea of good is not knowledge or being but the cause of both and something that is beyond and transcends being—this superhuman hyperbole (509 B-C) is the source of all so-called negative theologies and transcendental metaphysics from Philo and Plotinus to the present day.

But our present concern is not with these things but with the direct evidence that the idea of good is essentially for the interpretation of the *Republic* what modern ethical theory calls the sanction. One sentence I admit seems to identify the idea of good with God. The sun, it is said, is that which the Good created in the visible world to be its symbol and analogue. This would seem to identify the idea of good with the Demiurgos of the *Timaeus*, who is both the supreme God and a personification of the idea of good or the principle of teleology in nature. But we have already seen that it is uncritical to press Plato's language about God, a word which he accepts from traditional religion and employs as

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 101, note c, on 508 B.



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freely for edification and the rejection of militant atheism as Matthew Arnold does. Moreover, there are other sentences in this part of the *Republic* which, if pressed, are irreconcilable with the identification of the idea of good with God. In any case, apart from one or two sentences of vague and disputable meaning, the acceptance of the idea of good as the sanction more nearly lends an intelligible and reasonable meaning to everything that Plato says than does any other interpretation. On this view, then, I repeat, the idea of good is simply the hypostatization of what the idea of good means for common sense in modern usage. It is the good purpose in some mind able to execute its purposes. It is what such a mind conceives to be the supreme end to which all other ends are subordinated and referred.

The divided line and the cave are also images and symbols employed to bring out certain other aspects of the theory of ideas and of the idea of good in particular. The main object common to both is to put the thought "Alles vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis" into a proportion. The four terms of such a proportion may be secured either by invention or by forcing special meanings on some of the terms. In the case of the cave, the cave itself, the fettered prisoners, the fire and the apparatus by which the shadows of graven images are cast on the wall of the cave are clearly inventions. There is a real analogy between the release of the prisoners with their ascent to the light of day (515 c ff.) and the Socratic *elenchus* which releases the mind and draws it up from a world of sense to the world of thought (517 B-C). But it is obvious that all the details of the imagery cannot be pressed and that we need not ask too curiously to

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what in Plato's serious thought every touch that fills out the picture corresponds.

On my interpretation critics have likewise erred by refusing to admit a similar qualification of their too literal acceptance of the image of the divided line. The proportion : ideas are to things as things are to their reflections in mirrors or in water, has only three terms. The fourth term is found in mathematical ideas, which in their use in education and in respect of the method by which the mind deals with them are in some sort intermediate between ideas and things. We thus get our proportion. But in the description of it Plato is careful to distinguish the mathematical ideas only by the method of their treatment in science, not in dialectics, and not as entities of another kind. This raises the presumption that Plato, as usual, knows what he is doing and does not intend to distinguish objectively mathematical ideas *as ideas* from other ideas. I support this presumption by pointing out that in the later and final interpretation of the line Plato names the objective correlates of the mental processes corresponding to three divisions of the line but omits the fourth on the pretext that it would take too long. (*Cf.* on 534 A.) He names the mathematical attitude of mind or method but does not name its objects as something distinct from ideas or a distinct kind of ideas. I go on to show that there is no evidence in the Platonic writings for the doctrine that mathematical ideas differ in themselves from other concepts, and that the testimony of Aristotle is too confused to prove anything.<sup>a</sup> These assumptions raise a definite issue which can only be met by equally definite arguments. Instead of that

<sup>a</sup> *Cf. supra*, pp. xx-xxi, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 82 f.

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critics rebuke me for attributing insincerity to Plato, or at the best they ask, How could Aristotle be mistaken?

Plato himself regards all literature except dialectics as a form of play and much that passes for dialectics as conscious or unconscious jesting. Whenever he himself employs imagery, symbolism and myth or an eristic dialectic he is careful to warn us that it is not to be taken too literally or seriously,<sup>a</sup> and he usually points out just how much of his apparent conclusions it is necessary to accept for the carrying on of the argument. Now the particular synonyms I employ to describe this characteristic trait of Plato's method and style are obviously irrelevant to my main argument. Yet if in view of the frequency of the idea and word *παίξειν* in Plato I express the thought that the intermediate place of mathematical ideas in the proportion of the divided line is not to be taken literally and add that the ambiguous coinage *εἰκασία*, or conjecture, is a term of disparagement playfully thrown in to secure symmetry of subdivision in the two worlds and to suggest a depth below the lowest depth,<sup>b</sup> I am sternly told that "It is surely a strange reading of the character of Plato as a seeker after truth to maintain that in the very heart of his greatest work and at the very core of the problem of knowledge he should disturb and confuse those who are seeking to understand his doctrine with a little wholly uncalled-for 'playfulness,' even though it should be for the sake of 'symmetry.'"<sup>c</sup> Now I am quite willing to sub-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* on 539 c, p. 227, note d.

<sup>b</sup> *Idea of Good*, p. 229.

<sup>c</sup> H. J. Paton, *Plato's Theory of EIKASIA*, Aristotelian Society, 1922, p. 69.



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stitute some other expression for "playfully thrown in." But my precise expression, I repeat, is not the point. Plato in fact does here, as elsewhere, resort to artificial constructions and inventions in order to express the relation between the ideas and what we call realities by proportion. The *εἰκόνες* and *εἰκασία* are in fact introduced here to complete the symmetry of such a proportion and to suggest ironical disparagement of the inferior type of thought. They contribute nothing further to the solution of the "problem of knowledge." To recognize this plain fact is not to impugn the character of Plato, and to rebuke my frivolity with solemn eloquence is no answer to my argument. Plato himself never thinks it incompatible with a serious search for truth to mingle jest with earnest and seriousness with irony.

Similarly of the *ἀνυπόθετον* (510 B). It obviously suggests to modern interpreters the metaphysical first principle, the Unconditioned, the absolute ground, the *noumenon*, call it what you will. Plato himself may have been willing to let the word convey such overtones, and those who are not interested in his precise meanings may stop there and cry with Rousseau, "O Mighty Being!" But it is also equally obvious that the *ἀνυπόθετον* has a definite and less purely emotional meaning in its context. It expresses Plato's distinction between the man of science, who starts from assumptions that he does not allow to be questioned (510 C-D), and the philosopher or Platonic dialectician, who is able and willing to carry the discussion back, not necessarily always to a metaphysical first principle, but at least to a proposition on which both parties to the argument agree and which therefore is not arbitrarily assumed as an hypothesis

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by the questioner. This meaning could be illustrated by the *Crito*, in which it is said that all discussion is vain without such a starting-point of agreement.<sup>a</sup> It is the essential meaning of the passage in the *Phaedo* (101 D-E), where *ἰκανόν*, the adequate, the sufficient, is for all practical purposes a virtual synonym of the *ἀνυπόθετον*, though it does not suggest the possible metaphysical connotations of the word.

Now this distinction between dialectics or philosophy and the sciences is repeatedly borrowed by Aristotle<sup>b</sup> and even retains much of its validity under the changed conditions of modern thought. There will always be these two ways of thinking and these two types of mind. The passage, then, makes good sense so interpreted and lends a rational meaning to the *ἀνυπόθετον* without denying the mystic overtones which are all that seem to interest some interpreters of Plato.

To return to the political and social idea of good. Plato's conception of ultimate good in this sense must be gathered from his writings as a whole. Neither in the *Republic* nor elsewhere does he commit himself to a defining formula of social welfare. It is enough for his purpose to emphasize the distinction between the statesman and the politician and describe the education and the way of life that will produce the statesman and develop in him the ideals and the unity of purpose that distinguish him. But it would not be difficult to gather Plato's general conception of political and social good from the *Republic* and the *Laws* and certain passages of the *Gorgias* and *Politicus*. The true statesman's chief aim will be not

<sup>a</sup> *Crito* 49 D, *infra*, p. 175, note c, on 527 E.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf. infra*, p. 111.

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wealth and power and amusements, but the virtue of the citizens.<sup>a</sup> A sober disciplined life is preferable to the unlimited license and expansiveness of an imperialistic and decadent democracy. The statesman's chief instruments for realizing his ideals will be the control of education and what to-day is called eugenics.<sup>b</sup>

Is this plain common sense, then, all that is meant by Plato's idealistic eloquence and the imagery of the sun, the divided line and the cave? I never meant to say that it is all, but it is the central core of meaning without which Plato's transcendentalism is only a rhapsody of words. If nature is more than mechanism, if there is a God, as Plato himself believes and believes indispensable to morality and social order, his purposes, his idea of good, or, metaphysically or mythologically speaking, the idea of good which he contemplates as a pattern,<sup>c</sup> becomes the first and chief cause of the ordered world, and such understanding of his purposes as is possible for us is a better explanation of things than the material instruments that serve his ends.<sup>d</sup> This is the type of explanation that the Socrates of the *Phaedo* desires but cannot discover and that the *Timaeus* ventures to present only in mythical and poetical form.<sup>e</sup> It has little place in the *Republic*, though we may suppose it to be in the background of Plato's mind and to be suggested by his allegories. The idea of good in

<sup>a</sup> *Gorg.* 513 E, 517 B-C, 504 D-E, *Laws* 705 D-E, 693 B-C, 770 D, 962 D, 963 A.

<sup>b</sup> *Polit.* 309-310, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 62, n. 481; *Laws* and *Rep.* *passim*.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf. What Plato Said*, p. 613 on *Tim.* 28 A-B.

<sup>d</sup> *Cf. What Plato Said*, pp. 329, 346-347.

<sup>e</sup> *Cf. my Idea of Good*, p. 232.

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this sense, like the heat and light of the sun, is both the cause of the things we think "real" and the condition of our apprehension and understanding of them. It is not the substance of things; it is not their "being," but something apart from and transcending "being" in the ordinary sense of the word (509 B). But the allegory and the transcendental language apply equally well to the ethical and political ideas which are the chief theme of the *Republic*, and it is not necessary to look further. The cause of any political or social institution is the purpose or idea of good in some controlling mind, and, as Coleridge said and Mill repeated after him, the best way to understand any human institution or contrivance is to appreciate that purpose. That will throw a flood of light on everything.<sup>a</sup>

I have never meant to deny the mystic and metaphysical suggestions of Plato's language. I have merely tried to bring out the residuum of practical and intelligible meaning for the political and ethical philosophy of the *Republic*. It is a meaning that is still true to-day, and it is the only interpretation that makes intelligible sense of what Plato says. That surely creates a presumption which can be met only by definite arguments.

Whatever the more remote suggestions of the idea of good for general or ethical philosophy, this its simple practical meaning for the *Republic* is clearly indicated by Plato himself. It symbolizes the distinction between the ideal statesman and the politician of decadent Athens and marks the purpose and goal of all the studies of the Platonic higher education. The guardians have already received in a purified

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my *Idea of Good*, p. 227.

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form the normal Greek education in gymnastics and "music," described in the *Protagoras*, 325 c ff., and virtually repeated in the education prescribed for the entire citizenship in the *Laws*. The product of this Platonic elementary and secondary education would be a band of healthy, wholesome, sunburnt boys and girls, who, in Ruskin's phrase, "have had all the nonsense boxed and raced and spun out of them." They would have dipped into fewer books than our graduates, but they would know a few of the world's greatest books by heart, they would have no theory of art or sentimentality about it, but their taste would have been refined, almost to infallibility, by hearing only the best music and seeing only the best statues. They would have heard of fewer things but would know what they *did* know perfectly. They would have never studied a text-book of civics, ethics, or "sociology," but the essential principles of obedience, patriotism, modesty, order, temperance, good manners, would have been so instilled into them that the possibility of violating them would hardly occur to their minds. They would not only be strong and healthy, but through gymnastics, choral singing and dancing, and military drill, would have acquired the mastery of their bodies and a dignified and graceful bearing.

But already in the age of the sophists Athens had become too sophisticated for her ambitious youth to remain content with this simple old Greek education however reformed and idealized. There was a demand for a higher university education, which was met first by the sophists, and then in the next generation by Plato himself and his great rival, the orator Isocrates, who conducted academies side by



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side in Athens for forty years. The content of this higher education is given in every age by the knowledge of that age. What else can it be? These Greek teachers did not offer "electives" in the chemistry of the carbon compounds, or the origin of Shintoism in Japan, or the evolution of the English novel from *Tom Jones* to *Ulysses*, for the simple reason that these interesting branches of study had not yet been developed. The sophists taught a practical theory of politics and business and the new art of rhetoric, promising to make their pupils effective speakers and shrewd men of affairs.<sup>a</sup> The publicist Isocrates taught what he knew, the application of this sophistic doctrine to the composition of more serious political and ethical essays. Plato taught what we should call ethics, sociology and philosophy, but what he called dialectics—the closely reasoned argumentative discussion of problems of ethics, politics, social life, philosophy and religion.

But with wider experience Plato came to feel that the "Socratic method" of plunging mere lads directly into these difficult questions was unwise. It was doubtless stimulating; but it unsettled their moral faith, confused their minds, and converted them into pert and precocious disputants.<sup>b</sup> Dialectics demanded a preparatory training in some simpler methods of close, consecutive, abstract thinking. This preparation Plato found in the new sciences of arithmetic and geometry and in the sciences which he was among the first to constitute or predict—the sciences of mathematical astronomy,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 318-319, *Gorg.* 452 E, 456-457.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 220, note a, on 537 D ff.

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physics, and acoustics.<sup>a</sup> By these studies the youthful mind could be gradually lifted out of the region of loose pictorial thinking, habituated to the thin pure air of abstractions, taught the essential nature of definitions, axioms, principles, and rules of logic, and made capable of following with continuous attention long trains of reasoning. We value mathematics and the exact sciences largely for their practical applications.<sup>b</sup> In the *Republic* Plato prized them as the indispensable preparation for equally severe abstract thinking about the more complex and difficult problems of life, morals and society.<sup>c</sup> In his *Republic* he combines this idea drawn from the practice of his own school with his fundamental political and social ideal, the government of mankind by the really wise, and not by the politicians who happen to get the votes. We need not stop to ask whether a Utopia designed for a small Greek city is applicable to a democracy of 120 millions inhabiting a territory of three million square miles. We are concerned with the ideal and its embodiment in a theory of education.

The Platonic rulers are chosen by a process of progressive selection through ever higher educational tests applied to young men and women who have stood most successfully the tests of the lower education.<sup>d</sup> Through arithmetic, geometry, and astro-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. notes on Book vii. 521 ff., esp. on 521 c, 523 A, 527 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 525 c.

<sup>c</sup> Herbert Spencer speaks of "Social science . . . the science standing above all others in subtlety and complexity; the science which the highest intelligence alone can master . . ." —the science now taught to undergraduates who have not received the Platonic preparation.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 537 A, B, D.



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nomiy, mechanics and acoustics, so far as these admit of mathematical treatment, they are led up to the final test in ethics and sociology, which is not speech-making or slumming, or the running of university settlements, but the power of close, exact, consecutive reasoning about complex moral phenomena. It must not be forgotten, however, that this theoretical discipline is supplemented by many years of practical experience in minor offices of administration.<sup>a</sup>

The consummation of it all is described poetically as the "vision of the idea of good" (540 A)—which, however, as we have seen, turns out to mean for all practical purposes the apprehension of some rational unified conception of the social aim and human well-being, and the consistent relating of all particular beliefs and measures to that ideal—a thing which can be achieved only by the most highly disciplined intelligence. For in Plato's time as in ours the opinions of the average man are not so unified and connected, but jostle one another in hopeless confusion in his brain. Plato's conception of the higher education, then, may be summed up in a sentence: "Until a man is able to abstract and define rationally his idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections and is ready to meet them, not by appeals to opinion but to absolute truth, never faltering at any stage of the argument—unless he can do all this he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good. He apprehends only a shadow of opinion, not true and real knowledge."<sup>b</sup>

Starting from the sound psychological principle that the old-fashioned rote recitation of a text-book

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 539 E-540 A.

<sup>b</sup> See *Rep.* 534 B-C and notes.

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is an abomination, that verbal knowledge is no knowledge, that the concrete must precede the abstract, that we must visualize before we theorize, and apprehend objects before we analyse relations, we have in practice abandoned altogether the attempt to teach young people hard consecutive abstract thinking. We scorn to drill them in the old-fashioned studies that developed this power, such as grammatical analysis, "parsing," puzzling problems in arithmetic, algebra, or mechanics, elementary logic,—mental science, as it was called,—and the exact, if incomplete, methods of the orthodox political economy; and instead of this we encourage them to have and express opinions about large and vague questions of literary criticism, aesthetics, ethics and social reform. A true apprehension of Plato's ideal of education would not swing the pendulum back again to the other extreme, but it would help us to realize that no multiplication of entertaining knowledge, and no refinements of the new psychology, can alter the fact that all instruction is wasted on a flabby mind, and that true education, while it will not neglect entertainment, useful knowledge, and the training of the eye and hand, will always consist largely in the development of firm, hard, intellectual muscle. The studies best adapted to this end will always retain a value independent of practical utility or superficial attractiveness; for to change the figure and adapt Plato's own language: By such studies the eye of the mind, more precious than a thousand bodily eyes, is purged and quickened and made more keen for whatever truth higher education or life or business may present to it (527 D-E).

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Plato's own account of the curriculum of his higher education ought to be a sufficient answer to the charge that in the training of his guardians he manifests an anti-scientific spirit. It is only by wresting phrases from their context and refusing to make allowances for the quality of Plato's rhetoric that the imputation of hostility to modern experimental science can be fastened upon him.<sup>a</sup> As I have shown elsewhere<sup>b</sup> and point out again in the notes, Plato is (1) using scientific studies to develop the faculty of abstract reasoning; (2) incidentally predicting the mathematical astronomy and physics of the future.<sup>c</sup> Both purposes tempt him to hammer his main point with Emersonian emphasis and to surprise attention with Ruskinian *boutades* in order to mark more clearly the distinction between himself and contemporary empiricists. Hence his satire of the substitution of experiment for mathematics in acoustics (531 A-B), and the intentional epigrammatic extravagance of his "leave the stars alone" (530 B). It is uncritical to quote these sentences apart from their entire context and treat them as if they were a deliberate and systematic attack on modern experimental science.

The Four  
Polities.

The description of the four degenerate types of state in the eighth book relieves the strain of dialectics and the tedium of continuous argument by one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato. Macaulay says it is ". . . beyond all criticism. I

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 529 A, 530 B.

<sup>b</sup> "Platonism and the History of Science," *Am. Philos. Soc. Proc.* lxvi. pp. 171 f., *What Plato Said*, pp. 235-236

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 530 B.

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remember nothing in Greek philosophy superior to this in profundity, ingenuity and eloquence." It serves further to lead up to the embodiment in the tyrant of the analogical argument that the unhappiness of the worst man matches the misery of the worst state. The objections to the book or to its place in the economy of the *Republic* raised by Aristotle and others are mostly captious irrelevances.<sup>a</sup>

The transition from the ideal state is resumed at the point where it was interrupted at the beginning of the fifth book,<sup>b</sup> and it is pretended that Books V., VI. and VII. are a digression, though they are obviously an indispensable part of the *Republic*.<sup>c</sup> Matter-of-fact critics have argued that an ideal or perfect state would contain within itself no seeds of destruction and could not decay. But as Plato himself said, the philosophic state is a pattern or ideal which retains its value even if imperfectly realized.<sup>d</sup> It is a fundamental Platonic principle that only the divine is eternal and unchangeable.<sup>e</sup> All created and material things are subject to change. The universe itself is only as good as the Demiurgos was able to make it, and the created gods are preserved from destruction only by his sustaining will.<sup>f</sup>

The riddle of the "nuptial" number that deter-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1316 a 1 f. ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς, which is rather cool after all his borrowings from *Rep.* viii. in the preceding pages. And in 1286 b 15 ff. he seems to accept the development of *Rep.* viii. See also Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon*, p. 42.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Vol. I. on 449 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. xvi, *What Plato Said*, p. 225.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. on 499 D and *What Plato Said*, p. 564.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 207-208, *Rep.* vii. on the heavens, 530 B.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 37 D, 41 C-D, *What Plato Said*, p. 335.

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mines the beginning of the decline has never been solved to the satisfaction of a majority of competent critics. The solution would contribute something to our knowledge of early Greek mathematical terminology but nothing to our understanding of Plato's thought. Emerson's definitive word about it is, "He (Plato) sometimes throws a little mathematical dust into our eyes." The "meaning" of the number is simply Burke's statement (iv. p. 312) in *Regicide Peace*, p. 2, "I doubt whether the history of mankind is yet complete enough, if ever it can be so, to furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal causes which necessarily affect the fortune of a state."<sup>a</sup> But though the ultimate causes of de-

<sup>a</sup> For Aristotle's opinion *cf.* *Pol.* 1316 a 5 ff. For discussions of the number *cf.* Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 1<sup>4</sup>, pp. 857-860; Jowett's translation of the *Republic* (1888), pp. cxxx ff.; Adam, *Republic*, vol. ii. pp. 264-312; Ueberweg-Pracchter, *Philos. des Altertums* (1926), 94\* ff.; Paul Tannery, "Le Nombre Nuptial dans Platon," *Rev. Philos.* i., 1876, pp. 170-188; Georg Albert, *Die platonische Zahl*, Wien, 1896, and "Der Sinn der plat. Zahl," *Philologus*, vol. 66 (1907), pp. 153-156; J. Dupuis, "Le Nombre Géométrique de Platon," *Annuaire de l'Assoc. des Ét. grecques*, vol. 18, pp. 218-255; Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon*, pp. 47-48. *Cf.* also Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iii. p. 336, C. Ritter, *Platons Stellung zu den Aufgaben der Naturwissenschaft*, pp. 91-94; Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 108; G. Kafka in *Philologus* 73, pp. 109-121; D. B. Monro in *Class. Rev.* vi. (1892) pp. 152-156; and Adam, *ibid.* pp. 240-244, and xvi. pp. 17-23; Fr. Hulstsch in *Phil. Woch.* xii. (1892) pp. 1256-1258. *Cf.* further Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 25 "It is to be observed that Plato's 'perfect year' is also 36,000 solar years (Adam's *Republic*, vol. ii. p. 302), and that it is probably connected with the precession of the equinoxes"; Carl Vering, *Platons Staat*, p. 167 "Den Biologen wird die Zahlenmystik Platons an die Mendelschen Vererbungstabellen erinnern, durch welche die geniale Ahnung Platons, dass es zahlenmässig darstellbare Vererbungsgesetze geben

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generation escape our ken, Plato mentions a practical point that is of considerable significance to-day. Revolutions are due to the divisions and discords of the dominant and educated classes.<sup>a</sup> The allegory of the four metals is kept up. The decline begins when the rulers no longer breed true and the gold is mixed with base alloy.<sup>b</sup>

The limitation of the degenerate types of state to four is conscious and artistic. It should not be used to prove Plato's impatience of facts. There are endless minor varieties of social and political structure among the barbarians (544 c-d). Plato leaves it to Aristotle and the political and social science departments of the American universities to collect them.<sup>c</sup> The sequence, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny does not always reproduce the actual history of cities of Greece, but it anticipates many of the vicissitudes of modern history more suggestively than Aristotle's laborious collection of instances.<sup>d</sup> Plato occasionally forgets himself or lets himself go in contemporary satire or allusion that points to Athens

müsse, nach mehr als 2000 Jahren ihre wissenschaftliche Rechtfertigung gefunden hat." Cf. Baudrillart, *J. Bodin et son temps*, p. 360 ". . . A tout cela Bodin ajoute des calculs cabalistiques sur la durée des empires, sur le nombre nuptial . . ."

<sup>a</sup> *Rep.* 545 D, *Laws* 683 E, 682 D-E, *Class. Phil.* xvii. pp. 154-155. Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1305 a 39.

<sup>b</sup> 547 B. Cf. 415 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> Aristotle says that there are not only more kinds of government than these, but there are many sub-species of each. Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* vi., 1288 ff., 1279 b, 1229 a 8, 1289 a 8, Newman, vol. i. pp. 494 ff., and also *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 62-63.

<sup>d</sup> The case of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon is one of the most outstanding examples.

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rather than to any one of his four or five types.<sup>a</sup> But the consistency of his hypothesis is sufficiently maintained to satisfy any reasonable reader. The individual types corresponding to the four political patterns are the earliest and among the best systematic character-sketches in extant European literature and may be counted among the sources of the *Characters* of Theophrastus and their successors.<sup>b</sup>

The Ethical  
Argument.

Book IX. sums up and concludes the main ethical argument of the *Republic*. This is not the place for a systematic exposition of the Platonic ethics. Ethical philosophy as distinguished from exhortation and the code can always be stated in the form of a discussion of the validity of the moral law and the motives for obedience to it, in other words, the quest for the sanction.<sup>c</sup> But this mode of statement is especially suited to ages of so-called enlightenment and transition when the very existence of a moral law or its binding force is challenged, whether scriously or as an intellectual game.

Such in Plato's opinion was the age in which he lived. The main drift of the speculations of the pre-Socratic philosophers had been in the direction of materialism if not exactly atheism.<sup>d</sup> The populariza-

<sup>a</sup> Cf., e.g., 549 c and 553 A with Adam's notes, 551 B, 556 E, 562 D, 563 c, 565 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. also Matthew Arnold's description of the Barbarians and the Philistines in *Culture and Anarchy*.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Mill, *Diss. and Disc.* iii. p. 300 "The question concerning the *summum bonum* or what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality," etc.

<sup>d</sup> This has recently been denied. But the essential truth of the generalization is not appreciably affected by a few fragments whose religious, ethical and spiritual purpose is doubtful.



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tion of these ideas by the so-called sophists and their application to education, morals, politics and criticism of life had further tended to do away with all traditional moral and religious checks upon instinct and individualism. And the embittered class conflicts and the long demoralization of the thirty years' war had completed the work of moral and spiritual disintegration.<sup>a</sup> The Greeks had lost their old standards and had acquired no new, more philosophic, principles to take their place.<sup>b</sup> Plato's ears were dinned, he said, by the negations of materialists, atheists, relativists, and immoralists.<sup>c</sup> How to answer them was the chief problem of his ethical philosophy. To satirize these immoralists or to depict their defeat in argument was one of the main motives of his dramatic art.<sup>d</sup>

The evidence in support of Plato's interpretation of contemporary Greek life and thought has been repeatedly collected from Aristophanes, Euripides, and Thucydides, the fragments of the sophists and the pre-Socratics and Plato's own writings.<sup>e</sup> This conservative view of the Greek "enlightenment" has in turn often been challenged by modern historians of liberal or radical tendencies, a Grote, a

<sup>a</sup> See T. R. Glover, *Democracy in the Ancient World*, pp. 75-77; *supra*, Vol. I. p. xxxvi; *What Plato Said*, pp. 6, 141-142.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 538 c-e.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 358 c, *Protag.* 333 c, *Euthydem.* 279 b, *Phileb.* 66 e, *Gorg.* 470 d, *Laws* 662 c, 835 d, *Soph.* 265 c, *Phaedo* 92 d.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 527 a-b, *Rep.* i., *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 25.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 503, on *Gorg.* 461 c, for references, and *ibid.* pp. 137, 145, 215 ff., 392-393, also W. Jaeger, "Die griechische Staatsethik im Zeitalter des Platon," *Die Antike*, Bd. x. Heft 1, esp. p. 8.

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Mill, a Gomperz, and their followers.<sup>a</sup> The interpreter of the *Republic* need only note the sincerity and intensity of Plato's conviction and its effect upon the form of his presentation of ethics.

A complete study of the Platonic ethics would incorporate many other ideas drawn from the *Protagoras*, the *Philebus*, the *Laws*, the minor Socratic dialogues, and perhaps from the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*.<sup>b</sup> But the two chief ethical dialogues, the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, are cast in the form of an answer to dogmatic and unabashed ethical nihilism. What is to be said to an uncompromising immoralist? Is it possible to convince him, or failing that, to refute or seem to refute him to the edification of the bystander?<sup>c</sup> The serious aim of both *Gorgias* and *Republic* is to convince and refute, but there are parts of the *Gorgias* and of the first book of the *Republic* in which the chief dramatic purpose is the exhibition of Socrates' superiority in argument to the sceptic.

Many commentators ancient and modern object that Plato has not proved his case. They are not necessarily such immoralists as Plato had in mind. Such moralists as Grote, Mill and Leslie Stephen say that all men of goodwill would like to believe in the identity of virtue and happiness, but that the facts of experience are against it.<sup>d</sup> It is at best a general

<sup>a</sup> Cf., e.g., *Greek Thinkers*, vol. i. ch. iv., esp. pp. 403-411.

<sup>b</sup> See *International Journal of Ethics*, Jan. 1929, pp. 232-233; *What Plato Said*, pp. 317, and 364; *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 9-27.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 141.

<sup>d</sup> Cf., e.g., *Science of Ethics*, pp. 397-398, 434, and the whole problem of the book of Job. Cf. also Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, pp. 172-173.

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tendency or probability, not an invariable rule. Dryden is not sure that the law can always be verified on individuals, but is half humorously certain that it infallibly applies to nations, because in their case Providence is too deeply engaged.

The problem is too large to be incidentally solved by a commentator on the *Republic*. It is, as Plato himself would admit, partly a question of faith,<sup>a</sup> and partly of the kind of evidence that is admitted as relevant. "Do you ask for sanctions?" exclaims John Morley. "One whose conscience has been strengthened from youth in this faith can know no greater bitterness than the stain cast by a wrong act . . . and the discords that have become the ruling harmony of his days."<sup>b</sup> That is the kind of evidence to which Plato appeals when he argues that his

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 526 D, *Laws* 728, 904 D-E, *Crito* 54 B-C; and Arnold, *God and the Bible*, chap. iii. p. 136: "These truths . . . are the matter of an immense experience which is still going forward. . . . But if any man is so entirely without affinity for them . . . for him *Literature and Dogma* was not written."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. also Morley, *Rousseau*, ii. 280, *Voltaire*, p. 293; Faguet, *Pour qu'on lise Platon*, pp. 99-101, 138; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iv. 257-258, 293-294; Huxley, *Science and Hebrew Tradition*, p. 339, and the entire controversy arising out of his *Evolution and Ethics*; Arcesilas *apud* Brochard, *Les Sceptiques grecs*, p. 171. Cf. George Eliot's novels *passim*, and Mill's "Those whose conscientious feelings are so weak as to allow of their asking this question," which is practically equivalent to Shaftesbury's "If any gentleman asks why he should not wear a dirty shirt I reply that he must be a very dirty gentleman to ask the question." Cf. also Cicero, *De officiis*, iii. 29; Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, *passim*, e.g. 426 ff., and the arguments of Hazlitt, Macaulay and others against the Utilitarians. Such passages are a conclusive answer to the objection that Plato has not proved his case.

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guardians will find more happiness in duty fulfilled than they would by grasping at what are commonly thought the good things of life.<sup>a</sup> It is an argument that will not appeal to men of stunted moral sensibilities. The issue is, as Plato says, whether they are the best judges.<sup>b</sup> The question has always been debated and always will be debatable, and there is little to add to the considerations on either side which Cicero develops in his perpetual reargument of the Stoic paradox, that virtue alone suffices for a happy life, and that the sage will be happy on the rack. Matthew Arnold, Emerson and George Eliot are as fixed in the faith as Plato. Experience, says Arnold, is perpetually sending the denier who says in his heart, There is no God, back to school to learn his lesson better.<sup>c</sup> The writers most in vogue to-day would agree with Mill and Leslie Stephen, if not with Thrasymachus and Callicles.<sup>d</sup> It is not necessary to determine this controversy in order to justify the *Republic*. To condemn the *Republic* because it is not a demonstration that leaves no room for doubt is to affirm that the question is not worth discussing, or that Plato's treatment of it falls short of what could reasonably be expected. If it is not a proof, has any one come nearer to a demonstration? <sup>e</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Rep.* 419-420. Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 580 D ff., *Laws* 658-659.

<sup>c</sup> *God and the Bible*, p. xxxv.

<sup>d</sup> Brochard, *La Morale de Platon*, says: "Aucun moraliste moderne n'entreprendrait de défendre la doctrine de Platon, qui apparaît comme une gageure." Cf. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, i. pp. 17, 18, 321, and *passim*.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 354: "Evolution implies that there must be at least an approximate coincidence, and there is no apparent *a priori* reason why the coincidence should not be indefinitely close."

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As to the desirability of the attempt, Plato thought that it is not safe to expose young minds to the unanswered propaganda of philosophies of immoralism and relativity. And recent experience of an amoral and irreligious education of the masses has not yet proved him wrong.<sup>a</sup> He believed in his own arguments and in the doctrine which he taught. But apart from that he also believed that civilized society would disintegrate if morality were not effectively preached.<sup>b</sup> The charge hinted by Aristotle (*Eth.* x., 1172 a 34-35) and often repeated that this implies the "economy of truth" <sup>c</sup> and the inner or double doctrine is sufficiently refuted by the depth and intensity of Plato's own "adamantine" moral faith.<sup>d</sup> But however that may be, the question which he asks in his *Laws* still brings heart-searchings to the parent who has inherited a conscience from a generation that had not been swept from its moorings: What is a father to tell his son? <sup>e</sup> But I cannot give more space to these eternal controversies and must turn to the direct summing-up of Plato's argument in the ninth book.

Plato sums up the conclusions of the *Republic* in three formal arguments. The first is the broad

<sup>a</sup> See my article in the June, 1934, number of the *Atlantic Monthly*, pp. 722-723.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 890 D, 907 C, 718 D.

<sup>c</sup> *Laws* 663 C-D (*What Plato Said*, p. 364) may imply "economy" in theology, but not in ethical religion. Cf. also *What Plato Said*, p. 626, and Isoc. *Antid.* 283 καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὕτως ἔχει καὶ συμφέρει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν. Cf. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, pp. 183-184: "Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of a necessary and salutary οἰκονομηθῆναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 618 E, *Laws* 662 B.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laws* 662 D-663 A, *What Plato Said*, p. 364.



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analogy between the individual and the state, which runs through the entire work.<sup>a</sup> Plato feels that here he is not only clinching the subject, but finally grappling with the problem debated in the *Gorgias* and to which he returns in the *Laws*. He is gathering up all his forces for a defiant reply to the immoralist and ethical nihilist. The result is an elaboration, an intensity, an insistency, a repetition that are offensive to readers who feel distaste for anything that savours of moral didacticism.

The argumentative force of such an analogy is the cumulative impression of the detail that makes it plausible. Plato points the application of this argument by a psychological portrait of the typical tyrannical man, developed out of the democratic man as the democrat was developed from the oligarch. The literary symmetry strains the logic a little, for while the democratic man is the typical citizen of a democracy, the typical citizen of a tyranny is not the tyrant himself, but any one of those whom he oppresses. But it does not matter. To heighten his effect Plato describes first the soul of the man destined to become a Greek tyrant, and then the intensification of all its defects and miseries by the actual possession and exercise of usurped power.

Latent in all men are lawless instincts and appetites which reason and disciplined emotion hold in check, but which are sometimes revealed in dreams (571 B f.). In the tyrannical soul these lower propensities are unleashed. The censor, to borrow the language of a fashionable modern psychology, is dethroned, all control is abolished and the soul is at the mercy of the instincts of the night. Plato depicts the rake's

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. xxxv.

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progress of what again in modern terminology we may call the typical gangster and boss in a lawless democracy. He is the son of a democratic father, but, unlike his father, does not settle down into a tolerable compromise between the caprices of unregulated desire and the principles of tradition (572 D). In him desire grown great, a monstrous Eros, a ruling passion with its attendant train of appetites, usurps the throne and seizes the empty citadel of the mind, vacant of the only true guardians, the precepts of culture and right reason (573 A). He wastes his portion of the family inheritance, encroaches on the portion of his brothers, and if further advances are refused him does not shrink from the last outrage that Greek conservatism attributed to the "younger generation"—and "strikes his father."<sup>a</sup> He becomes the chosen leader of a gang of like-minded roisterers from whom he is distinguished only by a more enterprising spirit and the greater strength of the principle of desire in his soul; and the gang, if few, terrorize the city with crime (575 A-B), if many, strike the father- and mother-land, overthrow the constitution and establish a tyranny (575 D).

A modern moralist might improve the text that the gangster lives in an atmosphere of greed, suspicion and fear, and is destined finally to be shot by an ambitious rival. Plato, speaking in terms of Greek experience, makes the "tyrannical man" fulfil his nature and perfect his type by becoming an actual tyrant of a Greek city. And he then describes, perhaps in reminiscence of his own observations at the court of Dionysius at Syracuse, and in

<sup>a</sup> 574 c. Cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 1321 ff., 1421 ff.



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prophetic anticipation of Caligula and Louis Napoleon, the hell of suspicion, fear and insatiate and unsatisfied desires in which such a tyrant lives.<sup>a</sup> As the city which he misrules is, for all the splendour of the court and the courtiers, as a whole the most miserable of states, so is he, to the eye that can penetrate the dazzling disguise of pomp and power, "the farced title running 'fore the king," the most miserable of men (577-579).

It is obvious that Plato forces the note a little in the interest of his thesis. In actual history the tyrant need not be the sensualist of Plato's description. He may be only a cold-blooded, hard-headed Machiavellian,—in Plato's language a lover of honour and victory, not a lover of the pleasures that money purchases. But these cavils of a meticulous logic are beside the mark. The real argument, as we have said, is the psychological analysis and the facts of Greek experience that lend plausibility to the analogy. It prepares us to receive the more strictly philosophic and scientific arguments that are to follow.

The gist of the second argument is that the intellectual, the philosopher, has necessarily experienced all three kinds of pleasure in his life, while the representatives of the two other types have no experience of the pleasures of pure intelligence (581-582). To this is added the consideration that the organ or instrument of all such judgements, reason and rational

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* vi. 6 "neque frustra praestantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus, quando ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur."

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speech, is the special possession of the philosopher (582 A). This argument is never mentioned again by Plato and is by many critics, including Leslie Stephen,<sup>a</sup> rejected as a fallacy. But John Stuart Mill accepts and makes use of it.

The issue thus raised is really the old question of a distinction of quality and value in pleasure. No one can judge or prescribe another's pleasure, it is argued; pleasure *qua* pleasure admits no differences.<sup>b</sup> But is there any such thing as pleasure *qua* pleasure? Are there not always inseparable accompaniments and consequences? And though the hog may be sole judge of his own pleasures, is it on the whole as desirable or as pleasurable to be a hog as a man? <sup>c</sup> There is room for interminable argument, for the entire problem of relativity is involved. If all judgements are relative, Plato elsewhere argues, we are committed to chaos. The dog-faced baboon, and not man or God, is the measure of all things.<sup>d</sup> The very existence of the arts and the sciences presupposes that things are measured against standards and not merely against one another.<sup>e</sup> Thus, though the argument is not repeated by Plato in this form, it suggests and implies most of the fundamental questions of his ethical philosophy.

<sup>a</sup> He calls it "a familiar short cut to the desired conclusion" (*Science of Ethics*, p. 399). Cf. also Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, p. 148.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 494 E (*What Plato Said*, p. 508) and 499 B. See too Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 400.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 67 B, *What Plato Said*, p. 611. There is no space to repeat or quote here the arguments against the utilitarian point of view set forth by Macaulay and others. Cf. also Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, pp. 93-94, 121.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 161 c, *Laws* 716 c.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Politicus* 284 B-C, 285 A-B.

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The third argument, drawn from the negativity of the pleasure of sense, is the basis of the Platonic ethics, so far as it is an arguable doctrine. It is necessary to dwell upon this point, for it is commonly said that Plato's ethical philosophy is deduced from the idea of good.<sup>a</sup> That is true only from one quite special point of view. The idea of good, as we have seen, is a postulate of the logic of ethics and of the higher education of the philosopher. It is a blank cheque that supports the credit of the system but which is not filled in. No virtue and no particular "good" is adequately defined until it is explicitly related to an idea of good (505 A, 506 A). It may be defined provisionally and sufficiently for a given purpose in terms of psychology or tradition or with a tacit reference to an implied conception of good (504 A-B). But nowhere in Plato's writings are definite controversial arguments or substantive principles of ethical philosophy or rules of practice deduced from the idea of good. It is merely said that an ethical philosophy is not complete until we have decided what is our sanction.

But such principles *are* deduced from the negativity of the "lower" pleasures throughout Plato's writings.<sup>b</sup> This supplies the missing link in the argument of the *Protagoras* that virtue and happiness depend on the correct estimate of pleasures and pains.<sup>c</sup> The doctrine is implied in the *Phaedo* (83-84). It is distinctly suggested in the *Gorgias* (493 ff.). It crowns the

<sup>a</sup> Cf. W. H. Fairbrother, "The Relation of Ethics to Metaphysics," *Mind*, xiii., 1904, p. 43; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, 1886, p. xxvi. Cf. *supra*, p. xxvi.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. xxvi.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 130-131.

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argument of the *Republic* (583 B ff.). It is elaborated in the *Philebus* in order to reach a final settlement of the controversy dramatized in the *Gorgias*. It is tacitly employed in the endeavour of the *Laws* (660 E-663 E) to attach a practicable edifying conclusion to the utilitarian arguments of the *Protagoras*. The statement of the doctrine in the *Republic*, though briefer than that of the *Philebus*, touches on all the essential points, as the notes will show. It cannot be proved to be either a résumé or an imperfect anticipation of the developed theory. It cannot be used to date the ninth book of the *Republic* relatively to the *Philebus*.<sup>a</sup>

I am not here speaking of the absolute truth of the doctrine, but only of its demonstrable relation to Plato's ethical philosophy. As I have elsewhere said,<sup>b</sup> Plato teaches that sensuous pleasures are in their nature impure and illusory. They are preconditioned by, and mixed with, desire, want, pain. "Surgit amari aliquid" is ever true of them. They are the relief of an uneasiness, the scratching of an itch, the filling of a vacuum.<sup>c</sup> To treat them as real, or to make them one's aim (except so far as our human estate requires), is to seek happiness in a pro-

<sup>a</sup> Though the *Philebus* is in fact later than the *Republic*, as Mill said long before style statistics were thought of.

<sup>b</sup> *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 24.

<sup>c</sup> Already in the *Gorgias*, 493 E, 494 c and the *Phaedrus* 258 E ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι, etc.; *Rep.* 584 A-B. It has even been argued that the *Phaedrus* passage takes for granted the fuller discussion of the *Philebus* (W. H. Thompson, *Phaedrus*, *ad loc.*), and why not? Anything may be argued if the dialogues are supposed to grow out of one another and not out of Plato's mind.

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cess rather than a state,<sup>a</sup> in becoming rather than in being. It is to bind oneself to the wheel of Ixion and pour water into the bottomless jar of the Danaids.<sup>b</sup> Far happier, far more pleasurable, is the life that consistently aims at few and calm pleasures, to which the sensualist would hardly give the name, a life which he would regard as torpor or death.<sup>c</sup>

Both the physiology and the psychology of this doctrine have been impugned. It has been argued that, up to the point of fatigue, the action of healthy nerves involves no pain, and must yield a surplus of positive sensuous pleasure. It is urged that the present uneasiness of appetite is normally more than counterbalanced by the anticipation of immediate satisfaction. Such arguments will carry no weight with those who accept Plato's main contention, that the satisfactions of sense and ambition, however "necessary," have no real worth, and that to seek our true life in them is to weave and unweave the futile web of Penelope. Whatever qualifications modern psychology may attach to the doctrine, it is the logical basis of Plato's ethics. The unfeigned

<sup>a</sup> *Phileb.* 53 c ff., 54 E virtually = *Gorg.* 493 E. Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 322-323. The literal-minded objection of Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1174 b, and some moderns, that pleasure is not literally = κίνησις, is beside the point.

<sup>b</sup> *Gorg.* 493 B τετρημένος πίθος, etc., *Phaedo* 84 A ἀν-  
ήνυτον ἔργον . . . Πηνελόπης ἰστόν, *Gorg.* 507 E, *Phileb.*  
54 E.

<sup>c</sup> *Phaedo* 64 B, *Gorg.* 492 E, *Phileb.* 54 E καὶ φασι ζῆν οὐκ  
ἀν δέξασθαι, etc. In *Laws* 733, 734 B, the hedonistic calculus  
of the *Protagoras* is retained, but is applied not directly to  
the individual acts, but to types of life. The life of moderate  
pleasures is *a priori* the more pleasurable because it neces-  
sarily yields a more favourable balance than the life of intense  
pleasures.



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recognition of the inherent worthlessness of the lower pleasures removes at once the motive and the lures to evil.<sup>a</sup> It is the chief link in the proof that virtue is happiness. It insures the domination of reason over feeling and appetite. It moulds man into that likeness to the divine pattern which is Plato's expression for the ethical ideal,<sup>b</sup> for the divine life knows neither pleasure nor pain.<sup>c</sup> It is the serious argument that explains Plato's repudiation of the hedonistic formulas of the *Protagoras*<sup>d</sup> and justifies the noble anti-hedonistic rhetoric of the *Gorgias*,<sup>e</sup> the *Phaedo*,<sup>f</sup> and the *Philebus* (*in fine*).

Regarded as a logical system, then, and metaphysics apart, the Platonic ethics is not to be deduced from the idea of good. It is best studied and expounded under a few simple heads: (1) illustrations in the minor dialogues of the necessity and the difficulty of defining ethical terms; (2) the search for arguments that will convince, or at least confute, the ethical nihilism of a war-weary, cynical and over-enlightened generation—for proof, in short, that virtue and happiness coincide; (3) the attempt to find a compromise between the necessity of acknowledging the truth in a certain sense of hedonistic utilitarianism and our justifiable idealistic distaste for that way of describing the moral life; (4) as an essential part of the argument of both (2) and (3), the principle of the comparative worthlessness of the

<sup>a</sup> *Phaedo* 66 c, *Rep.* 586 A-B, 588.

<sup>b</sup> *Theaetet.* 176 B ff., *Laws* 716 D, 728 A-B, *Rep.* 352 A-B, 612 E, *Phileb.* 39 E.

<sup>c</sup> *Phileb.* 33 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 500.

<sup>e</sup> 512 D-E, *What Plato Said*, p. 149.

<sup>f</sup> 69 A, *What Plato Said*, pp. 171 and 174.

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lower or sensual pleasures, which, except so far as necessary, are bought at too high a price, because they are preconditioned by pain.<sup>a</sup>

These categories are not of my invention. They are the topics on which ethical discussion actually turns in the dialogues. The *Republic* supplies ample illustration of all these topics. The first book, like the *Gorgias*, dramatizes Socrates' dialectic superiority to the immoralist. The second book restates the issue in its most fundamental form. The fourth book resumes and for practical purposes provisionally solves the puzzles of the definition of the virtues in the minor Socratic dialogues. The allegory of the idea of good, rightly understood, shows what Plato meant in these minor dialogues by making the failure to define virtue always turn on the inability to discover the "good." The ninth book, as we have seen, sums up the argument and adds a sufficiently explicit exposition of the doctrine of the negativity of pleasure, which, as the *Philebus* shows, is the indispensable basis of the scientific and calculating ethics postulated in the *Protagoras*.

But true virtue is something more than argument, and its mood, as an eloquent passage of the *Phaedo* protests, is not that of the prudential, calculating reason.<sup>b</sup> And so the argument of the ninth book, like that of the fourth, culminates in an appeal through imagery and analogy to the imaginative reason and the soul. There (444-445) it was urged that the health and harmony of the soul must be still more indispens-

<sup>a</sup> See my review of Lodge in *International Journal of Ethics*, xxxix. pp. 232-233, and for the ethical argument of the *Republic* as a whole my "Idea of Justice in Plato's *Republic*," *The Ethical Record*, January 1890, pp. 185-199.

<sup>b</sup> *Phaedo* 69 A f., *What Plato Said*, p. 500.



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able to true happiness than that of the body. And we saw that the most scientific of modern ethical philosophies is finally forced back upon the same analogy.<sup>a</sup> In the conclusion of the ninth book the motif recurs with still greater elaboration and in a more eloquent climax. Every animal of the barnyard, Plato says in anticipation of Emerson and Freud, has found lodgement within this external sheath of humanity. And the issue for every human soul is whether it chooses to foster the snake, the lion and the ape, or the man, the mind, and the god within the mind.<sup>b</sup> Surely the wiser choice is that which values all the so-called goods, for which men scramble and contend, only as they tend to preserve or destroy the true constitution and health of the soul. This polity of the sober and righteous soul is the symbol of that City of God which may exist nowhere on earth but on which as a pattern laid up in heaven he who will may fix his eyes and constitute himself its citizen.<sup>c</sup>

A characteristic feature of Plato's art both in great and little matters is the climax after the apparent climax.<sup>d</sup> The tenth book of the *Republic*, which is in a sense an appendix, adds the climax of the originally disavowed religious sanction of immortality to that of the appeal to the imaginative reason. The intervening digression in defence of the banishment of the poets is in effect, if not in Plato's conscious intention, a relieving interval of calm between the two peaks of feeling. For the rest, the deeper psychology of the

The Banishment of Poetry.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. xvi.

<sup>b</sup> *Rep.* 589 D-E. Cf. *Tim.* 90 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Vol. I. pp. xlii-xliii.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *supra*, Vol. I. pp. xxi-xxii, *What Plato Said*, pp. 140, 189, 248, *infra*, p. 104.

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philosophic books and the theory of ideas expounded there invited a reconsideration of the subject and provided arguments based, not on the content of the Homeric epic, but on the essential nature of poetry and its influence.

The two arguments that have exercised the defenders of poetry from Aristotle to Arnold <sup>a</sup> are that poetry is not truth but imitation, a copy of a copy, and that poetry fosters emotion and so weakens the salutary control of feeling by the reason and the will. In support of the first the theory of ideas is invoked in a form so intentionally simplified that it has given rise to the fantastic hypothesis that this book must represent an earlier period of Plato's philosophy. <sup>b</sup> God made one idea of a couch. The artisan copies it in many material couches. The artist with words or colours copies, not the idea, but the copy. This argument of course could be and has been answered in its own terms by the claim of Browning's *Fra Lippo Lippi* that the genius of the artist does directly apprehend the idea or essence of things and reveal it to those who can see only through his eyes. <sup>c</sup> But the real question whether art deals with truth or appearance is independent of Plato's half-serious formulation of it in the language of the theory of ideas. It is still debated, and it is the business of the interpreters of Plato to understand, not necessarily to pronounce judgement.

The question whether poetry's chief function is to

<sup>a</sup> Sidney's *Defense of Poesy* is probably the most familiar.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 249, *supra*, p. xviii.

<sup>c</sup> For, don't you mark, we're made so that we love  
First when we see them painted, things we have passed  
Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see ;  
And so they are better, painted—better to us.

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stimulate and exercise emotion, or to relieve, purge,<sup>a</sup> refine, purify, sublimate and exalt it, likewise raises an issue which still divides psychologists, educators and critics. Its determination perhaps involves a great and deliberate choice in the acceptance and management of life as a whole. Plato's decision to banish the honeyed Muse from his ideal city represents only one aspect of his many-sided nature. It is obviously not, as is sometimes absurdly said, an expression of his insensibility to Hellenic poetry and art. It was his own sensitiveness that made him fear its power. He himself wrote verse in youth.<sup>b</sup> His imagery, the invention of his myths and the poetic quality of his prose rank him with the world's major poets.<sup>c</sup> He quotes poetry with exquisite and fond aptness throughout his writings.<sup>d</sup> And there are no more wistful words than his reluctant dismissal of the supreme poet, the author and source of all these beauties of epic and tragedy, the Ionian father of the rest—Homer.<sup>e</sup> However, Plato's ethical convictions gave him the courage of Guyon (*Faery Queene*, II. xii. 83) in dealing with these enchantments :

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle's doctrine of *κάθαρσις*. Cf. my review of Finsler, "Platon und die aristotelische Poetik," *Class. Phil.* iii. pp. 461-462; also *The Nation*, xc. (1910) p. 319; Sikes, *Greek View of Poetry*, pp. 118-125.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 17 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. pp. 196 and 200; Sidney, in *English Men of Letters*, p. 150 "Of all the philosophers he is the most poetical;" Chesterton, *The Resurrection of Rome*, p. 57 "But when we remember that the great poet Plato (as he must be called) banished poets from his *Republic*, we have a glimmer of why the great Greek Emperor banished sculptors from his empire."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 7-9; *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>e</sup> *Rep.* 607 c-d; cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 250.

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But all those pleasaunt bowres and Pallace brave  
Guyon broke downe with rigour pittillesse;  
Ne ought their goodly workmanship might save  
Them from the tempest of his wrathfulnesse.<sup>a</sup>

The Doctrine  
of Immorta-  
lity.

The guerdons of righteousness, worldly or other-worldly, were explicitly excluded in the original formulation of the question whether justice is or is not intrinsically its own reward.<sup>b</sup> But now, having proved his case independently of these, Plato thinks that no one can fairly object if he points out that in fact honesty is usually the best policy even in this world, and that there is good hope that the legends of a life and judgement to come are in essence true.<sup>c</sup>

There are hints of a life after death earlier in the *Republic*.<sup>d</sup> And nothing can be inferred from Glaucon's perhaps affected surprise at Soerates' offer to prove it. The immortality of the soul as an article of faith and hope, a sanction of moral law, an inspiration of poetry, will be treated lightly by no student of humanity. But there is a certain lack of intellectual seriousness in taking it seriously as a thesis of metaphysical demonstration.<sup>e</sup> Plato's belief in immortality was a conviction of the psychological and moral impossibility of sheer materialism, and a broad faith in the unseen, the spiritual, the ideal. The logical obstacles to a positive demonstration of personal immortality were as obvious to him as they are to his critics.<sup>f</sup> The immortality of the individual soul

<sup>a</sup> See also my review of Pater, *Plato and Platonism* in *The Dial*, xiv. (1893) p. 211.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Bk. ii., esp. 367 B-E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 251.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 330 D-E and Vol. I. p. 16.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 180, 177, 535.

<sup>f</sup> See my review of Gaye, *The Platonic Conception of Immortality*, in *Philos. Rev.* xiv., 1905, pp. 590-595.

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is for Plato a pious hope <sup>a</sup> and an ethical postulate <sup>b</sup> rather than a demonstrable certainty. <sup>c</sup> He essays various demonstrations, but nearly always in connexion with a myth, and of all the proofs attempted but one is repeated. <sup>d</sup> In the *Apology* Socrates, addressing his judges, affects to leave the question open. <sup>e</sup> But we cannot infer from this that the *Apology* antedates Plato's belief in immortality, and Socrates' language in *Crito* 54 B is precisely in the tone of the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo*. <sup>f</sup>

Immortality was affirmed before Plato by Pythagorean and Orphic mystics, and in the magnificent poetry of Pindar's *Second Olympian Ode* it is distinctly associated with a doctrine of future rewards and punishments. But Plato was the first great writer to enforce it by philosophical arguments, or impress it upon the imagination by vivid eschatological myths. And the Platonic dialogues, as Rohde shows, <sup>g</sup> remained the chief source of the hopes and aspirations of the educated minority throughout subsequent antiquity. Plato's name was the symbol and rallying point of the entire religious and philosophic

<sup>a</sup> *Phaedo* 114 D *χρῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡς περ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ*, *Gorg.* 524 A-B, *Phaedo* 67 B.

<sup>b</sup> *Rep.* 608 c ff., *Laws* 881 A, 967 D-E, 959 A-B; with τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον [εἶναι] ψυχὴν cf. *Phaedo* 115 D-E, and with the idea, 959 B, that the only βοήθεια at the bar of Hades is a just life in this world, cf. *Gorg.* 522 C-D, 526 E, *Crito* 54 B.

<sup>c</sup> *Phaedo* 85 C τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀθάνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπον τι. Cf. 107 A-B, *Tim.* 72 D, *Meno* 86 A-B, *Phaedr.* 265 C.

<sup>d</sup> That based on the theory that the soul is the source of all motion, *Phaedr.* 245 c ff., *Laws* 893 B ff.

<sup>e</sup> 40 D. Cf. also *Phaedo* 91 B.

<sup>f</sup> *Cratylus* 403 D-E implies the doctrine of *Phaedo* 67, 68.

<sup>g</sup> *Psyche* 5th and 6th ed., vol. ii. p. 265.



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opposition to the dogmatic materialism of the Epicureans and of the positive wing of the Peripatetics. Cicero and Plutarch were in this his disciples. The more wistful and religious spirits of Stoicism—a Seneca, a Marcus Aurelius—came more and more to see in Platonism the hopeful “ alternative ” of the great perhaps. Neo-Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans never grew weary of expanding and allegorizing the great myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*. They were directly or indirectly the chief inspiration of the sixth book of the *Aeneid*, and in the majority of later sepulchral epigrams that express the hope of immortality a Platonic colouring is perceptible. All this was due far more to the spell of Plato’s genius than to the force of his arguments. That the soul is the principle of motion (*Phaedr.* 245 c ff., *Laws* 893 B ff.), that it must have pre-existed because its apprehension of the ideas is reminiscence (*Phaedo* 72 E ff.), that it could be destroyed only by its own specific evil, injustice, which does not in fact destroy it (*Rep.* 608-611), that it cannot cease to exist because the idea of life which is essentially present with it will not admit its opposite (*Phaedo* 105 D-E)—these arguments may convince metaphysicians, but they will not stir the “ emotion of conviction ” that is fostered by the serene confidence of Socrates in the hour of death (*Phaedo* 114-118), by the vivid vision of the scarred and naked soul shivering at the bar of Rhadamanthus (*Gorg.* 524 D-E), by the detailed verisimilitude of the message brought back by the “ Angel from there,” Er, the son of Armenius (*Rep.* 614 B ff.).

The Epicureans and the more austere Stoics



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censured this mythological symbolism as unworthy of a philosopher; and Emerson contrasts Plato's license of affirmation with the self-restraint of the Author of Christianity, who refused to entertain the populace with that picture. But Plato has anticipated their criticism, saying in substance: No reasonable man will affirm that these things are precisely as I have described them. But since the soul is immortal, something of the kind must be true, and we ought to repeat and croon it over to ourselves in order to keep faith and hope alive (*Phaedo* 114 D). This plea could be rejected only by those who are willing to affirm that Plato's poetical imaginings have been more harmful in the encouragement of superstition than helpful in the maintenance of religious hope and moral faith.<sup>a</sup>

But what of the metaphysical arguments? Did Plato himself take them seriously? And are they, therefore, to be taken seriously by the interpreters of his philosophy? Are they essential links in a system? Can we find in them clues to the progress and development of his thought and even date the dialogues with their aid? It is not necessary to answer these questions here. On the validity of the arguments it would be idle to waste words. Some of them, reinforced by the *Theaetetus*, may help to show the inadequacy of a dogmatic materialistic psychology. At the most they prove the eternity of something other than "matter" which may be called "soul." They do not prove the immortality of the individual soul, which is nevertheless plainly taken as proved in the eschatological myths and their ethical applica-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my article in the June, 1934, number of the *Atlantic Monthly*, p. 721.

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tions. That the supreme dialectician, Plato, was himself unaware of that which is so readily perceived by every puny whipster who thinks to get his sword is to me unthinkable. A semblance of precedent proof was essential even to the literary effect of the concluding myths. And Plato himself in the *Laws* has warned us that an affirmative answer to some questions is required for the salvation of society and the moral government of mankind.<sup>a</sup>

But the myth itself is the really significant expression of Plato's hope and faith, and of its influence, hardly less than that of some national religions, upon the souls of men. After enumerating the blessings that normally attend the old age of the righteous man in this world, he says, we may fitly allow our imagination to dwell upon the rewards that await him in the world to come.

The enormous literature of the Platonic myths<sup>b</sup> deals partly with their conjectural sources, partly with their place and function in Plato's art and philosophy, and too little with the framework of definite meaning as distinguished from the remoter and more fanciful suggestions with which the ingenuity of commentators has sometimes obscured it. Leaving the translation and the notes to speak for themselves, I need here say only a few words on this last point.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. li.

<sup>b</sup> Cf., e.g., L. Couturat, *De mythis Platonicis*, Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, with my review in *Journal of Philos., Psy. and Scientific Method*, 3, pp. 495-498; P. Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon*; Karl Reinhardt, *Platons Mythen*, Bonn, 1927; Friedländer, *Platon*, i. pp. 199 ff.; W. Willi, *Versuch einer Grundlegung der platonischen Mythopöie*; J. Tate, "Socrates and the Myths," *Class. Quarterly*, xxvii. (April 1933) pp. 74-80; V. Brochard, "Les Mythes dans la philosophie de Platon," *L'Année Philos.*, 1900, pp. 1-13.

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If I may use without entirely adopting Professor Stewart's distinction between myth and allegory, the distinctive feature of the Platonic myth is that it embodies and reconciles the conflicting excellences of both—the transcendental feeling, the poetic mysticism of the true myth and the, to Professor Stewart, almost offensive lucidity of the allegory. In this it only exalts and intensifies a feature of Plato's style as a whole. He is unique in his power to reconcile formal dialectic and deliberate rhetoric with imagination and sincerity of feeling. He announces the effect that he intends to produce and produces it in defiance of the psychology of Goethe's "Da fühlt man Absicht und man wird verstimmt." He can pour his imagination, his poetry, his mysticism, his exhortation, and his edification into a pre-determined logical mould. He modulates from one chord to the other at the precise moment when satiety begins.<sup>a</sup> He starts from a definition, proceeds by analysis and division through firstlies and secondlies to perorations that sweep the emotional reader off his feet and make him forget or deny the dialectic that conducted him to the mount of vision. As Emerson puts it, "He points and quibbles; and by and by comes a sentence that moves the sea and land."<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Cf., e.g., *Phaedo* 115 A, 77 E-78 A, *Euthyphro* 6 B-C, 11 B-C, *Gorg.* 507 E. The little sermons scattered through the *Laws* have the same effect. Cf. in Goethe's *Faust* the chorus of angels followed by the devil. Cf. Carl Vering, *Platons Staat*, p. 7 "Ein Dialog Platons wirkt niemals ermüdend; jedesmal greift der Dichter Platon sofort ein, wenn der Philosoph durch ein schweres Problem dem Leser hart zugesetzt hat." Cf. also Sikes, *Greek View of Poetry*, p. 128.

<sup>b</sup> Cf., e.g., *Symp.* 211-212, *Gorgias*, *in fine*, *Phaedo* 114 c, *Rep.*, *in fine*.

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The definite thoughts embodied in the myth of Er the son of Armenius belong to Plato's permanent stock of opinions and do not differ appreciably from those of his other myths or the implied conclusions of his arguments.<sup>a</sup> The saving faith in immortality and judgement to come cannot rest on scientific demonstration only. It needs the confirmations of imagination, intuition, vision, revelation. The universe is a wonderful place whose structure is known to us only imperfectly and in part. Symbols are the fit expression of our dim apprehensions of its infinite possibilities. Heaven and hell are symbols of the most vital of all divisions, that which separates the virtuous from the vicious will. Purgatory may mark the distinction between remediable and curable wrong and that which admits of no pardon.<sup>b</sup> They are perhaps states of mind rather than places, but imagination may use what our imperfect science knows or divines of the world beneath our feet or the universe above our heads to give them a local habitation and a name, and our fancy may play in like manner with the ultimate unanswerable questions of philosophy: Whence comes evil<sup>c</sup>? and are our wills free<sup>d</sup>? If the soul is immortal and lives through endless transformations and transmigrations, it may be that the evil which baffles us here had its origin in some defect of will in worlds before the man (*Rep.* 613 A). Perhaps a great choice was offered to us and we chose wrong under the influence of mistaken ideas acquired in a former misspent life (618-619). Whatever the

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the notes on 614 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 536, on *Phaedo* 113 D and 113 E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 578, on *Theaet.* 176 A.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 644-645, on *Laws* 904 C.

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measure of truth in these fancies two principles of religion and morals stand fast. God is blameless (617 E), and we must always blame rather ourselves.<sup>a</sup> Our wills are somehow ours to make them his; though we must think of the sins of others as due solely to ignorance.<sup>b</sup> It matters not that the Aristotelians will argue that this is reasoning in a circle.<sup>c</sup> We know and must believe that virtue is free (617 E). And all the divinations of the soul and all the profounder interpretations of experience reiterate the lesson that the way of life that will present us fearless at the bar of eternal justice is the way that will yield the truest happiness here.<sup>d</sup> If we hold to that faith, then both in our earthly pilgrimage and in all the adventures of the soul hereafter, with us it will be well.

### THE TEXT

As regards the text I have little to add to what was said in the first volume, except a few qualifications to avoid misunderstanding. I have tried to be a little more careful than I was in the first volume in correcting minor inconsistencies due to the reprinting of the Teubner text of Hermann. But the opportunities which these might afford to captious criticism do not in the least affect the main principle or its applications. That is simply that the variations between the

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 727 B, *Rep.* 619 c, *Phaedo* 90 D, *Cratyl.* 411 c, etc.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 345 D-E, 358 C-D, *Laws* 734 B, and *What Plato Said*, p. 640, on 860 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Eth.* 1114 b 19.

<sup>d</sup> *Rep.* 621 c. Cf. *Gorg.* 526 D-E, *Phaedo* 114 E.



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chief modern editions rarely make any difference for Plato's thought or even for his style, and that the decision between different readings in the case of Plato should usually turn, not on any scientific principle of text criticism, but on knowledge of Plato and knowledge of the Greek language. To put it drastically : for all practical purposes of the student of the Greek language, literature and philosophy, Hermann's text of the *Republic* is quite as good as the more scientific text of Burnet or the text that might be constructed from the critical notes in Wilamowitz' appendix. Hermann's judgement on questions of Greek idiom and Platonic usage was quite as good as theirs. This is not meant as an illiberal disparagement of the great and indispensable special disciplines of text criticism and palaeography. It is merely a commonsense vindication of the intellectual right of those who prefer to do so to approach the study of Plato from another point of view.

### THE TRANSLATION

As regards the translation, I impenitently reaffirm the principles that I stated in the preface to the first volume—whatever errors of judgement I may commit in their application. Much of the *Republic* can be made easy reading for any literate reader. But some of the subtler and more metaphysical passages can be translated in that way only at the cost of misrepresentation of the meaning. In order to bring out the real significance of Plato's thought it is sometimes necessary to translate the same phrase in two ways, sometimes to vary a phrase which Plato repeats or

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repeat a synonym which he prefers to vary. It is often desirable to use two words to suggest the two-fold associations of one. To take the simplest example, it is even more misleading to translate *eidos* "Form" than it is to translate it "idea"—"idea or form" (without a capital letter) is less likely to be misunderstood.

Again, Plato did not write in the smooth, even style which Dionysius of Halicarnassus admired in Lysias and Matthew Arnold in Addison, and it is not the business of the translator to clothe him in the garb of that style.

Provided the meaning is plain and the emphasis right, he allows himself unlimited freedom in anacoluthons, short cuts, sharp corners, ellipses and generally in what I have elsewhere called illogical idiom. Anyone who does not like that style should give his days and nights to the study of Isocrates and Lysias. According to his mood and the context Plato's style ranges from Attic simplicity to metaphysical abstraction, from high-flown poetical prose to plain colloquial diction. And his colloquialism, though usually kept within the bounds of Attic urbanity, is not lacking in Aristophanic touches which, if rightly rendered, shock the taste of critics who approach him with a stronger sense of the dignity of philosophy than they have of Greek idiom. In deference to friendly criticism I have generally suppressed or transferred to footnotes my attempts to reproduce this feature of Plato's style. But I am not convinced. As Taine aptly says (*Life and Letters*, p. 53), "M. Cousin's elegant Plato is not at all like the easy . . . but always natural Plato of reality. He would shock us if we saw him as he is."



PLATO  
THE REPUBLIC  
BOOKS VI—X

# ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ, ΘΡΑΣΥΜΑΧΟΣ,  
ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ

Σ

St. T. II. p.

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Ι. Οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς διεξεληθόντος<sup>1</sup> λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἷ εἰσιν ἐκάτεροι. Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥάδιον. Οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φαῖναι εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατοψέσθαι τί διαφέρει Β βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν; Τί δ' ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἐξῆς; ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἄλλ' ἐν

<sup>1</sup> διεξεληθόντος ADM, διεξεληθόντες F.

<sup>a</sup> The argument is slightly personified. Cf. on 503 A.

<sup>b</sup> It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the philosopher occupies only a few pages.

<sup>c</sup> This is the main theme of the *Republic*, of which Plato never loses sight.

# THE REPUBLIC

[OR ON JUSTICE : POLITICAL]

## CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, GLAUCON, POLEMARCHUS, THRASYMACHUS,  
ADEIMANTUS, CEPHALUS

## BOOK VI

I. "So now, Glaucon," I said, "our argument after winding<sup>a</sup> a long<sup>b</sup> and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not." "Yes," he said, "a shorter way is perhaps not feasible." "Apparently not," I said. "I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose<sup>c</sup> of discerning the difference between the just and the unjust life requires us to discuss." "What, then," he said, "comes next?" "What else," said I, "but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging,<sup>d</sup> while those who are incapable of this, but lose themselves and

<sup>a</sup> For κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος cf. *Phaedo* 78 c, *Soph.* 248 A, *Tim.* 41 D, 82 B, *Epin.* 982 B and E.

πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσι πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι; Πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἄν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν; Ὅπότεροι ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνονται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, C τούτους καθιστάναι φύλακας. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Τόδε δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ ὄρωντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὅτιοῦν; Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον; Ἡ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἐκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφεῖς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κακείσε αἰ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέ- D στατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαι τε, ἐὰν δέη τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σώζειν; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρει. Τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα, ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρία δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας; Ἄτοπον μὲντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἰρεῖσθαι, εἴ γε τᾶλλα μὴ ἐλλείποντο· τούτῳ γὰρ 485 αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἄν προέχοιεν. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἰοί τ' εἶσονται οἱ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. p. 89, note h, on 505 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Luke vi. 39, Matt. xv. 14, John xix. 39-41.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Polit. 277 b, 277 d f., etc., Soph. 226 c, Parmen. 132 d.

<sup>d</sup> ἀποβλέποντες belongs to the terminology of the ideas. Cf. supra 472 c, Cratyl. 389 a, Gorg. 503 e, Tim. 28 a, Prot. 354 c, and my *What Plato Said*, p. 458 on Euthyph. 6 e.



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wander<sup>a</sup> amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?" "What, then," he said, "would be a fair statement of the matter?" "Whichever," I said, "appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, these we should establish as guardians." "Right," he said. "Is this, then," said I, "clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight?" "Of course it is clear," he said. "Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind<sup>b</sup> and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern<sup>c</sup> in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes<sup>d</sup> on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established?" "No, by heaven," he said, "there is not much difference." "Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience<sup>e</sup> and are not second to them in any part of virtue?" "It would be strange indeed," he said, "to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities." "Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* 539 E, 521 B, *Phileb.* 62. Cf. *Intro.* p. xl; Apelt, *Republic*, p. 490.

αὐτοὶ κακείνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ὁ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν· καὶ οἶμαι, ἂν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ ὅτι οἰοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους. Πῶς;

II. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων πέρι  
 B ὁμολογήσθω ἡμῖν, ὅτι μαθήματός γε αἰεὶ ἐρῶσιν, ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰεὶ οὐσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.  
 Ὅμολογήσθω. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἐκόντες ἀφίενται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς  
 C τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει, οἱ ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσεσθαι οἴους ἐλέγομεν. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἐκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ ξυγγενές τε καὶ οἰκείον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Ἡ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφία τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὔροις; Καὶ πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Lit. "is not made to wander by generation and decay." Cf. *Crat.* 411 c, *Phaedo* 95 f, whence Aristotle took his title. See *Class. Phil.* xvii. (1922) pp. 334-352.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra* 474 c-d.

<sup>c</sup> For similar expressions cf. 519 b, *Laws* 656 b, 965 c, *Symp.* 200 a.

<sup>d</sup> This and many other passages prove Plato's high regard

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is it not ? ” “ Quite so. ” “ Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth ; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these. ” “ How so ? ”

II. “ We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, that it is ever enamoured of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.<sup>a</sup> ” “ Let us take that as agreed. ” “ And, further, ” said I, “ that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honoured, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration<sup>b</sup> drawn from lovers and men covetous of honour. ” “ You are right, ” he said. “ Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures. ” “ What quality ? ” “ The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth. ” “ It is likely, ” he said. “ It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity<sup>c</sup> that he who is by nature enamoured of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love. ” “ Right, ” he said. “ Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth<sup>d</sup> ? ” “ Impossible, ” he said. “ Then can the same nature be a lover of

for the truth. Cf. *Laws* 730 c, 861 d, *Crat.* 428 d, *supra* 382 a. In 389 b he only permits falsehood to the rulers as a drastic remedy to be used with care for edification. Cf. Vol. I. on 382 c and d.

D φιλοψευδῆ; Οὐδαμῶς γε. Τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθύς ἐκ νέου ὃ τι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι. Παντελῶς γε. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὅτω γε εἰς ἓν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τᾶλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκείσε ἀπωχτευμένον. Τί μὴν; Ἔτι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρῦήκασι, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶμαι, ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος τις εἴη. Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. Σώφρων μὴν ὃ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῆ φιλοχρήματος· ὦν γὰρ ἔνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν. Οὕτως. Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν  
 486 κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μῆ. Τὸ ποῖον; Μὴ σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῆ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄλου καὶ παντὸς αἰεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου. Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ἡ οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοία μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἶει τούτῳ μέγα

<sup>a</sup> For this figure cf. *Laws* 844 A and 736 B, Eurip. *Suppl.* 1111 παρεκτρέποντες ὀχετόν, Empedocles, Diels<sup>1</sup> 195 λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων i ucretius ii. 365 "derivare queunt animum"; and for the idea cf. also *Laws* 643 C-D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 45-46, esp. n. 330, followed by Apelt, *Republic*, pp. 490-491. Cf. also Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. pp. 579-580, 584.

<sup>c</sup> For πεπλασμένως cf. *Soph.* 216 C μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 144 D χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα.

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wisdom and of falsehood?" "By no means." "Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form." "By all means." "But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel.<sup>a</sup>" "Surely." "So, when a man's desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument,<sup>b</sup> if the man is a true and not a sham<sup>c</sup> philosopher." "That is quite necessary." "Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he." "It is so." "And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature." "What point?" "You must not overlook any touch of illiberality.<sup>d</sup> For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness<sup>e</sup> in all things human and divine." "Most true," he said. "Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence<sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 174 E, of the philosopher, *eis āpasan eiwthōs tēn γῆν βλέπειν*, and 173 E, *infra* 500 B-C. Cf. Marc. Aurel. vii. 35, Livy xxiv. 34 "Archimedes is erat unicus spectator caeli siderumque," Mayor, Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. p. 128.

For *πᾶς χρόνος* cf. *infra* 498 D, 608 C, *Phaedo* 107 C, *Gorg.* 525 C, *Apol.* 40 E, *Tim.* 36 E, 47 B, 90 D. Cf. Isoc. i. 11, Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 46.

τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον; Ἄδύνατον,  
 B ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται  
 ὁ τοιοῦτος; Ἕκιστα γε. Δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευ-  
 θέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ  
 ἂν μετείη. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμιος καὶ  
 μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδ' ἀνελεύθερος μηδ' ἀλαζῶν  
 μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθ' ὅπη ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος  
 γένοιτο; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν  
 φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθύς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψει, εἰ  
 ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἡμερος ἢ δυσκοινωνήτος καὶ  
 ἀγρία. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παρα-  
 C λείψεις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι. Τὸ ποῖον; Εὐμαθῆς ἢ δυσ-  
 μαθῆς. ἢ προσδοκᾶς ποτέ τινα τι ἰκανῶς ἂν  
 στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις  
 σμικρὸν ἀνύτων; Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. Τί δ'; εἰ  
 μηδὲν ὦν μάθοι σώζειν δύναίτο, λήθης ὦν πλέως,  
 ἄρ' ἂν οἷός τ' εἶη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι; Καὶ  
 πῶς; Ἄνονητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ, οἷει, ἀναγκασθή-  
 D σεται τελευτῶν αὐτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην  
 πράξιν; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἐπιλήσιμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν  
 ταῖς ἰκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ  
 μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι. Παντάπασι  
 μὲν οὖν. Ἄλλ' οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ  
 ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαίμεν ἔλκειν ἢ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1123 b 32, the great-souled man, ὃ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα, Diog. Laert. vii. 128 πάντων ὑπεράνω, Cic. *De fin.* iii. 8 "infra se omnia humana ducens." Cf. *infra* on 500 B-C.

For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and mankind cf. 604 B-C, 496 D-E, 500 B-C, 516 D, *Laws* 803 B. Cf. also *Laws* 708 E-709 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 B-C; *Laws* 727 D, 828 D, 881 A, *Gorg.* 522 E, *Phaedo* 77 E, *Crato* 43 B, *Apol.* 35 A,



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can deem this life of man a thing of great concern<sup>a</sup>?" "Impossible," said he. "Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?<sup>b</sup>" "Least of all." "Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy." "I think not." "What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains<sup>c</sup>?" "Impossible." "This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.<sup>d</sup>" "Assuredly." "Nor will you overlook this, I fancy." "What?" "Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully<sup>e</sup> and with little result<sup>f</sup> from much toil?" "That could not be." "And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion,<sup>g</sup> could he fail to be void of knowledge?" "How could he?" "And so, having all his labour for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation?" "Of course." "The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory." "By all means." "But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and propor-

40 c. Cf. Spinoza's "There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little as death."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra*, Vol. I. on 442 E.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 375 B.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laches* 189 A-B ἀγδῶς μανθάνων.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 144 B.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 144 B λήθης γέμοντες. Cf. Cleopatra's "Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony" (*Ant. and Cleo.* I. iii. 90).

εἰς ἀμετρίαν. Τί μήν; Ἀλήθειαν δὲ ἀμετρία ἡγεῖ ξυγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἔμμετρία; Ἐμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὐχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἐκά-  
 Ε στου τὸ αὐτοφυῆς εὐάγωγον παρέξει. Πῶς δ' οὐ;  
 Τί οὖν; μή πη δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα  
 ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἐπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ  
 μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἰκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ  
 487 μεταλήψεσθαι; Ἀναγκαιότατα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.  
 Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπῃ μέμψει τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδεύμα, ὃ μὴ  
 ποτ' ἂν τις οἶός τε γένοιτο ἰκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι,  
 εἰ μὴ φύσει εἶη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής,  
 εὐχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενῆς ἀληθείας, δικαιο-  
 σύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης; Οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος,  
 ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 τελειωθείσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδεία τε καὶ ἡλικία  
 ἄρα οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις;

III. Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη,  
 Β πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἶός τ' εἶη ἀντειπεῖν·  
 ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες

<sup>a</sup> ἰδέαν is not exactly "idea." Cf. *Cratyl.* 389 b, *What Plato Said*, p. 458 on *Euthyph.* 6 d, *ibid.* p. 560 on *Rep.* 369 a and p. 585 on *Parmen.* 130 c-d. Cf. *Class. Phil.* xx. (1925) p. 347.

<sup>b</sup> Lit. "following one upon the other." Cf. *Tim.* 27 c ἐπομένως, *Laws* 844 e.

<sup>c</sup> μεγαλοπρεπής is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here. For the list of qualities of the ideal student cf. also 503 c, *Theaet.* 144 a-b, and Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. p. 418. Cf. *Laws* 709 e on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and *Cic. Tusc.* v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education.

<sup>d</sup> The god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in Lucian's dialogues. Cf. Overbeck, *Schriftquellen*, p. 208,

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tion." "Certainly." "And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion?" "To proportion." "Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal<sup>a</sup> reality in all things." "Assuredly." "Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible<sup>b</sup> with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?" "Nay, most necessary," he said. "Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent,<sup>c</sup> gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety?" "Momus<sup>d</sup> himself," he said, "could not find fault with such a combination." "Well, then," said I, "when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them?"

III. And Adeimantus said, "No one, Socrates, would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you<sup>e</sup> n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, s.v. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70; and *Anth. Pal.* xvi. 262. 3-4:

αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος  
φθέγγεται, "Ἀκρητος, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ σοφίη,

"Momus himself will cry out 'Father Zeus, this was perfect skill.'" (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus, *Chiliad*, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet. *Epist.* i. 1, p. 239, ed. Boissonade.

\* Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 35, n. 236, and *What Plato Said*, p. 463 on *Crito* 46 v. A speaker in Plato may thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz' suggested emendation (*Platon*, ii. p. 205) ἀ ἀν λέγεις is due to a misunderstanding of this.

ἐκάστοτε ἂ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὡσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὐταύτης τινὸς ἐτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθές οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτη ἔχειν. λέγω δ' εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας. νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἂν τίς σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὄραν, ὅσοι ἂν

<sup>a</sup> A *locus classicus* for Plato's anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B, *Theaet.* 166 A-B, *Rep.* 609 C, 438-439, and Apelt, *Republic*, p. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates, e.g. *Demon.* 44.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Apelt, *Aufsätze*, p. 73, Minto, *Logic, Induction and Deduction*, pp. 4 ff.; also *Gorg.* 461 D, 462 A, *Soph.* 230 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus* 262 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *supra* 451 A, and *Theaet.* 166 A, 168 A, *infra* 534 C ἀπτῶτι.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 262 B, *Cleitophon* 410 A, *Gorg.* 495 A, schol., τοὺς πρώτους λόγους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δηλονότι, *Gorg.* 457 E οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες, and also Agathon in *Symp.* 201 B.

<sup>f</sup> For this figure cf. *Laws* 739 A, 820 C-D, 903 D, *Eryxias* 395 A-B, *Hipparchus* 229 E, Eurip. *Suppl.* 409.

Aristotle, *Soph. El.* 165 a 10 ff., borrows the metaphor, but his ψῆφοι are those of book-keeping or reckoning. Cf. also Dem. *De cor.* 227 f.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Hipp. Minor* 369 B-C and Grote ii. p. 64 "Though Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the conclusion"; also Apelt, p. 492, *supra* 357 A-B and *Laws* 903 A βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, and also *Hipparchus* 232 B for

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argue thus feel in this way <sup>a</sup>: They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer <sup>b</sup> they are at every question led astray <sup>c</sup> a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall <sup>d</sup> and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said <sup>e</sup>; and that just as by expert draught-players <sup>f</sup> the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome.<sup>g</sup> I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts <sup>h</sup> he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,<sup>i</sup>

the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In the *Ion*, 533 c, Ion says he cannot ἀντιλέγειν, but the fact remains that he knows Homer but not other poets. Cf. also 536 d. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon's *Novum Organum*, App. XIII. "(sylogismus) . . . assensum itaque constringit, non res." Cf. Cic. *De fin.* iv. 3, *Tusc.* i. 8. 16, and the proverbial οὐ γὰρ πείσεις, οὐδ' ἦν πείσης, Aristoph. *Plutus* 600.

<sup>a</sup> See *Soph.* 234 ε for a different application of the same idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid against eristic but not against dialectic. See *What Plato Said*, p. 534 on *Phaedo* 99 ε, and *supra* on 473 α; also *What Plato Said*, p. 625 on *Laws* 636 α.

A favourite formula of Aristotle runs, "This is true in theory and is confirmed by facts." Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1099 b 25, 1123 b 22, 1131 a 13, *Pol.* 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29, 1334 a 5-6.

<sup>i</sup> Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular view of philosophers cf. *Theaet.* 173 c ff., 174 c-d, *Gorg.* 484-486 c, *Phaedo* 64 β. Cf. also Isoc. *passim*, e.g. *Antid.* 250, 312.



ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὀρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι  
 D ἔνεκα ἀφάμενοι νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ  
 μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσι, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ  
 πάνυ ἀλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονή-  
 ρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δ' ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας  
 ὁμῶς τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὐ σὺ  
 ἐπαινεῖς πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνο-  
 μένους. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, Οἶε οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς  
 ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς,  
 E ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι. Ἀκούοις  
 ἂν, ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τάληθῆ λέγειν. Πῶς οὖν,  
 ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παύ-  
 σονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι  
 ἄρξωσιν, οὓς ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι;  
 Ἐρωτᾶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρί-  
 σεως δι' εἰκόνας λεγομένης. Σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι,  
 οὐκ εἴωθας δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν.

IV. Εἶεν, εἶπον· σκώπτεις ἐμβεβληκῶς με εἰς  
 λόγον οὕτω δυσαπόδεικτον; ἄκουε δ' οὖν τῆς  
 488 εἰκόνας, ἵν' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς, ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω.  
 οὕτω γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ὃ  
 πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πεπόνθασιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν  
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον πεπονθός, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ πολ-  
 λῶν αὐτὸ ξυναγαγεῖν εἰκάζοντα καὶ ἀπολογοῦ-

<sup>a</sup> The perfect tense is ironical in *Crat.* 384 B, serious in *Laws* 670 A-B. In *Gorg.* 485 A it is replaced by ὅσον παιδείας χάριν.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 506 on *Gorg.* 484 c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Euthydem.* 306 E, *Protag.* 346 A, and for the idea without the word, *Soph.* 216 c.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Eurip. Medea* 299, and on 489 v.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *supra* 487 A. In *Euthydem.* 307 B Plato uses both ἐπιτήδευμα and πρᾶγμα.



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not merely touching upon it to complete their education <sup>a</sup> and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long <sup>b</sup> in the study of it, the majority become cranks, <sup>c</sup> not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless <sup>d</sup> to society by the pursuit <sup>e</sup> which you commend." And I, on hearing this, said, "Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so?" "I don't know," said he, "but I would gladly hear your opinion." "You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true." "How, then," he replied, "can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers?" "Your question," I said, "requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable. <sup>f</sup>" "And you," he said, "of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!"

IV. "So," said I, "you are making fun of me after driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my comparison so that you may still better see how I strain after <sup>g</sup> imagery. For so cruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to the state that there is no single thing <sup>h</sup> like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them one must bring together many things in such a com-

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 517 D, *Laws* 644 c, *Symp.* 215 A with Bury's note. Cf. the parable of the great beast *infra* 493, and of the many-headed beast, 588-589.

<sup>g</sup> The word *γλισχροῦς* is untranslatable, and often misunderstood. In 553 c it means "stingily"; in *Cratyl.* 414 c it is used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 c, usually misunderstood; in *Crito* 53 E of clinging to life; cf. *Phaedo* 117 A; in Plutarch, *De Is. et Osir.* 28 of a strained allegory and *ibid.* 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph. *Peace* 482 of a dog.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *Laws* 747 B.

## PLATO

μενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἶον οἱ γραφεῖς τραγελάφους  
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μιγνύντες γράφουσι. νόησον γὰρ  
τοιουτονὶ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεῶν πέρι εἴτε  
μίας· ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ ῥώμῃ ὑπὲρ τοὺς  
B ἐν τῇ νηϊ πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὄρωντα ὡς-  
αὐτως βραχύ τι καὶ γινώσκοντα περὶ ναυτικῶν  
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς  
ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἕκαστον οἴομενον  
δεῖν κυβερνᾶν, μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην  
μήτε ἔχοντα ἀποδείξαι διδάσκαλον ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ  
χρόνον ἐν ᾧ ἐμάνθανε, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας  
μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς  
C διδακτὸν ἐτοιμούς κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῶ  
ἀεὶ τῶ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι δεομένους καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Horace, *Ars Poetica*, *init.*; *What Plato Said*, p. 550 on *Phaedr.* 229 D-E, and *infra* 588 c f. The expression is still used, or revived, in Modern Greek newspapers.

<sup>b</sup> The syntax of this famous allegory is anacoluthic and perhaps uncertain: but there need be no doubt about the meaning. Cf. my article in the *Classical Review*, xx. (1906) p. 247.

Huxley commends the allegory, *Methods and Results*, p. 313. Cf. also Carlyle's famous metaphor of the ship doubling Cape Horn by ballot. Cf. *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 362.

<sup>c</sup> The Athenian demos, as portrayed *e.g.* in Aristophanes' *Knights* 40 ff. and *passim.* Cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1406 b 35 καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὁμοῖος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῶ μὲν ὑποκώφῳ δέ, Polyb. vi. 44 ἀεὶ γὰρ ποτε τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παραπλήσιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀδεσπῶτοις σκάφεσι, etc. Cf. the old sailor in Joseph Conrad's *Chance*, ch. i. "No ship navigated . . . in the happy-go-lucky manner . . . would ever arrive into port."

For the figure of the ship of state cf. *Polit.* 302 A ff., 299 B, *Euthydem.* 291 D, Aesch. *Seven against Thebes* 2-3, Theognis 670-685, Horace, *Odes* i. 15 with my note, Urwick,

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bination as painters mix when they portray goat-stags<sup>a</sup> and similar creatures. <sup>b</sup> Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one: Picture a shipmaster<sup>c</sup> in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship, but who is slightly deaf<sup>d</sup> and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with<sup>e</sup> his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher<sup>f</sup> or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all,<sup>g</sup> but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone<sup>h</sup> who says that it can be taught, and meanwhile they are always clustered about<sup>i</sup> the shipmaster importuning him and sticking

*The Message of Plato*, pp. 110-111, Ruskin, *Time and Tide*, xiii: "That the governing authority should be in the hands of a true and trained pilot is as clear and as constant. In none of these conditions is there any difference between a nation and a boat's company." Cf. Longfellow's *The Building of the Ship*, in *fine*. Cf. *Laws* 758 A, 945 C.

For the criticism of democracy by a figure cf. also *Polit.* 297 E ff.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 42-44.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 390 C, 426 D, 498 B, *Theaet.* 167 B, and Milton's "unknown and like esteemed," *Comus* 630.

<sup>f</sup> For this and similar checks on pretenders to knowledge cf. *Laches* 185 E, 186 A and C, *Alc. I.* 109 D and *Gorg.* 514 B-C.

<sup>g</sup> Plato of course believed that virtue or the political art can be taught in a reformed state, but practically was not taught at Athens. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 14, *infra* on 518 D, *What Plato Said*, pp. 70 and 511, Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* p. 397, Thompson on *Meno* 70 A.

<sup>h</sup> A hint of the fate of Socrates. Cf. *infra* 517 A, 494 E, and *Euthyphro* 3 E.

<sup>i</sup> The participle *περικεχυμένους* occurs in *Polit.* 268 C, but is avoided here by *anacoluthon*.

πάντα ποιούντας, ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίοτε δ' ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν ἀλλὰ ἄλλοι μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀποκτείνοντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς, τὸν δὲ γενναῖον ναύκληρον μανδραγόρα ἢ μέθη ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ ξυμποδίσαντας τῆς νεώς ἄρχειν χρωμένους τοῖς ἐνοῦσι, καὶ πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἶκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντας ναυτικὸν D μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν, ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ᾗ, ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχρηστον, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου πέρι μηδ' ἐπαίοντας,<sup>1</sup> ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ

<sup>1</sup> ἐπαίοντας c, ἐπαίοντες AFDM.

<sup>a</sup> For the idiom πάντα ποιεῖν cf. *Euthyph.* 8 c, *infra* 504 D-E, 571 c, 575 E, 494 E, *Gorg.* 479 c, *Phaedr.* 252 E, *Apol.* 39 A, and, slightly varied, Eurip. *Heracleidae* 841.

<sup>b</sup> The word ἐκβάλλοντας helps the obvious allegory, for it also means banish.

<sup>c</sup> Here figurative. Cf. *Gorg.* 482 E, *Theaet.* 165 E. *Infra* 615 E it is used literally.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 297 E. The expression is slightly ironical. Such is frequently the tone of γενναῖος in Plato. Cf. *Rep.* 454 A, 363 A, 544 C, 348 C, *Hipp. Min.* 370 D, *Soph.* 231 B, *Hipp. Maj.* 290 E, *Polit.* 274 E.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 302 A, *Laws* 906 E, Jebb on *Soph. Antig.* 189-190.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 407 D with Thucyd. iv. 26, vi. 69, vii. 25.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 427 E, *Laws* 905 c, *Eryx.* 396 E, Aristoph. *Knights* 229.

<sup>h</sup> Neither here nor in D-E can ὅπως with the future mean "in what way," and all interpretations based on that assumption are plainly wrong. The expression in both cases refers to getting control. Cf. 338 E, *Laws* 757 D, 714 C, 962 D-E, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 14. 5. Cf. *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) pp. 358 and 362.

<sup>i</sup> For τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον cf. *Ale. II.* 145 c.

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at nothing<sup>a</sup> to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out<sup>b</sup> from the ship, and then, after binding<sup>c</sup> and stupefying the worthy shipmaster<sup>d</sup> with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage<sup>e</sup> of it as is to be expected<sup>f</sup> from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand<sup>g</sup> in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule,<sup>h</sup> while the man who lacks this craft<sup>i</sup> they censure as useless. They have no suspicion<sup>j</sup> that the true pilot must give his attention<sup>k</sup> to the time of the year,

<sup>j</sup> The ppl. must refer to the sailors; hence the acc. (see crit. note).

Whatever the text and the amount of probable anacoluthon in this sentence, the meaning is that the unruly sailors (the mob) have no true conception of the state of mind of the real pilot (the philosophic statesman), and that it is he (adopting Sidgwick's *ολομένω* for the ms. *ολόμενοι* in ε) who does not believe that the trick of getting possession of the helm is an art, or that, if it were, he could afford time to practise it. Those who read *ολόμενοι* attribute the idea of the incompatibility of the two things to the sailors. But that overlooks the points I have already made about *δπως*, and *τέχνη* and is in any case improbable, because the sentence as a whole is concerned with the attitude of the true pilot (statesman), which may be represented by the words of Burke to his constituents, "I could hardly serve you as I have done and court you too."

*Cf.* Sidgwick, "On a Passage in Plato's *Republic*," *Journal of Philology*, v. pp. 274-276, and my notes in *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 364 and xvi. p. 234.

<sup>k</sup> For the force of the article *cf.* Thucyd. ii. 65 τὸ ἐπιφθορον λαμβάνει, and my article in *T.A.P.A.* 1893, p. 81, n. 6. *Cf.* also *Charm.* 156 ε and *Rep.* 496 ε.



καὶ ὠρῶν καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρον καὶ πνευμάτων  
καὶ πάντων τῶν τῆ τέχνη προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει  
τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει  
E εἴαν τέ τινες βούλωνται εἴαν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τού-  
του μήτε μελέτην οἰομένω<sup>1</sup> δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν  
ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν. τοιούτων δὴ περὶ τὰς  
ναῦς γιγνομένων τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ  
ἡγεῖ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην  
489 καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς  
οὔτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτῆρων; Καὶ  
μάλα, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος. Οὐ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἶμαι  
δεῖσθαι σε ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς  
πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινούς φιλοσόφους τὴν διά-  
θεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μαθάνειν ὁ λέγω. Καὶ μάλα,  
ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα,  
ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι,  
δίδασκέ τε τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν, ὅτι πολὺ  
B ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν, εἰ ἐτιμῶντο. Ἄλλὰ διδάξω,

<sup>1</sup> οἰομένω Sidgwick : οἰόμενοι mss.

<sup>a</sup> ὅπως . . . κυβερνήσει. Cf. p. 20, note h.

<sup>b</sup> The translation gives the right meaning. Cf. *infra* 518 D, and the examples collected in my emendation of *Gorgias* 503 D in *Class. Phil.* x. (1915) 325-326. The contrast between subjects which do and those which do not admit of constitution as an art and science is ever present to Plato's mind, as appears from the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedrus*. And he would normally express the idea by a genitive with *τέχνη*. Cf. *Protag.* 357 A, *Phaedrus* 260 E,



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the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm <sup>a</sup> with or without the consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art <sup>b</sup> and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation. With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed <sup>c</sup> be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?" "Quite so," said Adeimantus. "You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof <sup>d</sup> and show that the condition <sup>e</sup> we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers." "It is indeed," he said. "To begin with, then, teach this parable <sup>f</sup> to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honoured in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising if they were honoured." "I

also *Class. Rev.* xx. (1906) p. 247. See too Cic. *De or.* i. 4 "neque aliquod praeceptum artis esse arbitrentur," and *infra* 518 D.

<sup>c</sup> τῶ ὄντι verifies the allusion to the charge that Socrates was a babbler and a star-gazer or weather-prophet. Cf. *Soph.* 225 D, *Polit.* 299 B, and *What Plato Said*, p. 527 on *Phaedo* 70 c; Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 1480.

<sup>d</sup> Plato like some modern writers is conscious of his own imagery and frequently interprets his own symbols. Cf. 517 A-B, 531 B, 588 B, *Gorg.* 493 D, 517 D, *Phaedo* 87 B, *Laws* 644 c, *Meno* 72 A-B, *Tim.* 19 B, *Polit.* 297 E. Cf. also the cases where he says he cannot tell what it is but only what it is like, e.g. *Rep.* 506 E, *Phaedr.* 246 A, *Symp.* 215 A 5.

<sup>e</sup> δίαθεσις and ἔξις are not discriminated by Plato as by Aristotle.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 476 D-E.

ἔφη. Καὶ ὅτι τοίνυν τἀληθῆ λέγει, ὡς ἄχρηστοι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπεικέστατοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ· τῆς μέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο κομφευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές πέφυκεν, ἔάν τε πλούσιος ἔάν τε πένης κάμνη, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας  
 C ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναμένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων ἄρχεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τι ὄφελος ᾖ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς νῦν πολιτικούς ἄρχοντας ἀπεικάζων οἷς ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν ναύταις οὐχ ἁμαρτήσῃ, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀχρήστους λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολόσχας

<sup>a</sup> This passage illustrates one of the most interesting characteristics of Plato's style, namely the representation of thought as adventure or action. This procedure is, or was, familiar to modern readers in Matthew Arnold's account in *God and the Bible* of his quest for the meaning of God, which in turn is imitated in Mr. Updegraff's *New Word*. It lends vivacity and interest to Pascal's *Provinciales* and many other examples of it can be found in modern literature. The classical instance of it in Plato is Socrates' narrative in the *Phaedo* of his search for a satisfactory explanation of natural phenomena, 96 A ff. In the *Sophist* the argument is represented as an effort to track and capture the sophist. And the figure of the hunt is common in the dialogues (cf. *supra* Vol. I. p. 365). Cf. also *Rep.* 455 A-B, 474 B, 588 C-D, 612 c, *Euthyd.* 291 A-B, 293 A, *Phileb.* 24 A ff., 43 A, 44 D, 45 A, *Laws* 892 D-E, *Theaet.* 169 D, 180 E, 196 D, *Polit.* 265 B, etc.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 487 D. Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 3

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will teach him,"<sup>a</sup> he said. "And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirits among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness,<sup>b</sup> not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural<sup>c</sup> course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich.<sup>d</sup> The author of that epigram<sup>e</sup> was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be governed<sup>f</sup> to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything.<sup>g</sup> But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we were just describing, and those whom these call useless

"I am not sure that I do not think this the fault of our community rather than of the men of culture."

<sup>a</sup> For the idiom φύσει έχει cf. 473 A, Herod. ii. 45, Dem. ii. 26. Similarly έχει λόγον, *Rep.* 378 E, 491 D, 564 A, 610 A, *Phaedo* 62 B and D, *Gorg.* 501 A, etc.

<sup>b</sup> This saying was attributed to Simonides. Cf. schol. Hermann, *Plato*, vol. vi. p. 346, Joel, *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates*, ii.<sup>1</sup> p. 81, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1391 a 8. Cf. *Phaedr.* 245 A ἐπὶ ποιητικᾶς θύρας, Thompson on *Phaedr.* 233 E, *supra* 364 B ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας, *Laws* 953 D ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας, and for the idea cf. also *infra* 568 A and *Theaet.* 170 A, *Timon of Athens* iv. iii. 17 "The learned pate ducks to the golden fool."

<sup>c</sup> For Plato's attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-Socratics cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 68-69.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 170 B and *infra* 590 C-D.

<sup>e</sup> For the idiom with ὄφελος cf. 530 C, 567 B, *Euthyphro* 4 E, *Apol.* 36 C, *Crito* 46 A, *Euthydem.* 289 A, *Soph. O.C.* 259, where it is varied.

τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις. Ὁρθότατα, ἔφη.  
 Ἔκ τε τοίνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ῥάδιον  
 εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτηδεύμα ὑπὸ τῶν  
 D τὰναντία ἐπιτηδευόντων, πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ  
 ἰσχυροτάτη διαβολὴ γίνεται φιλοσοφία διὰ τοὺς  
 τὰ τοιαῦτα φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, οὓς δὴ σὺ φῆς  
 τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὡς παμπόνηροι  
 οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἰόντων ἐπ' αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐπι-  
 εικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ  
 σε λέγειν. ἦ γάρ; Ναί.

V. Οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τὴν  
 αἰτίαν διεληλύθαμεν; Καὶ μάλα. Τῆς δὲ τῶν  
 πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ  
 τοῦτο διέλθωμεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτου φιλοσοφία  
 E αἰτία, ἂν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι; Πάνυ  
 μὲν οὖν. Ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν  
 ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διῆμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἀνάγ-  
 490 κη φῦναι τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐσόμενον. ἠγείτο  
 δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ νῶ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν  
 διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλαζόνι  
 ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς. Ἦν  
 γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῦτο  
 σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις  
 περὶ αὐτοῦ; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ  
 μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὄν πεφυκῶς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 173 c, why speak of unworthy philosophers? and *infra* 495 c ff.

<sup>b</sup> Possibly "wooters." Cf. 347 c, 521 b. Plato frequently employs the language of physical love in speaking of philosophy. Cf. *infra* 495-496, 490 b, *Theaet.* 148 e ff., *Phaedo* 66 e, *Meno* 70 b, *Phaedr.* 266 b, etc.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 169 d.

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and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots." "Just so," he said. "Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders <sup>a</sup> to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers <sup>b</sup> are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted <sup>c</sup> that what you said was true. Is not that so?" "Yes."

V. "Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort?" "We have." "Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy is not to be blamed for this either?" "By all means." "Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be a scholar and gentleman <sup>d</sup> must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. *That* he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of <sup>e</sup> being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy." "Yes, that was said." "Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him?" "It is indeed," he said. "Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive

<sup>d</sup> The quality of the *καλὸς κἀγαθός* gave rise to the abstraction *καλοκἀγαθία* used for the moral ideal in the Eudemean Ethics. Cf. *Isoc. Demon.* 6, 13, and 51. Stewart on *Eth. Nic.* 1124 a 4 (p. 339) and 1179 b 10 (p. 460).

<sup>e</sup> For *ἤ* = "or else" cf. *Prot.* 323 A and C, *Phaedr.* 237 c, 239 A, 245 D, *Gorg.* 494 A, *Crat.* 426 B, etc.

εἴη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ὃ γε ὄντως φιλομαθῆς, καὶ οὐκ  
 B ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἐκά-  
 στοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι  
 τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς  
 φύσεως ἄψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι  
 τοῦ τοιούτου· προσήκει δὲ ξυγγενεῖ· ᾧ πλησιάσας  
 καὶ μιγείς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλή-  
 θειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῶη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ  
 οὕτω λήγοι ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ. 'Ὡς οἶόν τ', ἔφη,  
 μετριώτατα. Τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦδος  
 C ἀγαπᾶν ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον μισεῖν; Μισεῖν, ἔφη.  
 'Ἦγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἂν ποτε, οἶμαι,  
 φαίμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθηῆσαι. Πῶς  
 γάρ; 'Ἄλλ' ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ  
 σωφροσύνην ἔπεσθαι. 'Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Καὶ δὴ τὸν  
 ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν  
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάπτειν; μέμνησαι γάρ  
 που, ὅτι ξυνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγα-  
 λοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη· καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλα-  
 D βομένου, ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται ὁμολογεῖν  
 οἷς λέγομεν, ἐάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς  
 ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, φαίη ὄραν αὐτῶν  
 τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς  
 πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκο-

<sup>a</sup> Similar metaphors for contact, approach and intercourse with the truth are frequent in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. For Plato cf. Campbell on *Theaet.* 150 B and 186 A. Cf. also *supra* on 489 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 65 E f., *Symp.* 211 E-212 A.

<sup>c</sup> Lit. "be nourished." Cf. *Protag.* 313 C-D, *Soph.* 223 E, *Phaedr.* 248 B.

<sup>d</sup> A Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor. Cf. *Theaet.* 148 E ff., 151 A, and *passim*, *Symp.* 206 E, *Epist.* ii. 313 A, *Epictet. Diss.* i. 22. 17.



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emulously for true being and that he would not linger over the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with<sup>a</sup> the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs<sup>b</sup> to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow,<sup>c</sup> and so find surcease from his travail<sup>d</sup> of soul, but not before?”

“No plea could be fairer.” “Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, or, quite the contrary, hate it?”

“Hate it,” he said. “When truth led the way, no choir<sup>e</sup> of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train.” “How could it?” “But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance.” “Right,” he said. “What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory.<sup>f</sup> And when you interposed the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements,<sup>g</sup> yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the

<sup>a</sup> For the figurative use of the word *χορός* cf. 560 E, 580 B, *Euthydem.* 279 C, *Theaet.* 173 B.

<sup>f</sup> For the list of virtues cf. *supra* on 487 A.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. for the use of the dative *Polit.* 258 A *συγχωρεῖς οὖν οἷς λέγει*, *Phaedo* 100 C *τῇ τοιαύτῃ αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς*, Horace, *Sat.* ii. 3. 305 “stultum me fateor, liceat concedere veris.”

ποῦντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ' οἱ πολλοὶ  
κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν  
τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
E ὠρισάμεθα. "Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.

VI. Ταύτης δὴ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς φύσεως δεῖ  
θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλλυται ἐν πολλοῖς,  
σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει, οὗς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηροὺς,  
ἀχρήστους δὲ καλοῦσι· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὰς  
491 μιμουμένας ταύτην καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθιστα-  
μένας αὐτῆς, οἷαι οὔσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον  
καὶ μείζον ἑαυτῶν ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπιτήδευμα, πολ-  
λαχῆ πλημμελοῦσαι, πανταχῆ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας  
δόξαν οἷαν λέγεις φιλοσοφία προσῆψαν. Τίνας δέ,  
ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις; Ἐγώ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν  
οἶός τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι διελθεῖν. τότε μὲν  
οὖν, οἶμαι, πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην φύσιν  
καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν, ὅσα προσετάξαμεν νῦν δὴ,  
B εἰ τελέως μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκις  
ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας· ἢ οὐκ οἶει;  
Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς  
πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι. Τίνας δὴ; Ὁ μὲν  
πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν ἕκαστον  
ῶν ἐπηνέσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν ἔχουσαν  
ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποσπᾶ φιλοσοφίας· λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν,  
σωφροσύνην, καὶ πάντα ἃ διήλθομεν. "Ἄτοπον,  
C ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι. "Ἐτι τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς

<sup>a</sup> Le petit nombre des élus. Cf. *infra* 496 A-B and *Phaedo* 69 c-d, *Matt.* xx. 16, xxii. 14.

<sup>b</sup> For the Greek double use of *ἀξιος* and *ἀνάξιος* cf. *Laws* 943 e, *Aesch. Ag.* 1527. Cf. "How worthily he died who died unworthily" and Wyatt's line "Disdain me not without desert."

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cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be?" "That is so," he said.

VI. "We have, then," I said, "to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes,<sup>a</sup> even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high<sup>b</sup> for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak." "Of what corruptions are you speaking?" "I will try," I said, "to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point, that a nature such as we just now postulated for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don't you think so?" "Most emphatically." "Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few." "What are they?" "The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.<sup>c</sup>" "That does sound like a paradox," said he. "Furthermore," said I,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Burton, *Anatomy*, i. 1 "This St. Austin acknowledgeth of himself in his humble confessions, promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God's good gifts, but he did not use them to his glory."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Meno* 88 A-C, and Seneca, *Ep.* v. 7 "multa bona nostra nobis nocent."

τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾶ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ ξυγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεία· ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω. "Ἐχω, ἔφη· καὶ ἡδέως γ' ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἂ λέγεις πυθόμην. Λαβοῦ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, καὶ σοι εὐδηλὸν τε φανέεται καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα δόξει τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, D κελεύεις; Παντός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σπέρματος περὶ ἢ φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων, ἴσμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἧς προσήκει ἐκάστῳ μηδ' ὥρας μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσω ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον ἦ, τοσοῦτω πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων· ἀγαθῷ γὰρ που κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; "Ἐχει δὴ, οἶμαι, λόγον, τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρα οὔσαν τροφῇ κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης. "Ἐχει. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδεί- E μαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφυστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίνεσθαι; ἢ οἶει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῆ διολομένης γίνεσθαι,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 479 on *Charm.* 158 A. For "goods" cf. *ibid.* p. 629 on *Laws* 697 B. The minor or earlier dialogues constantly lead up to the point that goods are no good divorced from wisdom, or the art to use them rightly, or the political or royal art, or the art that will make us happy. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 71.

<sup>b</sup> This is for Plato's purpose a sufficiently clear statement of the distinction between contradictory and contrary opposition. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern logician's table of the opposition of propositions. But it is a misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say that he never got clear on the matter. He always understood

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“all the so-called goods<sup>a</sup> corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and powerful family connexions in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning?” “I do,” he said, “and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it.” “Well,” said I, “grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange.” “How do you bid me proceed?” he said. “We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good.<sup>b</sup>” “Of course.” “So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse<sup>c</sup> than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it.” “It is.” “Then,” said I, “Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature<sup>d</sup> and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its it. Cf. *Symp.* 202 A-B, and *supra* on 437 A-B, *What Plato Said*, p. 595 on *Soph.* 257 B, and *ibid.* p. 563 on *Rep.* 436 B ff.

<sup>c</sup> “Corruptio optimi pessima.” Cf. 495 A-B, *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 24, iv. 1. 3-4, Dante, *Inferno*, vi. 106:

Ed egli a me: Ritorna a tua scienza  
Che vuol, quanto la cosa è più perfetta,  
Più senta il bene e così la doglienza.

Cf. *Livy* xxxviii. 17 “generosius in sua quidquid sede gignitur: insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura vertente se, degenerat,” *Pausanias* vii. 17. 3.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 495 B; La Rochefoucauld, *Max.* 130 “la faiblesse est le seul défaut qu’on ne saurait corriger” and 467 “la faiblesse est plus opposée à la vertu que le vice.”

ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι; Οὐκ, ἀλλά, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως.

492 Ἦν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μὲν, οἶμαι, μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρείσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα τρέφῃται, εἰς πάντα τὰναντία αὐτῆς, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ. ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεί, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δὲ τινὰς σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστὰς, παιδεύειν δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἷους βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; Πότε δὴ; ἢ δ' ὅς. Ὅταν, εἶπον, ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἄθροοι οἱ πολλοὶ<sup>1</sup> εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ

<sup>1</sup> οἱ πολλοὶ Hermann: πολλοὶ mss., οἱ secl. Cobet.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* 497 B, *Tim.* 42 D.

<sup>b</sup> This is the θεῖα μοῖρα of 493 A and *Meno* 99 E. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 517.

<sup>c</sup> See *What Plato Said*, pp. 12 ff. and on *Meno* 93-94. Plato again anticipates many of his modern critics. Cf. Grote's defence of the sophists *passim*, and Mill, *Utility of Religion* (*Three Essays on Religion*, pp. 78, 84 ff.).

<sup>d</sup> ἰδιωτικούς refers to individual sophists as opposed to the great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 D, 493 A, 494 A.

<sup>e</sup> For καὶ ἄξιον λόγου cf. *Euthydem.* 279 C, *Laches* 192 A, *Laws* 908 B, *supra* 445 C, *Thucyd.* ii. 54. 5, *Aristot. Pol.* 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, *De part. an.* 654 a 13, *Demosth.* v. 16, *Isoc.* vi. 56.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 490 B, Emerson, *Self-Reliance*: "It is easy . . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. . . . But . . . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the



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nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil?" "No," he said, "that is the case." "Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown<sup>a</sup> and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue.<sup>b</sup> Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists,<sup>c</sup> and that there are sophists in private life<sup>d</sup> who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,<sup>e</sup> and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart's desire young and old, men and women?" "When?" said he. "Why, when," I said, "the multitude are seated together<sup>f</sup> in assemblies or in court-rooms or theatres or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd,

bottom of society is made to grow and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment," Carlyle, *French Revolution*: "Great is the combined voice of men. . . . He who can resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time."

For the public as the great sophist cf. Brimley, *Essays*, p. 224 (The Angel in the House): "The miserable view of life and its purposes which society instils into its youth of both sexes, being still, as in Plato's time, the sophist *par excellence* of which all individual talking and writing sophists are but feeble copies." Cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.*<sup>4</sup> II. 1. 601 "Die sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Konsequenz der Gewöhnlichen." This is denied by some recent critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions*, iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275.

For Plato's attitude toward the sophists see also *Polit.* 303 c, *Phaedr.* 260 c, *What Plato Said*, pp. 14-15, 158.

τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς αἶ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου. ἐν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἶει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ ποίαν ἂν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ροῦν, ἣ ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροῦ εἶναι,

D καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσσεσθαι τοιοῦτον; Πολλή, ἣ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.

VII. Καὶ μὴν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὐπω τὴν μεγίστην ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν. Ποίαν; ἔφη. Ἦν ἔργῳ προστιθέασι, λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες, οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταί τε καὶ σοφισταί. ἢ οὐκ οἴσθα, ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσιν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα. Τίνα οὖν ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἶει ἢ ποίους ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους

E ἐναντία τούτοις τείνοντας κρατήσειν; Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδένα, ἣ δ' ὅς. Οὐ γάρ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια. οὔτε γὰρ γίνεταί οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται [ἄλλο ἢ<sup>1</sup>] ἄλλοιον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν

<sup>1</sup> ἄλλο ἢ was added by Hermann, unnecessarily.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Eurip. *Orest.* 901, they shouted ὡς καλῶς λέγοι, also *Euthydem.* 303 B οἱ κλοῦες, 276 B and D, Shorey on Horace, *Odes* i. 20. 7 "datus in theatro cum tibi plausus," and also the account of the moulding process in *Protag.* 323-326.

<sup>b</sup> What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would he feel? Cf. Shorey in *Class. Phil.* v. (1910) pp. 220-221, *Iliad* xxiv. 367, *Theognis* 748 καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων; *Symp.*

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and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamour and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.<sup>a</sup> In such case how do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?<sup>b</sup> What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm<sup>c</sup> the same things that they do to be honourable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they?" "That is quite inevitable, Socrates," he said.

VII. "And, moreover," I said, "we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion." "What is it?" said he. "That which these 'educators' and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don't you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death?" "They most emphatically do," he said. "What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think will prevail in opposition to these?" "None, I fancy," said he. "No," said I, "the very attempt<sup>d</sup> is the height of folly. For there is not, never has been and never will be,<sup>e</sup> a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running

219 D 3 τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν; Eurip. *I.A.* 1173 τίνα ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἔξειν δοκεῖς;

<sup>a</sup> Adam translates as if it were *καὶ φήσει*. Cf. my "Platonism and the History of Science," *Amer. Philos. Soc. Proc.* lxvi. p. 174 n. See Stallbaum *ad loc.*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 317 A-B, *Soph.* 239 c, *Laws* 818 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Od.* xvi. 437. See Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. 386 n. who says ἀλλοῖον γίγνεσθαι can only = ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, "be made different."

πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε· θεῖον μέντοι  
 κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου· εὐ γὰρ  
 493 χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὃ τί περ ἂν σωθῆ ἢ τε καὶ γένηται οἶον  
 δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν  
 αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς. Οὐδ' ἔμοι  
 ἄλλως, ἔφη, δοκεῖ. Ἔπι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. Τὸ ποῖον; Ἐκα-  
 στος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὔτοι  
 σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ  
 ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα,  
 ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην  
 καλεῖν· οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ  
 ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργὰς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας  
 Β κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπῃ τε προσελθεῖν χρὴ καὶ ὅπῃ  
 ἄψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅποτε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πραό-  
 τατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ'  
 οἷς ἐκάστας εἶωθε φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἷας αὖ ἄλλου  
 φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, κατα-  
 μαθῶν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ξύνουσία τε καὶ χρόνου  
 τριβῆ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησά-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 529 c for the idiom, and *Laws* 696 A οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 176 c (of Socrates), *Phaedr.* 242 B, *Theaet.* 162 D-E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra* on 492 A, *Apol.* 33 c, *Phaedo* 58 E, *Protag.* 328 E, *Meno* 99 E, *Phaedr.* 244 C, *Laws* 642 c, 875 c, *Ion* 534 c.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Arnold, Preface to *Essays in Criticism*; *Phaedo* 60 D, *Laws* 817 B, *On Virtue* 376 D.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Epist.* v. 321 D ἔστιν γὰρ δὴ τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης καθάπερ ἐτινων ζώων, "each form of government has a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal" (tr. L. A. Post), Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the *Republic* which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici*, ii. 1 "If there be any among those common

counter to theirs<sup>a</sup>—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.<sup>b</sup> And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God<sup>c</sup> preserves it you will not be speaking ill.” “Neither do I think otherwise,” he said. “Then,” said I, “think this also in addition.” “What?” “Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,<sup>d</sup> inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humours and desires of a great strong beast<sup>e</sup> which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle; yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct

objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra,” Horace, *Epist.* i. 1. 76 “belua multorum es capitum.” Also Hamilton’s “Sir, your people is a great beast,” Sidney, *Arcadia*, bk. ii. “Many-headed multitude,” Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 172 “. . . like Plato’s sophist is learning what the public is and is beginning to understand ‘the passions and desires’ of that ‘huge and powerful brute,’” Shakes. *Coriolanus* iv. i. 2 “The beast with many heads Butts me away,” *ibid.* ii. iii. 18 “The many-headed multitude.” For the idea cf. also *Gorg.* 501 B-C ff., *Phaedr.* 260 C δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, “having studied the opinions of the multitude,” Isoc. ii. 49-50.



μενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζώου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκείνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχει λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακῶς εἶη μήτε ἄλλῃ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν πρὸς Διὸς οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής; Ἐμοιγ', ἔφη. Ἡ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ξυνιόντων ὄργην καὶ ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέαι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ' ἐν γραφικῇ εἴτ' ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; | ὅτι μὲν γάρ, ἐάν τις τούτοις ὀμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἢ ποιήσιν ἢ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει διακονίαν, κυρίου αὐτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἢ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὗτοι ἐπαινώσιν· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἥδη

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, *ibid.* xxiii. (1928) p. 361 (*Tim.* 75 D), *What Plato Said*, p. 616 on *Tim.* 47 E, *Aristot. Eth.* 1120 b 1 οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, Emerson, *Circles*, "Accept the actual for the necessary," Eurip. *I.A.* 724 καλῶς ἀναγκαῖως τε. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 miss the meaning. Cf. *supra* Bk. I. on 347 c, Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, *Protrept.* Teubner 148 K. ἀγνοοῦντος . . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, "not knowing how divergent have always been the good and the necessary."



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thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honourable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honourable,<sup>a</sup> never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator ? ” “ I do,” he said. “ Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics ? | For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry<sup>b</sup> or any other product of his craft or any political service,<sup>c</sup> and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable,<sup>d</sup> the proverbial necessity of Diomedes<sup>e</sup> will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honourable, have you ever heard an

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 659 B, 701 A, *Gorg.* 502 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 371 c, *Gorg.* 517 B, 518 B.

<sup>d</sup> Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. Cf. *Phaedo* 64 E καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, *infra* 558 D-E, 500 D, 383 c.

<sup>e</sup> The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes' binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on *Aristoph. Eccl.* 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, *Pausanias*, ii. p. 264.

πώποτε του ἤκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ  
 Ε καταγέλαστον; Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ'  
 ἀκούσομαι.

VIII. Ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκείνο  
 ἀναμνήσθητι· αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ  
 καλά, ἢ αὐτὸ τι ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα,  
 ἔσθ' ὅπως πλῆθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἠγήσεται εἶναι;  
 "Ἡκιστά γ', ἔφη. Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 494 πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. Ἀδύνατον. Καὶ τοὺς  
 φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν.  
 Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι  
 προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλω ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.  
 Δῆλον. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὄρᾳς σωτηρίαν  
 φιλοσόφῳ φύσει, ὥστ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μεί-  
 νασαν πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐννόει δ' ἐκ τῶν ἔμ-  
 Β προσθεν. ὠμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ  
 μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι  
 τῆς φύσεως. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν εὐθύς ἐν παισὶν ὁ  
 τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν ἅπασιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ  
 εἰάν τὸ σῶμα φυῆ προσφερῆς τῇ ψυχῇ; Τί δ' οὐ  
 μέλλει; ἔφη. Βουλήσονται δὴ, οἶμαι, αὐτῷ χρῆ-

<sup>a</sup> καταγέλαστον is a strong word. "Make the very jack-  
 asses laugh" would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, *Past and  
 Present*, iv. "Impartial persons have to say with a sigh  
 that . . . they have heard no argument advanced for it but  
 such as might make the angels and almost the very jack-  
 asses weep."

Cf. also Isoc. *Panegy.* 14, *Phil.* 84, 101, *Antid.* 247,  
*Peace* 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato *passim*, e.g. *Symp.* 189 v.

<sup>b</sup> A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists.  
 Cf. 503 v, *Polit.* 292 e, 297 v, 300 e.

Novotny, *Plato's Epistles*, p. 87, uses this to support his  
 view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes *Gorg.*  
 474 α τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite

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attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous<sup>a</sup>?" "No," he said, "and I fancy I never shall hear it either."

VIII. "Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?" "Not in the least," he said. "Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.<sup>b</sup>" "Impossible." "It is inevitable,<sup>c</sup> then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them." "Inevitable." "And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favour<sup>d</sup> with it." "Obviously." "From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed<sup>e</sup> that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature." "Yes." "Then even as a boy<sup>f</sup> among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul." "How could he fail to do so?" he said. "His kinsmen and

relevant. Cf. Renan, *Études d'histoire relig.* p. 403 "La philosophie sera toujours le fait d'une imperceptible minorité," etc.

<sup>a</sup> It is psychologically necessary. Cf. *supra*, Vol. I. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, *Laws* 655 E, 658 E, 681 C, 687 C, *Phaedr.* 239 C, 271 B, *Crito* 49 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 481 E, 510 D, 513 B.

<sup>c</sup> In 487 A.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. *Alc. I.* 103 A ff. imitates the passage. Cf. *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 24.

σθαι, ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν  
 πράγματα οἷ τε οἰκέοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται. Πῶς δ'  
 C οὐ; Ὑποκείσονται ἄρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες,  
 προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν  
 μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω  
 γίγνεσθαι. Τί οὖν οἶει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον  
 ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχη  
 μεγάλης πόλεως ὦν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ  
 γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδῆς καὶ μέγας; ἄρ' οὐ  
 πληρωθήσεσθαι ἀμηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἠγούμενον καὶ  
 D ἔσσεσθαι πρᾶττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν  
 αὐτόν, σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ  
 νοῦ ἐμπιπλάμενον; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Τῷ δὴ οὕτω  
 διατιθεμένῳ ἐάν τις ἠρέμα προσελθὼν τὰληθῆ  
 λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δέ, τὸ δέ  
 οὐ κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, ἄρ'  
 εὐπετές οἶει εἶναι εἰσακούσαι διὰ τοσοῦτων κακῶν;  
 Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἐὰν δ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τῶν λόγων  
 E εἰς αἰσθάνηταί τέ πη καὶ κάμπτηται καὶ ἔλκῃται  
 πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς  
 ἠγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρεῖαν τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> For ὑποκείσονται cf. *Gorg.* 510 c, *infra* 576 A ὑποπεσόντες, *Eurip. Orest.* 670 ὑποτρέχειν, *Theaet.* 173 A ὑπελθεῖν.

<sup>b</sup> *i.e.* endeavouring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favour when he is still young and impressionable.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Alc. I.* 104 b-c ff.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Alc. I.* 105 b-c.

<sup>e</sup> ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs." "Of course." "Then they will fawn upon<sup>a</sup> him with petitions and honours, anticipating<sup>b</sup> and flattering the power that will be his." "That certainly is the usual way." "How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall<sup>c</sup>? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes,<sup>e</sup> and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians,<sup>d</sup> and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense<sup>e</sup>?" "He surely will," he said. "And if to a man in this state of mind<sup>f</sup> someone gently<sup>g</sup> comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave<sup>h</sup> to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear<sup>i</sup> to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings<sup>j</sup>?" "Far from it," said he. "And even supposing," said I, "that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are

<sup>f</sup> Or perhaps "subject to these influences." Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *supra* Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, *Protag.* 333 E, *Phaedo* 83 A, *Crat.* 413 A, *Theaet.* 154 E.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 66 D, *Symp.* 184 c, *Euthydem.* 282 B.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. *Epin.* 990 A, *Epist.* vii. 330 A-B.

<sup>j</sup> Cf. *Alc.* I. 135 E.

ἔταιρείαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας καὶ περὶ αὐτόν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῆ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅπως ἂν μὴ οἴός τ' ἦ, καὶ ἰδία ἐπιβουλευοντας καὶ δημοσία εἰς  
 495 ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας; Πολλή, ἧ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη.  
 "Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει; Οὐ πάνυ.

IX. Ὅρας οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν ὡς ἄρα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αἴτια τρόπον τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή; Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ἐλέχθη. Οὗτος δὴ, εἶπον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὄλεθρός τε καὶ  
 B διαφθορὰ τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὀλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν. καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ οἱ τὰγαθὰ, οἱ ἂν ταύτη τύχῃσι ῥυέντες· σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ. Ἀληθέστατα, ἧ δ' ὅς. Οὔτοι  
 C μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα προσήκει, ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες αὐτοί τε βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ' ἀληθῆ ζῶσι, τὴν δὲ

<sup>a</sup> For πᾶν ἔργον cf. Sophocles, *El.* 615.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 517 Δ.



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losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at<sup>a</sup> to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it,<sup>b</sup> both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?" "That is inevitable," he said. "Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize?" "None at all," he said.

IX. "Do you see, then," said I, "that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,<sup>c</sup> and so do the so-called goods—<sup>d</sup> riches and all such instrumentalities<sup>e</sup>?" "No," he replied, "it was rightly said." "Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption<sup>f</sup> of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case,<sup>g</sup> as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel,<sup>h</sup> but a small nature<sup>i</sup> never does anything great to a man or a city." "Most true," said he. "Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers<sup>j</sup> rush in and

<sup>c</sup> For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 c.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *supra* on 491 c, p. 32, note a.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Lysis* 220 A; Arnold's "machinery," Aristotle's χορηγία.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 491 B-E, *Laws* 951 B ἀδιάφθαρος, Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 24.

<sup>g</sup> For καὶ ἄλλως cf. *Il.* ix. 699.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. on 485 D ὡσπερ ρεύμα.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. on 491 E, p. 33, note d.

<sup>j</sup> Cf. on 489 D, and *Theaet.* 173 c.

ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν ξυγγενῶν ἄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες ἀνάξιοι ἤσχυρὰν τε καὶ ὀνειδίη περιῆψαν, οἷα καὶ σὺ φῆς ὀνειδίζεις τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς οἱ ξυνόντες αὐτῇ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἀξιοί εἰσιν. Καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, τά γε λεγόμενα ταῦτα. Εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λεγόμενα. καθορῶντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπίσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν ταύτην γιγνομένην, καλῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων μεστήν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες ἄσμενοι καὶ οὗτοι ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ ἂν κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ τὸ αὐτῶν τεχνίον. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρὸς γε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας καίπερ οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα μεγαλοπρεπέστερον λείπεται· οὐδ' ἔπιέμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἦν δ'

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: "Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c'est chez des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la malheureuse philosophie livrée aux mains gantées et parfumées d'eau bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants." Cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294, 298.

For the shame that has befallen philosophy cf. *Euthydem.* 304 ff., *Epist.* vii. 328 E, Isoc. *Busiris* 48, Plutarch 1091 F, Boethius, *Cons.* i. 3. There is no probability that this is aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde, *Kleine Schriften*, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But

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defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin,<sup>a</sup> and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils." "Why, yes," he replied, "that is what they do say." "And plausibly," said I; "for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical arts<sup>b</sup> to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.<sup>c</sup> For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated<sup>d</sup> by their vulgar occupations<sup>e</sup> even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable?" "Quite so," he said. "Is

Plato as usual is generalizing. See *What Plato Said*, p. 593 on *Soph.* 242 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. the different use of the idea in *Protag.* 318 ε.

<sup>c</sup> *τεχνιον* is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also *ἀνθρωπισκοι* in c, and *ψυχάριον* in 519 λ.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *infra* 611 c-d, *Theaet.* 173 A-B.

<sup>e</sup> For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy cf. *infra* 522 β and 590 c, *Laus* 919 c ff., and *What Plato Said*, p. 663 on *Rivals* 137 β. Cf. Richard of Bury, *Philobiblon*, Prologue, "Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts." Cf. also *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 3, and *Ecclesiasticus* xxxviii. 25 f. "How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad . . . and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter . . ."

ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργύριον κτησαμένου χαλκέως φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου, νεουργὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρεσκευασμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότης  
 496 τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. Ποῖ' ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾶν τοὺς τοιούτους; οὐ νόθα καὶ φαῦλα; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Τί δαί; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, ὅταν αὐτῇ πλησιάζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, ποῖ' ἄττα φῶμεν γεννᾶν διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας; ἄρ' οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς<sup>1</sup> ἐχόμενον; Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Χ. Πάνσμικρον δὴ τι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, Β  
 λείπεται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφία, ἣν ποὺ ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθὲν γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἦθος, ἀπορία τῶν διαφθερούντων κατὰ φύσιν μείναν ἐπ' αὐτῇ, ἣ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῆ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ· βραχὺ δέ ποὺ τι καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλης τέχνης δικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφνὲς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγουσ χαλινὸς

<sup>1</sup> ἄξιον secl. Ast: ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς ΛΜ, ἄξιον ὡς ἀληθινῆς D, ἀληθινῆς ὡς ἄξιον F: ἀξίως conj. Campbell.

<sup>a</sup> For a similar short vivid description cf. *Erastae* 134 v. *Euthyphro* 2 v. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. *Mercator* 639.

<sup>b</sup> It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf. also *Theaet.* 150 c, and *Symp.* 212 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Euthydem.* 306 D.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 A ὀλίγοι δὴ λείπονται, and *supra* 494 A and on 490 E.

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not the picture which they present," I said, "precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker<sup>a</sup> who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?" "There is no difference at all," he said. "Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents? Will they not be bastard<sup>b</sup> and base?" "Inevitably." "And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence<sup>c</sup>?" "Quite so," he said.

X. "There is a very small remnant,<sup>d</sup> then, Adeimantus," I said, "of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check<sup>e</sup> by exile,<sup>f</sup> and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns<sup>g</sup> and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages<sup>h</sup> also might operate as a restraint. For in the

<sup>e</sup> Perhaps "overtaken." Cf. Goodwin on Dem. *De cor.* § 107.

<sup>f</sup> It is possible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself or Dion.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Theæt.* 173 B, *infra* 540 D.

<sup>h</sup> This bridle has become proverbial. Cf. Plut. *De san. tuenda* 126 B, Aelian, *Var. Hist.* iv. 15. For Theages cf. also *Apol.* 33 E and the spurious dialogue bearing his name.



οἷος κατασχεῖν· καὶ γὰρ Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα  
 C παρεσκευάσται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἢ δὲ  
 τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν  
 πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον  
 λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἢ γὰρ πού τι ἀλλῶ  
 ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. καὶ τούτων δὴ  
 τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ  
 καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς  
 ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιᾶς ὡς  
 ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει, οὐδ' ἔστι  
 D ξύμμαχος, μεθ' ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων  
 βοήθειαν σώζοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄν-  
 θρωπος ἐμπεσῶν, οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε  
 ἱκανὸς ὢν εἰς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρὶν τι τὴν

<sup>a</sup> The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests. Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 456-457, on *Euthyphro* 3 B, Jowett and Campbell, p. 285.

<sup>b</sup> For τούτων . . . γενόμενοι cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 107 τούτων γενοῦ μοι.

<sup>c</sup> The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the starting-point of Plato's political and social speculations. Cf. *infra* 497 B, *Laws* 832 c f., *Epist.* vii. 326 A; Byron, *apud* Arnold, *Essays in Crit.* ii. p. 195 "I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing governments."

This passage, *Apol.* 31 E ff. and *Gorg.* 521-522 may be considered Plato's apology for not engaging in politics. Cf. J. V. Novak, *Platon u. d. Rhetorik*, p. 495 (Schleiermacher, *Einl. z. Gorg.* pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. 441-442 "Wer kann hier die Klage über das eigene Los überhören?"

There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained, the *Republic* itself was intended as a programme of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone



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case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign,<sup>a</sup> is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company<sup>b</sup> and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics,<sup>c</sup> and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice<sup>d</sup> could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts,<sup>e</sup> unwilling to share their misdeeds<sup>f</sup> and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his

of Plato's later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger's *Neue Phil. Untersuchungen*, Heft 6, *Platos Apologie*, pp. 31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the *Apology* before the *Gorgias* and that the same doctrine in the seventh *Epistle* absolutely proves that the *Apology* is Plato's own.

Cf. also *Theaet.* 173 c ff., *Hipp. Maj.* 281 c, *Euthydem.* 306 b, *Xen. Mem.* i. 6. 15.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 368 b, *Apol.* 32 ε εἰ . . . ἐβόηθουν τοῖς δίκαιοις and 32 α μαχόμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δίκαιου.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* i. 64. For the antithetic juxtaposition cf. also εἰς πᾶσιν below; see too 520 b, 374 a, *Menex.* 241 b, *Phaedr.* 243 c, *Laws* 906 d, etc.

More in the *Utopia* (Morley, *Ideal Commonwealths*, p. 84) paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls "no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher's meddling with government."

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 73 καλὸν μὲν τὸν ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν· εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ ξυναδικεῖν, "it is well to prevent anyone from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrongdoing."

πόλιν ἢ φίλους ὀνήσαι προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελῆς αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο—ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβῶν ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας ἀγαπᾶ, εἴ  
 E πη αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἰλεῶς τε καὶ εὐμενῆς ἀπαλλάξεται. Ἄλλά τοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα  
 497 ἂν διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιο. Οὐδέ γε, εἶπον, τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης· ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτὸς τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.

XI. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὧν ἔνεκα διαβολὴν εἴληφε καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ μετρίως εἰρηῆσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔτ' ἄλλο λέγεις τι σύ.  
 Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι λέγω περὶ τούτου· ἀλλὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολι-  
 B τειῶν; Οὐδ' ἠγτινοῦν, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Maximus of Tyre 21. 20 comments, "Show me a safe wall." See Stallbaum *ad loc.* for references to this passage in later antiquity. Cf. Heraclit. fr. 44, Diels<sup>3</sup> i. 67, J. Stenzel, *Platon der Erzieher*, p. 114, Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, p. 33, Renan, *Souvenirs*, xviii., P. E. More, *Shelburne Essays*, iii. pp. 280-281. Cf. also *Epist.* vii. 331 d, Eurip. *Ion* 598-601.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* Vol. I. on 331 a, *infra* 621 c-d, Marc. Aurel. xii. 36 and vi. 30 *in fine*. See my article "Hope" in Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1094 b 9 *μείζον γε καὶ τελώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν*, "yet the good of

friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall<sup>a</sup> in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope,<sup>b</sup> serene and well content when the end comes.” “Well,” he said, “that is no very slight thing to have achieved before taking his departure.” “He would not have accomplished any very great thing either,<sup>c</sup>” I replied, “if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature<sup>d</sup> and together with his own preserve the common weal.

XI. “The causes and the injustice of the calumnia-tion of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.<sup>e</sup>” “No,” he said, “I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?” “None whatever,” I said; “but the very ground of my complaint is that no the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure” (tr. F. H. Peters).

<sup>d</sup> For *αὐξήσεσθαι* cf. *Theaet.* 163 c *ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ*, and Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. p. 68 “As the Christian is said to be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the *πόλις*,” Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, xv. “Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state.” Cf. also *infra* 592 A-B, 520 A-C and *Introd.* Vol. I. p. xxvii.

<sup>e</sup> An instance of Socrates’ Attic courtesy. Cf. 430 B, *Cratyl.* 427 D, *Theaet.* 183 c, *Gorg.* 513 c, *Phaedr.* 235 A. But in *Gorg.* 462 c it is ironical and perhaps in *Hipp. Maj.* 291 A.

ἐπαιτιῶμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατά-  
 στασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως· διὸ καὶ στρέ-  
 φεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι αὐτήν, ὥσπερ ξενικὸν  
 σπέρμα ἐν γῆ ἄλλη σπειρόμενον ἐξίτηλον εἰς τὸ  
 ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἵεναι, οὕτω καὶ  
 τοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἴσχειν τὴν αὐτοῦ  
 δύναμιν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος ἐκπίπτειν· εἰ δὲ  
 C λήψεται τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ  
 ἀριστόν ἐστι, τότε δηλώσει, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι  
 θεῖον ἦν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ τε τῶν φύσεων  
 καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. δῆλος δὲ οὖν εἶ ὅτι μετὰ  
 τοῦτο ἐρήσει τίς αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία. Οὐκ ἔγνωσ,  
 ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔμελλον, ἀλλ' εἰ αὕτη, ἣν ἡμεῖς  
 διεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἄλλη. Τὰ  
 μὲν ἄλλα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρρήθη  
 μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι δεήσοι τι αἰεὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει  
 D λόγον ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν ὄνπερ καὶ  
 σὺ ὁ νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθεις. Ἐρ-  
 ρήθη γάρ, ἔφη. Ἰ' Ἀλλ' οὐχ ἰκανῶς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη,  
 φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε  
 μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ  
 τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ πάντως<sup>1</sup> ῥᾶστον διελθεῖν. Τὸ ποῖον;  
 Τίνα τρόπον μεταχειριζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφίαν οὐ  
 διολεῖται. τὰ γὰρ δὴ μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ

<sup>1</sup> πάντως AFDM: πάντων conj. Bekker.

<sup>a</sup> κατάστασις = constitution in both senses. Cf. 414 A, 425 D, 464 A, 493 A, 426 C, 517 B. So also in the *Laws*. The word is rare elsewhere in Plato.

<sup>b</sup> For ἐξίτηλον cf. *Critias* 121 A.

<sup>c</sup> This need not be a botanical error. In any case the meaning is plain. Cf. *Tim.* 57 B with my emendation.

<sup>d</sup> For the idiom cf. αὐτὸ δειξέει *Phileb.* 20 C, with Stallbaum's note, *Theaet.* 200 E, *Hipp. Maj.* 288 B, Aristoph. *Wasps*

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polity <sup>a</sup> of to-day is worthy of the philosophic nature.

√ This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration ; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out <sup>b</sup> into the native growth, <sup>c</sup> so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent <sup>d</sup> that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next going to ask what is this best form of government." "Wrong," he said <sup>e</sup> ; "I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another." "In other respects it is this one," said I ; "but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.<sup>f</sup>" "That was said," he replied. / "But it was not sufficiently explained," I said, "from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.<sup>g</sup>" "Just what do you mean?" "The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly

994, *Frogs* 1261, etc., Pearson on *Soph.* fr. 388. Cf. *ἀνὸρ σῆμανεῖ*, Eurip. *Bacch.* 476, etc.

<sup>a</sup> Plato similarly plays in dramatic fashion with the order of the dialogue in 523 B, 528 A, 451 B-C, 458 B.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *supra* on 412 A and *What Plato Said*, p. 647 on *Laws* 962; *infra* 502 D.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Soph.* 244 c. See critical note.



τὸ λεγόμενον τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά. Ἄλλ' E ὅμως, ἔφη, λαβέτω τέλος ἢ ἀπόδειξις τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου. Οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει· παρῶν δὲ τήν γ' ἐμὴν προθυμίαν εἶσει. σκόπει δὲ καὶ νῦν, ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς μέλλω λέγειν, ὅτι τούναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ ἐπιτη-  
 498 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἀπτόμενοι μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι· λέγω δὲ χαλεπώτατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔπειτα, εἴαν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροαταὶ γίνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἠγοῦνται, πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἐκτὸς δὴ τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺν B μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου ἠλίου, ὅσον αὐθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται. Δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη. Πᾶν τούναντίον· μειράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μεираκιώδη παιδείαν

<sup>a</sup> So Adam. Others take τῷ ὄντι with χαλεπά as part of the proverb. Cf. 435 c, *Crat.* 384 a-b with schol.

<sup>b</sup> For the idiomatic ἀλλ' εἶπερ cf. *Parmen.* 150 v, *Euthydem.* 296 v, Thompson on *Meno*, Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, *Aristot. An. Post.* 91 b 33, *Eth. Nic.* 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30, 1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, *Met.* 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11, *Rhet.* 1371 a 16.

<sup>c</sup> What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the *Gorgias* recommends, 484 c-d. For the danger of premature study of dialectic cf. 537 d-e ff. Cf. my *Idea of Education in Plato's Republic*, p. 11. Milton develops the thought with characteristic exuberance, *Of Education*: "They present their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the most intellectual abstractions of logic and metaphysics . . .



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says, fine things are hard.<sup>a</sup>” “All the same,” he said, “our exposition must be completed by making this plain.” | “It will be no lack of will,” I said, “but if anything,<sup>b</sup> a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.<sup>c</sup>” “In what way?” “At present,” said I, “those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood,<sup>d</sup> who in the interval<sup>e</sup> before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. | In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen<sup>f</sup> to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age,<sup>g</sup> with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely than the sun of Heraclitus,<sup>h</sup> inasmuch as it is never rekindled.” “And what should they do?” he said. “Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy

to be tossed and turmoiled with their unballasted wits n fathomless and unquiet deeps of controversy,” etc.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 386 A, 395 c, 413 c, 485 D, 519 A, Demosth. xxi. 154, Xen. Ages. 10. 4, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc. xv. 289.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 450 c.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 475 D, Isoc. xii. 270 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἄλλον δεικνύοντος καὶ ποιήσαντος ἠθέλησεν ἀκροατῆς γενέσθαι, “would not even be willing to listen to one worked out and submitted by another” (tr. Norlin in L.C.L.).

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Antiphon's devotion to horsemanship in the *Parmenides*, 126 c. For πρὸς τὸ γῆρας cf. 552 D, *Laws* 653 A.

<sup>h</sup> Diels i.<sup>3</sup> p. 78, fr. 6. Cf. Aristot. *Meteor.* ii. 2. 9, Lucretius v. 662.

καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδρούται, εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελείεσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφία κτωμένους· προϋούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ἣ ἡ ψυχὴ τελειοῦσθαι ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια· ὅταν δὲ  
 C λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτήσαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν.

XII/Ως ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, λέγειν γε προθύμως, ᾧ Σώκρατες· οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀκουόντων προθυμότερον ἔτι ἀντιτείνειν οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξαμένους. Μὴ διάβαλλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ καὶ  
 D Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἡ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὐθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 410 c and *What Plato Said*, p. 496 on *Protag.* 326 B-C.

<sup>b</sup> Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favourite figure with Plato. Cf. *Laws* 635 A, *Protag.* 320 A. It is used literally in *Critias* 119 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *infra* 540 A-B, Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. pp. 329-330. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 c to 502 A is a digression expressing Plato's personal desire to be the philosopher in Athenian politics.

<sup>d</sup> A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality reserved for Bk. x. 608 D ff. It involves no contradiction and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of the *Republic*. Cf. Gomperz iii. 335.

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themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support<sup>a</sup> for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture<sup>b</sup> and do nothing but philosophize,<sup>c</sup> except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world."

XII. "You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates," he said; "yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus." "Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born again<sup>d</sup> and meet with such discussions as these." "A

*Cf.* Emerson, *Experience, in fine*, "which in his passage into new worlds he will carry with him." Bayard Taylor (*American Men of Letters*, p. 113), who began to study Greek late in life, remarked, "Oh, but I expect to use it in the other world." Even the sober positivist Mill says (*Theism*, pp. 249-250) "The truth that life is short and art is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in some other life even when seemingly useless in this."

Εἰς σμικρὸν γ', ἔφη, χρόνον εἴρηκας. Εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, ὡς γε πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα. τὸ μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις τοὺς πολλοὺς θαῦμα οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ

E νῦν λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὠμοιωμένα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὥσπερ νῦν ξυμπεσόντα· ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὠμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ, δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρα τοιαύτη, οὐ πώποτε

499 ἐωράκασιν οὔτε ἓνα οὔτε πλείους· ἢ οἶε; Οὐδαμῶς γε. Οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων, ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἰκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν, οἷων ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς ξυντεταμένως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τοῦ γνῶναι χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψά τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων. Οὐδὲ τούτων, ἔφη.

B Τούτων τοι χάριν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώμενοι ἡμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδιότες ὁμῶς ἐλέγομεν, ὑπὸ

<sup>a</sup> For εἰς here cf. Blaydes on *Clouds* 1180, Herod. vii. 46, Eurip. *Heracleidae* 270.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* on 486 A. See too Plut. *Cons. Apol.* 17. 111 c "a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an ἀόριστος point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides says." Cf. also *Lyra Graeca* (L.C.L.), ii. p. 338, *Anth. Pal.* x. 78.

<sup>c</sup> γενόμενον . . . λεγόμενον. It is not translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato's parody of "polyphonic prose." The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of *παρίσωσις* and *παρομοίωσις* is unmistakable. The subtlety of Plato's style treats the "accidental" occurrence of a Gorgian figure in his own writing as a symbol of the difference between the artificial style and insincerity of the sophists and the serious truth of his own ideals.

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brief time<sup>a</sup> your forecast contemplates," he said. "Nay, nothing at all," I replied, "as compared with eternity.<sup>b</sup> However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token,<sup>c</sup> but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here. But the figure of a man 'equilibrated' and 'assimilated' to virtue's self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen in one case or in many. Do you think they have?" "By no means." "Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavour was to search out the truth<sup>d</sup> at any cost for knowledge's sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar<sup>e</sup> all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion<sup>f</sup> and strife in court-room and in private talk." "They have not," he said. "For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears<sup>g</sup> declared under compulsion of the truth<sup>h</sup> that

*Cf.* Isoc. x. 18 λεγόμενος . . . γινόμενος, *What Plato Said*, p. 544 on *Symp.* 185 c, F. Reinhardt, *De Isocratis aemulis*, p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. "hoc 'nolueris et debueris' te si minu' delectat, quod τεχνίον Isocrateium est," etc.

<sup>d</sup> As the Platonic dialectic does (*Phileb.* 58 c-d, *cf.* *What Plato Said*, p. 611) in contrast with the rhetorician, the lawyer (*Theaet.* 172 d-e) and the eristic (*Euthydem.* 272 b, *Hipp. Maj.* 268 d).

<sup>e</sup> *Cf.* Eurip. *Hippol.* 102, *Psalm cxxxviii.* 6 "the proud he knoweth afar off."

<sup>f</sup> *Cf.* *Phaedrus* 253 d with *Theaetet.* 187 c, and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 48.

<sup>g</sup> *Cf.* on 489 a.

<sup>h</sup> *Cf.* Aristot. *Met.* 984 b 10, 984 a 19.



τάληθοῦς ἠναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολι-  
 τεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτε γένηται τέλεος,  
 πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ  
 οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη  
 τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μὴ πό-  
 λεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκοοι γενέσθαι,  
 ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων  
 C υἰέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς  
 φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων δὲ  
 πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφοτερά ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνα-  
 τον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημί ἔχειν λόγον. οὔτω γὰρ  
 ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελώμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως εὐχαῖς  
 ὁμοια λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ οὔτως; Οὔτως. Εἰ τοίνυν  
 ἄκροισ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπι-  
 μεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρω τῷ παρελη-  
 λυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν τινι βαρβαρικῷ  
 D τόπῳ, πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπ-  
 ὄψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου  
 ἔτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἢ  
 εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν  
 αὕτη ἢ μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατῆς γένηται. οὐ γὰρ  
 ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ' ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν.  
 χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται. Καὶ ἐμοί,  
 ἔφη, οὔτω δοκεῖ. Τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 747 E. But we must not attribute personal superstition to Plato. See *What Plato Said*, index, s.v. Superstition.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 711 D, Thuc. vi. 24. 3; so iv. 4. 1 ὁρμὴ ἐπέπεσε.

<sup>c</sup> We might say, "talking like vain Utopians or idle idealists." The scholiast says, p. 348, τοῦτο καὶ κενὴν φασὶ μακαρίαν. Cf. *supra*, Vol. I. on 458 A, and for εὐχαί on 450 D, and Novotny on *Epist.* vii. 331 D.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Laws* 782 A, 678 A-B, and *What Plato Said*, p. 627 on 64



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neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration<sup>a</sup> a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession<sup>b</sup> either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are.<sup>c</sup> Is not that so?" "It is." "If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past,<sup>d</sup> or now are in some barbaric region<sup>e</sup> far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention<sup>f</sup> that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be<sup>g</sup> realized<sup>h</sup> when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state.<sup>i</sup> It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit." "I also think so," he said. "But the multitude—are you going to say?—

*Laws* 676 A-B; also *Isoc. Panath.* 204-205, seven hundred years seemed a short time. <sup>a</sup> *Cf. Phaedo* 78 A.

<sup>f</sup> For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb *cf. Parmen.* 137 c, *Laches* 180 A. The omission of the third person is very frequent.

<sup>g</sup> *Cf.* 492 E, *Laws* 711 E, 739 c, 888 E.

<sup>h</sup> *Cf.* Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxii, and *ibid.* on 472 B, and *What Plato Said*, p. 564, also *infra* 540 D, Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. p. 377.

<sup>i</sup> This is what I have called the ABA style. *Cf.* 599 E, *Apol.* 20 c, *Phaedo* 57 B, *Laches* 185 A, *Protag.* 344 c, *Theaet.* 185 A, 190 B, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary structure, *Apology*, pp. 204-217.

ὅτι οὐκ αὐ̄ δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς; Ἴσως, ἔφη. ὦ μακάριε,  
 E ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ πανυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγορεῖ,  
 ἀλλοίαν<sup>1</sup> τοι δόξαν ἔξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ φιλο-  
 νεικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος καὶ ἀπολυόμενος τὴν  
 τῆς φιλομαθίας διαβολὴν ἐνδεικνύῃ οὓς λέγεις τοὺς  
 φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὴν τε φύσιν  
 500 αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἵνα μὴ ἠγῶνται σε  
 λέγειν οὓς αὐτοὶ οἴονται. ἦ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται,  
 ἀλλοίαν τ' οὐ<sup>2</sup> φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ  
 ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι; ἦ οἶει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ  
 χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ, ἄφθονόν τε καὶ  
 πρᾶον ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ σὲ προφθάσας λέγω,  
 ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἠγοῦμαι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλήθει  
 χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίγνεσθαι. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμέλει,  
 B ἔφη, ξυνοίομαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ξυνοίει,  
 τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς δια-  
 κεῖσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐ  
 προσῆκον ἐπεισκεκωμακότας, λοιδορουμένους τε  
 αὐτοῖς<sup>3</sup> καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας καὶ αἰεὶ περὶ

<sup>1</sup> ἀλλοίαν AD, ἀλλ' οἶαν F, ἀλλ' οἶαν M.

<sup>2</sup> τ' οὐ Baier: τοι mss. Burnet brackets the sentence.

<sup>3</sup> αὐτοῖς Burnet and Adam, αὐτοῖς Ast, Stallbaum, Jowett, and Campbell.

<sup>a</sup> It is uncritical to find "contradictions" in variations of mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and that no writer can avoid. Any thinker may at one moment and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn't matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (*Gal. i. 10*) "Do I seek to please men? for if I yet pleased men I should not be the servant of Christ," says also (*Rom. xiv. 16*) "Let not then your good be evil spoken of." Cf. also *What Plato Said*, p. 646 on *Laws* 950 b.

<sup>b</sup> A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf. *ἄθυμον*

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does not think so," said I. "That may be," he said. "My dear fellow," said I, "do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude.<sup>a</sup> They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavouring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking. Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging<sup>b</sup> and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found." "And I, you may be assured," he said, "concur." "And do you not also concur<sup>c</sup> in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in<sup>d</sup> where they do not belong, wrangling with one another,<sup>e</sup> filled with spite<sup>f</sup>

411 B, *Laws* 888 A, *ἐψυχίας Laws* 791 C, Thompson on *Meno* 78 E, Aristot. *Topics* 112 a 32-38, Eurip. *Heracleidae* 730 ἀσφαλῶς, Shakes. *Rich. III.* v. v. 37 "Reduce these bloody days again."

<sup>a</sup> For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word cf. 517 C, 394 B, 449 C, 470 B-C.

<sup>b</sup> For the figure of the κῶμος or revel rout cf. *Theaet.* 184 A, Aesch. *Ag.* 1189, Eurip. *Ion* 1197, and, with a variation of the image, Virgil, *Aen.* i. 148 and Tennyson, "Lucretius":

As crowds that in an hour  
Of civic tumult jam the doors.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Adam *ad loc.* and Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. 121.

<sup>d</sup> Isoc. *Antid.* 260 seems to take this term to himself; cf. *Panath.* 249, *Peace* 65, Lysias xxiv. 24 πολυπράγμων εἰμι καὶ θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθῆμων, Demosth. xxiv. 6.

ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους, ἤκιστα φιλοσοφία πρέπον ποιούντας; Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

XIII. Οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι  
 C κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ  
 μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ  
 ταῦτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὀρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὐτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὐτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ  
 πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμείσθαι τε καὶ ὃ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἶει τινὰ  
 μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὀμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμείσθαι ἐκεῖνο; Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη. Θεῖω δὴ καὶ  
 D κοσμίω ὃ γε φιλόσοφος ὀμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ  
 θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται· διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ἄν οὖν τις,

<sup>a</sup> i.e. gossip. Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1125 a 5 οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also *Phileb.* 59 b, *Theaet.* 173 d, 174 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* on 486 a, also *Phileb.* 58 d, 59 a, *Tim.* 90 d, and perhaps *Tim.* 47 a and *Phaedo* 79.

This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and ἐκεῖ in 500 d shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of them, though in *Rep.* 529 a-b ff. he protests against this identification. And strictly speaking κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα in c would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas. Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philosopher's mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. *Met.* 1063 a 16 ταῦτὰ δ' αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα. Cf. also Sophocles, *Ajax* 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, *Evolution of Ethics*, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xi. (Teubner ii. p. 199),

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and always talking about persons,<sup>a</sup> a thing least befitting philosophy?" "Least of all, indeed," he said.

XIII. "For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities<sup>b</sup> has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavour to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate<sup>c</sup> himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration?" "Impossible," he said. "Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.<sup>d</sup> But calumny<sup>e</sup> is plentiful everywhere." "Yes, truly." "If, then," I said, "some

Boethius, *Cons.* iii. 8 "respicite caeli spatium . . . et aliquando desinite vilia mirari," Dante, *Purg.* 14:

The heavens call you and o'er your heads revolving  
Reveal the lamps of beauty ever burning;  
Your eyes are fixed on earth and goods dissolving,  
Wherefore He smites you, He, the all-discerning.

*Cf.* Arnold, "A Summer Night," *in fine*:

. . . you remain  
A world above man's head to let him see  
How boundless might his soul's horizons be, etc.

<sup>e</sup> ἀφομοιοῦσθαι suggests the ὁμοίωσις θέῳ *Theaet.* 176 v. *Cf.* *What Plato Said*, p. 578.

<sup>d</sup> *Cf.* on 493 D, and for the idea 383 c.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf.* *Hamlet* III. i. 141 "thou shalt not escape calumny," Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203 βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μὲν ἔστιν ἐπ' ἔργοις.



εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὄρα μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἦθη καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία τιθέσθαι, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἄρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἶε γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ξυμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; Ἡκιστά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν δὴ αἰσθωνται οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι ἀληθῆ περι αὐτοῦ λέγομεν, χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θεῷ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι; Οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐάνπερ αἰσθωνται. ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα λέγεις τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς; Λαβόντες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἦθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν· ὁ οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον· ἀλλ' οὖν οἶσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθὺς τῶν ἄλλων

<sup>a</sup> The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 E.

<sup>b</sup> ἐκεῖ is frequently used in Plato of the world of ideas. Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 A, *Phaedo* 109 E.

<sup>c</sup> For the word πλάττειν used of the lawgiver cf. 377 c, *Laws* 671 c, 712 B, 746 A, 800 B, *Rep.* 374 A, 377 c, 420 c, 466 A, 588 c, etc.

For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to the pattern cf. *infra* 540 A-B.

Plato applies the language of the theory of ideas to the "social tissue" here exactly as he applies it to the making of a tool in the *Cratylus* 389 c. In both cases there is a workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle's doctrine of matter and form. Cf. *Met.* 1014 a 25, *De part. an.* 639 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., *De an.* 403 b 3, Zeller, *Aristot.* (Eng.) i. p. 357. Cf. also *Gorg.* 503 D-E, *Polit.* 306 c, 309 D and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous, *Εἰσαγωγή* ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153)

ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὄραται, μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἦθη.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1329 a 21 ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. Cf. also



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compulsion<sup>a</sup> is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,<sup>b</sup> and not merely to mould<sup>c</sup> and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman<sup>d</sup> of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue<sup>e</sup>?" "By no means," he said. "But if the multitude become aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced<sup>f</sup> by artists who used the heavenly model?" "They will not be harsh," he said, "if they perceive that. But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?" "They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—<sup>g</sup> no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary

1275 b 29 with Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* p. 229. Cf. 395 c δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας, *Theages* 125 A δημιουργὸν . . . τῆς σοφίας.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 968 A πρὸς ταῖς δημοσiais ἀπειαῖς, *Phaedo* 82 A and *supra*, Vol. I. on 430 c. Brochard, "La Morale de Platon," *L'Année Philosophique*, xvi. (1905) p. 12 "La justice est appelée une vertu populaire." This is a little misleading if he means that justice itself is "une vertu populaire."

<sup>f</sup> For διαγράψειαν cf. 387 B and *Laws* 778 A. See also Stallbaum *ad loc.*

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Vol. I. on 426 D. This is one of the passages that may be used or misused to class Plato with the radicals. Cf. 541 A, *Laws* 736 A-B, *Polit.* 293 D, *Euthyphro* 2 D-3 A. H. W. Schneider, *The Puritan Mind*, p. 36, says, "Plato claimed that before his Republic could be established the adult population must be killed off."

Cf. however Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxix, *What Plato Said*, p. 83, and *infra*, p. 76, note a on 502 B.

διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἄν ἄψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἶει ὑπογράψασθαι ἄν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας; Τί μήν; Ἔπειτα, Β οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἄν ἐκατέρωσ' ἀποβλέποιεν, πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, ξυμμειγνύντες τε καὶ κεραυνύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοεἶκελον. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγρά- C φοιεν, ἕως ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἦθη εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιήσειαν. Καλλίστη γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡ γραφὴ γένοιτο. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πείθομέν πη ἐκείνους, οὓς διατεταμένους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἔφησθα ἰέναι, ὡς τοιοῦτός ἐστι πολιτειῶν ζωγράφος, ὃν τότ' ἐπηνοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, δι' ὃν ἐκείνοι ἐχαλέπαινον, ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρέδιδόμεν, καὶ τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραῦνονται; Καὶ

<sup>a</sup> The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of the artist looking off to his model and back again to his work. Cf. on 484 c, and *What Plato Said*, p. 458, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 37.

<sup>b</sup> i.e. the idea of justice. For φύσις and the theory of ideas cf. *infra* 597 c, *Phaedo* 103 b, *Parmen.* 132 d, *Cratyl.* 389 c-d, 390 e.

<sup>c</sup> For ἀνδρείκελον cf. *Cratyl.* 424 e.

<sup>d</sup> *Il.* i. 131, *Od.* iii. 416. Cf. 589 d, 500 c-d, *Laws* 818 b-c, and *What Plato Said*, p. 578 on *Theaet.* 176 b, *Cic. Tusc.*

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reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean." "And they would be right," he said. "And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution?" "Surely." "And then, I take it, in the course of the work they would glance<sup>a</sup> frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things,<sup>b</sup> and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity<sup>c</sup> which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.<sup>d</sup>" "Right," he said. "And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another until in the measure of the possible<sup>e</sup> they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be." "That at any rate<sup>f</sup> would be the fairest painting." "Are we then making any impression on those who you said<sup>g</sup> were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying?" "Much gentler," he said,

i. 26. 65 "divina malle<sup>m</sup> ad nos." Cf. also *Tim.* 90 A, *Phaedr.* 249 c.

The modern reader may think of Tennyson, *In Mem.* cviii. "What find I in the highest place But mine own phantom chanting hymns?" Cf. also Adam *ad loc.*

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 500 D and on 493 D.

<sup>f</sup> For γούν cf. *supra*, Vol. I. on 334 A.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 474 A.

- D πολὺ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν. Πῆ γὰρ δὴ ἔξουσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι; πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐραστὰς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους; Ἄτοπον μὲντ' ἂν, ἔφη, εἴη. Ἄλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἣν ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχοῦσαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν τελέως ἔσσεσθαι καὶ φιλόσοφον εἶπερ τινὰ ἄλλην; ἢ ἐκείνους φήσειν<sup>1</sup> μᾶλλον, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἀφωρίσαμεν;
- E Οὐ δῆπου. Ἐπι οὖν ἀγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν, ὅτι, πρὶν ἂν πόλεως τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος ἐγκρατὲς γένηται, οὔτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν παῦλα ἔσται, οὐδὲ ἡ πολιτεία, ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ, ἔργῳ τέλος λήψεται; Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἦττον. Βούλει οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ἦττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ παντάπασι πράους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεισθαι, ἵνα,  
502 εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

XIV. Οὗτοι μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο πεπεισμένοι ἔστων· τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι; Οὐδ' ἂν εἰς, ἔφη. Τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθαρῆναι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ξυγχωροῦμεν· ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ  
B τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς σωθείη, ἔσθ' ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσει; Καὶ πῶς; Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων

<sup>1</sup> φήσειν ADM: Adam reads φήσει; see his note *ad loc.*

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 591 A. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial or controversy is a motif frequent in the Attic orators. Cf. Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc.

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“if they are reasonable.” “How *can* they controvert it<sup>a</sup>? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth?” “That would be monstrous,” he said. “Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best?” “Not that either.” “Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded?” “Surely not.” “Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable<sup>b</sup> in words be brought to pass in deed?” “They will perhaps be less so,” he said. “Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?” “Certainly,” said he.

XIV. “Let us assume, then,” said I, “that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature?” “Not one,” he said. “And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty<sup>c</sup> of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time not one of all could be saved,<sup>d</sup> will anyone maintain that?” “How could he?” “But surely,” said I, “the occurrence of one such is

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 376 D, *Laws* 632 E, 841 C, *Phaedr.* 276 E. Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon*, p. 13, says Plato uses the word *μῦθος* only once of his own myths, *Polit.* 268 E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 711 D τὸ χαλεπὸν, and 495 A-B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 494 A.

πειθομένην, πάντ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα. Ἰκανὸς γάρ, ἔφη. Ἄρχοντας γάρ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δῆπου ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας. Οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν. Ἀλλὰ δῆ, ἄπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δόξα καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ C ἀδύνατον; Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἶπερ δυνατά, ἰκανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, διήλθομεν. Ἰκανῶς γάρ. Νῦν δῆ, ὡς ἔοικε, ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. Ξυμβαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

XV. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχε, τὰ D ἐπίλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον, τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτῆρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι ἐκάστων ἀπτόμενοι; Λεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη. Ἄ Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο τῆν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν καὶ τῆν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότε ὡς ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ χαλεπὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ παντελῶς E ἀληθῆς· νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἤττον ἦλθε τὸ δεῖν αὐτὰ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Epist.* vii. 328 c and Novotny, *Plato's Epistles*, p. 170. Plato's apparent radicalism again. Cf. on 501 A. Cf. also *Laws* 709 E, but note the qualification in 875 c, 713 E-714 A, 691 c-D. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say that the εἰς ἰκανός is the philosopher—Plato.

<sup>b</sup> Note the different tone of 565 E λαβῶν σφῆδρα πειθόμενον δχλον. Cf. *Phaedr.* 260 c λαβῶν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθη.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 499 D, and Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon*, p. 43.



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

enough,<sup>a</sup> if he has a state which obeys him,<sup>b</sup> to realize<sup>c</sup> all that now seems so incredible." "Yes, one is enough," he said. "For if such a ruler," I said, "ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out." "By no means." "Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come<sup>d</sup>?" "I think not," said he. "And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown." "Yes, sufficiently." "Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult<sup>e</sup> yet not impossible." "That is the conclusion," he said.

XV. "This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers<sup>f</sup> of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study." "Yes, we have to speak of that," he said. "I gained nothing," I said, "by my cunning<sup>g</sup> in omitting heretofore<sup>h</sup> the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; for now I am none the less compelled

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Epist.* vii. 327 B-C, viii. 357 B ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 502 A, Campbell's note on *Theaet.* 144 A, and Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 208.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. on 412 A-B and 497 C-D, *Laws* 960 B. 463 B is not quite relevant.

<sup>g</sup> For τὸ σοφὸν cf. *Euthydem.* 293 D, 297 D, *Gorg.* 483 A, Herod. v. 18 τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἶναι σοφόν, *Symp.* 214 A τὸ σόφισμα, *Laches* 183 D.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 423 E.

διελθεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ  
 παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡσπερ ἔξ  
 ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ. ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μνημονεύεις,  
 503 δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδάς τε φαίνεσθαι, βασανι-  
 ζομένους ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις, καὶ τὸ δόγμα  
 τοῦτο μῆτ' ἐν πόνοις μῆτ' ἐν φόβοις μῆτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ  
 μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν  
 ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν δὲ πανταχοῦ ἀκή-  
 ρατον ἐκβαίνοντα, ὡσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανίζο-  
 μενον, στατέον ἀρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι  
 καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἄθλα. τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἦν τὰ  
 λεγόμενα, παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ  
 Β λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν. Ἀληθέ-  
 στατα, ἔφη, λέγεις· μέμνημαι γάρ. Ὀκνος γάρ,  
 ἔφη, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολμημένα·  
 νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς  
 ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι.  
 Εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον δὴ, ὡς εἰκότως ὀλίγοι  
 ἔσσονται σοι. ἦν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπ-  
 ἄρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταῦτ' ὁ ξυμφύεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη

<sup>a</sup> In Bk. V.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 412 D-E, 413 C-414 A, 430 A-B, 537, 540 A, *Laws* 751 C.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 412 E, 413 C, *Soph.* 230 B.

<sup>d</sup> τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is only implied. Cf. 373 C, 598 C. See my article in *Transactions of the American Phil. Assoc.* xlvii. (1916) pp. 205-236.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Theognis* 417-418 παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολιβδῶ χρυσός, *ibid.* 447-452, 1105-1106, Herod. vii. 10, Eurip. fr. 955 (N.).

Cf. *Zechariah* xiii. 9 "I . . . will try them as gold is tried," *Job* xxiii. 10 "When he hath tried me I shall come forth as gold." Cf. also 1 *Peter* i. 7, *Psalms* xii. 6, lxvi. 10, *Isaiah* xlvi. 10.

<sup>f</sup> The translation preserves the intentional order of the Greek. For the idea cf. 414 A and 465 D-E and for ἄθλα cf. 460 B. Cobet rejects καὶ ἄθλα, but emendations are needless.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of,<sup>a</sup> but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point. We were saying, if you recollect, that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested<sup>b</sup> in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon<sup>c</sup> this fixed faith<sup>d</sup> under stress of labours or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must be rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire,<sup>e</sup> is to be established as ruler and to receive honours in life and after death and prizes as well.<sup>f</sup> Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face<sup>g</sup> in fear<sup>h</sup> of starting<sup>i</sup> our present debate." "Most true," he said; "I remember." "We shrank, my friend," I said, "from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect<sup>j</sup> guardians we must establish philosophers." "Yes, assume it to have been said," said he. "Note, then, that they will naturally be few,<sup>k</sup> for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 237 A, *Epist.* vii. 340 A. For the personification of the λόγος cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 500 on *Protag.* 361 A-B. So too *Cic. Tusc.* i. 45. 108 "sed ita tetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 387 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. the proverbial μή κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, do not move the immovable, "let sleeping dogs lie," in *Laws* 684 D-E, 913 B. Cf. also *Phileb.* 16 c, and the American idiom "start something."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 503 D, 341 B, 340 E, 342 D.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. on 494 A

- ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται.
- C Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί<sup>1</sup> τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπη ἂν τύχῃσι, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἦθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς ἂν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς
- D χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὐτῶν ποιεῖ ταῦτόν· δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπονεαρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπλυνται, ὅταν τι δέη τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν. Ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη. Ἡμεῖς δέ γ' ἔφαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς. Ὁρθῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἷοι
- E ἔσεσθαι; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Βασιανιστέον δὴ ἐν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς, καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὁ τότε παρείμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν

<sup>1</sup> On the text see end of note a below.

<sup>a</sup> The translation is correct. In the Greek the anacoluthon is for right emphasis, and the separation of νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς from the other members of the list is also an intentional feature of Plato's style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely combine are Plato's two temperaments. The description of the orderly temperament begins with οἷοι and οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to the preceding description of the active temperament. The mss. have καὶ before νεανικοί; Heindorf, followed by Wilamowitz, and Adam's minor edition, put it before οἷοι. Burnet follows the mss. Adam's larger edition puts καὶ νεανικοί τε

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grow in one ; but for the most part these qualities are found apart." "What do you mean ?" he said. "Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives ;<sup>a</sup> but such men, by reason of their quickness,<sup>b</sup> are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them." "You speak truly," he said. "And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way<sup>c</sup> when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed,<sup>d</sup> and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them." "It is so," he said. "But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest<sup>e</sup> education nor in honours nor in rule." "And rightly," he said. "Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing ?" "Of course." "They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke,<sup>f</sup> and we have also now to speak of a

after *ἔπειτα*. The right meaning can be got from any of the texts in a good *viva voce* reading.

Plato's contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous temperament is not necessarily intellectual. *Cf. supra* on 375 c, and *What Plato Said*, p. 573 on *Theaet.* 144 A-B, *Cic. Tusc.* v. 24.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf. Theaet.* 144 A ff.

<sup>c</sup> A touch of humour in a teacher.

<sup>d</sup> For the figure *cf. Meno* 80 A, 84 B and c.

<sup>e</sup> Lit. "most precise." *Cf. Laws* 965 B ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν.

<sup>f</sup> In 412 c ff.



μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας εἰ  
καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν,  
504 εἴτε καὶ ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις<sup>1</sup>  
ἀποδειλιῶντες. Πρέπει γε τοι δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτω  
σκοπεῖν· ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;

XVI. Μνημονεύεις μὲν που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι  
τριτὰ εἶδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι ξυνεπιβάζομεν  
δικαιοσύνης τε. πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας  
καὶ σοφίας ὁ ἕκαστον εἶη. Μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων,  
ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἶην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν. Ἡ καὶ  
B τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν; Τὸ ποῖον δὴ; Ἐλέγομέν  
που, ὅτι, ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατ-  
ιδεῖν, ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἶη περίοδος, ἦν περι-  
ελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν  
προειρημένων ἐπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τ' εἶη  
προσάψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω  
δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ  
ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν  
τοῦτο εἶποιτε. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, μετρίως· ἐφαί-  
C νετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. Ἄλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ'

<sup>1</sup> ἄθλοις Orelli: ἄλλοις MSS.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* 535 B, *Protag.* 326 C.

<sup>b</sup> For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 A and 436 B, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 42, *What Plato Said*, p. 526 on *Phaedo* 68 C, p. 552 on *Phaedr.* 246 B, and p. 563 on *Rep.* 435 B-C.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Vol. I. on 435 D, *Phaedr.* 274 A, Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300, Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon*, pp. 81 ff., and my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic* (*Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil.* vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it.



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point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch<sup>a</sup> as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body." "That is certainly the right way of looking at it," he said. "But what do you understand by the greatest studies?"

XVI. "You remember, I presume," said I, "that after distinguishing three kinds<sup>b</sup> in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally." "If I did not remember," he said, "I should not deserve to hear the rest." "Do you also remember what was said before this?" "What?" "We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way<sup>c</sup> was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say." "Well," he said, "it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company."

The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may mean a teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the *Timaeus*. The *Republic* merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf. also *Introd.*, p. xxxv.

ἐγώ, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολείπον καὶ ὀτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον· δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἰκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥαθυμίαν. Τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἤκιστα προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε καὶ νόμων. Εἰκόσ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφη, D περιτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἦττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ· ἢ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὐποτε ἤξει. Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλ' ἔτι τι μείζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλθομεν; Καὶ μείζον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὡσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι· ἢ οὐ γελοῖον, ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίους πᾶν E ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὁ τι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας

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<sup>a</sup> Cf. Cic. *De fin.* i. 1 "nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris."

Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato's distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the *homo mensura* in the *Theaetetus*, in the statement of the *Laws* 716 c, that God is the measure of all things (*What Plato Said*, p. 631), and in the contrast in the *Politicus* 283-284 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. *infra* 531 A.

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“Nay, my friend,” said I, “a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,<sup>a</sup> though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough<sup>b</sup> and that there is no need of further inquiry.” “Yes, indeed,” he said, “many experience this because of their sloth.” “An experience,” said I, “that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws.” “That seems likely,” he said. “Then,” said I, “such a one must go around<sup>c</sup> the longer way and must labour no less in studies than in the exercises of the body; or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him.” “Why, are not these things the greatest?” said he; “but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described?” “There is not only something greater,” I said, “but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline<sup>d</sup> as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve<sup>e</sup> to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Menex.* 234 A, *Charm.* 158 c, *Symp.* 204 A, *Epist.* vii. 341 A.

From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connexion with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 274 A.

<sup>d</sup> i.e. sketch, adumbration. The *ὑπογραφή* is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.

<sup>e</sup> For *πάν ποιεῖν* cf. on 488 c, for *συντεινωμένους* *Euthydem.* 288 D.

ἀξιούν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, [ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα]<sup>1</sup>. ὁ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὃ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἶει τιν' ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφείναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστίν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας· νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὐ διανοεῖ ἐμοὶ  
 505 πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ἢ δὴ δίκαια καὶ τᾶλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνεταί. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθ' ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης, εἰ ὃ τι μάλιστα τᾶλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν  
 B ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ κεκτῆμέθα τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἶει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσις ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθὴν; ἢ πάντα τᾶλλα φρονεῖν

<sup>1</sup> Bracketed by Scheiermacher, whom the Oxford text follows. Cf. also Adam *ad loc.* Stallbaum *ad loc.* defends.

<sup>a</sup> Such juxtaposition of different forms of the same word is one of the most common features of Plato's style. Cf. 453 B ἕνα ἕν, 466 D πάντα πάντη, 467 D πολλὰ πολλοῖς, 496 C οὐδεὶς οὐδέν, *Laws* 835 C μόνῳ μόνος, 958 B ἐκόντα ἐκόν. Cf. also *Protag.* 327 B, *Gorg.* 523 B, *Symp.* 217 B, *Tim.* 92 B, *Phaedo* 109 B, *Apol.* 32 C, and *Laws passim*.

<sup>b</sup> The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, *Crito* 47 C, and D, *Laches* 195 D, *Gorg.* 467 E. See critical note.

<sup>c</sup> Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the unavailing quest for "the good" in the earlier dialogues is an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. *supra* Vol. I. on 476 A and *What Plato Said*, p. 71. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 567, does not understand.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 508 E, 517 C, *Cratyl.* 418 E. Cf. *Phileb.* 64 E and *What Plato Said*, p. 534, on *Phaedo* 99 A.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

greatest<sup>a</sup> matters?" "It would indeed,<sup>b</sup>" he said; "but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned?" "By no means," said I; "but do you ask the question. You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard<sup>c</sup> that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good<sup>d</sup> by reference to which<sup>e</sup> just things<sup>f</sup> and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail<sup>g</sup> without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit<sup>h</sup> in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the

Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (*cf.* Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. *Cf.* my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, pp. 188-189, *What Plato Said*, pp. 72, 230-231, *Introd.* Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.

<sup>a</sup> Lit. "the use of which," *i.e.* a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal.

<sup>f</sup> The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing colour. It makes no difference.

<sup>g</sup> For the idiom *οὐδὲν ὄφελος* *cf.* *Euthyph.* 4 E, *Lysis* 208 E, *supra* 365 B, *Charm.* 155 E, etc.

<sup>h</sup> *Cf.* 427 A, *Phaedr.* 275 C, *Cratyl.* 387 A, *Euthyd.* 288 E, *Laws* 751 B, 944 D, etc.



ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

XVII. Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψότεροις φρόνησις. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως. Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ ξυνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγγωνται ὄνομα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Τί δαί; οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὀριζόμενοι μὴν μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεω τῶν ἐτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς;

<sup>a</sup> καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν suggests but does not mean καλοκάγαθον in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. *Phileb.* 65 A and *Symp.* 210-211 where because of the subject the καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν.

<sup>b</sup> So Polus and Callicles in the *Gorgias* and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also *What Plato Said*, p. 131; Eurip. *Hippol.* 382 οἱ δ' ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and *supra* on 329 A-B.

There is no contradiction here with the *Philebus*. Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good.

<sup>c</sup> κομψότεροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American "sophisticated" in recent use. See too *Theaet.* 156 A, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1905 a 18 οἱ χαρίεντες.

<sup>d</sup> Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (cf. *Protag.* 337 A ff.) and Aristotle (cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose. Cf. *Euthyd.* 281 D, *Theaet.* 176 B with 176 C.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 428 B-C, *Euthydem.* 288 D f., *Laws* 961 E ὁ περὶ τί



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good<sup>a</sup>?" "No, by Zeus, I do not," he said.

XVII. "But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure<sup>b</sup> to be the good, and the finer<sup>c</sup> spirits intelligence or knowledge.<sup>d</sup>" "Certainly." "And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge<sup>e</sup> it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good." "Most absurdly," he said. "Is it *not* absurd," said I, "if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,<sup>f</sup> as if we understood their meaning when they utter<sup>g</sup> the word 'good.'" "Most true," he said. "Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion<sup>h</sup> of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner<sup>i</sup> compelled to admit that there

*voûs.* See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 650. The demand for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. *Euthyph.* 13 D, *Laches* 192 E, *Gorg.* 451 A, *Charm.* 165 C-E, *Alc. I.* 124 E ff.

<sup>f</sup> There is no "the" in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on *Phileb.* 11 B-C in *Class. Phil.* vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345.

<sup>g</sup> *φθέγγωνται* logically of mere physical utterance (cf. *Theaet.* 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance.

<sup>h</sup> Lit. "wandering," the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, *Lysis* 213 E, *Phaedo* 79 C, *Soph.* 230 B, *Phaedr.* 263 B, *Parmen.* 135 E, *Laws* 962 D.

<sup>i</sup> *καὶ οὗτοι* is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. *Protag.* 336 C, *Gorg.* 456 C-D, *Phaedo* 62 A.

Σφόδρα γε. Συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ὁμο-  
 D λογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταῦτά. ἦ γάρ; Τί  
 μὴν; Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισ-  
 βητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
 Τί δέ;· τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ  
 πολλοὶ ἂν ἔλουντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κὰν μὴ ἦ, ὅμως  
 ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ  
 δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ  
 ὄντα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς  
 E ἀτιμάζει; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὁ δὴ διώκει μὲν  
 ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα πάντα πράττει,  
 ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ  
 ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει  
 χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἷα καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα, διὰ τοῦτο  
 δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν,  
 506 περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν  
 ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ

<sup>a</sup> A distinct reference to Callicles' admission in *Gorgias* 499 B τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους, cf. 499 c, *Rep.* 561 c, and *Phileb.* 13 c πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι. Stenzel's notion (*Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik*, p. 98) that in the *Philebus* Plato "ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 c weit entfernt" is uncritical. The *Republic* merely refers to the *Gorgias* to show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves.

<sup>b</sup> ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, cf. *Theaet.* 163 c, 158 c, 198 c, *Sophist* 233 B, 225 B, but less so than ἐρίξειν in *Protag.* 337 A.

<sup>c</sup> Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. *Theaet.* 167 c, 172 A-B, and Shorey in *Class. Phil.* xvi. (1921) pp. 164-168.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 468 B τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες, *supra* 505 A-B, *Phileb.* 20 D, *Symp.* 206 A, *Euthyd.* 278 E, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.*

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

are bad pleasures<sup>a</sup>?" "Most assuredly." "The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not?" "Certainly." "Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes<sup>b</sup> about it?" "Of course." "And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honourable many would prefer the semblance<sup>c</sup> without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here?" "Quite so," he said. "That, then, which every soul pursues<sup>d</sup> and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition<sup>e</sup> of its reality, but yet baffled<sup>f</sup> and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,<sup>g</sup> and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,—in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens<sup>h</sup>"

1173 a, 1094 a οὐ πάντα ἐπλεται, Zeller, *Aristot.* i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, *Purg.* xvii. 127-129.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 64 Δ μαρτυρεῖτον. Cf. Arnold's phrase, *God and the Bible*, chap. i. p. 23 "approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after."

<sup>f</sup> As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 71.

<sup>g</sup> Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the *παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. *Introd.* p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 "Toute aultre science est dommageable à celui qui n'a la science de la bonté."

<sup>h</sup> As in the "longer way" Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians.

πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν; "Ηκιστά γ', ἔφη. Οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὄπη ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτηῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα, μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς. Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύει. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν Β ἢ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;

XVIII. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῆς εἶναι ἢ ἡδονήν; ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνὴρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανῆς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ μὴ, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον. Τί δαί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι C περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδε λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα; Οὐδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ' ἂ οἶεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν. Τί δέ; εἶπον· οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί· ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν

<sup>a</sup> The personal or *ab urbe condita* construction. Cf. *Theaet.* 169 E.

<sup>b</sup> The guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men cf. *Laws* 968 A, 964 C, 858 D-E, 817 C, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 6. 8.

<sup>c</sup> For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B λελέξεται, 465 A προστετάξεται, Eurip. *Heracleidae* 980 πεπράξεται.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

to whose hands we are to entrust all things?" "Least of all," he said. "I fancy, at any rate," said I, "that the just and the honourable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,<sup>a</sup> will not have secured a guardian<sup>b</sup> of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this." "You surmise well," he said. "Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization<sup>c</sup> only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it."

XVIII. "Necessarily," he said. "But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different?" "What a man it is," said I; "you made it very plain<sup>d</sup> long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it." "Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates," he said, "to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long."<sup>e</sup> "But then," said I, "do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know?" "By no means," he said, "as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines." "Nay," said I, "have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge<sup>f</sup> are ugly things? The best of them are blind.<sup>g</sup> Or do you think that those who hold some

<sup>a</sup> For the personal construction cf. 348 E, Isoc. *To Nic.* 1. *καταφανής* is a variation in this idiom for *δηλος*. Cf. also *Theaet.* 189 c, *Symp.* 221 b, *Charm.* 162 c, etc.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 367 D-E.

<sup>c</sup> This is not a contradiction of *Meno* 97 b, *Theaet.* 201 b-c, and *Phileb.* 62 a-b, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. on 484 c, *Phaedr.* 270 E.

διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες; Οὐδέν, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν  
 D αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι τυφλά τε καὶ σκόλια, ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά; Μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὦν ἀποστῆς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διηλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθης. Καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἴός τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριοι,  
 E αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὰγαθόν, εἰσώμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι· πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὀρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν· ὅς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, εἶαν. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, λέγε· εἰσαῦθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτίσεις τὴν διήγησιν. Βου-  
 507 λοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι

<sup>a</sup> Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. *Phaedr.* 250 c, *Phileb.* 16 c, *Rep.* 518 c, 478 c, 479 d, 518 a. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the *lumina orationis* of Isocratean style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 64 c ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις, "we are now in the vestibule of the good."

<sup>c</sup> καὶ μάλα, "jolly well," humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to "define" the conventional virtues than to explain the "sanction." Cf. *Symp.* 189 a, *Euthydem.* 298 d-e, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the *Republic*. Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 e.

<sup>d</sup> Excess of zeal, *προθυμία*, seemed laughable to the Greeks.



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?" "They do not differ at all," he said. "Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous<sup>a</sup> and fair?" "Nay, in heaven's name, Socrates," said Glaucon, "do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.<sup>b</sup> For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues." "It will right well<sup>c</sup> content me, my dear fellow," I said, "but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.<sup>d</sup> Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;<sup>e</sup> for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight to-day.<sup>f</sup> But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness<sup>g</sup> I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop." "Well, speak on," he said, "for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time." "I could wish," I said, "that I were able to make  
*Cf.* my interpretation of *Iliad* i. in *fine*, *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.

<sup>a</sup> *Cf.* More, *Principia Ethica*, p. 17 "Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact."

<sup>f</sup> This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See *Introd.* p. xxvii, and my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, p. 212. τὰ νῦν repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι (*cf.* *Tim.* 48 c), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῶθις below sometimes lays the topic on the table, never to be taken up again. *Cf.* 347 E and 430 c.

<sup>g</sup> *Cf.* *Laws* 897 D-E, *Phaedr.* 246 A.

καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι μὴ πῆ ἔξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδούς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου. Εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε. Διομολογησάμενός γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τὰ τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη B πολλάκις εἰρημένα. Τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς. Πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ. Φαμέν γάρ. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων, ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἐκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὀράσθαι φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι C δ' οὔ, τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὀράσθαι δ' οὔ. Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. Τῷ οὖν ὀρώμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὀρώμενα; Τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά; Τί μὴν; Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐννεόγκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὄσω

<sup>a</sup> This playful interlude relieves the monotony of argument and is a transition to the symbolism. *τόκος* means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 ε, *Polit.* 267 α, *Aristoph. Clouds* 34, *Thesm.* 845, *Pindar, Ol.* x. 12. The equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article "Usury" in *Hastings's Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics*, and Antonio's

. . . when did friendship take  
A breed for barren metal of his friend?

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest<sup>a</sup> and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest." "We will do our best," he said, "to be on our guard. Only speak on." "Yes," I said, "after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.<sup>b</sup>" "What?" said he. "We predicate 'to be'<sup>c</sup> of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they *are*, and so define them in our speech." "We do." "And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.<sup>d</sup>" "It is so." "And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen." "By all means." "With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things?" "With sight," he said. "And do we not," I said, "hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses?" "Surely." "Have you ever observed," said I, "how much the

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 475 E f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, *i.e.* practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. *Rep.* 596 A ff., *Phaedo* 108 B ff.

<sup>c</sup> The modern reader will never understand Plato from translations that talk about "Being." Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 605.

<sup>d</sup> ὁ ἔστιν is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. *Phaedo* 75 B, D, 78 D, *Parmen.* 129 B, *Symp.* 211 C, *Rep.* 490 B, 532 A, 597 A.

πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὄραν τε καὶ ὀράσθαι δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν; Οὐ πάνν, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ὤδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὃ τι προσδεῖ ἀκοῆ καὶ φωνῆ γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ ἀκούε-

D σθαι, ὃ εἰάν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἢ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται, ἢ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται; Οὐδενός, ἔφη. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδ' ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾶ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται; Πῶς; Ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρώας ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰάν μὴ

E παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα, ὅτι ἢ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται τὰ τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα. Τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου; Ὁ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶς. Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐ μικρᾶ ἄρα ἰδέα ἢ τοῦ  
508 ὄραν αἰσθησις καὶ ἢ τοῦ ὀράσθαι δύναμις τῶν ἄλλων ξυζεύξεων τιμιωτέρω ζυγῶ ἐζύγησαν, εἶπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς. Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.

<sup>a</sup> Creator, δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 250 D, *Tim.* 45 B.

<sup>c</sup> This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, *Tim.* 67 B. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.

<sup>d</sup> Lit. "kind of thing," γένος. Cf. 507 C-D.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Troland, *The Mystery of Mind*, p. 82: "In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. There must also be a source of so-called 'light.'" Cf. Sir John Davies' poem on the Soul:

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

greatest expenditure the creator<sup>a</sup> of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?<sup>b</sup> ” “Why, no, I have not,” he said. “Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium<sup>c</sup> so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard?” “They need nothing,” he said. “Neither, I fancy,” said I, “do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?” “Not I,” he said. “But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need?” “How?” “Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though colour be present, yet without the presence of a third thing<sup>d</sup> specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colours will remain invisible.<sup>e</sup>” “What<sup>f</sup> is this thing of which you speak?” he said. “The thing,” I said, “that you call light.” “You say truly,” he replied. “The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form<sup>g</sup> than that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honour.” “It surely is far from being so,” he said.

But as the sharpest eye discerneth nought  
 Except the sunbeams in the air do shine;  
 So the best soul with her reflecting thought  
 Sees not herself without some light divine.

<sup>f</sup> Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.

<sup>g</sup> The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of *idéa*. Cf. *Laws* 689 D καὶ τὸ μικρότατον εἶδος. “Form” over-translates *idéa* here, which is little more than a synonym for *γένος* above. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 250.

XIX. Τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὄραῖν ὃ τι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα ὀραῖσθαι; Ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς. Ἄρ' οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν; Πῶς; Οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἢ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτῇ οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ δὲ κα-  
 B λούμεν ὄμμα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἄλλ' ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. Πολύ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει, ἐκ τούτου ταμειομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτῃται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὀράται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης;

<sup>a</sup> Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (*Cratyl.* 397 D, *Aristoph. Peace* 406 ff., *Herod.* iv. 188). Cf. *Laws* 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, *Apol.* 26 D, *Epinomis* 985 B, 988 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, pp. 374-384, Arnold, "Mycerinus":

Yet, surely, O my people, did I deem  
 Man's justice from the all-just Gods was given;  
 A light that from some upper fount did beam,  
 Some better archetype, whose seat was heaven;  
 A light that, shining from the blest abodes,  
 Did shadow somewhat of the life of Gods.

*Complete Poems of Henry More*, p. 77:

Lift myself up in the Theologie  
 Of heavenly Plato. There I'll contemplate  
 The Archetype of this sunne, that bright Idee  
 Of steddie Good, that doth his beams dilate  
 Through all the worlds, all lives and beings  
 propagate . . .

. . . a fair delineament  
 Of that which Good in Plato's school is hight,  
 His T'agathon with beauteous rayes bedight.



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

XIX. "Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven <sup>a</sup> as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?" "Why, the one that you too and other people mean," he said; "for your question evidently refers to the sun. <sup>b</sup>" "Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?" "What?" "Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun." "Why, no." "But it is, I think, the most sunlike <sup>c</sup> of all the instruments of sense." "By far the most." "And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun?" "Certainly." "Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause <sup>d</sup> thereof

Mediaeval writers have much to say of Plato's mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses *τάγαθόν* in much the same way.

It is naïve to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 394 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, *Enn.* i. 6. 9 οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδῆς μὴ γεγεννημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic. *Tusc.* i. 25. 63 *in fine* "quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare," Manilius ii. 115:

quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,  
et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum?

Goethe's

Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,  
Die Sonne könnt es nie erblicken,

and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: "Hätte ich nicht die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich wäre mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Complete Poems of Henry More*, p. 113:

Behold a fit resemblance of this truth,  
The Sun begetteth both colours and sight . . . , etc.

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι  
 με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τὰγαθὸν  
 C ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὃ τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ  
 νοητῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο  
 τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὄρατῷ πρὸς τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα.  
 Πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι διέλθέ μοι. Ὁφθαλμοί, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, οἶσθ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκείνά τις αὐτοὺς  
 τρέπη ὧν ἂν τὰς χροῶς τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχη,  
 ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ  
 ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης  
 καθαρᾶς ὄψεως; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὅταν δέ γ',  
 D οἶμαι, ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὀρώσι, καὶ  
 τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνούσα φαίνεται. Τί  
 μὴν; Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει·  
 ὅταν μὲν, οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς  
 τοῦτο ἀπερείσθαι, ἐνόησέ τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ  
 νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ  
 κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον,  
 δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς  
 δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.  
 E Ἐοικε γάρ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον  
 τοῖς γινγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιννώσκοντι τὴν

<sup>a</sup> *i.e.* creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the *Republic* where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the *Timaeus*. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τὰγαθόν here either with God or

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is beheld by vision itself? ” “ That is so,” he said. “ This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good <sup>a</sup> which the good begot to stand in a proportion <sup>b</sup> with itself : as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.” “ How is that? ” he said; “ explain further.” “ You are aware,” I said, “ that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colours the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them.” “ Yes, indeed,” he said. “ But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes.” “ Certainly.” “ Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent <sup>c</sup> it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.” “ Yes, it does.” “ This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing with the ideas as a whole. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 512.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 465 B-C, *infra* 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, *Phaedo* 111 A-B, *Tim.* 29 C, 32 A-B. For ἀνάλογον in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, *Phaedo* 110 D.

<sup>c</sup> Plato's rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being, the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato's ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, *i.e.* the “sanction,” and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.

δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὔσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γινγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει· ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ  
 509 φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὀπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν. Ἀμύχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ

<sup>a</sup> No absolute distinction can be drawn between *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in Plato. But *ἰδέα* may be used to carry the notion of "apprehended aspect" which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 369 A, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 35, *What Plato Said*, p. 585, *Class. Phil.* xx. (1925) p. 347.

<sup>b</sup> The meaning is clear. We really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. *Introd.* pp. xxxv-xxxvi. The position and case of *γινγνωσκομένης* are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.

<sup>c</sup> Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 B *αἰσχιστον . . . αἰσχιον*, 578 B, *Symp.* 180 A-B and *Bury ad loc.* The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the *Symposium* where Agathon's speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates; similarly in the *Gorgias* and the tenth book of the *Republic*. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 174, *supra* *Introd.* p. lxi.

This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing

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to the knower, you must say is the idea <sup>a</sup> of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.<sup>b</sup> Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still <sup>c</sup> than these you will think rightly of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform,<sup>d</sup> but to think that either of them is the good <sup>e</sup> is not right. Still higher honour belongs to the possession and habit <sup>f</sup> of the good." "An inconceivable beauty you speak of," he said, "if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely <sup>g</sup> cannot mean that it is pleasure." "Hush,"

to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. *Meno* 81 D-E.

<sup>a</sup> ἀγαθοειδῆ occurs only here in classical Greek literature. Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.

<sup>e</sup> There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. Cf. on 505 c, p. 89, note f.

<sup>f</sup> ἔξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian "habit." However *Protag.* 344 c approaches it. Cf. also *Phileb.* 11 D, 41 c, Ritter-Preller, p. 285.

Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g. ἔξις *Laws* 625 c, γένεσις *Laws* 691 B, *Tim.* 73 B, 76 E, μοῖρα *Phaedr.* 255 B, 274 E, *Menex.* 249 B, φύσις *Phaedo* 109 E, *Symp.* 186 B, *Laws* 729 c, 845 D, 944 D, etc. He may have chosen ἔξις here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think it = τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless.

<sup>g</sup> For οὐ γὰρ δῆπου cf. *Apol.* 20 c, *Gorg.* 455 A, *Euthyph.* 13 A.



λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὦδε μᾶλλον  
 Β τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει. Πῶς; Τὸν  
 ἥλιον τοῖς ὄρωμένοις οὐ μόνον, οἶμαι, τὴν τοῦ  
 ὄρασθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν  
 γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν  
 ὄντα. Πῶς γάρ; Καὶ τοῖς γινγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν  
 μὴ μόνον τὸ γιννώσκεισθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ  
 παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ'  
 ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ  
 ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία  
 καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

С XX. Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, "Ἀπολλον,  
 ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς! Σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ  
 λέγειν. Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μὴ τι  
 ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὐ' διεξιῶν, εἴ  
 πη ἀπολείπεις. Ἄλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπο-

<sup>a</sup> *i.e.* not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God's mind for the universe, man's mind for political institutions. This, being the only interpretation that makes sense of the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato's meaning. Cf. *Intro.* pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

Quite irrelevant are Plato's supposed identification of the ἀγαθόν with the ἓν, one, and Aristotle's statement, *Met.* 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas.

The remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies.

<sup>b</sup> It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato's sentence would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here. ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

said I, "but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.<sup>a</sup>" "How?" "The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation." "Of course not." "In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence<sup>b</sup> in dignity and surpassing power."

XX. And Glaucon very ludicrously<sup>c</sup> said, "Heaven save us, hyperbole<sup>d</sup> can no further go." "The fault is yours," I said, "for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it." "And don't desist," he said, "but at least<sup>e</sup> expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting." "Why, certainly," I said, "I am omitting a great deal." "Well,

in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. Cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. *De divinis nominibus*, ii. 2, Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 87.

<sup>c</sup> He is amused at Socrates' emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz' notion (*Platon*, i. p. 209) that the laughable thing is Glaucon's losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph. *Birds* 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265.

The dramatic humour of Glaucon's surprise is Plato's way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B, *Lysis* 223 B, *Protag.* 340 E, *Charm.* 175 E, *Cratyl.* 426 B, *Theaet.* 200 B, 197 D, etc. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 172 on the *Phaedo*.

<sup>d</sup> "What a comble!" would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for *ὑπερβολῆς*. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne's remark that "nothing can be said hyperbolically of God." The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato's manner.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 502 A, *Symp.* 222 E, *Meno* 86 E.

λείπω. Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπης. Οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολὺ ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἐκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω. Μὴ  
 D γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύω αὐτῶ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὄρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη, ὄρατόν, νοητόν; Ἐχω. Ὡσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα<sup>1</sup> τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε ἑκάτερον τμήμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὀρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καὶ σοι ἔσται σαφηνεία καὶ ἀσαφεία πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν  
 E τῷ ὀρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμήμα εἰκόνας. λέγω  
 510 δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκε, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. Ἄλλα κατανοῶ. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ὧ τοῦτο ἔοικε, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος. Τίθημι, ἔφη. Ἡ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διηρησθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν  
 B πρὸς τὸ ὧ ὁμοιώθη; Ἐγωγ', ἔφη, καὶ μάλα. Σκόπει δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ἢ τμητέον.

<sup>1</sup> ἄνισα ADM Proclus, ἄν, ἴσα F, ἀν' ἴσα Stallbaum.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the similar etymological pun in *Cratyl.* 396 B-C. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.

<sup>b</sup> The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See *Introd.* p. xxxi for my interpretation of the passage.

<sup>c</sup> Some modern and ancient critics prefer ἀν' ἴσα. It is a

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don't omit the least bit," he said. "I fancy," I said, "that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out." "Do not," he said. "Conceive then," said I, "as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,<sup>a</sup> but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible." "I do." "Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided<sup>b</sup> into two unequal<sup>c</sup> sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images. By images<sup>d</sup> I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend." "I do." "As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man." "I so assume it," he said. "Would you be willing to say," said I, "that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:<sup>e</sup> as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness?" "I certainly would." "Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section." "In what way?"

little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honourable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. *Plat. Quest.* 3.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 402 B, *Soph.* 266 B-C.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *supra* on 508 c, p. 103. note b.

Πῆ; ἥτις τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν<sup>1</sup> ὡς εἰκόσι χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον ἐπ'<sup>2</sup> ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ ὧν περ ἐκείνο εἰκόνων αὐτοῖς εἶδεσι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη. Ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἔμαθον. Ἄλλ' C αὖθις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ῥᾶον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσει. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναί, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἐκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων D δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο, οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὀρμήσωσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα. Οὐκ-

<sup>1</sup> τμηθεῖσιν DM, μιμηθεῖσιν A Proclus, τιμηθεῖσιν F.

<sup>2</sup> [τὸ] ἐπ' Ast.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed *axioma medium*, but to its relation to ultimate Good. To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or the Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also *Intro.* pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

<sup>b</sup> The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. *Intro.* pp. xvi-xviii.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

“By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,<sup>a</sup> and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas<sup>b</sup> only and progressing systematically through ideas.” “I don’t fully understand<sup>c</sup> what you mean by this,” he said. “Well, I will try again,” said I, “for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them<sup>d</sup> to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out.” “Certainly,” he said, “I know that.”

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 79, note *c* on 347 A and p. 47, note *f* on 338 D; *What Plato Said*, p. 503 on *Gorg.* 463 D.

<sup>d</sup> Aristot. *Top.* 100 b 2-3 οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato’s thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval “contra principium negantem non est disputandum.” A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is “real.”



οὖν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὀρωμένοις εἶδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πέρι, οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἦν  
 Ε γράφουσι, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ πλάττουσί τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰκόνες εἰσὶ, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὐχρῶμενοι, ζητοῦντές δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκείνα ἰδεῖν, ἃ οὐκ  
 511 ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

XXI.—Τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσει δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰούσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένη τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκείνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις. Μανθάνω,  
 Β ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τμημῶν οὐ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο, οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 527 A-B. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkeley and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.

<sup>b</sup> i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.

<sup>c</sup> Stenzel, *Handbuch*, 118 "das er nur mit dem Verstande (διανοίᾳ) sieht" is mistaken. *διανοία* is used not in its special sense ("understanding." See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.

<sup>d</sup> For the concessive *μὲν* cf. 546 E, 529 D, *Soph.* 225 c.



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

“ And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw <sup>a</sup>? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn <sup>b</sup> as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.<sup>c</sup>” “ True,” he said.

XXI. “ This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,<sup>d</sup> but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter <sup>e</sup> are esteemed as clear and held in honour.<sup>f</sup>” “ I understand,” said he, “ that you are speaking <sup>g</sup> of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts.” “ Understand then,” said I, “ that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason <sup>h</sup> itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,<sup>h</sup> treating its

<sup>a</sup> The loosely appended dative *ἐκείνοις* is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. *Phaedo* 105 A. Wilamowitz' emendation (*Platon*, ii. p. 384) to *πρὸς ἐκείνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις* rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.

<sup>f</sup> The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam *ad loc.*

<sup>g</sup> *λόγος* here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 533 A. *Phileb.* 57 E.

τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὄρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀρχὴν ἰῶν, ἡ ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευταίην καταβαίνει,

C αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρῶμενος, ἀλλ' εἶδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾶ εἰς εἶδη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὐ—δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν—ὅτι μέντοι βούλει δι-  
ορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοία μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ

D αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι,

<sup>a</sup> τῷ ὄντι emphasizes the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 E, *Phaedo* 80 D, *Phileb.* 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, p. 229, Thompson on *Meno* 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀρχή—of the inquiry.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 211 C ὡς περ ἐπαναβάσμοις, "like steps of a stair."

<sup>c</sup> παντός ἀρχὴν taken literally lends support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντός ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the *Phaedo*. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,<sup>a</sup> underpinnings, footings,<sup>b</sup> and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,<sup>c</sup> and after attaining to that again|taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense<sup>d</sup> but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.<sup>e</sup>” “I understand,” he said; “not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding<sup>f</sup> and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true

<sup>a</sup> This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.

<sup>e</sup> The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 233-234.

<sup>f</sup> *διανοία* here as in 511 A is general and not technical.

καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὔσαν. Ἰκανώτατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησι μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, E διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἠγησάμενος μετέχειν. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.

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<sup>a</sup> νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means "have no sense." For its higher meaning cf. *Meno* 99 c, *Laws* 962 a.

<sup>b</sup> Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετὰ here. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. The meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quite as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense.

<sup>c</sup> Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

intelligence<sup>a</sup> about them although<sup>b</sup> the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding<sup>c</sup> and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason." "Your interpretation is quite sufficient," I said; "and now, answering to<sup>d</sup> these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief<sup>e</sup> to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,<sup>f</sup> and arrange them in a proportion,<sup>g</sup> considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality." "I understand," he said; "I concur and arrange them as you bid."

faculty inferior to *νοῦς*, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.

<sup>a</sup> For *ἐπι* cf. *Polit.* 280 A, *Gorg.* 463 B.

<sup>c</sup> *πίστις* is of course not "faith" in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.

<sup>f</sup> *εἰκασία* undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note b.

## Z

514 I. Μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ, εἶπον, ἀπέεικασον τοιοῦτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἶον ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκῆσει σπηλαιῶδει, ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ μακρὰν παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς

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<sup>a</sup> The image of the cave illustrates by another proportion the contrast between the world of sense-perception and the world of thought. Instead of going above the plane of ordinary experience for the other two members of the proportion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire and shadows cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun and the "real" objects of sense. In such a proportion our "real" world becomes the symbol of Plato's ideal world.

Modern fancy may read what meanings it pleases into the Platonic antithesis of the "real" and the "ideal." It has even been treated as an anticipation of the fourth dimension. But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical reader in doubt as to his own intended meaning. There may be at the most a little uncertainty as to which precise traits are intended to carry the symbolism and which are merely indispensable parts of the picture.

The source and first suggestion of Plato's imagery is an interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, "The Origin of Plato's Cave" in *Harvard Studies in Class. Phil.* xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also Wright, *loc. cit.* pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world



## BOOK VII

I. "Next," said I, "compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern<sup>a</sup> with a long entrance open<sup>b</sup> to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered<sup>c</sup> from childhood, so that they

to a cave, Diels i.<sup>3</sup> 269. Cf. Wright, *loc. cit.* Wright refers it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and marionette shows to which he refers. Cf. Diès in *Bulletin Budé*, No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 f.

The suggestiveness of the image has been endless. The most eloquent and frequently quoted passage of Aristotle's early writings is derived from it, Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 37. It is the source of Bacon's "idols of the den." Sir Thomas Browne writes in *Urn Burial*: "We yet discourse in Plato's den and are but embryo philosophers." Huxley's allegory of "Jack and the Beanstalk" in *Evolution and Ethics*, pp. 47 ff. is a variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, *Siris*, § 263. The Freudians would have still more fantastic interpretations. Cf. Jung, *Analytic Psych.* p. 232. Eddington perhaps glances at it when he attributes to the new physics the frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows. Cf. also *Complete Poems of Henry More* (ed. Grossart), p. 44:

Like men new made contriv'd into a cave  
That ne'er saw light, but in that shadowy pit  
Some uncouth might them hoodwink hither drave, etc.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 111 c ἀναπεπταμένους.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 67 D.

καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας, ὥστε μένειν τε  
 Β αὐτοῦ<sup>1</sup> εἰς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὄραν, κύκλῳ δὲ  
 τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν,  
 φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καό-  
 μενον ὀπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ  
 τῶν δεσμωτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ' ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον  
 παρωκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ  
 ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν. Ὅρῳ, ἔφη. Ὅρα  
 τοίνυν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους  
 σκευή τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου καὶ  
 515 ἀνδριάντας καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα λίθινά τε καὶ ξύλινα καὶ  
 παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἷον εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν φθει-  
 γομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων.  
 Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτό-  
 πους. Ὅμοίους ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς γὰρ τοιού-  
 τους πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἶει ἄν τι  
 ἕωρακέσαι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς  
 εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσ-  
 πιπτούσας; Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς  
 Β κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκασμένοι εἶεν διὰ βίου; Τί δὲ  
 τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο. Τί μήν;  
 Εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἰοί τ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ  
 ταῦτα<sup>2</sup> ἡγεί ἂν τὰ παριόντα<sup>3</sup> αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὀνομά-

<sup>1</sup> αὐτοῦ Hischig: αὐτούς.

<sup>2</sup> οὐ ταῦτα D, οὐ ταῦτά AFM, οὐκ αὐτά ci. Vermehren.

<sup>3</sup> παριόντα scr. recce., παρόντα AFDM, ὄντα Iamblichus.

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remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet-shows<sup>a</sup> have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets." "All that I see," he said. "See also, then, men carrying<sup>b</sup> past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent." "A strange image you speak of," he said, "and strange prisoners." "Like to us," I said; "for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these men would have seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?" "How could they," he said, "if they were compelled to hold their heads unmoved through life?" "And again, would not the same be true of the objects carried past them?" "Surely." "If then they were able to talk to one another, do you not think that they would suppose that in naming the things

<sup>a</sup> H. Rackham, *Class. Rev.* xxix. pp. 77-78, suggests that the *τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς* should be translated "at the marionettes" and be classed with *καινοῖς τραγωδοῖς* (Pseph. *ap. Dem.* xviii. 116). For the dative he refers to Kuehner-Gerth, *ii. i. p. 445*.

<sup>b</sup> The men are merely a part of the necessary machinery of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The artificial objects correspond to the things of sense and opinion in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of reflections, *εἰκόνας*.

ζειν ἄπερ ὀρώμεν; Ἀνάγκη. Τί δ'; εἰ καὶ ἡχὼ  
 τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι, ὅποτε τις  
 τῶν παριόντων φθέγγεται, οἷοι ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς  
 ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριούσαν σκιάν;  
 Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Παντάπασι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 C οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθές ἢ  
 τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.  
 Σκόπει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσειν τε καὶ ἴασι  
 τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, οἷα τις ἂν εἴη, εἰ  
 φύσει τοιαύδε ξυμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς· ὅποτε τις λυθείη  
 καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαι τε καὶ περι-  
 ἀγειν τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς  
 ἀναβλέπειν,<sup>a</sup> πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλογοῖ τε καὶ  
 D τότε τὰς σκιάς ἐώρα, τί ἂν οἷοι αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἴ  
 τις αὐτῷ λέγοι, ὅτι τότε μὲν ἐώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν  
 δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Parmen.* 130 D, *Tim.* 51 B, 52 A, and my *De Platonis Idearum doctrina*, pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann in *Wochenschrift f. klass. Phil.* xxxvi. (1919) pp. 196-197. As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the reality (αὐτὸ δ' ἔστι) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak of the shadows as the world, though the real reference unknown to them would be to the objects that cause the shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the "real" world of which they are copies. The general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they would suppose the shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn of expression are doubtful. See crit. note. παριόντα is intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they

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that they saw<sup>a</sup> they were naming the passing objects?"

"Necessarily." "And if their prison had an echo<sup>b</sup> from the wall opposite them, when one of the passers-by uttered a sound, do you think that they would suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?" "By Zeus, I do not," said he.

"Then in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects." "Quite inevitably," he said.

"Consider, then, what would be the manner of the release<sup>c</sup> and healing from these bonds and this folly if in the course of nature<sup>d</sup> something of this sort should happen to them: When one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, what do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality

really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are homonymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get somewhat the same meaning from the text ταῦτά. "Do you not think that they would identify the passing objects (which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they saw?"

<sup>c</sup> Cf. also P. Corssen, *Philologische Wochenschrift*, 1913, p. 286. He prefers οὐκ αὐτά and renders: "Sie würden in dem, was sie sähen, das Vorübergehende selbst zu benennen glauben."

<sup>b</sup> The echo and the voices (515 A) merely complete the picture.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 67 D λείν, and 82 D λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῶ. λύσις became technical in Neoplatonism.

<sup>d</sup> Lit. "by nature." φύσις in Plato often suggests reality and truth.

ὄντα τετραμμένους ὀρθότερα βλέπει, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζει ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἔστιν; οὐκ οἶει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἠγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὀρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα; Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

II. Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζει  
 E αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ  
 φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ δύναται  
 καθορᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα  
 τῶν δεικνυμένων; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Εἰ δέ, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βία διὰ τραχείας  
 τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους καὶ μὴ ἀνεΐη πρὶν  
 ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ  
 ὀδυνᾶσθαι τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ  
 516 ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ  
 ὄμματα μεστὰ ὀρᾶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν  
 λεγομένων ἀληθῶν; Οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε.  
 Συνηθείας δὴ, οἶμαι, δέοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω  
 ὄψεσθαι· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾶστα καθ-  
 ορῶ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τὰ τε τῶν  
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδωλα, ὕστερον δέ  
 αὐτά· ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν  
 οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾶον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ  
 B τῶν ἀστρῶν τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν

<sup>a</sup> The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful experience of one whose false conceit of knowledge is tested by the Socratic *elenchus*. Cf. *Soph.* 230 B-D, and for ἀπορεῖν *Meno* 80 A, 84 B-C, *Theaet.* 149 A, *Apol.* 23 D. Cf. also *What Plato Said*, p. 513 on *Meno* 80 A, Eurip. *Hippol.* 247 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν ὀδυνᾶ, "it is painful to have one's opinions set right," and *infra* 517 A, *supra* 494 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 175 B, Boethius, *Cons.* iii. 12 "quicumque in superum diem mentem ducere quaeritis"; *infra* 529 A, 521 c, and the Neoplatonists' use of ἀνάγειν and their



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and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly? And if also one should point out to him each of the passing objects and constrain him by questions to say what it is, do you not think that he would be at a loss<sup>a</sup> and that he would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now pointed out to him?" "Far more real," he said.

II. "And if he were compelled to look at the light itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not turn away and flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out?" "It is so," he said. "And if," said I, "someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent<sup>b</sup> which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams so that he would not be able to see<sup>c</sup> even one of the things that we call real?" "Why, no, not immediately," he said. "Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water<sup>d</sup> of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day

"anagogical" virtue and interpretation. Cf. Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt, vii. 270.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 897 D, *Phaedo* 99 D.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 99 D. Stallbaum says this was imitated by Themistius, *Orat.* iv. p. 51 B.

τὸν ἡλίον τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. Πῶς δ' οὐ;  
 Τελευταῖον δὴ, οἶμαι, τὸν ἡλίον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασι  
 οὐδ' ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἔδρα φαντάσματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ'  
 αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναιτ' ἂν  
 κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν. Ἀναγκαῖον,  
 ἔφη. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ  
 αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τὰς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ  
 ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ  
 C ὄρωμένῳ τόπῳ, καὶ ἐκείνων, ὧν σφεῖς ἐώρων,  
 τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος. Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ  
 ταῦτα ἂν μετ' ἐκείνα ἔλθοι. Τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνη-  
 σκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ  
 σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε ξυνδεσμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν  
 μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν;  
 Καὶ μάλα. Τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς  
 ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθ-  
 ορῶντι τὰ παριόντα, καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα  
 D ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα  
 πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπο-  
 μαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἤξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν  
 ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ'  
 ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ  
 τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἂν πεπονθέναί καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι

\* It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism in all the details of this description. There are more stages of progress than the proportion of four things calls for. All that Plato's thought requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of good. Cf. 517 B-C.

<sup>b</sup> i.e. a foreign medium.  
 \* Cf. 508 B, and for the idea of good as the cause of all things cf. on 509 B, and Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

P. Corssen, *Philol. Wochenschrift*, 1913, pp. 287-288, unnecessarily proposes to emend ὧν σφεῖς ἐώρων to ὧν σκιάς ἐ. or

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the sun and the sun's light.<sup>a</sup> "Of course." "And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting,<sup>b</sup> but in and by itself in its own place." "Necessarily," he said. "And at this point he would infer and conclude that this it is that provides the seasons and the courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region, and is in some sort the cause<sup>c</sup> of all these things that they had seen." "Obviously," he said, "that would be the next step." "Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you not think that he would count himself happy in the change and pity them<sup>d</sup>?" "He would indeed." "And if there had been honours and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, sequences and co-existences,<sup>e</sup> and so most successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honoured by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer<sup>f</sup> and greatly

*ὦν σφεῖς σκιὰς ἐ.*, "ne sol umbrarum, quas videbant, auctor fuisse dicatur, cum potius earum rerum, quarum umbras videbant, fuerit auctor."<sup>g</sup> Cf. on 486 A, p. 10, note a.

<sup>h</sup> Another of Plato's anticipations of modern thought. This is precisely the Humian, Comtian, positivist, pragmatist view of causation. Cf. *Gorg.* 501 A *τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι*, "relying on routine and habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result." (Loeb tr.)

<sup>i</sup> *Odys.* xi. 489. The quotation is almost as apt as that at the beginning of the *Crito*.

ἐπάρουρον ἔοντα θητευέμεν ἄλλω ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἂν πεπονθέναί μᾶλλον ἢ κείνᾳ  
 E τε δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν; Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔγωγε οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναί ἂν δέξασθαι ἢ ζῆν ἐκείνως. Καὶ τότε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβάς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θᾶκον καθίζοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ σκότους ἂν πλέως<sup>1</sup> σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, ἐξαίφνης ἤκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου; Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη. Τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιάς ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ  
 517 δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν καταστῆναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος δ' ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἶη τῆς συνηθείας, ἄρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀναβάς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἤκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἵέναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουσαι ἂν<sup>2</sup>; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

III. Ταύτην τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ᾧ φίλε Γλαῦκων, προσαπτεόν ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν  
 B λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν τῆ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου οἰκῆσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῆ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει· τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν

<sup>1</sup> ἂν πλέως Stallb., ἀνάπλεως MSS., ἂν ἀνάπλεως Baiter. See Adam *ad loc.* on the text.

<sup>2</sup> ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουσαι ἂν F: ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτινύουσαι ἂν AD Iamblichus: ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτινύουσαι αὐ M, ἀποκτείνουσαι ἂν ci. Baiter.

<sup>a</sup> On the metaphor of darkness and light *cf.* also *Soph.* 254 A.

<sup>b</sup> Like the philosopher in the court-room. *Cf.* *Theaet.* 172 c, 173 c ff., *Gorg.* 484 D-E. *Cf.* also *supra* on 487 c-D. 515 D, *infra* 517 D, *Soph.* 216 D, *Laches* 196 B, *Phaedr.* 249 D.

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prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man, and endure anything rather than opine with them and live that life?" "Yes," he said, "I think that he would choose to endure anything rather than such a life." "And consider this also," said I, "if such a one should go down again and take his old place would he not get his eyes full<sup>a</sup> of darkness, thus suddenly coming out of the sunlight?" "He would indeed." "Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in 'evaluating' these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter,<sup>b</sup> and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him<sup>c</sup>?" "They certainly would," he said.

III. "This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul's

<sup>a</sup> An obvious allusion to the fate of Socrates. For other stinging allusions to this cf. *Gorg.* 486 B, 521 C, *Meno* 100 B-C. Cf. Hamlet's "Wormwood, wormwood" (III. ii. 191). The text is disputed. See crit. note. A. Drachmann, "Zu Platons Staat," *Hermes*, 1926, p. 110, thinks that an *ολεῖ* or something like it must be understood as having preceded, at least in Plato's thought, and that *ἀποκτείνειν* can be taken as a gloss or variant of *ἀποκτείνουσαι* and the correct reading must be *λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτείνουσαι ἄν.* See also Adam *ad loc.*



τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσῃ τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούειν θεὸς δέ που οἶδεν, εἰ ἀληθῆς οὔσα τυγχάνει. τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις  
 C ὀράσθαι, ὀφθεῖσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἔν τε ὀρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἔν τε νοητῷ αὕτη κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. Συνοίομαι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι. Ἴθι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε ξυνοιήθητι καὶ μὴ θαυμάσης ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσι τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγονται  
 D αὐτῶν αἰ ψυχὰι διατρίβειν· εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως, εἴπερ αὖ κατὰ τὴν προειρημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ' ἔχει. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τόδε οἶει τι θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἰκανῶς συνήθης

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 508 B-C, where Arnou (*Le Désir de dieu dans la philos. de Plotin*, p. 48) and Robin (*La Théorie plat. de l'amour*, pp. 83-84) make *τόπος νοητός* refer to *le ciel astronomique* as opposed to the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* of the *Phaedrus* 247 A-E, 248 B, 248 D-249 A. The phrase *νοητὸς κόσμος*, often attributed to Plato, does not occur in his writings.

<sup>b</sup> Plato was much less prodigal of affirmation about metaphysical ultimates than interpreters who take his myths literally have supposed. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 515, on *Meno* 86 B.



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ascension to the intelligible region,<sup>a</sup> you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows<sup>b</sup> whether it is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth<sup>c</sup> in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely<sup>d</sup> in private or public must have caught sight of this." "I concur," he said, "so far as I am able." "Come then," I said, "and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who have attained to this height are not willing<sup>e</sup> to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of our image holds." "Yes, it is likely." "And again, do you think it at all strange," said I, "if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries<sup>f</sup> of men cuts a sorry figure<sup>g</sup> and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 506 E.

<sup>d</sup> This is the main point for the *Republic*. The significance of the idea of good for cosmogony is just glanced at and reserved for the *Timaeus*. Cf. on 503 B, p. 102, note *a* and pp. 505-506. For the practical application cf. *Meno* 81 D-E. See also *Intro.* pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 521 A, 345 E, and Vol. I. on 347 D, p. 81, note *d*.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 346 E.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 174 c ἀσχημοσύνη.

γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν  
δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν  
τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ  
E διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαμβάνεται  
ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῆν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε  
ἰδόντων; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν θαυμαστόν, ἔφη. Ἄλλ'  
518 εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεμνητ' ἄν, ὅτι  
διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμ-  
μασιν, ἔκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ  
ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς· ταῦτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας  
γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, ὅποτε ἴδοι θορυβου-  
μένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατουσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν  
ἀλογίστως γελῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοποῖ ἂν πότερον ἐκ  
φανοτέρου βίου ἤκουσα ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἐσκότῳται ἢ  
B ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰούσα ὑπὸ λαμ-  
προτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ  
τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου,  
τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ' αὐτῇ βούλοιτο,  
ἦττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἶη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ  
τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἠκούση. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη,  
μετρίως λέγεις.

IV. Δεῖ δὴ, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ  
αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἶαν τινὲς  
ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι.

<sup>a</sup> For the contrast between the philosophical and the  
pettifogging soul cf. *Theaet.* 173 c-175 e. Cf. also on  
517 A, p. 128, note b.

<sup>b</sup> For ἀγαλμάτων cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*,  
p. 237, *Soph.* 234 c, *Polit.* 303 c.

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to the environing darkness, he is compelled in court-rooms<sup>a</sup> or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images<sup>b</sup> that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?" "It would be by no means strange," he said. "But a sensible man," I said, "would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light,<sup>c</sup> and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh<sup>d</sup> unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.<sup>e</sup> And so<sup>f</sup> he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above." "That is a very fair statement," he said.

IV. "Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their profes-

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle, *De an.* 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is *ἀόρατον* but otherwise than the dark.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 175 D-E.

<sup>c</sup> Lit. "or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a greater light."

<sup>f</sup> i.e. only after that. For *οὕτω δὴ* in this sense cf. 484 D, 429 D, 443 E, *Charm.* 171 E.

- C φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέσθαι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέσθαι. Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει, ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον, ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ ξὺν ὄλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ξὺν ὄλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὄν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται
- D ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη· τοῦτο δ' εἶναί φαμεν τὰγαθόν· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Τούτου τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς ῥᾶστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὄραν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἱ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι. Ἔοικε γάρ, ἔφη.

<sup>a</sup> ἐπαγγελλόμενοι connotes the boastfulness of their claims. Cf. *Protag.* 319 A, *Gorg.* 447 c, *Laches* 186 c, *Euthyd.* 273 E, *Isoc. Soph.* 1, 5, 9, 10, *Antid.* 193, *Xen. Mem.* iii. 1. 1, i. 2. 8, *Aristot. Rhet.* 1402 a 25.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Theognis* 429 ff. Stallbaum compares Eurip. *Hippol.* 917 f. Similarly *Anon. Theaet. Comm.* (Berlin, 1905), p. 32, 48. 4 καὶ δεῖν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνθέσεως μαθημάτων, ἀλλὰ ἀναμνήσεως. Cf. also St. Augustine: "Nolite putare quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine. Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae;" and Emerson's "Strictly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from another soul."

<sup>c</sup> περιακτέον is probably a reference to the *περιακτοὶ* or triangular prisms on each side of the stage. They revolved on an axis and had different scenes painted on their three faces. Many scholars are of the opinion that they were not known in the classical period, as they are mentioned only by late

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sions.<sup>a</sup> What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting<sup>b</sup> vision into blind eyes." "They do indeed," he said. "But our present argument indicates," said I, "that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periaet<sup>c</sup> in the theatre, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the good,<sup>d</sup> do we not?" "Yes." "Of this very thing, then," I said, "there might be an art,<sup>e</sup> an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about." "Yes, that seems likely," he said. "Then

writers; but others do not consider this conclusive evidence, as a number of classical plays seem to have required something of the sort. Cf. O. Navarre in Daremberg-Saglio *s.v.* Machine, p. 1469.

<sup>d</sup> Hard-headed distaste for the unction or seeming mysticism of Plato's language should not blind us to the plain meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral will to be unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached and drilled into ordinary morality, but that the degree of their intelligence is an unalterable endowment of nature. Some teachers will concur.

<sup>e</sup> Plato often distinguishes the things that do or do not admit of reduction to an art or science. Cf. on 488 E, p. 22, note b. Adam is mistaken in taking it "Education (*ἡ παιδεία*) would be an art," etc.



Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς  
 κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος.  
 Ε τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνούσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμ-  
 ποιῆσθαι ἔθεσί τε καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι  
 παντὸς μᾶλλον θειότερου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς  
 ἔοικεν, οὔσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπ-  
 ὄλλουσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαιγωγῆς χρήσιμόν τε καὶ  
 519 ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται.  
 ἡ οὐπω ἐννεόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μὲν,  
 σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμύ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ  
 ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην  
 ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακία δ' ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν,  
 ὥστε ὅσω ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσοῦτω πλείω  
 κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τοῦτο  
 μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ  
 παιδὸς εὐθύς κοπτόμενον περιεκότη τὰς τῆς  
 Β γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὴ

<sup>a</sup> This then is Plato's answer (intended from the first) to the question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the *Protagoras* and *Meno*. The intellectual virtues (to use Aristotle's term), broadly speaking, cannot be taught; they are a gift. And the highest moral virtue is inseparable from rightly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary moral virtue is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes by the grace of God. In a reformed state it could be systematically inculcated and "taught." Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 511-512 on *Meno* 70 a. But we need not infer that Plato did not believe in mental discipline. Cf. Charles Fox, *Educational Psychology*, p. 164 "The conception of mental discipline is at least as old as Plato, as may be seen from the seventh book of the *Republic* . . ."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1103 a 14-17 ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους. Plato does not explicitly name "ethical" and "intellectual" virtues. Cf. Fox, *op. cit.* p. 104 "Plato correctly believed



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the other so-called virtues<sup>a</sup> of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit<sup>b</sup> and practice. But the excellence of thought,<sup>c</sup> it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency, but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficent, or, again, useless and harmful. Have you never observed in those who are popularly spoken of as bad, but smart men,<sup>d</sup> how keen is the vision of the little soul,<sup>e</sup> how quick it is to discern the things that interest it,<sup>f</sup> a proof that it is not a poor vision which it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief it accomplishes? "I certainly have," he said. "Observe then," said I, "that this part of such a soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and had thus been struck free<sup>g</sup> of the leaden weights, so that all virtues except wisdom could be acquired habitually

<sup>a</sup> Plato uses such synonyms as *φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς, διάνοια*, etc., as suits his purpose and context. He makes no attempt to define and discriminate them with impracticable Aristotelian meticulousness.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 176 D, *Laws* 689 C-D, Cic. *De offic.* i. 19, and also *Laws* 819 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 195 A, *ibid.* 173 A *σμικροὶ . . . τὰς ψυχὰς*, Marcus Aurelius' *ψυχάρπιον εἰ βαστάζων νεκρὸν*, Swinburne's "A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man" ("Hymn to Proserpine," *in fine*), Tennyson's "If half the little soul is dirt."

<sup>f</sup> Lit. "Toward which it is turned."

<sup>g</sup> The meaning is plain, the precise nature of the image that carries it is doubtful. Jowett's "circumcision" was suggested by Stallbaum's "*purgata ac circumcisa*," but carries alien associations. The whole may be compared with the incrustation of the soul, *infra* 611 C-D, and with *Phaedo* 81 B f.

ἔδωδαῖς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι κάτω<sup>1</sup> στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν· ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὴν περιεστρέφετο εἰς τάληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀξύτατα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἃ νῦν τέτραπται. Εἰκός γε, ἔφη. Τί δαί; τόδε οὐκ εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, μήτε τοὺς ἀπαιδευτοὺς καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπείρους

C ἰκανῶς ἂν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεῦσαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν ὅτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἓνα, οὐ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἐκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξουσιν, ἡγούμενοι ἐν μακάρων νήσοις ζῶντες ἔτι ἀπωκίσθαι; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν οἰκιστῶν τὰς τε βελτίστας φύσεις ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἔφαμεν εἶναι μέγιστον, ἰδεῖν τε τὸ

D ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν; καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀναβάντες ἰκανῶς ἴδωσι, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτοῖς ὃ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ; Τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν πάλιν

<sup>1</sup> κάτω Hermann: περι κάτω MSS.: περι τὰ κάτω Iamblichus.

<sup>a</sup> Or "eye of the mind." Cf. 533 D, *Sym.* 219 A, *Soph.* 254 A, *Aristot. Eth.* 1144 a 30, and the parallels and imitations collected by Gomperz, *Apol. der Heilkunst*, 166-167. Cf. also *What Plato Said*, p. 534, on *Phaedo* 99 E, *Ovid, Met.* xv. 64:

. . . quae natura negabat  
visibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hausit.

Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. pp. 12-13, 15, and perhaps *Odyssey*, i. 115, *Marc. Aurel.* iv. 29 καταμῆναι τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι.

<sup>b</sup> For likely and necessary cf. on 485 c, p. 6, note c.

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to speak, of our birth and becoming, which attaching themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and gluttonies turn downwards the vision of the soul<sup>a</sup>—if, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a conversion towards the things that are real and true, that same faculty of the same men would have been most keen in its vision of the higher things, just as it is for the things toward which it is now turned.” “It is likely,” he said. “Well, then,” said I, “is not this also likely<sup>b</sup> and a necessary consequence of what has been said, that neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever adequately preside over a state, nor could those who had been permitted to linger on to the end in the pursuit of culture—the one because they have no single aim<sup>c</sup> and purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blest.<sup>d</sup>” “True,” he said. “It is the duty of us, the founders, then,” said I, “to compel the best natures to attain the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good, to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now permitted.” “What is that?” “That they should linger there,” I said, “and refuse

<sup>a</sup> σκοπόν: this is what distinguishes the philosophic statesman from the opportunist politician. Cf. 452 E, *Laws* 962 A-B, D, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 18, n. 102.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 540 B, *Gorg.* 526 c, *infra* 520 D ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ and *Phaedo* 114 c, 109 B. Because they will still suppose that they are “building Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land” (Blake).

καταβαίνειν παρ' ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσμώτας μηδὲ μετέχειν τῶν παρ' ἐκείνοις πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν, εἴτε φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι. Ἐπειτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χεῖρον ζῆν, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὄν ἄμεινον;

- E V. Ἐπελάθου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι νόμῳ οὐ τοῦτο μέλει, ὅπως ἔν τι γένος ἐν πόλει διαφερόντως εὖ πράξει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι, ξυναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθοῖ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις  
 520 τῆς ὠφελείας, ἦν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ ὦσιν ὠφελεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν τοιοῦτους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφίῃ τρέπεσθαι ὅπῃ ἕκαστος βούλεται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καταχρῆται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν ξύνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη· ἐπελαθόμην γάρ. Σκέψαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδικήσομεν τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν φιλοσόφους γιγνομένους, ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν, προσαναγκάζοντες τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τε καὶ  
 B φυλάττειν. ἐροῦμεν γάρ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόνων· αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείας, δίκην δ' ἔχει τό γε αὐτοφυές, μηδενὶ τροφήν ὀφείλον, μηδ' ἐκτίειν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* 539 E and *Laws* 803 B-C, and on 520 C, Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 53 "the hero of our story descended the bean-stalk and came back to the common world," etc.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315 on 419.

<sup>c</sup> *i.e.* happiness, not of course exceptional happiness.

<sup>d</sup> Persuasion and compulsion are often bracketed or contrasted. Cf. also *Laws* 661 C, 722 B, 711 C, *Rep.* 548 B.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 369 C ff. The reference there however is only to the economic division of labour. For the idea that laws should

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to go down again<sup>a</sup> among those bondsmen and share their labours and honours, whether they are of less or of greater worth." "Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power?"

V. "You have again forgotten,<sup>b</sup> my friend," said I, "that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition<sup>c</sup> in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion,<sup>d</sup> and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit<sup>e</sup> which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth." "True," he said, "I did forget it." "Observe, then, Glaucon," said I, "that we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who arise among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens and be their guardians.<sup>f</sup> For we will say to them that it is natural that men of similar quality who spring up in other cities should not share in the labours there. For they grow up spontaneously<sup>g</sup> from no volition of the government in the several states, and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay

be for the good of the whole state *cf.* 420 B ff., 466 A, 341-342, *Laws* 715 B, 757 D, 875 A.

<sup>f</sup> *Noblesse oblige.* This idea is now a commonplace of communist orations.

<sup>g</sup> *αὐτόμαροι*: *cf.* *Protag.* 320 A, *Euthyd.* 282 c. For the thought that there are a few men naturally good in any state *cf.* also *Laws* 951 B, 642 C-D.



τω προθυμείσθαι τὰ τροφεία· ὑμᾶς δ' ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν  
 τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὡσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν  
 ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἀμεινόν τε  
 C καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους καὶ μᾶλλον  
 δυνατοὺς ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν. καταβατέον οὖν  
 ἐν μέρει ἐκάστω εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ξυνοίκησιν καὶ  
 ξυνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι· ξυνεθιζόμενοι  
 γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ, καὶ γνώσεσθε  
 ἕκαστα τὰ εἶδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὦν, διὰ τὸ τάληθῆ  
 ἔωρακένας καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι·  
 καὶ οὕτω ὑπαρ ἡμῖν καὶ ὑμῖν ἢ πόλις οἰκήσεται,  
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄναρ, ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ σκιαμαχούν-  
 D των τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ  
 ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος.  
 τὸ δέ που ἀληθὲς ᾧδ' ἔχει· ἐν πόλει ἢ ἡκιστα  
 πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην  
 ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν  
 δ' ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας σχοῦσαν ἐναντίως. Πάνυ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Isoc. *Archidamus* 108 ἀποδῶμεν τὰ τροφεία τῇ πατρίδι. Stallbaum refers also to *Phoenissae* 44. For the country as τροφῆς see Vol. I, p. 303, note e on 414 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 301 D-E, *Xen. Cyr.* v. 1. 24, *Oecon.* 7. 32-33.

<sup>c</sup> For τελεώτερον . . . πεπαιδευμένους cf. *Prot.* 342 E τελέως πεπαιδευμένον.

<sup>d</sup> They must descend into the cave again. Cf. *infra* 539 E and *Laws* 803 B-C. Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philos.* pp. 89-90: "It was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on philosophers descending by turns into the cave from which they had been released and coming to the help of their former fellow-prisoners." He agrees with Stewart (*Myths of Plato*, p. 252, n. 2) that Plato had in mind the Orphic *κατάβασις εἰς Ἄιδον* to "rescue the spirits in prison." Cf. Wright, *Harvard Studies*, xvii. p. 139 and *Complete Poems of Henry More*, pp. xix-xx "All which is agreeable to that opinion of Plato: That some descend hither to declare the Being and Nature of the Gods; and for the greater Health,



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to anyone the price of its nurture.<sup>a</sup> But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king-bees<sup>b</sup> and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education<sup>c</sup> than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go<sup>d</sup> then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely<sup>e</sup> better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of the 'idols'<sup>f</sup> is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So our city will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream<sup>g</sup> by men who fight one another for shadows<sup>h</sup> and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office<sup>i</sup> must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this."

Purity and Perfection of this Lower World." This is taking Plato somewhat too literally and confusing him with Plotinus.

<sup>a</sup> For *μυπτι* cf. Eurip. *Androm.* 701.

<sup>f</sup> i.e. images, Bacon's "idols of the den."

<sup>g</sup> Plato is fond of the contrast, *ἕκαστος . . . ἕνα*. Cf. 476 c, *Phaedr.* 277 d, *Phileb.* 36 e, 65 e, *Polit.* 277 d, 278 e, *Theaet.* 158 b, *Rep.* 574 d, 576 b, *Tim.* 71 e, *Laws* 969 b, also 533 b-c.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. on 536 c, p. 393; Shelley, *Adonais* st. 39 "keep with phantoms an unprofitable strife"; Arnold, "Dover Beach":

. . . a darkling plain . . .

Where ignorant armies clash by night.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. on 517 c, p. 131, note e.

μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἀπειθήσουσιν οὖν ἡμῖν, οἷι, οἱ  
 τρόφιμοι ταῦτ' ἀκούοντες, καὶ οὐκ ἐθελήσουσι  
 συμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἕκαστοι ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ  
 πολὺν χρόνον μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ;

Ε Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη· δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δικάοις ἐπι-  
 τάξομεν. παντὸς μὲν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον  
 αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἶσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τοῦναντίον τῶν νῦν  
 ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει ἀρχόντων. Οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε· εἰ μὲν βίον ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ  
 521 ἄρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἄρξειν, ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ  
 γενέσθαι πόλις εὐ οἰκουμένη· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ  
 ἄρξουσιν οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσοῦ, ἀλλ'  
 οὐ δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ  
 ἔμφρονος. εἰ δὲ πτωχοὶ καὶ πεινῶντες ἀγαθῶν  
 ἰδίων ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἴασιν, ἐντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι  
 τὰ γαθὸν δεῖν ἀρπάζειν, οὐκ ἔστι· περιμάχητον  
 γὰρ τὸ ἄρχειν γιγνόμενον, οἰκεῖος ὢν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ  
 τοιοῦτος πόλεμος αὐτοῦς τε ἀπόλλυσι καὶ τὴν  
 Β ἄλλην πόλιν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ἐχεις οὖν, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον τινὰ πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν κατα-  
 φρονοῦντα ἢ τὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας; Οὐ μὰ  
 τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε μὴ ἐραστὰς  
 τοῦ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἐπ' αὐτό· εἰ δὲ μή, οἷ γε ἀντ-  
 ερασταὶ μαχοῦνται. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τίνας οὖν ἄλλους  
 ἀναγκάσεις ἰέναι ἐπὶ φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, ἢ οἱ

<sup>a</sup> The world of ideas, the upper world as opposed to that of the cave. Cf. Stallbaum *ad loc.*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* Vol. I. p. 80, note b on 347 c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus in fine, supra* 416 E-417 A, *infra* 547 B.

<sup>d</sup> Stallbaum refers to Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 3. 39 οἰομαί σε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡδῖον πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας, "for you must enjoy your riches much more, I think, for the very reason that it was only after being hungry for wealth that you became rich." (Loeb tr.) Cf. also *infra* 577 E-578 A, and Adam *ad loc.*

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“By all means,” he said. “Will our alumni, then, disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse to share in the labours of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell the most of the time with one another in that purer world <sup>a</sup>?” “Impossible,” he said: “for we shall be imposing just commands on men who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as an unavoidable necessity, <sup>b</sup> and in the opposite temper from that of the present rulers in our cities.” “For the fact is, dear friend,” said I, “if you can discover a better way of life than office-holding for your future rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility. For only in such a state will those rule who are really rich, <sup>c</sup> not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happiness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and starvelings <sup>d</sup> from lack of goods of their own, they turn to affairs of state thinking that it is thence that they should grasp their own good, then it is impossible. For when office and rule become the prizes of contention, <sup>e</sup> such a civil and internecine strife <sup>f</sup> destroys the office-seekers themselves and the city as well.” “Most true,” he said. “Can you name any other type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political office except the life of true philosophers <sup>g</sup>?” I asked. “No, by Zeus,” he said. “But what we require,” I said, “is that those who take office <sup>h</sup> should not be lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with rival lovers.” “Surely.” “What others, then, will you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 347 D, *Laws* 715 A, also 586 c and *What Plato Said*, p. 627, on *Laws* 678 E, *Isoc. Areop.* 24, *Pan.* 145 and 146.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Eurip. *Heracleidae* 415 οἰκείος ἤδη πόλεμος ἐξαρτεύεται.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *infra* 580 D ff., pp. 370 ff.

<sup>h</sup> ἵέναι ἐπι in erotic language means “to woo.” Cf. on 489 D, p. 26, note b, also 347 c, 588 B, 475 c.

περὶ τούτων τε φρονιμώτατοι, δι' ὧν ἄριστα πόλις οἰκεῖται, ἔχουσι τε τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ βίον ἀμείνω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ; Οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἔφη.

C VI. Βούλει οὖν τοῦτ' ἤδη σκοπῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ Ἑλίου λέγονται δὴ τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἔφη.

Τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφή ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινὸς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος οὔσα ἐπάνοδος,<sup>1</sup> ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

D ἔχει τοιαύτην δύναμιν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὄλκον ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; τόδε δ' ἐννοῶ λέγων ἅμα· οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους

<sup>1</sup> οὔσα ἐπάνοδος Hermann: οὔσαν ἐπάνοδον AFDM, ἰούσης ἐπάνοδον scr. rec.: οὐσίαν ἐπάνοδος ci. Cobet.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 515 E, p. 124, note b.

<sup>b</sup> This has been much debated. Cf. Adam *ad loc.* Professor Linforth argues from Pausanias i. 34 that Amphiarus is meant.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 241 B; also the description of the game in Plato Comicus, *fr.* 153, *apud* Norwood, *Greek Comedy*, p. 167. The players were divided into two groups. A shell or potsherd, black on one side and white on the other, was thrown, and according to the face on which it fell one group fled and the other pursued. Cf. also commentators on Aristoph. *Knights* 855.

<sup>d</sup> Much quoted by Neoplatonists and Christian Fathers. Cf. Stallbaum *ad loc.* Again we need to remember that Plato's main and explicitly reiterated purpose is to describe a course of study that will develop the power of consecutive consistent abstract thinking. All metaphysical and mystical suggestions of the imagery which conveys this idea are

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than those who have most intelligence of the principles that are the means of good government and who possess distinctions of another kind and a life that is preferable to the political life?" "No others," he said.

VI. "Would you, then, have us proceed to consider how such men may be produced in a state and how they may be led upward<sup>a</sup> to the light even as some<sup>b</sup> are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?" "Of course I would." "So this, it seems, would not be the whirling of the shell<sup>c</sup> in the children's game, but a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day—that ascension<sup>d</sup> to reality of our parable which we will affirm to be true philosophy." "By all means." "Must we not, then, consider what studies have the power to effect this?" "Of course." "What, then, Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being? A thought strikes me while I speak<sup>e</sup>: Did we not say that these men in youth must be athletes

secondary and subordinate. So, *e.g.* Urwick, *The Message of Plato*, pp. 66-67, is mistaken when he says ". . . Plato expressly tells us that his education is designed simply and solely to awaken the spiritual faculty which every soul contains, by 'wheeling the soul round and turning it away from the world of change and decay.' He is not concerned with any of those 'excellences of mind' which may be produced by training and discipline, his only aim is to open the eye of the soul . . ." The general meaning of the sentence is plain but the text is disputed. See crit. note.

<sup>a</sup> A frequent pretence in Plato. Cf. 370 A, 525 c, *Euthyphro* 9 c, *Laws* 686 c, 702 B, *Phaedr.* 262 c with Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. p. 498, *Laws* 888 D with Tayler Lewis, *Plato against the Atheists*, pp. 118-119. Cf. also Vol. I. on 394 D-E, and Isoc. *Antid.* 159 ἐνθυμοῦμαι δὲ μεταξὺ λέγων, *Panath.* 127.



ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας; Ἐφάμεν γάρ. Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα ὃ ζητοῦμεν, πρὸς ἐκείνῳ. Τὸ ποῖον; Μὴ ἄχρηστον πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶναι. Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη, εἴπερ οἶόν E τε. Γυμναστικῇ μὲν καὶ μουσικῇ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπαιδεύοντο ἡμῖν. Ἦν ταῦτα, ἔφη. Καὶ γυμναστικὴ μὲν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον τετεύτακε<sup>1</sup>. σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως ἐπιστατεῖ. Φαίνεται. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἴη 522 ὃ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα. Οὐ γάρ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα μουσική, ὅσῃν τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν; Ἄλλ' ἦν ἐκείνη γ', ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατὰ τε ἀρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδούσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθῃ<sup>2</sup> ἅττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι μυθῶδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν· μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ἀγαθόν,<sup>3</sup> οἶον σὺ νῦν B ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ. Ἀκριβέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν εἶχεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων, τί ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτον; αἶ τε γὰρ τέχναι βάνανσοί που ἅπασαι ἔδοξαν εἶναι. Πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ μὲν τί ἔτ' ἄλλο

<sup>1</sup> τετεύτακε(ν) ADM Euseb., τεύτακε F, τέτευχε d vulg.

<sup>2</sup> ἔθῃ F Euseb., ἔφη ADM.

<sup>3</sup> ἀγαθόν ADM, ἄγον Euseb. et γρ D, αγ (sic) F.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 416 D, 422 B, 404 A, and Vol. I. p. 266, note a, on 403 E.

<sup>b</sup> προσέχειν is here used in its etymological sense. Cf. pp. 66-67 on 500 A.

<sup>c</sup> This further prerequisite of the higher education follows naturally from the plan of the *Republic*; but it does not



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of war<sup>a</sup>?" "We did." "Then the study for which we are seeking must have this additional<sup>b</sup> qualification." "What one?" "That it be not useless to soldiers."<sup>c</sup> "Why, yes, it must," he said, "if that is possible." "But in our previous account they were educated in gymnastics and music."<sup>d</sup> "They were," he said. "And gymnastics, I take it, is devoted<sup>e</sup> to that which grows and perishes; for it presides over the growth and decay of the body."<sup>f</sup> "Obviously." "Then this cannot be the study that we seek." "No." "Is it, then, music, so far as we have already described it?"<sup>g</sup> "Nay, that," he said, "was the counterpart of gymnastics, if you remember. It educated the guardians through habits, imparting by the melody a certain harmony of spirit that is not science,<sup>h</sup> and by the rhythm measure and grace, and also qualities akin to these in the words of tales that are fables and those that are more nearly true. But it included no study that tended to any such good as you are now seeking." "Your recollection is most exact," I said; "for in fact it had nothing of the kind. But in heaven's name, Glaucon, what study could there be of that kind? For all the arts were in our opinion base and mechanical."<sup>i</sup> "Surely;

interest Plato much and is, after one or two repetitions, dropped.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 376 E ff.

<sup>b</sup> For τετεύτακε cf. *Tim.* 90 B τετεύτακόντι.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 376 E. This is of course no contradiction of 410 C.

<sup>d</sup> The ordinary study of music may cultivate and refine feeling. Only the mathematics of music would develop the power of abstract thought.

<sup>e</sup> Knowledge in the true sense, as contrasted with opinion or habit.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 49, note e, on 495 E. This idea is the source of much modern prejudice against Plato.

- λείπεται μάθημα, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν κεχωρισμένον; Φέρε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὴδὲν ἔτι ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔχομεν λαβεῖν, τῶν ἐπὶ
- C πάντα τεινόντων τι λάβωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; Οἶον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὃ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη μαθάνειν. Ποῖον; ἔφη. Τὸ φαῦλον τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἐν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν· λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔχει, ὡς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίνεσθαι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ πολεμικῆ; Πολλή, D ἔφη, ἀνάγκη. Παγγέλοιοι γοῦν, ἔφην, στρατηγὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις Παλαμήδης ἐκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει. ἢ οὐκ ἐννεόηκας ὅτι φησὶν ἀριθμὸν εὐρῶν τὰς τε τάξεις τῷ στρατοπέδῳ καταστήσαι ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ ἐξαριθμῆσαι ναῦς τε καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ἀναριθμῆτων ὄντων καὶ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδ' ὅσους πόδας εἶχεν εἰδότης, εἴπερ ἀριθμεῖν μὴ ἠπίστατο; καίτοι ποῖόν τιν' αὐτὸν οἶε στρατηγὸν εἶναι; Ἄτοπόν τιν', ἔφη, ἔγωγε, εἰ ἦν τοῦτ' ἀληθές.
- E VII. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάθημα ἀναγκαῖον πολεμικῷ ἀνδρὶ θήσομεν καὶ λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν τείνει.

<sup>b</sup> διάνοιαι is not to be pressed in the special sense of 511 D-E.

<sup>c</sup> A playful introduction to Plato's serious treatment of the psychology of number and the value of the study of mathematics.

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and yet what other study is left apart from music, gymnastics and the arts?" "Come," said I, "if we are unable to discover anything outside of these, let us take something that applies to all alike.<sup>a</sup>" "What?" "Why, for example, this common thing that all arts and forms of thought<sup>b</sup> and all sciences employ, and which is among the first things that everybody must learn." "What?" he said. "This trifling matter,<sup>c</sup>" I said, "of distinguishing one and two and three. I mean, in sum, number and calculation. Is it not true of them that every art and science must necessarily partake of them?" "Indeed it is," he said. "The art of war too?" said I. "Most necessarily," he said. "Certainly, then," said I, "Palamedes<sup>d</sup> in the play is always making Agamemnon appear a most ridiculous<sup>e</sup> general. Have you not noticed that he affirms that by the invention of number he marshalled the troops in the army at Troy in ranks and companies and enumerated the ships and everything else as if before that they had not been counted, and Agamemnon apparently did not know how many feet he had if he couldn't count? And yet what sort of a general do you think he would be in that case?" "A very queer one in my opinion," he said, "if that was true."

VII. "Shall we not, then," I said, "set down as a study requisite for a soldier the ability to reckon and

<sup>a</sup> Palamedes, like Prometheus, is a "culture hero," who personifies in Greek tragedy the inventions and discoveries that produced civilization. Cf. the speech of Prometheus in Aesch. *Prom.* 459 ff. and *Harvard Studies*, xii. p. 208, n. 2.

<sup>e</sup> Quoted by later writers in praise of mathematics. Cf. Theo Smyrn. p. 7 ed. Gelder. For the necessity of mathematics cf. *Laws* 818 c.

ἀριθμεῖν δύνασθαι; Πάντων γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, εἰ καὶ ὅτιοῦν μέλλει τάξεων ἐπαΐειν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἔσσεσθαι. Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, εἶπον, περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα ὅπερ ἐγώ; Τὸ ποῖον; Κινδυνεύει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντων φύσει εἶναι ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτῶ ὀρθῶς, ἑλκτικῶ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι. ἃ γὰρ διαιροῦμαι παρ' ἑμαυτῶ ἀγωγὰ τε εἶναι οἱ λέγομεν καὶ μή, ξυνθεατῆς γενόμενος ξύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἶον μαντεύομαι. Δείκνυ, ἔφη. Δείκνυμι δὴ, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾶς, τὰ μὲν ἐν Β ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης. Τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα. Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὐ λέγω. Ποῖα μὲν, ἔφη, λέγεις; Τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 819 d.

<sup>b</sup> Plato's point of view here, as he will explain, is precisely the opposite of that of modern educators who would teach mathematics concretely and not puzzle the children with abstract logic. But in the *Laws* where he is speaking of primary and secondary education for the entire population he anticipates the modern kindergarten ideas (819 b-c).

<sup>c</sup> For σαφέστερον cf. 523 c. Cf. Vol. I. p. 47, note f, on 338 d, and *What Plato Said*, p. 503, on *Gorg.* 463 d.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 38 c, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 337.

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number?" "Most certainly, if he is to know anything whatever of the ordering of his troops—or rather if he is to be a man at all.<sup>a</sup>" "Do you observe then," said I, "in this study what I do?" "What?" "It seems likely that it is one of those studies which we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awakening of thought, but that no one makes the right use<sup>b</sup> of it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to essence and reality." "What do you mean?" he said. "I will try," I said, "to show you at least my opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things I distinguish in my mind as being or not being conducive to our purpose, and either concur or dissent, in order that here too we may see more clearly<sup>c</sup> whether my surmise is right." "Point them out," he said. "I do point them out," I said, "if you can discern that some reports of our perceptions do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgement<sup>d</sup> of them by sensation seems adequate,<sup>e</sup> while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted.<sup>f</sup>" "You obviously mean distant<sup>g</sup> appearances," he said, "and shadow-painting.<sup>h</sup>" "You have quite missed my meaning,<sup>i</sup>" said I. "What do you mean?" he said. "The experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do not at the same

<sup>a</sup> *ικανός* is not to be pressed here.

<sup>f</sup> For *οὐδὲν ὑγιές* cf. 496 c, 584 A, 589 c, *Phaedo* 69 B, 89 E, 90 E, *Gorg.* 524 E, *Laws* 776 E, *Theaet.* 173 B, Eurip. *Phoen.* 201, *Bacch.* 262, *Hel.* 746, etc.

<sup>g</sup> The most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. *Laws* 663 B.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 137 on 365 c.

<sup>i</sup> The dramatic misapprehension by the interlocutor is one of Plato's methods for enforcing his meaning. Cf. on 529 A, p. 180, note a, *Laws* 792 B-C.



- C ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὴν ἢ αἴσθησις μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτ' ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. ὧδε δὲ ἅ λέγω σαφέστερον εἶσει. οὔτοι, φασί, τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὃ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ὡς ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν ὀρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ. ἀλλὰ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τόδε σκόπει. Τὸ ποῖον; Δάκτυλος μὲν
- D αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, εἴαν τε ἐν μέσῳ ὀράται εἴαν τ' ἐν ἐσχάτῳ, εἴαν τε λευκὸς εἴαν τε μέλας, εἴαν τε παχὺς εἴαν τε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἢ ψυχῇ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ δάκτυλος· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἢ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνε τὸν δάκτυλον τοῦναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰκότως τό γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως
- E οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδ' ἐγερτικὸν εἶη. Εἰκότως. Τί δὲ δῆ; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἢ ὄψις ἄρα ἰκανῶς ὀρά, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κείσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Jacks, *Alchemy of Thought*, p. 29: "The purpose of the world, then, being to attain consciousness of itself as a rational or consistent whole, is it not a little strange that the first step, so to speak, taken by the world for the attainment of this end is that of presenting itself in the form of contradictory experience?" αἴσθησις is not to be pressed. Adam's condescending apology for the primitive character of Plato's psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies. Plato varies the expression, but his meaning is clear. Cf. 524 D. No modern psychologists are able to use "sensation," "perception," "judgement," and similar terms with perfect consistency.

<sup>b</sup> For προσπίπτουσα cf. *Tim.* 33 A, 44 A, 66 A, *Rep.* 515 A, 154



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time issue in a contradictory perception.<sup>a</sup> Those that do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when the perception no more manifests one thing than its contrary, alike whether its impact<sup>b</sup> comes from nearby or afar. An illustration will make my meaning plain. Here, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the second and the middle." "Quite so," he said. "Assume that I speak of them as seen near at hand. But this is the point that you are to consider." "What?" "Each one of them appears to be equally a finger,<sup>c</sup> and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to question the reason and to ask what in the world is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite of a finger." "Why, no, it does not," he said. "Then," said I, "it is to be expected that such a perception will not provoke or awaken<sup>d</sup> reflection and thought." "It is." "But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision's view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated<sup>e</sup> outside or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of

561 c, *Laws* 791 c, 632 A, 637 A, *Phileb.* 21 c; also *accidere* in Lucretius, e.g. iv. 882, ii. 1024-1025, iv. 236 and iii. 841, and Goethe's "Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an unsere Sinne drängt."

<sup>a</sup> This anticipates Aristotle's doctrine that "substances" do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less.

<sup>b</sup> We should never press synonyms which Plato employs for ποικιλία of style or to avoid falling into a rut of terminology.

<sup>c</sup> κείσθαι perhaps anticipates the Aristotelian category.

ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἢ ἀφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; ἢ ὧδε ποιεῖ  
 524 ἐκάστη αὐτῶν· πρῶτον μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἰσθησις ἠνάγκασται καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταῦτόν σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν, τί ποτε σημαίνει αὐτῇ ἢ αἰσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν λέγει, καὶ ἢ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἢ τοῦ βαρέος, τί τὸ κούφον καὶ βαρύ, εἰ τό τε βαρὺ κούφον καὶ τὸ  
 Β κούφον βαρὺ σημαίνει; Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὐταῖ γε ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἐρμηνεῖαι καὶ ἐπισκέψεως δεόμεναι. Εἰκότως ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειράται λογισμὸν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχὴ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἴτε ἐν εἴτε δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἐν ἐκά-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 186 ff., *Tim.* 62 v, Taylor, *Timaeus*, p. 233 on 63 d-e, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 222 and 225, Diels, *Dialer.* 5 (ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 341). *Protag.* 331 d anticipates this thought, but Protagoras cannot follow it out. Cf. also *Phileb.* 13 a-b. Stallbaum also compares *Phileb.* 57 d and 56 c f.

<sup>b</sup> Plato gives a very modern psychological explanation. Thought is provoked by the contradictions in perceptions that suggest problems. The very notion of unity is contradictory of uninterpreted experience. This use of ἀπορεῖν (cf. *supra* 515 d) anticipates much modern psychology supposed to be new. Cf. e.g. Herbert Spencer *passim*, and Dewey, *How We Think*, p. 12 "We may recapitulate by saying that the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or doubt"; also *ibid.* p. 72. Meyerson, *Déduction relativiste*

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touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things? Or is the operation of each of them as follows? In the first place, the sensation that is set over the hard is of necessity related also to the soft,<sup>a</sup> and it reports to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft to its perception." "It is so," he said. "Then," said I, "is not this again a case where the soul must be at a loss<sup>b</sup> as to what significance for it the sensation of hardness has, if the sense reports the same thing as also soft? And, similarly, as to what the sensation of light and heavy means by light and heavy, if it reports the heavy as light, and the light as heavy?" "Yes, indeed," he said, "these communications<sup>c</sup> to the soul are strange and invite reconsideration." "Naturally, then," said I, "it is in such cases as these that the soul first summons to its aid the calculating reason<sup>d</sup> and tries to consider whether each of the things reported to it is one or two.<sup>e</sup>" "Of course." "And if it appears to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit.<sup>f</sup>"

p. 142, says "Mais Platon . . . n'avait-il pas dit qu'il était impossible de raisonner si ce n'est en partant d'une perception?" citing *Rep.* 523-524, and Rodier, *Aristot. De anima*, i. p. 197. But that is not Plato's point here. Zeller, *Aristot.* i. p. 166 (Eng.), also misses the point when he says "Even as to the passage from the former to the latter he had only the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion and fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass to the pure treatment of ideas."

<sup>a</sup> For ἐρμηνείαι cf. *Theaet.* 209 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Parmen.* 130 A τοῖς λογισμῶ λαμβανόμενοις.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 185 B, *Laws* 963 C, *Sophist* 254 D, *Hipp. Major* 301 D-E, and, for the dialectic here, *Parmen.* 143 D.

<sup>f</sup> Or, as the Greek puts it, "both 'one' and 'other.'" Cf. Vol. I. p. 516, note *f* on 476 A. For ἕτερον cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 522, 580, 587-588.

τερον φαίνεται; Ναί. Εἰ ἄρα ἐν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφοτέρα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστα γε δύο ἐνόει, ἀλλ' ἔν. Ὁρθῶς. Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φασί, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἢ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τούναντίον ἢ 'κείνη. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ' ὄρατόν ἐκαλέσαμεν. D Ὁρθότατ', ἔφη.

VIII. Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν, ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστί, τὰ δ' οὐ, ἃ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ὀριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως. Μανθάνω τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως. Τί οὖν;

<sup>a</sup> γε *vi termini*. Cf. 379 B, 576 C, *Parmen.* 145 A, *Protag.* 358 C.

<sup>b</sup> κεχωρισμένα and ἀχώριστα suggest the terminology of Aristotle in dealing with the problem of abstraction.

<sup>c</sup> Plato's aim is the opposite of that of the modern theorists who say that teaching should deal integrally with the total experience and not with the artificial division of abstraction.

<sup>d</sup> The final use of *διά* became more frequent in later Greek. Cf. *Aristot. Met.* 982 b 20, *Eth. Nic.* 1110 a 4, *Gen. an.* 717 a 6, *Poetics* 1450 b 3, 1451 b 37. Cf. *Lysis* 218 D, *Epin.* 975 A, *Olympiodorus, Life of Plato*, Teubner vi. 191, *ibid.* p. 218, and schol. *passim*, *Apsines*, Spengel i. 361, line 18.

<sup>e</sup> Plato merely means that this is the psychological origin

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"Yes." "If, then, each is one and both two, the very meaning<sup>a</sup> of 'two' is that the soul will conceive them as distinct.<sup>b</sup> For if they were not separable, it would not have been thinking of two, but of one." "Right." "Sight too saw the great and the small, we say, not separated but confounded.<sup>c</sup> Is not that so?" "Yes." "And for<sup>d</sup> the clarification of this, the intelligence is compelled to contemplate the great and small,<sup>e</sup> not thus confounded but as distinct entities, in the opposite way from sensation." "True." "And is it not in some such experience as this that the question first occurs to us, what in the world, then, is the great and the small?" "By all means." "And this is the origin of the designation *intelligible* for the one, and *visible* for the other." "Just so," he said.

VIII. "This, then, is just what I was trying to explain a little while ago when I said that some things are provocative of thought and some are not, defining as provocative things that impinge upon the senses together with their opposites, while those that do not I said do not tend to awaken reflection." "Well, now I understand," he said, "and agree."

of our attempt to form abstract and general ideas. My suggestion that this passage is the probable source of the notion which still infests the history of philosophy, that the great-and-the-small was a metaphysical entity or principle in Plato's later philosophy, to be identified with the indeterminate dyad, has been disregarded. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 84. But it is the only plausible explanation that has ever been proposed of the attribution of that "clotted nonsense" to Plato himself. For it is fallacious to identify *μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* in *Philebus* 24 c, 25 c, 27 ε, and elsewhere with the *μέγα καὶ μικρόν*. But there is no limit to the misapprehension of texts by hasty or fanciful readers in any age.



ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἐν ποτέρων δοκεῖ εἶναι; Οὐ ξυννοῶ, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην, ἀναλογίζου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἰκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ

E ὁράται ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται τὸ ἐν, οὐκ ἂν ὀλκὸν εἶη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν· εἰ δ' αἰεί τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὁράται ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν ἢ καὶ τούναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινούντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, κινουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν, τί 525 ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἶη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἢ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἥκιστα ἢ περὶ αὐτὸ<sup>1</sup> ὄψις· ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτόν ὡς ἐν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ τὸ ἐν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς ταῦτόν πέπονθε τούτῳ; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἄλλὰ μὴν λογιστικὴ τε καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμὸν πᾶσα.

B Καὶ μάλα. Ταῦτα δέ γε φαίνεται ἀγωγὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. Ὡν ζητοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, μαθημάτων ἂν εἶη· πολεμικῶ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαῖον μαθεῖν ταῦτα, φιλο-

<sup>1</sup> αὐτὸ F Iamblichus, τὸ αὐτὸ AD.

<sup>a</sup> To waive metaphysics, unity is, as modern mathematicians say, a concept of the mind which experience breaks up. The thought is familiar to Plato from the *Meno* to the *Parmenides*. But it is not true that Plato derived the very notion of the concept from the problem of the one and the many. Unity is a typical concept, but the consciousness of the concept was developed by the Socratic quest for the definition.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 523 B. The meaning must be gathered from the context.

<sup>c</sup> See crit. note and Adam *ad loc.*



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“To which class, then, do you think number and the one belong<sup>a</sup>?” “I cannot conceive,” he said. “Well, reason it out from what has already been said. For, if unity is adequately<sup>b</sup> seen by itself or apprehended by some other sensation, it would not tend to draw the mind to the apprehension of essence, as we were explaining in the case of the finger. But if some contradiction is always seen coincidentally with it, so that it no more appears to be one than the opposite, there would forthwith be need of something to judge between them, and it would compel the soul to be at a loss and to inquire, by arousing thought in itself, and to ask, whatever then is the one as such, and thus the study of unity will be one of the studies that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation of true being.” “But surely,” he said, “the visual perception of it<sup>c</sup> does especially involve this. For we see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite plurality.<sup>d</sup>” “Then if this is true of the one,” I said, “the same holds of all number, does it not?” “Of course.” “But, further, reckoning and the science of arithmetic<sup>e</sup> are wholly concerned with number.” “They are, indeed.” “And the qualities of number appear to lead to the apprehension of truth.” “Beyond anything,” he said. “Then, as it seems, these would be among the studies that we are seeking. For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops, and a philosopher, because he must rise out of

<sup>a</sup> This is the problem of the one and the many with which Plato often plays, which he exhaustively and consciously illustrates in the *Parmenides*, and which the introduction to the *Philebus* treats as a metaphysical nuisance to be disregarded in practical logic. We have not yet got rid of it, but have merely transferred it to psychology.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 450 D, 451 B-C.

σόφω δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτεόν εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι. "Ἔστι ταῦτ", ἔφη. Ὁ δέ γε ἡμέτερος φύλαξ πολεμικός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος τυγχάνει ὢν. Τί μῆν; Προσῆκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη, ὧ Γλαύκων, νομοθετῆσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν C μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθάπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ θεάν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα πολέμου τε καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥαστώνης μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν. Κάλλιστ', ἔφη, λέγεις. Καὶ μῆν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισ- D μούς μαθήματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῆ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα, εἰάν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἕνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύη, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my review of Jowett, *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 365. My view there is adopted by Adam *ad loc.*, and Apelt translates in the same way.

<sup>b</sup> It is not true as Adam says that "the nature of numbers cannot be fully seen except in their connexion with the Good." Plato never says that and never really meant it, though he might possibly have affirmed it on a challenge. Numbers are typical abstractions and educate the mind for the apprehension of abstractions if studied in their nature, in themselves, and not in the concrete form of five apples. There is no common sense nor natural connexion between numbers and the good, except the point made in the *Timaeus* 53 B, and which is not relevant here, that God used numbers and forms to make a cosmos out of a chaos.

<sup>c</sup> Instead of remarking on Plato's scorn for the realities of experience we should note that he is marking the distinctive quality of the mind of the Greeks in contrast with the Egyptians and orientals from whom they learned and

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the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he can never become a true reckoner.<sup>a</sup>” “It is so,” he said. “And our guardian is soldier and philosopher in one.” “Of course.” “It is befitting, then, Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be prescribed by our law and that we should induce those who are to share the highest functions of state to enter upon that study of calculation and take hold of it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain to the contemplation of the nature of number,<sup>b</sup> by pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and selling,<sup>c</sup> as if they were preparing to be merchants or hucksters, but for the uses of war and for facilitating the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth.” “Excellently said,” he replied. “And, further,” I said, “it occurs to me,<sup>d</sup> now that the study of reckoning has been mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for the sake of knowledge<sup>e</sup> and not for

the Romans whom they taught. Cf. *infra* 525 *ἡ κατηλέειν*, and Horace, *Ars Poetica* 323-332, Cic. *Tusc.* i. 2. 5. *Per contra* Xen. *Mem.* iv. 7, and Libby, *Introduction to History of Science*, p. 49: “In this the writer did not aim at the mental discipline of the students, but sought to confine himself to what is easiest and most useful in calculation, ‘such as men constantly require in cases of inheritance, legacies, partition, law-suits, and trade, and in all their dealings with one another, or where the measuring of lands, the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other objects of various sorts and kinds are concerned.’”

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 521 *ἡ*, p. 147, note *e*.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 982 a 15 *τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν*, and *Laws* 747 c. Montesquieu *apud* Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 6: “The first motive which ought to impel us to study is the desire to augment the excellence of our nature and to render an intelligent being more intelligent.”

Πῆ δὴ; ἔφη. Τοῦτό γε, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς σφόδρα ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμῆ ἀποδεχόμενον ἔάν τις αὐτῇ ὁρατὰ ἢ ἀπτὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμούς προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται. οἶσθα  
 Ε γάρ που τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὺς ὡς, ἔάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἐπιχειρῆ τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν, καταγελωσί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλ' ἔάν σὺ κερματίζης αὐτό, ἐκεῖνοι πολλαπλασιούσιν, εὐλαβούμενοι μὴ ποτε φανῆ τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια. Ἀληθές-  
 526 στατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τί οὖν οἶει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἴ τις ἔροιτο αὐτούς, ὦ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἶον ὑμεῖς ἀξιουτέ ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον, μόριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι; Τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὅτι περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν, ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ,

<sup>a</sup> Lit. "numbers (in) themselves," i.e. ideal numbers or the ideas of numbers. For this and the following as one of the sources of the silly notion that mathematical numbers are intermediate between ideal and concrete numbers, cf. my *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, p. 33, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 83-84, *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Meno* 79 c κατακερματίζης, *Aristot. Met.* 1041 a 19 ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι, *Met.* 1052 b 1 ff., 15 ff. and 1053 a 1 τὴν γὰρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντη ἀδιαίρετον. κερματίζειν is also the word used of breaking money into small change.

<sup>c</sup> Numbers are the aptest illustration of the principle of the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides* that thought has to postulate unities which sensation (sense perception) and also dialectics are constantly disintegrating into pluralities. Cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, p. 222. Stenzel, *Dialektik*, p. 32, says this dismisses the problem of the one and the many "das ihn (Plato) später so lebhaft beschäftigt

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huckstering." "In what respect?" he said. "Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels it to discourse about pure numbers,<sup>a</sup> never acquiescing if anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers attached to visible and tangible bodies. For you are doubtless aware that experts in this study, if anyone attempts to cut up the 'one' in argument, laugh at him and refuse to allow it; but if *you* mince it up,<sup>b</sup> *they* multiply, always on guard lest the one should appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts.<sup>c</sup>" "Most true," he replied. "Suppose now, Glaucon, someone were to ask them, 'My good friends, what numbers<sup>d</sup> are these you are talking about, in which the one is such as you postulate, each unity equal to every other without the slightest difference and admitting no division into parts?' What do you think would be their answer?" "This, I think—that they are speaking of units which can only be conceived by thought, and which it is not possible to deal with in

sollte." But that is refuted by *Parmen.* 159 c οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φημὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν. The "problem" was always in Plato's mind. He played with it when it suited his purpose and dismissed it when he wished to go on to something else. Cf. on 525 A, *Phaedr.* 266 B, *Meno* 72 c, *Laws* 964 A, *Soph.* 251.

<sup>a</sup> This is one of the chief sources of the fancy that numbers are intermediate entities between ideas and things. Cf. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, i. p. 219: "Mathematical particulars are therefore not as Plato thought intermediate between sensible figures and universals. Sensible figures are only less simple mathematical ones." Cf. on 525 D. Plato here and elsewhere simply means that the educator may distinguish two kinds of numbers,—five apples, and the number five as an abstract idea. Cf. *Theaet.* 195 E: We couldn't err about eleven which we only think, *i.e.* the abstract number eleven. Cf. also Berkeley, *Siris*, § 288.



ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν. Ὅρας οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν  
**B** κινδυνεύει εἶναι τὸ μάθημα, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεται γε προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν; Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε ποιεῖ αὐτό. Τί δαί; τότε ἤδη ἐπεσκεψώ, ὡς οἱ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὀξεῖς φύονται, οἱ τε βραδεῖς, ἂν ἐν τούτῳ παιδευθῶσι καὶ γυμνάσωνται, κἂν μηδὲν ἄλλο ὠφεληθῶσιν, ὅμως εἰς γε τὸ ὀξύτεροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόασιν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη,  
**C** οὕτως. Καὶ μὴν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἃ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὔροις ὡς τοῦτο. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Πάντων δὴ ἔνεκα τούτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄριστοι τὰς φύσεις παιδευτέοι ἐν αὐτῷ. Εὐμφημι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

IX. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, ἐν ἡμῖν κείσθω· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεψώμεθα ἄρα τι προσήκει ἡμῖν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἢ γεωμετρίαν, ἔφη, λέγεις; Αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅσον μὲν, ἔφη,  
**D** πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον ὅτι προσήκει· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Isoc. *Antid.* 267 αὐτοὶ δ' αὐτῶν εὐμαθέστεροι. For the idiom αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν cf. also 411 c, 421 d, 571 d, *Prot.* 350 a and d, *Laws* 671 b, *Parmen.* 141 a, *Laches* 182 c. Plato of course believed in mental discipline or "spread." "Educators" have actually cited him as authority for the opposite view. On the effect of mathematical studies cf. also *Laws* 747 b, 809 c-d, 819 c, Isoc. *Antid.* 265. Cf. Max. Tyr. 37 § 7 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἴη ἂν τι τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ τὸ φαυλότατον. Mill on Hamilton ii. 311 "If the practice of mathematical reasoning gives nothing else it gives wariness of mind." *Ibid.* 312.



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any other way." "You see, then, my friend," said I, "that this branch of study really seems to be indispensable for us, since it plainly compels the soul to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself." "It most emphatically does." "Again, have you ever noticed this, that natural reckoners are by nature quick in virtually all their studies? And the slow, if they are trained and drilled in this, even if no other benefit results, all improve and become quicker than they were<sup>a</sup>?" "It is so," he said. "And, further, as I believe, studies that demand more toil in the learning and practice than this we shall not discover easily nor find many of them.<sup>b</sup>" "You will not, in fact." "Then, for all these reasons, we must not neglect this study, but must use it in the education of the best endowed natures." "I agree," he said.

IX. "Assuming this one point to be established," I said, "let us in the second place consider whether the study that comes next<sup>c</sup> is suited to our purpose." "What is that? Do you mean geometry," he said. "Precisely that," said I. "So much of it," he said, "as applies to the conduct of war<sup>d</sup> is obviously suitable. For in dealing with encampments and the occupation

<sup>b</sup> The translation is, I think, right. Cf. *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 365, and Adam *ad loc.*

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 111: "Even Plato puts arithmetic before geometry in the *Republic* in deference to tradition." For the three branches of higher learning, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, cf. *Laws* 817 E-818 A, *Isoc. Antid.* 261-267, *Panath.* 26, *Bus.* 226; *Max. Tyr.* 37 § 7.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Basilicon Doron* (Morley, *A Miscellany*, p. 144): "I graunt it is meete yee have some entrance, specially in the Mathematickes, for the knowledge of the art militarie, in situation of Campes, ordering of battels, making fortifications, placing of batteries, or such like."

χωρίων καὶ συναγωγὰς καὶ ἐκτάσεις στρατιᾶς, καὶ ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν αὐταῖς τε ταῖς μάχαις καὶ πορείαις, διαφέρουσι ἄν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ μὴ ὢν. Ἄλλ' οὖν δὴ, εἶπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα βραχὺ τι ἂν ἕξαρκοῖ γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν μῶριον· τὸ δὲ πολὺ

Ε αὐτῆς καὶ πορρωτέρω προῖον σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ, εἴ τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τείνει, πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν κατιδεῖν ῥᾶον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν. τείνει δέ, φαμέν, πάντα αὐτόσε, ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον μεταστρέφεισθαι, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει θεάσασθαι, προσήκει, εἰ δὲ γένεσιν, οὐ προσήκει. Φαμέν γε

527 δὴ. Οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητήσουσιν ἡμῖν, ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη πᾶν τούναντίον ἔχει τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοις λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων.

<sup>a</sup> This was Xenophon's view, *Mem.* vi. 7. 2. Whether it was Socrates' nobody knows. Cf. *supra* pp. 162-163 on 525 c, *Epin.* 977 e, Aristoph. *Clouds* 202.

<sup>b</sup> Because it develops the power of abstract thought. Not because numbers are deduced from the idea of good. Cf. on 525, p. 162, note b.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 518 c. Once more we should remember that for the practical and educational application of Plato's main thought this and all similar expressions are rhetorical surplusage or "unction," which should not be pressed, nor used e.g. to identify the idea of good with God. Cf. *Introd.* p. xxv.

<sup>d</sup> Or "becoming." Cf. 485 B, 525 B.

<sup>e</sup> γε δὴ is frequent in confirming answers. Cf. 557 B, 517 c, *Symp.* 172 c, 173 e, *Gorg.* 449 B, etc.

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of strong places and the bringing of troops into column and line and all the other formations of an army in actual battle and on the march, an officer who had studied geometry would be a very different person from what he would be if he had not." "But still," I said, "for such purposes a slight modicum<sup>a</sup> of geometry and calculation would suffice. What we have to consider is whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of good.<sup>b</sup> That tendency, we affirm, is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality,<sup>c</sup> which it is imperative that it should behold." "You are right," he said. "Then if it compels the soul to contemplate essence, it is suitable; if genesis,<sup>d</sup> it is not." "So we affirm.<sup>e</sup>" "This at least," said I, "will not be disputed by those who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry, that this science is in direct contradiction with the language employed in it by its adepts.<sup>f</sup>" "How so?"

<sup>f</sup> Geometry (and mathematics) is inevitably less abstract than dialectics. But the special purpose of the Platonic education values mathematics chiefly as a discipline in abstraction. Cf. on 523 A, p. 152, note b; and Titchener, *A Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 265-266: "There are probably a good many of us whose abstract idea of 'triangle' is simply a mental picture of the little equilateral triangle that stands for the word in text-books of geometry." There have been some attempts to prove (that of Mr. F. M. Cornford in *Mind*, April 1932, is the most recent) that Plato, if he could not anticipate in detail the modern reduction of mathematics to logic, did postulate something like it as an ideal, the realization of which would abolish his own sharp distinction between mathematics and dialectic. The argument rests on a remote and strained interpretation of two or three texts of the *Republic* (cf. e.g. 511 and 533 B-D) which, naturally interpreted, merely affirm the general inferiority of the

Πῶς; ἔφη. Λέγουσι μὲν που μάλα γελοίως τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως· ὡς γὰρ πράττοντές τε καὶ πράξεις ἔνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγουσι τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω φθειγγόμενοι· τὸ δ' ἔστι που πᾶν τὸ μάθημα γνώσεως ἔνεκα ἐπιτηδευόμενον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον; Τὸ ποῖον; Ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ποτέ τι γιγνομένου καὶ ἀπολλυμένου. Εὐομολόγητον, ἔφη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἢ γεωμετρικὴ γνώσις ἔστιν. Ὀλκὸν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶη ἂν καὶ

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mathematical method and the intermediate position for education of mathematics as a propaedeutic to dialectics. Plato's purpose throughout is not to exhort mathematicians as such to question their initiatory postulates, but to mark definitely the boundaries between the mathematical and other sciences and pure dialectics or philosophy. The distinction is a true and useful one to-day. Aristotle often refers to it with no hint that it could not be abolished by a new and different kind of mathematics. And it is uncritical to read that intention into Plato's words. He may have contributed, and doubtless did contribute, in other ways to the improvement and precision of mathematical logic. But he had no idea of doing away with the fundamental difference that made dialectics and not mathematics the coping-stone of the higher education—science as such does not question its first principles and dialectic does. Cf. 533 B-534 E.

<sup>a</sup> The very etymology of "geometry" implies the absurd practical conception of the science. Cf. *Epin.* 990 c γελοῖον ὄνομα.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 302 E, *Laws* 757 E, 818 B, *Phileb.* 62 B, *Tim.* 69 D, and also on 494 A. The word ἀναγκαίως has been variously misunderstood and mistranslated. It simply means that geometers are compelled to use the language

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he said. " Their language is most ludicrous,<sup>a</sup> though they cannot help it,<sup>b</sup> for they speak as if they were doing something<sup>c</sup> and as if all their words were directed towards action. For all their talk<sup>d</sup> is of squaring and applying<sup>e</sup> and adding and the like,<sup>f</sup> whereas in fact the real object of the entire study is pure knowledge.<sup>g</sup>" " That is absolutely true," he said. " And must we not agree on a further point?" " What?" " That it is the knowledge of that which always is,<sup>h</sup> and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passes away." " That is readily admitted," he said, " for geometry is the knowledge of the eternally existent." " Then, my good friend, it would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be

of sense perception though they are thinking of abstractions (ideas) of which sense images are only approximations.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 1051 a 22 *εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν*, "geometrical constructions, too, are discovered by an actualization, because it is by dividing that we discover them." (Loeb tr.)

<sup>d</sup> For *φθεγγόμενοι* cf. on 505 c, p. 89, note *g*.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 87 a.

<sup>f</sup> E. Hoffmann, *Der gegenwärtige Stand der Platonforschung*, p. 1097 (Anhang, Zeller, *Plato*, 5th ed.), misunderstands the passage when he says: " Die Abneigung Platons, dem Ideellen irgendwie einen dynamischen Charakter zuzuschreiben, zeigt sich sogar in terminologischen Andeutungen; so verbietet er *Republ.* 527 a für die Mathematik jede Anwendung dynamischer Termini wie *τετραγωνίζειν, παρατείνειν, προστιθέναι*." Plato does not forbid the use of such terms but merely recognizes their inadequacy to express the true nature and purpose of geometry.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Meyerson, *De l'explication dans les sciences*, p. 33: " En effet, Platon déjà fait ressortir que la géométrie, en dépit de l'apparence, ne poursuit aucun but pratique et n'a tout entière d'autre objet que la connaissance."

<sup>h</sup> *i.e.* mathematical ideas are (Platonic) ideas like other concepts. Cf. on 525 d, p. 164, note a.



ἀπεργαστικὸν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω  
 σχεῖν ἂ νυν κάτω οὐ δέον ἔχομεν. Ὡς οἶόν τε  
 C μάλιστα, ἔφη. Ὡς οἶόν τ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάλι-  
 στα προστακτέον ὅπως οἱ ἐν τῇ καλλιπόλει σοι  
 μηδενὶ τρόπῳ γεωμετρίας ἀφέξονται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ  
 πάρεργα αὐτοῦ οὐ σμικρά. Ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἄ-  
 τε δὴ σὺ εἶπες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον,  
 καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς πάσας μαθήσεις, ὥστε κάλλιον  
 ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἴσμεν που ὅτι τῷ ὄλῳ καὶ παντὶ  
 διοίσει ἡμμένος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή. Τῷ παντὶ  
 μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη. Δεύτερον δὴ τοῦτο τιθῶμεν  
 μάθημα τοῖς νέοις; Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.

D X. Τί δαί; τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομίαν; ἦ οὐ  
 δοκεῖ; Ἔμοιγ' οὖν, ἔφη. τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὐ-  
 αισθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ  
 μόνον γεωργία οὐδὲ ναυτιλία προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 στρατηγία οὐχ ἥττον. Ἡδὺς εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι  
 ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλούς, μὴ δοκῆς ἄχρηστα  
 μαθήματα προστάττειν. τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ  
 φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις  
 τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθ-

<sup>a</sup> καλλιπόλει: Plato smiles at his own Utopia. There were cities named Callipolis, e.g. in the Thracian Chersonese and in Calabria on the Gulf of Tarentum. Cf. also Herod. vii. 154. Fanciful is the attempt of some scholars to distinguish the Callipolis as a separate section of the *Republic*, or to take it as the title of the *Republic*.

<sup>b</sup> Plato briefly anticipates much modern literature on the value of the study of mathematics. Cf. on 526 B, p. 166, note a. Olympiodorus says that when geometry deigns to enter into matter she creates mechanics which is highly esteemed.



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII

productive of a philosophic attitude of mind, directing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned earthward." "Nothing is surer," he said. "Then nothing is surer," said I, "than that we must require that the men of your Fair City<sup>a</sup> shall never neglect geometry, for even the by-products of such study are not slight." "What are they?" said he. "What you mentioned," said I, "its uses in war, and also we are aware that for the better reception of all studies<sup>b</sup> there will be an immeasurable<sup>c</sup> difference between the student who has been imbued with geometry and the one who has not." "Immense indeed, by Zeus," he said. "Shall we, then, lay this down as a second branch of study for our lads?" "Let us do so," he said.

X. "Shall we set down astronomy as a third, or do you dissent?" "I certainly agree," he said; "for quickness of perception about the seasons and the courses of the months and the years is serviceable,<sup>d</sup> not only to agriculture and navigation, but still more to the military art." "I am amused,<sup>e</sup>" said I, "at your apparent fear lest the multitude<sup>f</sup> may suppose you to be recommending useless studies.<sup>g</sup> It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified<sup>h</sup> and kindled afresh by such studies

<sup>c</sup> For *δλω και παντι* cf. 469 C, *Laws* 779 B, 734 E, *Phaedo* 79 E, *Crat.* 434 A.

<sup>d</sup> Xen. *Mem.* iv. 7. 3 ff. attributes to Socrates a similar purely utilitarian view of science.

<sup>e</sup> For *ἡδὺς εἶ* cf. 337 D, *Euthydem.* 300 A, *Gorg.* 491 E *ἡδιστε*, *Rep.* 348 C *γλυκὺς εἶ*, *Hipp. Maj.* 288 B.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. on 499 D-E, p. 66, note a.

<sup>g</sup> Again Plato anticipates much modern controversy.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 1. 4 *ἐκκεκαθαυμένους τὰς ψυχάς*, and *Phaedo* 67 B-C.

Ε αἰρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυ-  
 φλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον  
 ὄν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ  
 ἀλήθεια ὀράται. οἷς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ,  
 ἀμηχάνως ὡς εὖ δόξεις λέγειν· ὅσοι δὲ τούτου μη-  
 δαμῆ ἤσθημένοι εἰσίν, εἰκότως ἠγγήσονται σε λέγειν  
 οὐδέν· ἄλλην γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐχ ὀρώσιν ἀξίαν  
 λόγου ὠφέλειαν. σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν, πρὸς ποτέ-  
 528 ρους διαλέγει, ἢ οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους, ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ  
 ἔνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν  
 οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλῳ, εἴ τίς τι δύναίτο ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.  
 Οὕτως, ἔφη, αἰροῦμαι, ἐμαυτοῦ ἔνεκα τὸ πλεῖστον  
 λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. "Αναγε  
 τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς τοῦπίσω· νῦν δὴ γὰρ οὐκ  
 ὀρθῶς τὸ ἐξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῇ γεωμετρῖᾳ. Πῶς  
 λαβόντες; ἔφη. Μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν  
 περιφορᾷ ὃν ἤδη στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ'  
 Β αὐτὸ λαβεῖν· ὀρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἐξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν  
 αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν. ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο περὶ  
 τὴν τῶν κύβων αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθους μετέχον.  
 "Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες,

<sup>a</sup> Another instance of Plato's "unction." Cf. *Tim.* 47 A-B, Eurip. *Orest.* 806 *μυρίων κρείσσων*, and Stallbaum *ad loc.* for imitations of this passage in antiquity.

<sup>b</sup> For ἀμηχάνως ὡς cf. *Charm.* 155 D ἀμήχανόν τι οἶον. Cf. 588 A, *Phaedo* 80 c, 95 c, *Laws* 782 A, also *Rep.* 331 A θαυμάστως ὡς, *Hipp. Maj.* 282 c, *Epin.* 982 c-D, Aristoph. *Birds* 427, *Lysist.* 198, 1148.

<sup>c</sup> This is the thought more technically expressed in the "earlier" work, *Crito* 49 D. Despite his faith in dialectics

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when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes<sup>a</sup>; for by it only is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively<sup>b</sup> true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine.<sup>c</sup> For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning. Decide, then, on the spot, to which party you address yourself. Or are you speaking to neither, but chiefly carrying on the discussion for your own sake,<sup>d</sup> without however grudging any other who may be able to profit by it?" "This is the alternative I choose," he said, "that it is for my own sake chiefly that I speak and ask questions and reply." "Fall back<sup>e</sup> a little, then," said I; "for we just now did not rightly select the study that comes next<sup>f</sup> after geometry." "What was our mistake?" he said. "After plane surfaces," said I, "we went on to solids in revolution before studying them in themselves. The right way is next in order after the second dimension<sup>g</sup> to take the third. This, I suppose, is the dimension of cubes and of everything that has depth." "Why, yes, it is," he said; "but this subject, Socrates, does not appear to have been investi-

Plato recognizes that the primary assumptions on which argument necessarily proceeds are irreducible choices of personality. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 468, *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 352.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Charm.* 166 D, *Phaedo* 64 c, *Soph.* 265 A, *Apol.* 33 A.

<sup>c</sup> ἀναγε is a military term. Cf. *Aristoph. Birds* 383, *Xen. Cyr.* vii. 1. 45, iii. 3. 69.

<sup>f</sup> ἐξῆς: cf. *Laches* 182 B.

<sup>g</sup> Lit. "increase." Cf. *Pearson, The Grammar of Science*, p. 411: "He proceeds from curves of frequency to surfaces of frequency, and then requiring to go beyond these he finds his problem lands him in space of many dimensions."

δοκεῖ οὐπω εὐρήσθαι. Διτὰ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ αἷτια· ὅτι τε οὐδεμία πόλις ἐντίμως αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἀσθενῶς ζητεῖται χαλεπὰ ὄντα, ἐπιστάτου τε δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἄνευ οὐ οὐκ ἂν εὐροίεν, ὃν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἔπειτα καὶ γενομένου, ὡς νῦν ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν πείθοντο οἱ περὶ ταῦτα  
 C ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. εἰ δὲ πόλις ὄλη ξυνεπιστατοῖ ἐντίμως ἄγουσα αὐτά, οὗτοί τε ἂν πείθοντο καὶ ξυνεχῶς τε ἂν καὶ ἐντόνως ζητούμενα ἐκφανῆ γένοιτο ὅπη ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα<sup>1</sup> ὑπὸ<sup>2</sup> τῶν ζητούντων, λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ' ὃ τι χρήσιμα, ὁμως πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα βία ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξά-

<sup>1</sup> κολουόμενα AD, κωλυόμενα F.

<sup>2</sup> ὑπὸ Madvig: ὑπὸ δὲ mss.

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<sup>a</sup> This is not to be pressed. Plato means only that the progress of solid geometry is unsatisfactory. Cf. 528 D. There may or may not be a reference here to the "Delian problem" of the duplication of the cube (cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 503 for the story) and other specific problems which the historians of mathematics discuss in connexion with this passage. Cf. Adam *ad loc.* To understand Plato we need only remember that the extension of geometry to solids was being worked out in his day, perhaps partly at his suggestion, e.g. by Theaetetus for whom a Platonic dialogue is named, and that Plato makes use of the discovery of the five regular solids in his theory of the elements in the *Timaeus*. Cf. also *Laws* 819 E ff. For those who wish to know more of the ancient traditions and modern conjectures I add references: Eva Sachs, *De Theaeteto Ath. Mathematico*, Diss. Berlin, 1914, and *Die fünf platonischen Körper* (Philolog. Untersuch. Heft 24), Berlin, 1917; E. Hoppe, *Mathematik und Astronomie im klass. Altertum*, pp. 133 ff.; Rudolf Ebeling, *Mathematik und Philosophie bei Plato*, Münden, 1909, with my review in *Class. Phil.* v. (1910) p. 115; Seth

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gated yet.<sup>a</sup>” “There are two causes of that,” said I: “first, inasmuch as no city holds them in honour, these inquiries are languidly pursued owing to their difficulty. And secondly, the investigators need a director,<sup>b</sup> who is indispensable for success and who, to begin with, is not easy to find, and then, if he could be found, as things are now, seekers in this field would be too arrogant<sup>c</sup> to submit to his guidance. But if the state as a whole should join in superintending these studies and honour them, these specialists would accept advice, and continuous and strenuous investigation would bring out the truth. Since even now, lightly esteemed as they are by the multitude and hampered by the ignorance of their students<sup>d</sup> as to the true reasons for pursuing them,<sup>e</sup> they nevertheless in the face of all these obstacles force their way by their inherent charm<sup>f</sup> and it would not surprise us

Demel, *Platons Verhältnis zur Mathematik*, Leipzig, with my review, *Class. Phil.* xxiv. (1929) pp. 312-313; and, for further bibliography on Plato and mathematics, Budé, *Rep.* Introd. pp. lxx-lxxi.

<sup>b</sup> Plato is perhaps speaking from personal experience as director of the Academy. Cf. the hint in *Euthydem.* 290 c.

<sup>c</sup> *i.e.* the mathematicians already feel themselves to be independent specialists.

<sup>d</sup> This interpretation is, I think, correct. For the construction of this sentence cf. Isoc. xv. 84. The text is disputed; see crit. note.

<sup>e</sup> Lit. “in what respect they are useful.” Plato is fond of the half legal *καθ' ὅ τι*. Cf. *Lysis* 210 c, *Polit.* 293 c.

<sup>f</sup> An eminent modern psychologist innocently writes: “The problem of why geometry gives pleasure is therefore a deeper problem than the mere assertion of the fact. Furthermore, there are many known cases where the study of geometry does not give pleasure to the student.” Adam seems to think it may refer to the personality of Eudoxus.



Δνεται, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν αὐτὰ φανῆναι. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει. ἀλλὰ μοι σαφέστερον εἰπέ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες. τὴν μὲν γάρ που τοῦ ἐπιπέδου πραγματείαν γεωμετρίαν ἐτίθεις. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰτά γ', ἔφη, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀστρονομίαν μετὰ ταύτην, ὕστερον δ' ἀνεχώρησας. Σπεύδων γάρ, ἔφην, ταχὺ πάντα διεξελθεῖν μᾶλλον βραδύνω· ἐξῆς γὰρ οὔσαν τὴν βάθους αὔξης μέθοδον, ὅτι τῇ ζητήσῃ γελοίως ἔχει, ὑπερβὰς αὐτὴν μετὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν

Ε ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὔσαν βάθους. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τέταρτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τιθῶμεν μάθημα ἀστρονομίαν, ὡς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς νῦν παραλειπομένης, ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετή. Εἰκός, ἦ δ' ὅς· καὶ ὁ γε νῦν δὴ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέπληξας περὶ ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι, νῦν ἦ σὺ 529 μετέρχει ἐπαινω. παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον, ὅτι

<sup>a</sup> *πραγματεῖαν*: interesting is the development of this word from its use in *Phaedo* 63 A ("interest," "zeal," "inquiring spirit." Cf. 64 E, 67 B) to the later meaning, "treatise." Cf. *Aristot. Top.* 100 a 18, *Eth. Nic.* 1103 b 26, *Polyb.* i. 1. 4, etc

<sup>b</sup> An obvious allusion to the proverb found in many forms in many languages. Cf. also *Polit.* 277 A-B, 264 B, *Soph. Antig.* 231 *σχολῆ ταχύς*, *Theognis* 335, 401 *μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν*, *Suetonius, Augustus* 25, *Aulus Gellius* x. 11. 5, *Macrob. Sat.* vi. 8. 9, "festina lente," "hâtez-vous lentement" (Boileau, *Art poétique*, i. 171), "Chi va piano va sano e va lontano" (Goldoni, *I volponi*, i. ii.), "Eile mit Weile" and similar expressions; Franklin's "Great haste makes great waste," etc.



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if the truth about them were made apparent." "It is true," he said, "that they do possess an extraordinary attractiveness and charm. But explain more clearly what you were just speaking of. The investigation<sup>a</sup> of plane surfaces, I presume, you took to be geometry?"

"Yes," said I. "And then," he said, "at first you took astronomy next and then you drew back."

"Yes," I said, "for in my haste to be done I was making less speed.<sup>b</sup> For, while the next thing in order is

the study<sup>c</sup> of the third dimension or solids, I passed it over because of our absurd neglect<sup>d</sup> to investigate it, and mentioned next after geometry astronomy,<sup>e</sup> which deals with the movements of solids." "That is right,"

he said. "Then, as our fourth study," said I, "let us set down astronomy, assuming that this science, the discussion of which has been passed over, is available,<sup>f</sup> provided, that is, that the state pursues it." "That

is likely," said he; "and instead of the vulgar utilitarian<sup>g</sup> commendation of astronomy, for which you just now rebuked me, Socrates, I now will praise it on your principles. For it is obvious to everybody,

<sup>a</sup> *μέθοδον*: this word, like *πραγματεία*, came to mean "treatise."

<sup>b</sup> This is the meaning. Neither Stallbaum's explanation, "quia ita est comparata, ut de ea quaerere ridiculum sit," nor that accepted by Adam, "quia ridicule tractatur," is correct, and 529 E and 527 A are not in point. Cf. 528 B, p. 176, note a.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 822 A ff.

<sup>f</sup> *i.e.* "assuming this to exist," "vorhanden sein," which is the usual meaning of *ὑπάρχειν* in classical Greek. The science, of course, is solid geometry, which is still undeveloped, but in Plato's state will be constituted as a regular science through endowed research.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 410, note c, on 442 E, *Gorg.* 482 E, *Rep.* 367 A, 581 D, *Cratyl.* 400 A, *Apol.* 32 A, *Aristot. Pol.* 1333 b 9.

αὕτη γε ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὄραν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε ἄγει. Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί· ἐμοί γάρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἔφη. Ὡς μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες, πάνυ ποιεῖν κάτω βλέπειν. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμβάνειν παρὰ σαυτῶ ἢ ἐστι· κινδυνεύεις γάρ, καὶ εἴ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλματα θεώμενος ἀνακύπτων καταμανθάνοι τι, ἠγείσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν νοήσει ἄλλ' οὐκ ὄμμασι θεωρεῖν. Ἴσως οὖν καλῶς ἠγεί, ἐγὼ δ' εὐθηθικῶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ἦ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον· ἐὰν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. my review of Warburg, *Class. Phil.* xxiv. (1929) p. 319. The dramatic misunderstanding forestalls a possible understanding by the reader. Cf. *supra* on 523 B. The misapprehension is typical of modern misunderstandings. Glaucon is here the prototype of all sentimental Platonists or anti-Platonists. The meaning of "higher" things in Plato's allegory is obvious. But Glaucon takes it literally. Similarly, modern critics, taking Plato's imagery literally and pressing single expressions apart from the total context, have inferred that Plato would be hostile to all the applications of modern science to experience. They refuse to make allowance for his special and avowed educational purpose, and overlook the fact that he is prophesying the mathematical astronomy and science of the future. The half-serious exaggeration of his rhetoric can easily be matched by similar utterances of modern thinkers of the most various schools, from Rousseau's "écarter tous les faits" to Judd's "Once we acquire the power to neglect all the concrete facts . . . we are free from the incumbrances that come through attention to the concrete facts." Cf. also on 529 B, 530 B and 534 A.

<sup>b</sup> ἀνάγοντες is tinged with the suggestions of *supra* 517 A, but

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I think, that this study certainly compels the soul to look upward<sup>a</sup> and leads it away from things here to those higher things." "It may be obvious to everybody except me," said I, "for I do not think so." "What do you think?" he said. "As it is now handled by those who are trying to lead us up to philosophy,<sup>b</sup> I think that it turns the soul's gaze very much downward." "What do you mean?" he said. "You seem to me in your thought to put a most liberal<sup>c</sup> interpretation on the 'study of higher things,'" I said, "for apparently if anyone with back-thrown head should learn something by staring at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason and not with the eyes.<sup>d</sup> Perhaps you are right and I am a simpleton. For I, for my part, am unable to suppose that any other study turns the soul's gaze upward<sup>e</sup> than that which deals with being

the meaning here is those who use astronomy as a part of the higher education. *φιλοσοφία* is used in the looser sense of Isocrates. Cf. *A.J.P.* xvi. p. 237.

<sup>c</sup> For *οὐκ ἀγεννῶς* cf. *Gorg.* 462 D, where it is ironical, as here, *Phaedr.* 264 B, *Euthyph.* 2 C, *Theaet.* 184 C. In *Charm.* 158 C it is not ironical.

<sup>d</sup> The humorous exaggeration of the language reflects Plato's exasperation at the sentimentalists who prefer stargazing to mathematical science. Cf. *Tim.* 91 D on the evolution of birds from innocents who supposed that sight furnished the surest proof in such matters. Cf. Walt Whitman:

When I heard the learned astronomer . . .  
Rising and gliding out I wander'd off by myself  
In the mystical moist night air, and from time to time  
Look'd up in perfect silence at the stars.

Yet such is the irony of misinterpretation that this and the following pages are the chief support of the charge that Plato is hostile to science. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 174 A *ἀνω βλέποντα*.

δέ τις ἄνω κεκηνῶς ἢ κάτω συμμεμυκῶς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιχειρῆ τι μαθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἄν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν — ἐπιστήμην γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχειν τῶν τοιούτων — οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ  
 C βλέπειν τὴν ψυχὴν, κὰν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῆ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μαθάνῃ.

XI. Δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω· ὀρθῶς γάρ μοι ἐπέπληξας. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἔλεγες δεῖν ἀστρονομίαν μαθάνειν παρὰ ἃ νῦν μαθάνουσιν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὠφελίμως πρὸς ἃ λέγομεν μαθήσεσθαι; ὦδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπεὶ περ ἐν ὄρατῷ πεποικίλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγείσθαι καὶ  
 D ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ ὄν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὔσα βραδυτῆς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 172.

<sup>b</sup> συμμύω probably refers to the eyes. But cf. Adam *ad loc.*

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 264 A, and Adam in *Class. Rev.* xiii. p. 11.

<sup>d</sup> Or rather, "serves me right," or, in the American language, "I've got what's coming to me." The expression is colloquial. Cf. *Epist.* iii. 319 E, Antiphon cxxiv. 45. But *δίκην ἔχει* in 520 B = "it is just."

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 40 A κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον, Eurip. *Hel.* 1096 ἀστέρων ποικίλματα, Critias, *Sisyphus*, Diels ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 321, lines 33-34:

τό τ' ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας  
 χρόνου καλὸν ποικίλμα τέκτονος σοφοῦ.

Cf. also *Gorg.* 508 A, Lucretius v. 1205 "stellis micantibus aethera fixum," ii. 1031 ff., *Aeneid* iv. 482 "stellis ardentibus aptum," vi. 797, xi. 202, Ennius, *Ann.* 372, Shakes. *Hamlet* II. ii. 313 "This majestic roof fretted with golden fire," Arthur Hugh Clough, *Uranus*:

Then Plato in me said,  
 'Tis but the figured ceiling overhead  
 With cunning diagrams bestarred . . .  
 Mind not the stars, mind thou thy mind and God

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and the invisible. But if anyone tries to learn about the things of sense, whether gaping up<sup>a</sup> or blinking down,<sup>b</sup> I would never say that he really learns—for nothing of the kind admits of true knowledge—nor would I say that his soul looks up, but down, even though he study floating on his back<sup>c</sup> on sea or land.”

XI. “A fair retort,<sup>d</sup>” he said; “your rebuke is deserved. But how, then, did you mean that astronomy ought to be taught contrary to the present fashion if it is to be learned in a way to conduce to our purpose?” “Thus,” said I: “these sparks that paint the sky,<sup>e</sup> since they are decorations on a visible surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact of material things; but we must recognize that they fall far short of the truth,<sup>f</sup> the movements, namely, of

The word *ποικιλματα* may further suggest here the complication of the movements in the heavens.

<sup>f</sup> The meaning of this sentence is certain, but the expression will no more bear a matter-of-fact logical analysis than that of *Phaedo* 69 A-B, or *Rep.* 365 c, or many other subtle passages in Plato. No material object perfectly embodies the ideal and abstract mathematical relation. These mathematical ideas are designated as the true, *ἀληθινῶν*, and the real, *ὄν*. As in the *Timæus* (38 c, 40 A-B, 36 D-E) the abstract and ideal has the primacy and by a reversal of the ordinary point of view is said to contain or convey the concrete. The visible stars are in and are carried by their invisible mathematical orbits. By this way of speaking Plato, it is true, disregards the apparent difficulty that the movement of the visible stars then ought to be mathematically perfect. But this interpretation is, I think, more probable for Plato than Adam's attempt to secure rigid consistency by taking *τὸ ὄν τάχος* etc., to represent invisible and ideal planets, and *τὰ ἐνόητα* to be the perfect mathematical realities, which are in them. *ἐνόητα* would hardly retain the metaphysical meaning of *ὄντα*. For the interpretation of 529 D cf. also my “Platonism and the History of Science,” *Am. Philos. Soc. Proc.* lvi. p. 172.



ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόητα φέρει· ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοία ληπτά, ὄψει δ' οὐ· ἢ σὺ οἶει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ

- E ἂν εἴ τις ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἢ τινος ἄλλου δημιουργοῦ ἢ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν. ἠγῆσαιτο γὰρ ἂν πού τις ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας, ἰδὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα, κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχειν ἀπεργασία, γελοῖον μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν αὐτὰ σπουδῇ, ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς
- 530 ληψόμενον ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς συμμετρίας. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἔφη. Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄντα οὐκ οἶει ταῦτόν πεῖσεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἀστρων φοράς ἀποβλέποντα; νομιεῖν μὲν, ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ξυνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν ξυμμετρίαν καὶ τούτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτόν καὶ
- B τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων πρὸς τε ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὐκ ἄτοπον, οἶει, ἠγῆσεται τὸν νομίζοντα γίνεσθαι τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα, καὶ

<sup>a</sup> δημιουργῷ: an anticipation of the *Timaeus*.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Bruno *apud* Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, i. 125 and 128, and Galileo, *ibid.* i. 178; also Lucretius v. 302-305.

<sup>c</sup> Plato was right against the view that Aristotle imposed on the world for centuries. We should not therefore say with Adam that he would have attached little significance to the perturbations of Neptune and the consequent discovery



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real speed and real slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain. These can be apprehended only by reason and thought, but not by sight; or do you think otherwise?" "By no means," he said. "Then," said I, "we must use the blazonry of the heavens as patterns to aid in the study of those realities, just as one would do who chanced upon diagrams drawn with special care and elaboration by Daedalus or some other craftsman or painter. For anyone acquainted with geometry who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the workmanship, but would think it absurd to examine them seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute truth with regard to equals or doubles or any other ratio." "How could it be otherwise than absurd?" he said. "Do you not think," said I, "that one who was an astronomer in very truth would feel in the same way when he turned his eyes upon the movements of the stars? He will be willing to concede that the artisan<sup>a</sup> of heaven fashioned it and all that it contains in the best possible manner for such a fabric; but when it comes to the proportions of day and night, and of their relation to the month, and that of the month to the year, and of the other stars to these and one another, do you not suppose that he will regard as a very strange fellow the man who believes that these things go on for ever without change<sup>b</sup> or the least deviation<sup>c</sup>—though they possess

of Uranus. It is to Plato that tradition attributes the problem of accounting by the simplest hypothesis for the movement of the heavenly bodies and "saving the phenomena."

The alleged contradiction between this and *Laws* 821 B ff. and *Tim.* 47 A is due to a misapprehension. That the stars in their movements do not perfectly express the exactness of mathe-

ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν;  
 Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, σοῦ νῦν ἀκούοντι. Προ-  
 βλήμασιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρώμενοι ὥσπερ  
 γεωμετρίαν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτιμεν· τὰ  
 C δ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴασομεν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὄντως

mathematical conceptions is no more than modern astronomers say. In the *Laws* passage Plato protests against the idea that there is no law and order governing the movement of the planets, but that they are "wandering stars," as irregular in their movements as they seem. In the *Timaeus* he is saying that astronomy or science took its beginning from the sight and observation of the heavenly bodies and the changing seasons. In the *Republic* Plato's purpose is to predict and encourage a purely mathematical astronomy and to indicate its place in the type of education which he wishes to give his guardians. There is not the slightest contradiction or change of opinion in the three passages if interpreted rightly in their entire context.

<sup>a</sup> The meaning is not appreciably affected by a slight doubt as to the construction of ζητεῖν. It is usually taken with ἀτοπον (regarded as neuter), the meaning being that the philosophic astronomer will think it strange to look for the absolute truth in these things. This double use of ἀτοπον is strained and it either makes παντὶ τρόπῳ awkward or attributes to Plato the intention of decrying the concrete study of astronomy. I think ζητεῖν etc. are added by a trailing anacoluthon such as occurs elsewhere in the *Republic*. Their subject is the real astronomer who, using the stars only as "diagrams" or patterns (529 D), seeks to learn a higher exacter mathematical truth than mere observation could yield. Madvig's ζητήσῃ implies a like view of the meaning but smooths out the construction. But my interpretation of the passage as a whole does not depend on this construction. If we make ζητεῖν depend on ἀτοπον (neuter) ἡγήσεται, the meaning will be that he thinks it absurd to expect to get that higher truth from mere observation. At all events Plato is not here objecting to observation as a suggestion for mathematical studies but to its substitution for them, as the next sentence shows.

<sup>b</sup> That is just what the mathematical astronomy of to-day

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bodies and are visible objects—and that his unremitting quest<sup>a</sup> is the realities of these things?” “I at least do think so,” he said, “now that I hear it from you.” “It is by means of problems,<sup>b</sup> then,” said I, “as in the study of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and we will let be the things in the heavens,<sup>c</sup> if we are to have a part in the true science of

does, and it is a *πολλαπλάσιον ἔργον* compared with the merely observational astronomy of Plato’s day. Cf. the interesting remarks of Sir James Jeans, *apud* S. J. Woolf, *Drawn from Life*, p. 74: “The day is gone when the astronomer’s work is carried on only at the eyepiece of a telescope. Naturally, observations must be made, but these must be recorded by men who are trained for that purpose, and I am not one of them,” etc.

Adam’s quotation of Browning’s “Abt Vogler” in connexion with this passage will only confirm the opinion of those who regard Plato as a sentimental enemy of science.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. also *Phileb.* 59 A, Aristot. *Met.* 997 b 35 οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἢ ἀστρολογία τόνδε.

This intentional Ruskinian *boutade* has given great scandal. The Platonist, we are told *ad nauseam*, deduces the world from his inner consciousness. This is of course not true (*cf.* *Unity of Plato’s Thought*, p. 45). But Plato, like some lesser writers, loves to emphasize his thought by paradox and surprise, and his postulation and prediction of a mathematical astronomy required emphasis. Cf. my *Platonism and the History of Science*, pp. 171-174.

This and similar passages cannot be used to prove that Plato was unscientific, as many hostile or thoughtless critics have attempted to do. Cf. *e.g.* the severe strictures of Arthur Platt, *Nine Essays*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1927, pp. 12-16, especially p. 16: “Plato being first and foremost a metaphysician with a sort of religious system would not have us study anything but metaphysics and a kind of mystic religion.” Woodbridge Riley, *From Myth to Reason*, p. 47: “. . . Plato . . . was largely responsible for turning back the clock of scientific progress. To explain the wonders of the world he preferred imagination to observation.” Cf. also Benn, *Greek Philosophers*, vol. i. pp. 173 and 327, Herrick,

ἀστρονομίας μεταλαμβάνοντες χρήσιμον τὸ φύσει φρόνιμον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξ ἀχρήστου ποιήσειν. Ἡ πολλαπλάσιον, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται προστάττεις. Οἶμαι δέ γε, εἶπον, καὶ τὰλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον προστάξειν ἡμᾶς, εἴαν τι ἡμῶν ὡς νομοθετῶν ὄφελος ᾖ.

XII. Ἄλλὰ γὰρ τί ἔχεις ὑπομνήσαι τῶν προσηκόντων μαθημάτων; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γ' οὕτωςί. Οὐ μὴν ἔν, ἀλλὰ πλείω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶδη D παρέχεται ἡ φορά, ὡς ἐγῶμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα ἴσως ὅστις σοφὸς ἔξει εἰπεῖν· ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν προφανῆ, δύο. Ποῖα δῆ; Πρὸς τούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντίστροφον αὐτοῦ. Τὸ ποῖον; Κινδυνεύει, ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φοράν ὦτα παγῆναι, καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων ἀδελφαί τινες αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, ὡς οἷ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Γλαῦκων,

*The Thinking Machine*, p. 335, F. C. S. Schiller, *Plato and his Predecessors*, p. 81: ". . . that Plato's anti-empirical bias renders him profoundly anti-scientific, and that his influence has always, openly or subtly, counteracted and thwarted the scientific impulse, or at least diverted it into unprofitable channels." Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science*, pp. 27-28: "Plato was a great philosopher but in the history of experimental science he must be counted a disaster."

Such statements disregard the entire context of the Platonic passages they exploit, and take no account of Plato's purpose or of other passages which counteract his seemingly unscientific remarks.

Equally unfair is the practice of comparing Plato unfavourably with Aristotle in this respect, as Grote *e.g.* frequently does (*cf. Aristotle*, p. 233). Plato was an artist and Aristotle an encyclopaedist; but Plato as a whole is far nearer the point of view of recent science than Aristotle. *Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science*, p. 163; also 532 A and on 529 A, p. 180, note a, and *What Plato Said*, p. 236.

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astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul." "You enjoin a task," he said, "that will multiply the labour<sup>a</sup> of our present study of astronomy many times." "And I fancy," I said, "that our other injunctions will be of the same kind if we are of any use as lawgivers.

XII. "However, what suitable studies have you to suggest?" "Nothing," he said, "thus off-hand." "Yet, surely," said I, "motion<sup>b</sup> in general provides not one but many forms or species, according to my opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the task of a wise man,<sup>c</sup> but even to us two of them are apparent." "What are they?" "In addition to astronomy, its counterpart," I replied. "What is that?" "We may venture to suppose," I said, "that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the ears are framed<sup>d</sup> for the movements of harmony; and these are in some sort kindred sciences,<sup>e</sup> as the Pythagoreans<sup>f</sup> affirm and we admit,<sup>g</sup> do we not,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 272 *ἅ καίτοι οὐ μικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον.*

<sup>b</sup> Plato here generalizes motion as a subject of science.

<sup>c</sup> The modesty is in the tone of the *Timaeus*.

<sup>d</sup> For *πέπηγεν* cf. 605 A.

<sup>e</sup> The similar statement attributed to Archytas, Diels i. 3 p. 331, is probably an imitation of this.

<sup>f</sup> Pythagoras is a great name, but little is known of him. "Pythagoreans" in later usage sometimes means mystics, sometimes mathematical physicists, sometimes both. Plato makes use of both traditions but is dominated by neither. For Erich Frank's recent book, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, cf. my article in *Class. Phil.* vol. xxiii. (1928) pp. 347 ff. The student of Plato will do well to turn the page when he meets the name Pythagoras in a commentator.

<sup>g</sup> For this turn of phrase cf. Vol. I. p. 333, 424 c, *Protag.* 316 A, *Symp.* 186 E.



ξυγχωροῦμεν. ἢ πῶς ποιούμεν; Οὕτως, ἔφη.  
 Ε Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ πολὺ τὸ ἔργον, ἐκεί-  
 νων πευσόμεθα, πῶς λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ εἴ-  
 τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις; ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ πάντα  
 ταῦτα φυλάξομεν τὸ ἡμέτερον. Ποῖον; Μὴ ποτ'  
 αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μαθάνειν οὐς  
 θρέψομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξήκον ἐκείσε αἰεὶ, οἱ πάντα δεῖ  
 ἀφήκειν, οἷον ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν.

531 ἢ οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἕτερον τοιοῦτον  
 ποιούσι; τὰς γὰρ ἀκουόμενας αὖ συμφωνίας καὶ  
 φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες ἀνήνυτα ὥσπερ  
 οἱ ἀστρονόμοι ποιοῦσιν. Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, καὶ  
 γελοίως γε, ~~πυκνώματ' ἅπτα~~ ὀνομάζοντες καὶ  
 παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὦτα, οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων φωνῆν  
 θηρευόμενοι, οἱ μὲν φασιν ἔτι κατακούειν ἐν μέσῳ  
 τινὰ ἤχην καὶ μικρότατον εἶναι τοῦτο διάστημα,

<sup>a</sup> For the reference to experts *cf. supra* 400 b, 424 c. *Cf.* also *What Plato Said*, p. 484, on *Laches* 184 d-e.

<sup>b</sup> *παρά* of course here means "throughout" and not "contrary."

<sup>c</sup> I take the word *ἀτελές* etymologically (*cf. pp.* 66-67, note b, on 500 a), with reference to the end in view. Others take it in the ordinary Greek sense, "imperfect," "incomplete."

<sup>d</sup> This passage is often taken as another example of Plato's hostility to science and the experimental method. It is of course not that, but the precise interpretation is difficult. Glaucon at first misapprehends (*cf. p.* 180, note a, on 529 a) and gives an amusing description of the mere empiricist in music. But Socrates says he does not mean these, but those who try to apply mathematics to the perception of sound instead of developing a (Kantian) *a priori* science of harmony to match the mathematical science of astronomy. *Cf. also p.* 193, note g, on 531 b, W. Whewell, *Transactions of the Cambridge Philos. Soc.* vol. ix. p. 589, and for music A. Rivaud, "Platon et la musique," *Rev. d'Histoire de la Philos.* 1929;



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Glaucon?" "We do," he said. "Then," said I, "since the task is so great, shall we not inquire of them<sup>a</sup> what their opinion is and whether they have anything to add? And we in all this<sup>b</sup> will be on the watch for what concerns us." "What is that?" "To prevent our fosterlings from attempting to learn anything that does not conduce to the end<sup>c</sup> we have in view, and does not always come out at what we said ought to be the goal of everything, as we were just now saying about astronomy. Or do you not know that they repeat the same procedure in the case of harmonies<sup>d</sup>? They transfer it to hearing and measure audible concords and sounds against one another,<sup>e</sup> expending much useless labour just as the astronomers do." "Yes, by heaven," he said, "and most absurdly too. They talk of something they call minims<sup>f</sup> and, laying their ears alongside, as if trying to catch a voice from next door,<sup>g</sup> some affirm that they can hear a note between and that this is the least interval and the unit of measurement, while

pp. 1-30; also Stallbaum *ad loc.*, and E. Frank, *Platon u. d. sog. Pyth.*, Anhang, on the history of Greek music. He expresses surprise (p. 139) that Glaucon knows nothing of Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove Socrates' ignorance of music.

<sup>a</sup> This hints at the distinction developed in the *Politicus* between relative measurement of one thing against another and measurement by a standard. Cf. *Polit.* 283 E, 284 B-C, *Theat.* 186 A.

<sup>f</sup> *πικνῶματα* (condensed notes). The word is technical. Cf. Adam *ad loc.* But, as *ἄττα* shows, Plato is using it loosely to distinguish a measure of sense perception from a mathematically determined interval.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Pater, *Renaissance*, p. 157. The phrase, *ἐκ γειτόνων*, is colloquial and, despite the protest of those who insist that it only means in the neighbourhood, suggests overhearing what goes on next door—as often in the New Comedy.

ὧ μετρητέον, οἱ δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὡς ὅμοιον ἤδη  
 B φθεγγομένων, ἀμφοτέρω ὦτα τοῦ νοῦ προσθησά-  
 μενοι. Σὺ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις  
 τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ  
 βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας·  
 ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἢ εἰκῶν γίγνηται, πλήκτρω  
 τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι καὶ  
 ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς  
 εἰκόνας καὶ οὐ φημι τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους  
 οὓς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἐρήσεσθαι.  
 C ταῦτόν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ· τοὺς  
 γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουομέναις  
 ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα  
 ἀνίασιν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τίνες ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ  
 τίνες οὐ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι. Δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη,  
 πρᾶγμα λέγεις. Χρήσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aldous Huxley, *Jesting Pilate*, p. 152: "Much is enthusiastically taught about the use of quarter tones in Indian music. I listened attentively at Lucknow in the hope of hearing some new and extraordinary kind of melody based on these celebrated fractions. But I listened in vain." Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iii. pp. 334-335, n. 85, thinks that Plato "shrugs his shoulders at experiments." He refers to Plutarch, *Life of Marcellus*, xiv. 5, and *Quaest. Conv.* viii. 2. 1, 7, where Plato is represented as "having been angry with Eudoxus and Archytas because they employed instruments and apparatus for the solution of a problem, instead of relying solely on reasoning."

<sup>b</sup> So Malebranche, *Entretiens sur la métaphysique*, 3, x.: "Je pense que vous vous moquez de moi. C'est la raison et non les sens qu'il faut consulter."

<sup>c</sup> For *χρηστός* in this ironical sense cf. also 479 A, *Symp.* 177 B.

<sup>d</sup> The language of the imagery confounds the torture of slaves giving evidence on the rack with the strings and pegs of a musical instrument. For the latter cf. Horace, *A. P.* 348,

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others insist that the strings now render identical sounds,<sup>a</sup> both preferring their ears to their minds.<sup>b</sup> "You," said I, "are speaking of the worthies<sup>c</sup> who vex and torture the strings and rack them<sup>d</sup> on the pegs; but—not to draw out the comparison with strokes of the plectrum and the musician's complaints of too responsive and too reluctant strings<sup>e</sup>—I drop the figure,<sup>f</sup> and tell you that I do not mean these people, but those others<sup>g</sup> whom we just now said we would interrogate about harmony. Their method exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer; for the numbers they seek are those found in these heard concords, but they do not ascend<sup>h</sup> to generalized problems and the consideration which numbers are inherently concordant and which not and why in each case." "A superhuman task," he said. "Say, rather, useful,<sup>i</sup>" said I, "for the investigation of the

nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem vult manus et mens  
poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum.

Stallbaum says that Plato here was imitated by Aristaenetus, *Epist.* xiv. libr. 1 *τὶ πράγματα παρέχετε χορδαῖς;*

<sup>e</sup> This also may suggest a reluctant and a too willing witness.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. on 489 A, p. 23, note *d*.

<sup>g</sup> He distinguishes from the pure empirics just satirized those who apply their mathematics only to the data of observation. This is perhaps one of Plato's rare errors. For though there may be in some sense a Kantian *a priori* mechanics of astronomy, there can hardly be a purely *a priori* mathematics of acoustics. What numbers are consonantly harmonious must always remain a fact of direct experience. Cf. my *Platonism and the History of Science*, p. 176.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 108, n. 1.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 47 c-d. Plato always keeps to his point—cf. 349 B-C, 564 A-B—or returns to it after a digression. Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note *e*.

τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν, ἄλλως δὲ μεταδιωκόμενον ἄχρηστον. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

XIII. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ τούτων  
 D πάντων ὧν διεληλύθαμεν μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ  
 τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκηται καὶ ξυγγένειαν,  
 καὶ ξυλλογισθῇ ταῦτα ἧ ἔστιν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα,  
 φέρειν τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν  
 καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόνητα.  
 Καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ  
 ἔργον λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, ἢ τίνος λέγεις; ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι πάντα  
 ταῦτα προοίμια ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὧν δεῖ  
 E δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι', ἔφη, εἰ  
 μὴ μάλα γέ τινες ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα.  
 Ἄλλ' ἤδη,<sup>1</sup> εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοὶ τινες ὄντες<sup>2</sup> δοῦναί τε  
 καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαι ποτέ τι ὧν φημὲν

<sup>1</sup> ἀλλὰ ἤδη ADM, ἀλλὰ δὴ F.

<sup>2</sup> μὴ δυνατοὶ τινες ὄντες A<sup>2</sup>FDM, οἱ μὴ δυνατοὶ τινες ὄντες A:  
 μὴ ὄντα οἷτινες Burnet.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 505 B, p. 88, note a.

<sup>b</sup> μέθοδος, like πραγματείαν in D, is used almost in the later technical sense of "treatise" or "branch of study." Cf. on 528 D, p. 178, note a.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 537 c, *Epin.* 991 E.

<sup>d</sup> Plato is fond of this image. It suggests here also the preamble of a law, as the translation more explicitly indicates. Cf. 532 D, anticipated in 457 c, and *Laws* 722 D-E, 723 A-B and E, 720 D-E, 772 E, 870 D, 854 A, 932 A and *passim*.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 146 B, and perhaps *Euthyd.* 290 c. Though mathematics quicken the mind of the student, it is, apart from metaphysics, a matter of common experience that mathematicians are not necessarily good reasoners on other subjects. Jowett's wicked jest, "I have hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason," misled an eminent

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beautiful and the good,<sup>a</sup> but if otherwise pursued, useless." "That is likely," he said.

XIII. "And what is more," I said, "I take it that if the investigation<sup>b</sup> of all these studies goes far enough to bring out their community and kinship<sup>c</sup> with one another, and to infer their affinities, then to busy ourselves with them contributes to our desired end, and the labour taken is not lost; but otherwise it is vain." "I too so surmise," said he; "but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates." "Are you talking about the prelude,<sup>d</sup>" I said, "or what? Or do we not know that all this is but the preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain that we have to apprehend? For you surely do not suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners and dialecticians<sup>e</sup>?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "except a very few whom I have met." "But have you ever supposed," I said, "that men who could not render and exact an account<sup>f</sup> of opinions in discussion would ever know anything of the things

professor of education who infers that Plato disbelieved in "mental discipline" (*Yale Review*, July 1917). Cf. also Taylor, Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn, *Mind*, xii. (1903) p. 511; Charles Fox, *Educational Psychology*, pp. 187-188: "... a training in the mathematics may produce exactness of thought . . . provided that the training is of such a kind as to inculcate an ideal which the pupil values and strives to attain. Failing this, Glaucon's observation that he had 'hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning' is likely to be repeated." On the text cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. pp. 384-385, and Adam *ad loc.*

<sup>f</sup> λόγον . . . δοῦναι. A commonplace Platonic plea for dialectics. Cf. 534 B, *Prot.* 336 C, *Polit.* 286 A, *Theaet.* 202 C, 175 C, 183 D, *Soph.* 230 A, *Phaedo* 78 C-D, 95 D, *Charm.* 165 B, *Xen. Oecon.* 11. 22. Cf. also λόγον λαβεῖν *Rep.* 402 A, 534 B, *Soph.* 246 C, *Theaet.* 208 D, and Thompson on *Meno* 75 D.



532 δειν εἰδέναι; Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὗτος ἤδη αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὃν καὶ ὄντα νοητὸν μιμοῖτ' ἂν ἢ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις, ἣν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῶα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον. οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὀρμᾶν,<sup>1</sup> καὶ μὴ ἀποστῆ,  
 Β πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; οἱ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς; Τί μὴν; Ἡ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἶδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῶα τε

<sup>1</sup> ὀρμᾶν Clemens: ὀρμᾶ AFDM.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 58 D, *Meno* 75 C-D, *Charm.* 155 A, *Cratyl* 390 C, and on 533 B, pp. 200 f., note f.

<sup>b</sup> This is not a literal rendering, but gives the meaning.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 516 A-B. Plato interprets his imagery again here and in B *infra*.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *supra* p. 180, note a, and p. 187, note c. Cf. also 537 D, and on 476 A ff. Cf. Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 9: "Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols"; E. S. Robinson, *Readings in General Psych.* p. 295: "A habit of suppressing mental imagery must therefore characterize men who deal much with abstract ideas; and as the power of dealing easily and firmly with these ideas is the surest criterion of a high order of intellect . . ."; Pear, *Remembering and Forgetting*, p. 57: "He (Napoleon) is reported to have said that 'there are some who, from some physical or moral peculiarity of character, form a picture (tableau) of everything. No matter what knowledge, intellect, courage, or good qualities they may have, these men



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we say must be known ? ” “ No is surely the answer to that too. ” “ This, then, at last, Glaucon, ” I said, “ is the very law which dialectics <sup>a</sup> recites, the strain which it executes, of which, though it belongs to the intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress <sup>b</sup> of the faculty of vision, as we described <sup>c</sup> its endeavour to look at living things themselves and the stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like manner, when anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense <sup>d</sup> to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable came to the goal of the visible. ” “ By all means, ” he said. “ What, then, will you not call this progress of thought dialectic ? ” “ Surely. ” “ And the release from bonds, ” I said, “ and the conversion from the shadows to the images <sup>e</sup> that cast them and to the light and the ascent <sup>f</sup> from the subterranean cavern to the world above, <sup>g</sup> and there the persisting

are unfit to command ” ; A. Bain, *Mind*, 1880, p. 570 : “ Mr. Galton is naturally startled at finding eminent scientific men, by their own account, so very low in the visualizing power. His explanation, I have no doubt, hits the mark ; the deficiency is due to the natural antagonism of pictorial aptitude and abstract thought ” ; Judd, *Psychology of High School Subjects*, p. 321 : “ It did not appear on superficial examination of the standings of students that those who can draw best are the best students from the point of view of the teacher of science. ”

<sup>a</sup> εἰδωλα : cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, p. 238 ; also 516 A, *Theaet.* 150 C, *Soph.* 240 A, 241 E, 234 C, 266 B with 267 C, and *Rep.* 517 D ἀγαλμάτων.

<sup>b</sup> ἐπάνοδος became almost technical in Neoplatonism. Cf. also 517 A, 529 A, and p. 124, note b.

<sup>c</sup> Lit. “ sun, ” i.e. the world illumined by the sun, not by the fire in the cave.

καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτι ἀδυναμία<sup>1</sup>  
 C βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα<sup>2</sup> καὶ  
 σκιάς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιάς δι'  
 ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς ἡλίον κρίνειν  
 ἀποσκιαζόμενας, πᾶσα αὕτη ἢ πραγματεία τῶν  
 τεχνῶν, ἃς διήλθομεν, ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ  
 ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ  
 ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὔσι θεάν, ὥσπερ τότε τοῦ σα-  
 φεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν  
 D τῷ σωματοειδεῖ τε καὶ ὄρατῷ τόπῳ. Ἐγὼ μὲν,  
 ἔφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὕτω. καίτοι παντάπασί γέ μοι  
 δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλον δ' αὖ  
 τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὅμως δέ—οὐ γὰρ  
 ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις  
 πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον—ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν  
 λέγεται, ἐπ' αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν νόμον ἴωμεν, καὶ  
 διέλθωμεν οὕτως ὥσπερ τὸ προοίμιον διήλθομεν.  
 λέγε οὖν, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνά-  
 E μως, καὶ κατὰ ποῖα δὴ εἶδη διέστηκε, καὶ τίνες  
 αὖ ὁδοί. αὗται γὰρ ἂν ἦδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἱ πρὸς  
 αὐτὸ ἄγουσαι εἶεν, οἱ ἀφικομένῳ ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ  
 ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας. Οὐκέτ',

<sup>1</sup> ἔτι ἀδυναμία Iamblichus: ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ ADM, ἀδυναμία F.

<sup>2</sup> θεῖα mss., bracketed by Stallbaum: θεῖα Ast and Apelt. Adam once proposed <καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεία.

<sup>a</sup> See crit. note. The text of Iamblichus is the only reason-  
 able one. The reading of the manuscripts is impossible.  
 For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 B οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν  
 μικρολογία, Laws 638 B σφόδρα γυναικῶν, with England's  
 note, Theaet. 183 E πάννυ πρεσβύτης, Laws 791 C παντελῶς  
 παίδων, 698 C σφόδρα φίλα, Rep. 564 A ἄγαν δουλείαν, with  
 Stallbaum's note.

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inability<sup>a</sup> to look directly at animals and plants and the light of the sun, but the ability to see the phantasms created by God<sup>b</sup> in water and shadows of objects that are real and not merely, as before, the shadows of images cast through a light which, compared with the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of the arts and sciences that we have described indicates their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the contemplation of what is best among realities, as in our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned to the contemplation of what is brightest in the corporeal and visible region.” “I accept this,” he said, “as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard to reject.<sup>c</sup> Nevertheless, since we have not to hear it at this time only, but are to repeat it often hereafter, let us assume that these things are as now has been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go through with it as we have gone through the prelude. Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journey-

<sup>b</sup> *θεῖα* because produced by God or nature and not by man with a mirror or a paint-brush. See crit. note and *Class. Review*, iv. p. 480. I quoted *Sophist* 266 B-D, and Adam with rare candour withdrew his emendation in his Appendix XIII. to this book. Apelt still misunderstands and emends, p. 296 and note.

<sup>c</sup> This sentence is fundamental for the understanding of Plato's metaphysical philosophy generally. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 30, n. 192, *What Plato Said*, p. 268 and p. 586 on *Parmen.* 135 c. So Tennyson says it is hard to believe in God and hard not to believe.

533 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τ' ἔσει ἀκολουθεῖν·  
 ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι· οὐδ'  
 εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὐ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ  
 ἀληθές, ὃ γε δὴ μοι φαίνεται—εἰ δ' ὄντως ἢ μὴ  
 οὐκέτ' ἄξιον τοῦτο δισχυρίζεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν  
 δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἦ γάρ; Τί μὴν;  
 Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἂν  
 φήνειεν ἐμπείρω ὄντι ὧν νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἄλλη  
 δὲ οὐδαμῆ δυνατόν; Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἄξιον δι-  
 σχυρίζεσθαι. Τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν  
 Β ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἐκάστου

<sup>a</sup> This is not mysticism or secret doctrine. It is, in fact, the avoidance of dogmatism. But that is not all. Plato could not be expected to insert a treatise on dialectical method here, or risk an absolute definition which would only expose him to misinterpretation. The principles and methods of such reasoning, and the ultimate metaphysical conclusions to which they may lead, cannot be expounded in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the intelligent, whose own experience will help them to understand. As the *Republic* and *Laws* entire explain Plato's idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. Cf. *What Plato Said*, Index s.v. Dialectics, and note *f* below.

<sup>b</sup> For the idiom οὐδὲν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι cf. *Symp.* 210 A, *Meno* 77 A, *Laws* 961 c, Aesch. *Prom.* 343, Thucyd. viii. 22. 1, Eurip. *Hippol.* 285.

<sup>c</sup> On Plato's freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 515 on *Meno* 86 b.

<sup>d</sup> The mystical implications of φήνειεν are not to be pressed. It is followed, as usual in Plato, by a matter-of-fact statement of the essential practical conclusion (γοῦν) that no man can be trusted to think straight in large matters who has not been educated to reason and argue straight.

<sup>e</sup> Plato anticipates the criticism that he neglects experience.

<sup>f</sup> i.e. dispute our statement and maintain. The meaning is plain. It is a case of what I have called illogical idiom.

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ing." "You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further,<sup>a</sup> though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill.<sup>b</sup> And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm.<sup>c</sup> But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm.<sup>c</sup> Is not that so?" "Surely." "And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal<sup>d</sup> this, and that only to one experienced<sup>e</sup> in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?" "That, too," he said, "we may properly affirm." "This, at any rate," said I, "no one will maintain in dispute against us<sup>f</sup>: that there is any other way of inquiry<sup>g</sup> that attempts

*Cf. T.A.P.A.* vol. xlvii. pp. 205-234. The meaning is that of *Philebus* 58 E, 59 A. Other "science" may be more interesting or useful, but sound dialectics alone fosters the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. *Cf. Soph.* 235 c, *Phaedr.* 265-266. Aristotle, *Topics* i. 2. 6, practically comes back to the Platonic conception of dialectics.

The full meaning of dialectics in Plato would demand a treatise. It is almost the opposite of what Hegelians call by that name, which is represented in Plato by the second part of the *Parmenides*. The characteristic Platonic dialectic is the checking of the stream of thought by the necessity of securing the understanding and assent of an intelligent interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting all relevant distinctions, divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and terms. When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on the leader's voice or the reader's attention, as in some of the later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary form.

<sup>g</sup> Cicero's "via et ratione." *περὶ παντός* is virtually identical with *αὐτοῦ γε ἐκάστου περὶ*.

It is true that the scientific specialist confines himself to his specialty. The dialectician, like his base counterfeit the sophist (*Soph.* 231 A), is prepared to argue about anything, *Soph.* 232 c f., *Euthyd.* 272 A-B.



πέρι, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῶ περι παντὸς λαμβάνειν. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις ἢ πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων ἅπασαι τετράφαται· αἱ δὲ λοιπαί, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς  
 C ταύτη ἐπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν περι τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσει χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῷσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὁ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε συμπλέκεται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; Οὐδεμία, ἢ δ' ὅς.

XIV. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιρούσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται, καὶ τῷ  
 D ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ τινὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 525 c, 527 b.

<sup>b</sup> The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparaging it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic, as has been suggested. Cf. on 527 a. It is the nature of mathematics to fall short of dialectics.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 20 b and on 520 c, p. 143, note g.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *supra* on 531 e.

<sup>e</sup> The touch of humour in the expression may be illustrated by Lucian, *Hermostimus* 74, where it is used to justify Lucian's scepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt's remark on Coleridge, "Excellent talker if you allow him to start from no premises and come to no conclusion."

<sup>f</sup> Or "admission." Plato thinks of even geometrical



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systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said <sup>a</sup> did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it—are, as we see, dreaming <sup>b</sup> about being, but the clear waking vision <sup>c</sup> of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account <sup>d</sup> of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known,<sup>e</sup> what possibility is there that assent <sup>f</sup> in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science? ” “ None,” said he.

XIV. “ Then,” said I, “ is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul<sup>g</sup> is sunk in reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Cf. the exaggeration of this idea by the Epicureans in Cic. *De fin.* i. 21 “ quae et a falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus.”

Dialectic proceeds *διὰ συγχωρήσεων*, the admission of the interlocutor. Cf. *Laws* 957 D, *Phaedr.* 237 C-D, *Gorg.* 487 E, *Lysis* 219 C, *Prot.* 350 E, *Phileb.* 12 A, *Theaet.* 162 A, 169 D-E, 164 C, *Rep.* 340 B. But such admissions are not valid unless when challenged they are carried back to something satisfactory—*ικανόν*—(not necessarily in any given case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such peremptorily demands the admission of his postulates and definitions. Cf. 510 B-D, 511 B.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *supra* on 519 B, p. 138, note a.

κατωρυγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἴς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὠρισάμεθα· ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περι

Ε ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσοῦτων πέρι σκέψις ὄσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη· [ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σαφήνειαν, ἃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀρκέσει.]<sup>1</sup> Ἀρέσκει γοῦν,<sup>2</sup> ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν  
534 ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ διάνοιαν, τρίτην δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην· καὶ ξυναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν, ξυναμφότερα δ' ἐκεῖνα νόησιν· καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ ὅ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅ τι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν· τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα

<sup>1</sup> The text as printed is that of Hermann, brackets by Adam. ἀλλ' ὁ AM, ἄλλο FD: ἔξιν σαφηνεῖα AFDM, ἔξω σαφηνεῖαν Herm., πως τὴν ἔξιν, σαφηνεῖα Burnet, τὴν ἔξιν πῶς ἔχει σαφηνεῖας Bywater: ἃ addidit et σαφηνεῖαν emendavit Herm.; λέγει AD, λέγειν FM, λέγεις A<sup>2</sup>: ἀρκέσει mss. See also Adam, Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> ἀρέσκει mss., καὶ ἀρκέσει Burnet; γοῦν AM, οὖν FD, Burnet.

<sup>a</sup> Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in the world below; cf. 363 D. Again we should not press Plato's rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile critics. See Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* p. 463, n. 3.

<sup>b</sup> All writers and philosophers are compelled to "speak with the vulgar." Cf. e.g. Meyerson, *De l'explication dans les sciences*, i. p. 329: "Tout en sachant que la couleur n'est pas réellement une qualité de l'objet, à se servir cependant, dans la vie de tous les jours, d'une locution qui l'affirme."

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the barbaric slough<sup>a</sup> of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit,<sup>b</sup> though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. 'Understanding,'<sup>c</sup> I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name<sup>d</sup> when things of such moment lie before us for consideration." "No, indeed," he said.<sup>e</sup> \* \* \* "Are you satisfied, then," said I, "as before,<sup>f</sup> to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief,<sup>g</sup> and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation, and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion<sup>h</sup>: as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates<sup>i</sup> and the division into two

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 511 D, pp. 116-117, note c.

<sup>d</sup> This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 516 on *Meno* 78 B-C for numerous instances. Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. *Diss.* xxvii. p. 40 ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῖς τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθομαι Πλάτωνι.

<sup>e</sup> The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often considered an interpolation. The translation omits it. See Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, *Journal of Phil.* (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124. <sup>f</sup> *Supra* 511 D-E.

<sup>g</sup> Always avoid "faith" in translating Plato.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note b.

<sup>i</sup> That is the meaning, though some critics will object to the phrase. Lit. "the things over which these (mental states) are set, or to which they apply."

ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῆ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἐῷμεν, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήση ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρ-  
 B εληλυθότες. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι ἔπεσθαι, ξυνδοκεῖ. Ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχη λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, φαίην; Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως· ὅς ἂν μὴ ἔχη διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελῶν τὴν τοῦ  
 C ἀγαθοῦ ιδέαν, καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιῶν, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναί τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἴ πη εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ,

<sup>a</sup> There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective classification is nothing to Plato's present purpose; (2) The second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics and in mathematics. Cf. *supra* on 525 D, 526 A, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 83-84, and *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an intermediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there is no evidence in Plato's own writings.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* on 531 E, p. 195, note f.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 511 D, p. 116, note a.

<sup>d</sup> This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the *ικανόν* must always be the idea of good. What follows distinguishes the dialectician from the eristic sophist. For the

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parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss,<sup>a</sup> Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding."

"Well," he said, "I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow."

"And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account<sup>b</sup> of the essence of each thing?

And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence<sup>c</sup> about the matter?"

"How could I say that he does?" he replied.

"And is not this true of the good likewise<sup>d</sup>—that the man who

is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish

and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle,

running the gauntlet<sup>e</sup> of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by

opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping<sup>f</sup> in his reasoning—the man who lacks this

power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends

short cut, *kai . . . ὡσαύτως*, cf. 523 E, 580 D, 585 D, 346 A, etc.

<sup>a</sup> It imports little whether the objections are in his own mind or made by others. Thought is a discussion of the soul with itself (cf. *Theaet.* 189 E, *Phileb.* 38 E, *Soph.* 263 E), and when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes continues the argument himself by supplying both question and answer, e.g. *Gorg.* 506 c ff. Cf. further *Phaedrus* 278 c, *Parmen.* 136 D-E, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 17.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 160 D, *Phileb.* 45 A. The practical outcome = *Laws* 966 A-B, *Phaedr.* 278 c, *Soph.* 259 B-C. Cf. Mill, *Diss. and Disc.* iv. p. 283: "There is no knowledge and no assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against confutation."



οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον  
 ὄνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδ' ἐξ-  
 D εγρέσθαι, εἰς Ἄιδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως  
 ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν; Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἧ δ' ὄς, σφόδρα  
 γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τοὺς γε σαυτοῦ  
 παῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ  
 ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν εἰσῆσαι, ὡς ἐγὼμαι,  
 ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμὰς ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ  
 πόλει κυρίου τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν,  
 ἔφη. Νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα  
 τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε  
 καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἰοί τ' ἔσονται;  
 E Νομοθετήσω, ἔφη, μετὰ γε σοῦ. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ  
 σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ  
 διαλεκτικῇ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο  
 τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι,  
 535 ἀλλ' ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων; Ἐμοιγ',  
 ἔφη.

XV. Διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπὸν σοι,  
 τίσι ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον.  
 Δῆλον, ἔφη. Μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν  
 τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἷους ἐξελέξαμεν; Πῶς γάρ, ἧ δ'  
 ὄς, οὐ; Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκείνας

<sup>a</sup> For εἰδώλου cf. on 532 b, p. 197, note e. This may be one of the sources of *Epist.* vii. 342 b.

<sup>b</sup> For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man is something between sleep and waking. Cf. *Apol.* 31 a. Note the touch of humour in τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν. Cf. Bridges, *Psychology*, p. 382: "There is really no clear-cut distinction between what is usually called sleeping and waking. In sleep we are less awake than in the waking hours, and in waking life we are less asleep than in sleep."

<sup>c</sup> Plato likes to affirm his ideal only of the philosophic rulers.



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any adumbration<sup>a</sup> of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for ever?<sup>b</sup>” “Yes, by Zeus,” said he, “all this I will stoutly affirm.” “But, surely,” said I, “if you should ever nurture in fact your children<sup>c</sup> whom you are now nurturing and educating in word,<sup>d</sup> you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational<sup>e</sup> as the lines so called in geometry.” “Why, no,” he said. “Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer<sup>f</sup> questions in the most scientific manner?” “I will so legislate,” he said, “in conjunction with you.” “Do you agree, then,” said I, “that we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were the coping-stone<sup>g</sup>—and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is now complete<sup>h</sup>?” “I do,” he said.

XV. “The distribution, then, remains,” said I, “to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way.” “Clearly,” he said. “Do you remember, then, the kind of man we chose in our former selection<sup>i</sup> of rulers?” “Of course,” he said. “In most respects, then,” said I, “you must suppose that we

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 376 D, 369 C, 472 E, *Critias* 106 A.

<sup>b</sup> A slight touch of humour. Cf. the schoolgirl who said, “These equations are inconsiderate and will not be solved.”

<sup>f</sup> A frequent periphrasis for dialectics. Cf. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, *Gorg.* 461 E, *Charm.* 166 D, *Prot.* 338 D, *Alc. I.* 106 B.

<sup>g</sup> For ὡσπερ θριγκός cf. *Eur. Herc. Fur.* 1280, *Aesch. Ag.* 1283; and *Phileb.* 58 C-D ff.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 541 B.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. 412 D-E, 485-487, 503 A, C-E.

τὰς φύσεις οἷου δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι· τοὺς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους προαιρετέον, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους· πρὸς δὲ B τούτοις ζητητέον μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἦθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅ τῆδε τῆ παιδεία τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἐκτέον αὐτοῖς. Ποῖα δὲ διαστέλλει; Δριμύτητα, ὦ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μανθάνειν· πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσι ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· οἰκειότερος γὰρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος ἀλλ' οὐ κοινὸς ὢν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Καὶ C μνήμονα δὲ καὶ ἀρρατον καὶ πάντη φιλόπονον ζητητέον. ἢ τινι τρόπῳ οἶε τά τε τοῦ σώματος ἐθελήσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν καὶ τοσαύτην μάθησίν τε καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν; Οὐδένα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν μὴ παντάπασί γ' ἦ εὐφυῆς. Τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἀμάρτημα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφία διὰ ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, ὅτι οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἄπονται· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἄπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους. Πῶς; ἔφη. Πρῶτον D μὲν, εἶπον, φιλοπονία οὐ χῶλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀψόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεια φιλόπονον, τὰ δ' ἡμίσεια ἄπονον· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστῆς μὲν καὶ φιλόθηρος ἦ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος φιλοπονῆ, φιλομαθῆς δὲ μὴ, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ

<sup>a</sup> Intellectually as well as physically. Cf. 357 A, *Prot.* 350 B f.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 209 B-C, *Phaedr.* 252 E and Vol. I. p. 261 on 402 D. Ascham, *The Schoolmaster*, Bk. I. also approves of this qualification.

<sup>c</sup> For βλοσυροῦς cf. *Theaet.* 149 A.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 504 A, 374 E, *Gorg.* 480 C, *Protag.* 326 C, *Euthyphro* 15 C.

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have to choose those same natures. The most stable, the most brave and enterprising <sup>a</sup> are to be preferred, and, so far as practicable, the most comely.<sup>b</sup> But in addition we must now require that they not only be virile and vigorous <sup>c</sup> in temper, but that they possess also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of education." "What qualities are you distinguishing?" "They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more likely to flinch and faint <sup>d</sup> in severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and not shared with the body." "True," he said. "And we must demand a good memory and doggedness and industry <sup>e</sup> in every sense of the word. Otherwise how do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline?" "No one could," he said, "unless most happily endowed." "Our present mistake," said I, "and the disesteem that has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I said before,<sup>f</sup> caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers. They should not have been bastards<sup>g</sup> but true scions." "What do you mean?" he said. "In the first place," I said, "the aspirant to philosophy must not limp <sup>h</sup> in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labours of the body, yet is not fond of learning or

<sup>e</sup> The qualities of the ideal student again. Cf. on 487 A.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *supra* 495 c ff., pp. 49-51.

<sup>g</sup> Montaigne, i. 24 (vol. i. p. 73), "les âmes boiteuses, les bastardes et vulgaires, sont indignes de la philosophie."

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *Laws* 634 A, *Tim.* 44 c.

ζητητικός, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονῆ· χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τᾶναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκὸς τὴν φιλοπονίαν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ὅν τοῦτο ἀνά-  
 E πηρον ψυχὴν θήσομεν, ἢ ἂν τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον ψεῦδος μισῆ καὶ χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτὴ τε καὶ ἐτέρων ψευδομένων ὑπεραγανακτῆ, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον εὐκόλως προσδέχεται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά που ἀλισκομένη μὴ ἀγανακτῆ, ἀλλ' εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν  
 536 ἀμαθία μολύνηται; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη οὐχ ἡκιστα δεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον, ὅταν γάρ τις μὴ ἐπίσθηται τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις, λανθάνουσι χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόθοις χρώμενοι, πρὸς ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃσι τούτων, οἱ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ ἄρχουσι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει. Ἡμῖν δὲ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 B διευλαβητέον, ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀρτιμελεῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίφρονας ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ μᾶθησιν καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀσκησιν κομίσαντες παιδεύωμεν, ἢ τε δίκη ἡμῖν οὐ μέμψεται αὐτῇ, τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν σώσομεν, ἀλλοίους δὲ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα τᾶναντία

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 548 E, *Lysis* 206 c, *Euthyd.* 274 c, 304 c, and Vol. I. p. 515, on 475 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 382 A-B-C.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 819 D, *Rep.* 372 D, *Politicus* 266 c, and my note in *Class. Phil.* xii. (1917) pp. 308-310. Cf. too the proverbial ὅς γνοίη, *Laches* 196 D and *Rivals* 134 A; and Apelt's emendation of *Cratyl.* 393 c, *Progr. Jena*, 1905, p. 19.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 487 A and Vol. I. p. 261, note c on 402 c. The cardinal virtues are not rigidly fixed in Plato. Cf. on 427 E, Vol. I. p. 346.

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of listening<sup>a</sup> or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way." "Most true," he said. "Likewise in respect of truth," I said, "we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood<sup>b</sup> and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig.<sup>c</sup>" "By all means," he said. "And with reference to sobriety," said I, "and bravery and loftiness of soul<sup>d</sup> and all the parts of virtue,<sup>e</sup> we must especially be on our guard to distinguish the base-born from the true-born. For when the knowledge necessary to make such discriminations is lacking in individual or state, they unawares employ at random<sup>f</sup> for any of these purposes the crippled and base-born natures, as their friends or rulers." "It is so indeed," he said. "But we," I said, "must be on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so severe a training, justice herself will have no fault to find<sup>g</sup> with us, and we shall preserve the state and our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort,

<sup>a</sup> Plato is using ordinary language and not troubling himself with the problem of *Protag.* 329 D (*What Plato Said*, p. 497) and *Laws* 633 A (*What Plato Said*, p. 624). Cf. also on 533 D.

<sup>f</sup> πρὸς ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι: lit. "for whatsoever they happen to of these (services)." Cf. *Symp.* 181 B, *Prot.* 353 A, *Crito* 44 D and 45 D, *Gorg.* 522 c, *Laws* 656 c, *Rep.* 332 B, 561 D, *Dem.* iv. 46, *Isoc. Panath.* 25, 74, 239, *Aristot. Met.* 1013 a 6.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *supra* 487 A. For *δίκη* cf. *Hirzel, Dike, Themis und Verwandtes*, p. 116.



πάντα καὶ πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν. Αἰσχρὸν μὲντ' ἂν εἶη, ἢ δ' ὄς. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, εἶπον· γελοῖον δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἔοικα παθεῖν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

- C Ἐπελαθόμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον. λέγων γὰρ ἅμα ἔβλεψα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἰδὼν προπεπηλακισμένην ἀναξίως ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὡσπερ θυμωθεὶς τοῖς αἰτίοις σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἢ εἶπον. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ οὖν ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῆ. Ἄλλ' ὡς ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. τόδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλανθανώμεθα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ προτέρα ἐκλογῇ πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν, ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσει· Σόλωνι
- D γὰρ οὐ πειστέον, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἦττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

XVI. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἦν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρῆ προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς διδαχῆς ποιουμένους. Τί δή; Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

E οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρῆ

<sup>a</sup> καταντλήσομεν: cf. 314 D.

<sup>b</sup> Jest and earnest are never far apart in Plato. Fabling about justice is an old man's game, *Laws* 685 A, 769 A. Life itself is best treated as play, *Laws* 803 c. Science in *Tim.* 59 D is παιδιά, like literature in the *Phaedrus* 276 D-E, *ibid.* 278 B. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. pp. 38 and 160, and *What Plato Said*, pp. 553 and 601.

<sup>c</sup> For similar self-checks cf. *Laws* 804 B, 832 B, 907 B-C, *Phaedr.* 260 D, 269 B. For ἐντεινάμενος cf. Blaydes on *Aristoph. Clouds* 969.



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the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall pour a still greater flood<sup>a</sup> of ridicule upon philosophy."

"That would indeed be shameful," he said. "Most certainly," said I; "but here again I am making myself a little ridiculous." "In what way?" "I forgot," said I, "that we were jesting,<sup>b</sup> and I spoke with too great intensity.<sup>c</sup> For, while speaking, I turned my eyes upon philosophy,<sup>d</sup> and when I saw how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are in fault." "No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me<sup>e</sup> as a hearer." "But too much so for me as a speaker," I said. "But this we must not forget, that in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not do. For we must not take Solon's<sup>f</sup> word for it that growing old a man is able to learn many things. He is less able to do that than to run a race. To the young<sup>g</sup> belong all heavy and frequent labours." "Necessarily," he said.

XVI. "Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction.<sup>h</sup>" "Why so?" "Because," said I, "a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly; for

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Isoc. *Busiris* 49. Whatever the difficulties of the chronology it is hard to believe that this is not one of Isocrates' many endeavours to imitate Platonic effects.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Soph.* 226 c, Sophocles, *Ajax* 397.

<sup>c</sup> γηράσκω δ' αὖτις πολλά διδασκόμενος, "I grow old ever learning many things." Cf. *Laches* 188 A-B; Otto, p. 317.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 146 B. This has been misquoted to the effect that Plato said the young are the best philosophers.

<sup>e</sup> This and *παίζοντας* below (537 A) anticipate much modern kindergarten rhetoric.

μανθάνειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βία  
 πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται,  
 ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα. Ἀληθῆ,  
 ἔφη. Μὴ τοίνυν βία, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας  
 537 ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ  
 μᾶλλον οἴός τ' ἦς καθορᾶν ἐφ' ὃ ἕκαστος πέφυκεν.  
 Ἔχει ὃ λέγεις, ἔφη, λόγον. Οὐκοῦν μνημονεύεις,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔφαμεν τοὺς  
 παῖδας εἶναι ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων θεωρούς, καὶ  
 ἐάν που ἀσφαλὲς ἦ, προσακτέον ἐγγὺς καὶ γευ-  
 στέον αἵματος, ὥσπερ τοὺς σκύλακας; Μέμνημαι,  
 ἔφη. Ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς τε  
 πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις, ὃς ἂν ἐντρεχέ-  
 στατος αἰεὶ φαίνεται, εἰς ἀριθμὸν τινα ἐγκριτέον.  
 B Ἐν τίνι, ἔφη, ἡλικίᾳ; Ἠνίκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν  
 ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μεθίενται. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ  
 χρόνος, ἐάν τε δύο ἐάν τε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται,  
 ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πράξει. κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι  
 μαθήμασι πολέμιοι· καὶ ἅμα μία καὶ αὕτη τῶν  
 βασιάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη, τίς ἕκαστος ἐν τοῖς γυμ-  
 νασίοις φανείται. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. Μετὰ  
 δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσι-

<sup>a</sup> Newman, *Introd. Aristot. Pol.* 358, says Aristotle rejects this distinction, *Pol.* 1338 b 40 μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφήν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἦ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 424 E-425 A, *Laws* 819 B-C, 643 B-D, 797 A-B, *Polit.* 308 D.

Cf. the naïve statement in Colvin and Bagley, *Human*

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while bodily labours<sup>a</sup> performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind." "True," he said. "Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play.<sup>b</sup> That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each." "There is reason in that," he said. "And do you not remember," I said, "that we also declared<sup>c</sup> that we must conduct the children to war on horseback to be spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do with whelps?" "I do remember." "And those who as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled on a list.<sup>d</sup>" "At what age?" he said. "When they are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For that period, whether it be two or three years, incapacitates them for other occupations.<sup>e</sup> For great fatigue and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be their behaviour in their physical exercises.<sup>f</sup>" "Surely it is," he said. "After this period," I said, "those who are given preference from the twenty-year class

*Behaviour*, p. 41: "The discovery [*sic!*] by Karl Groos that play was actually a preparation for the business of later life was almost revolutionary from the standpoint of educational theory and practice."

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 467, Vol. I. pp. 485-487.

<sup>d</sup> ἐγκριτέον: cf. 413 D, 377 C, 486 D, *Laws* 802 B, 820 D, 936 A, 952 A.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1339 a 7 f. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, etc.; *Plut. De Ed. Puer.* 11, *De Tuenda San.* c. 25, quoted by Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. p. 359, are irrelevant to this passage, but could be referred to the balancing of music and gymnastics in 410-412.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Laws* 829 B-C.

- C ετῶν οἱ προκριθέντες τιμὰς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλλων οἷσονται, τά τε χύδην μαθήματα παισὶν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητος ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως. Μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη μάθησις βέβαιος ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται. Καὶ μεγίστη γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πείρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μὴ ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὐ.
- D Ξυνοίομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει σε ἐπισκοποῦντα, οἱ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὧσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μόνιμοι δ' ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν, ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μείζους τε τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν, τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει βασανίζοντα, τίς ὁμμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν μετ' ἀληθείας ἰέναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς

<sup>a</sup> σύνοψιν: cf. 531 D. This thought is endlessly repeated by modern writers on education. Cf. Mill, *Diss. and Disc.* iv. 336; Bagley, *The Educative Process*, p. 180: "The theory of concentration proposed by Ziller . . . seeks to organize all the subject matter of instruction into a unified system, the various units of which shall be consciously related to one another in the minds of the pupils"; Haldane, *The Philosophy of Humanism*, p. 94: "There was a conference attended by representatives of various German Universities . . . which took place at Hanstein, not far from Göttingen in May 1921. . . . The purpose of the movement is nominally the establishment of a Humanistic Faculty. But in this connexion 'faculty' does not mean a separate faculty of humanistic studies. . . . The real object is to bring these subjects into organic relation to one another."

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will receive greater honours than the others, and they will be required to gather the studies which they disconnectedly pursued as children in their former education into a comprehensive survey<sup>a</sup> of their affinities with one another and with the nature of things." "That, at any rate," he said, "is the only instruction that abides with those who receive it." "And it is also," said I, "the chief test of the dialectical nature and its opposite. For he who can view things in their connexion is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not." "I concur," he said. "With these qualities in mind," I said, "it will be your task to make a selection of those who manifest them best from the group who are steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth year to promote them, by a second selection from those preferred in the first,<sup>b</sup> to still greater honours, and to prove and test them by the power of dialectic<sup>c</sup> to see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and other senses<sup>d</sup> and go on to being itself in company with truth. And at this point, my friend, the greatest

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, vol. i. p. 4 "So true is it that, as Plato puts it, the metaphysician is a 'synoptical' man." Cf. also Aristot. *Soph. Él.* 167 a 38 διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. Stenzel, *Dialektik*, p. 8, misuses the passage to support the view that Plato's dialectic still looks for unity and not for divisions and distinctions, as in the *Sophist*. Cf. also *ibid.* p. 72.

<sup>b</sup> For the technical meaning of the word προκρίτων cf. *Laws* 753 B-D.

<sup>c</sup> For this periphrasis cf. *Phaedr.* 246 D, *Tim.* 85 E. Cf. also on 509 A.

<sup>d</sup> The reader of Plato ought not to misunderstand this now. Cf. *supra* on 532 A, pp. 196 f., note d, and 530 B, p. 187, note c.



ἔργον, ὦ ἑταῖρε. Τί μάλιστα; ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκ ἐν-  
 Ε νοεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακὸν  
 γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται; Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Παρα-  
 νομίας που, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐμπίπλυνται. Καὶ μάλα,  
 ἔφη. Θαυμαστὸν οὖν τι οἶε, εἶπον, πάσχειν αὐ-  
 τοὺς, καὶ οὐ ξυγγιγνώσκεις; Πῆ μάλιστα; ἔφη.  
 Οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ τις ὑποβολιμαῖος τραφεῖη ἐν  
 538 καὶ κόλαξι πολλοῖς, ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος αἰσθοίτο,  
 ὅτι οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων, τοὺς  
 δὲ τῷ ὄντι γεννήσαντας μὴ εὖροι, τοῦτον ἔχεις  
 μαντεύσασθαι, πῶς ἂν διατεθείη πρὸς τε τοὺς κό-  
 λακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποβαλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε  
 τῷ χρόνῳ, ᾧ οὐκ ἦδει τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑποβολῆς, καὶ  
 ἐν ᾧ αὐτὸς ἦδει; ἦ βούλει ἐμοῦ μαντευομένου ἀκοῦσαι;  
 Βούλομαι, ἔφη.

XVII. Μαντεύομαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν  
 Β τιμᾶν ἂν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοὺς  
 ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας ἢ τοὺς κολακεύοντας,  
 καὶ ἦττον μὲν ἂν περιδεῖν ἐνδεεῖς τινός, ἦττον δὲ

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<sup>a</sup> Plato returns to an idea suggested in 498 A, and warns against the mental confusion and moral unsettlement that result from premature criticism of life by undisciplined minds. In the terminology of modern education, he would not encourage students to discuss the validity of the Ten Commandments and the Constitution of the United States before they could spell, construe, cipher, and had learned to distinguish an undistributed middle term from a *petitio principii*. Cf. *Phaedo* 89 D-E.

We need not suppose with Grote and others that this involves any "reaction" or violent change of the opinion he held when he wrote the minor dialogues that portray such discussions. In fact, the still later *Sophist*, 230 B-C-D, is more friendly to youthful dialectics.

Whatever the effect of the practice of Socrates or the



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care<sup>a</sup> is requisite." "How so?" he said. "Do you not note," said I, "how great is the harm caused by our present treatment of dialectics?" "What is that?" he said. "Its practitioners are infected with lawlessness.<sup>b</sup>" "They are indeed." "Do you suppose," I said, "that there is anything surprising in this state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable<sup>c</sup>?" "In what way, pray?" he said. "Their case," said I, "resembles that of a supposititious son reared in abundant wealth and a great and numerous family amid many flatterers, who on arriving at manhood should become aware that he is not the child of those who call themselves his parents, and should not be able to find his true father and mother. Can you divine what would be his feelings towards the flatterers and his supposed parents in the time when he did not know the truth about his adoption, and, again, when he knew it? Or would you like to hear my surmise?" "I would."

XVII. "Well, then, my surmise is," I said, "that he would be more likely to honour his reputed father and mother and other kin than the flatterers, and that there would be less likelihood of his allowing them to lack for anything, and that he would be less

Sophists, Plato himself anticipates Grote's criticism in the *Republic* by representing Socrates as discoursing with ingenuous youth in a more simple and edifying style. Cf. *Lysis* 207 D ff., *Euthydem.* 278 E-282 C, 288 D-290 D. Yet again the *Charmides* might be thought an exception.

Cf. also Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen*, ii. 1, p. 912, who seems to consider the *Sophist* earlier than the *Republic*.

<sup>b</sup> i.e. they call all restrictions on impulses and instincts tyrannical conventions. Cf. *Gorg.* 483-484, Aristoph. *Clouds*, *passim*, and on nature and law cf. Vol. I. p. 116, note a, on 359 c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 494 A, p. 43, note c.

παράνομόν τι δράσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν εἰς αὐτούς, ἦττον δὲ ἀπειθεῖν τὰ μεγάλα ἐκείνοις ἢ τοῖς κόλαξιν, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἰδείη. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Αἰσθόμενον τοίνυν τὸ ὄν μαντεύομαι αὐτὸν περὶ μὲν τούτους ἀνεῖναι ἂν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάξιν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς κόλακας ἐπιτείνειν, καὶ πείθεσθαι τε αὐτοῖς

C διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον καὶ ζῆν ἂν ἤδη κατ' ἐκείνους, ξυνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακαλύπτως, πατρὸς δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων, εἰ μὴ πάνυ εἴη φύσει ἐπιεικής, μέλειν τὸ μηδέν.

Πάντ', ἔφη, λέγεις οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ πῆ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὕτη φέρει ἢ εἰκῶν; Τῆδε. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ παίδων περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα ὡσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι, πειθαρχοῦντές τε καὶ τιμῶντες

D αὐτά. Ἔστι γάρ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντία τούτων ἐπιτηδεύματα ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἔλκει ἐφ' αὐτά, πείθει δ' οὐ τοὺς καὶ ὀπησοῦν μετρίους· ἀλλ' ἐκείνα τιμῶσι τὰ πάτρια καὶ ἐκείνοις πειθαρχοῦσιν. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

<sup>a</sup> διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον: cf. *Phaedo* 85 b.

<sup>b</sup> οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο is the phrase Aristotle uses to distinguish the truth of poetry from the facts of history.

<sup>c</sup> That is the meaning. Lit. "those who lay hold on discourse."

<sup>d</sup> Plato's warning applies to our day no less than to his own. Like the proponents of ethical nihilism in Plato's Athens, much of our present-day literature and teaching questions all standards of morality and aesthetics, and confuses justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness. Its gospel is expressed in Mr. Oppenheim's lines:

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inclined to do or say to them anything unlawful, and less liable to disobey them in great matters than to disobey the flatterers—during the time when he did not know the truth.” “It is probable,” he said. “But when he found out the truth, I surmise that he would grow more remiss in honour and devotion to them and pay more regard to the flatterers, whom he would heed more than before<sup>a</sup> and would henceforth live by their rule, associating with them openly, while for that former father and his adoptive kin he would not care at all, unless he was naturally of a very good disposition.” “All that you say,” he replied, “would be likely to happen.<sup>b</sup> But what is the pertinency of this comparison to the novices of dialectic<sup>c</sup>?” “It is this. We have, I take it, certain convictions<sup>d</sup> from childhood about the just and the honourable, in which, in obedience and honour to them, we have been bred as children under their parents.” “Yes, we have.” “And are there not other practices going counter to these, that have pleasures attached to them and that flatter and solicit our souls, but do not win over men of any decency; but they continue to hold in honour the teachings of their fathers and obey them?” “It is

Let nothing bind you.  
If it is duty, away with it.  
If it is law, disobey it.  
If it is opinion, go against it.  
There is only one divinity, yourself,  
Only one god, you.

For the unsettling effects of dialectic *cf.* *Phaedo* 90 B; also Chesterton, *George Bernard Shaw*, p. 249: “There may have been ages so sluggish . . . that anything that woke them up at all was a good thing. . . . No one . . . does any good to our age merely by asking questions unless he can answer the question.” *Cf.* also on 537 D, p. 220, note a.

Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται, τί ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἀποκριναμένου, ὃ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἦκουεν, ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ πολλαχῇ ἐλέγχων εἰς δόξαν Ε καταβάλλῃ, ὡς τοῦτο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροῦν, καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἂ μάλιστα ἦγεν ἐν τιμῇ, μετὰ τοῦτο τί οἶε ποιήσειν αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τιμῆς τε πέρι καὶ πειθαρχίας; ῥ' Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, μήτε τιμᾶν ἔτι ὁμοίως μήτε πείθεσθαι. Ὅταν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε ταῦτα ἠγγῆται τίμια καὶ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ, τά τε 539 ἀληθῆ μὴ εὐρίσκη, ἔστι πρὸς ὁποῖον βίον ἄλλον ἢ τὸν κολακεύοντα εἰκότως προσχωρήσεται; Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη. Παράνομος δὴ, οἶμαι, δόξει γενόμεναι ἐκ νομίμου. ῥ' Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, εἰκὸς τὸ πάθος τῶν οὕτω λόγων ἀπτομένων καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, πολλῆς συγγνώμης ἄξιον; Καὶ ἐλέου γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὴ γίννηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι, εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν λόγων ἀπτέον; Καὶ μάλ', ἦ δ' ὅς. ῥ' Ἀρ' οὖν Β οὐ μία μὲν εὐλάβεια αὕτη συχνή, τὸ μὴ νέους

<sup>a</sup> The question is here personified, as the λόγος so often is, e.g. 503 A. Cf. *What Plato Said on Protag.* 361 A-B.

<sup>b</sup> A possible allusion to the καταβάλλοντες λόγοι of the sophists. Cf. *Euthydem.* 277 D, 288 A, *Phaedo* 88 C, *Phileb.* 15 E and *What Plato Said*, p. 518, on *Crito* 272 B.

<sup>c</sup> This is the moral counterpart of the intellectual scepti-

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so." "Well, then," said I, "when a man of this kind is met by the question,<sup>a</sup> 'What is the honourable?' and on his giving the answer which he learned from the lawgiver, the argument confutes him, and by many and various refutations upsets<sup>b</sup> his faith and makes him believe that this thing is no more honourable than it is base,<sup>c</sup> and when he has had the same experience about the just and the good and everything that he chiefly held in esteem, how do you suppose that he will conduct himself thereafter in the matter of respect and obedience to this traditional morality?" "It is inevitable," he said, "that he will not continue to honour and obey as before." "And then," said I, "when he ceases to honour these principles and to think that they are binding on him,<sup>d</sup> and cannot discover the true principles, will he be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which flatters his desires<sup>e</sup>?" "He will not," he said. "He will, then, seem to have become a rebel to law and convention instead of the conformer that he was." "Necessarily." "And is not this experience of those who take up dialectics in this fashion to be expected and, as I just now said, deserving of much leniency?" "Yes, and of pity too," he said. "Then that we may not have to pity thus your thirty-year-old disciples, must you not take every precaution when you introduce them to the study of dialectics?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "And is it not one chief safeguard not to suffer them to taste

cism or *μισολογία* of *Phaedo* 90 c-d. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 531, on *Phaedo* 89 d.

<sup>a</sup> For *οικεία* cf. *supra* 433 E, 443 D, and *Class. Phil.* xxiv. (1929) pp. 409-410.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laws* 633 E and *supra* 442 A-B. Others render it, "than the life of the flatterers (parasites)." Why not both?



ὄντας αὐτῶν γεύεσθαι; <sup>Χ</sup>οῖμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθῆναι ὅτι οἱ μαιρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύονται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, αἰεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἔλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον αἰεὶ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν <sup>ἐφη</sup> ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέγξωσιν, ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐλεγχθῶσι, σφόδρα καὶ ταχὺ ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἠγεῖσθαι ὥνπερ πρότερον· καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὄλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ὁ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης μανίας οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι μετέχειν, τὸν δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἐθέλοντα καὶ σκοπεῖν τᾶληθῆς μᾶλλον μιμήσεται ἢ τὸν παιδιᾶς χάριν παίζοντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα, καὶ αὐτός τε μετριώτερος ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τιμιώτερον ἀντὶ ἀτιμοτέρου ποιήσει. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα τούτου ἐπ' εὐλαβείᾳ πάντα προεῖρηται, τὸ τὰς φύσεις κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ στασίμους οἷς τις μεταδώσει

<sup>a</sup> See on 498 A-B. Cf. Richard of Bury, *Philobiblon* (Morley, *A Miscellany*, pp. 49-50): "But the contemporaries of our age negligently apply a few years of ardent youth, burning by turns with the fire of vice; and when they have attained the acumen of discerning a doubtful truth, they immediately become involved in extraneous business, retire, and say farewell to the schools of philosophy; they sip the frothy must of juvenile wit over the difficulties of philosophy, and pour out the purified old wine with economical care."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Apol.* 23 c, *Phileb.* 15 E, *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 46, *Isoc.* xii. 26 and x. 6; also Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. p. 568.

<sup>c</sup> But in another mood or from another angle this is the bacchic madness of philosophy which all the company in the



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of it while young? <sup>a</sup> For I fancy you have not failed to observe that lads, when they first get a taste of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, and, imitating confuters, they themselves confute others. <sup>b</sup> They delight like puppies in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them." "Exceedingly so," he said. "And when they have themselves confuted many and been confuted by many, they quickly fall into a violent distrust of all that they formerly held true; and the outcome is that they themselves and the whole business of philosophy are discredited with other men." "Most true," he said. "But an older man will not share this craze, <sup>c</sup>" said I, "but will rather choose to imitate the one who consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who makes a jest <sup>d</sup> and a sport of mere contradiction, and so he will himself be more reasonable and moderate, and bring credit rather than discredit upon his pursuit." "Right," he said. "And were not all our preceding statements made with a view to this precaution—our requirement that those permitted to take part in such discussions must have orderly and stable natures,

*Symposium* have shared, 218 A-B. Cf. also *Phaedr.* 245 B-C, 249 C-E, *Sophist* 216 D, *Phileb.* 15 D-E, and *What Plato Said*, p. 493, on *Protag.* 317 D-E.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 500 B-C. Yet the prevailing seriousness of Plato's own thought does not exclude touches of humour and irony, and he vainly warns the modern reader to distinguish between jest and earnest in the drama of disputation in his dialogues. Many misinterpretations of Plato's thought are due to the failure to heed this warning. Cf. e.g. *Gorgias* 474 A (*What Plato Said*, p. 504), which Robin, *L'Année Philos.* xxi. p. 29, and others miss, *Rep.* 376 B, *Symp.* 196 C, *Protag.* 339 f., *Theaet.* 157 A-B, 160 B, 165 B, and *passim*. Cf. also on 536 c, p. 214, note b.

τῶν λόγων, καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχῶν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

XVIII. Ἄρκεϊ δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλήψει μείναι ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως, μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, ἀλλ' ἀντιστρόφως γυμναζομένω τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα  
 Ε γυμνασίους, ἔτη διπλάσια ἢ τότε; Ἐξ, ἔφη, ἢ τέτταρα λέγεις; Ἄμέλει, εἶπον, πέντε θές. μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονται σοι εἰς τὸ σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα μὴδ' ἐμπειρία ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐν τούτοις βασανιστέοι, εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν ἐλκόμενοι  
 540 πανταχόσε ἢ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσιν. Χρόνον δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πόσον τοῦτον τίθης; Πεντεκαίδεκα ἔτη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντουτῶν τοὺς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα πάντη ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον, καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον,

<sup>a</sup> For the idiom *μὴ ὡς νῦν* etc. cf. *supra* on 410 B οὐχ ὥσπερ; also 610 D, *Gorg.* 522 A, *Symp.* 179 E, 189 C, *Epist.* vii. 333 A, Aristoph. *Knights* 784, Eurip. *Bacchae* 929, *Il.* xix. 403, *Od.* xxiv. 199, xxi. 427, Dem. iv. 34, Aristot. *De an.* 414 a 22.

<sup>b</sup> It is very naïve of modern commentators to cavil at the precise time allotted to dialectic, and still more so to infer that there was not much to say about the ideas. Dialectic was not exclusively or mainly concerned with the metaphysics of the ideas. It was the development of the reasoning powers by rational discussion.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 519 c ff., pp. 139-145.

<sup>d</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 2. 13 seems to copy this. Cf. on 484 D.

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instead of the present practice <sup>a</sup> of admitting to it any chance and unsuitable applicant?" "By all means," he said.

XVIII. "Is it enough, then, to devote to the continuous and strenuous study of dialectics undisturbed by anything else, as in the corresponding discipline in bodily exercises, twice as many years as were allotted to that?" "Do you mean six or four?" he said. "Well," I said, "set it down as five.<sup>b</sup> For after that you will have to send them down into the cave <sup>c</sup> again, and compel them to hold commands in war and the other offices suitable to youth, so that they may not fall short of the other type in experience <sup>d</sup> either. And in these offices, too, they are to be tested to see whether they will remain steadfast under diverse solicitations or whether they will flinch and swerve.<sup>e</sup>" "How much time do you allow for that?" he said. "Fifteen years," said I, "and at the age of fifty<sup>f</sup> those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upwards the vision of their souls <sup>g</sup> and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld

Critics of Plato frequently overlook the fact that he insisted on practical experience in the training of his rulers. Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. p. 5, points out that this experience takes the place of special training in political science.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *ὑποκινήσαντ*, *Aristoph. Frogs* 643.

<sup>f</sup> An eminent scholar quaintly infers that Plato could not have written this page before he himself was fifty years old.

<sup>g</sup> Plato having made his practical meaning quite clear feels that he can safely permit himself the short cut of rhetoric and symbolism in summing it up. He reckoned without Neoplatonists ancient and modern. Cf. also on 519 B, p. 138, note a.

- καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρω-  
 μένους ἐκείνω, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς  
 B κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἐκάστους, τὸ  
 μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ  
 τὸ μέρος ἦκη, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας  
 καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς  
 καλὸν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, καὶ  
 οὕτως ἄλλους αἰεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοιοῦτους, ἀντι-  
 καταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς μακάρων  
 νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν· μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ  
 C θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία  
 ξυναναιρῆ, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὡς εὐδαίμοσι τε  
 καὶ θείοις. Παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧ  
 Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιῶς ἀπείργασαι. Καὶ  
 τὰς ἀρχούσας γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ Γλαύκων· μηδὲν  
 γάρ τι οἶον με περὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἢ  
 εἶρηκα ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἱκαναὶ τὰς  
 φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, εἶπερ ἴσα γε  
 πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωθήσουσιν, ὡς διήλθομεν.  
 D Τί οὖν; ἔφην· ξυγχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ  
 πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι,  
 ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δέ πη, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 500 D-E. For παράδειγμα cf. 592 B and *What Plato Said*, p. 458, on *Euthyphro* 6 E, and p. 599, on *Polit.* 277 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 520 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 347 C-D, 520 E.

<sup>d</sup> Plato's guardians, unlike Athenian statesmen, could train their successors. Cf. *Protag.* 319 E-320 B, *Meno* 99 B. Also ἄλλους ποιεῖν *Meno* 100 A, *Gorg.* 449 B, 455 C, *Euthyph.* 3 C, *Phaedr.* 266 C, 268 B, *Symp.* 196 E, *Protag.* 348 E, *Isoc. Demon.* 3, *Panath.* 28, *Soph.* 13, *Antid.* 204, *Xen. Oecon.* 15. 10, and παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, generally used of the sophists, *Gorg.* 519 E, *Protag.* 317 B, *Euthyd.* 306 E, *Laches* 186 D, *Rep.* 600 C

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the good itself they shall use it as a pattern<sup>a</sup> for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn,<sup>b</sup> devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of the state and holding office for the city's sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity<sup>c</sup>; and so, when each generation has educated others<sup>d</sup> like themselves to take their place as guardians of the state, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blest<sup>e</sup> and there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials<sup>f</sup> and sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle approves<sup>g</sup> or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.<sup>h</sup>”

“A most beautiful finish, Socrates, you have put upon your rulers, as if you were a statuary.<sup>i</sup>” “And on the women<sup>j</sup> too, Glaucon,” said I; “for you must not suppose that my words apply to the men more than to all women who arise among them endowed with the requisite qualities.” “That is right,” he said, “if they are to share equally in all things with the men as we laid it down.” “Well, then,” said I, “do you admit that our notion of the state and its polity is not altogether a day-dream,<sup>k</sup> but that though it is difficult,<sup>l</sup> it is in a way possible<sup>m</sup> and in no other way

<sup>a</sup> Cf. p. 139, note *d*. Plato checks himself in mid-flight and wistfully smiles at his own idealism. Cf. on 536 B-C, also 540 c and 509 c. Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon*, p. 170.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 209 E.

<sup>g</sup> For this caution cf. 461 E and Vol. I. p. 344, note *c*, on 427 c.

<sup>h</sup> Plato plays on the words *δαίμων* and *εὐδαίμων*. Cf. also *Crat.* 398 B-C. <sup>i</sup> Cf. 361 D. <sup>j</sup> Lit. “female rulers.”

<sup>k</sup> Cf. on 450 D and 499 c.

<sup>l</sup> Cf. 499 D.

<sup>m</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 564 on *Rep.* 472 B-E, and *supra* p. 65, note *h*, on 499 D.



εἴρηται, ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἠγησάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου

E ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμᾶς, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὔξοντες αὐτὸ διασκευωρήσωσιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅσοι μὲν ἄν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν

541 ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν νῦν ἡθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γονῆς ἔχουσι, θρέψωνται ἐν τοῖς σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οὔσιν οἷοις διεληλύθαμεν τότε· καὶ οὕτω τάχιστα τε καὶ ῥᾶστα πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν ἐλέγομεν, κατασταῶσαν αὐτὴν τε εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐν ᾧ ἄν

B ἐγγένηται πλεῖστα ὀνήσειν; Πολύ γ', ἔφη· καὶ ὡς ἄν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ εἰρηκέαι. Οὐκοῦν ἄδην ἤδη, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι περὶ τε τῆς πόλεως ταύτης καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ταύτῃ ἀνδρός; δῆλος γάρ που καὶ οὗτος, οἷον φήσομεν δεῖν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Δῆλος, ἔφη· καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾶς, δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 473 c-d, 499 b-c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 521 b, 516 c-d.

<sup>c</sup> τὸ ὀρθόν: cf. *Theaet.* 171 c, *Meno* 99 a.

<sup>d</sup> This is another of the passages in which Plato seems to lend support to revolutionaries. Cf. *supra* p. 71, note g. It is what the soviets are said to be doing. Lowell points out that it is what actually happened in the New England of 1630-1660.

Cf. *Laws* 752 c, where it is said that the children would accept the new laws if the parents would not. Cf. *supra*



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than that described—when genuine philosophers,<sup>a</sup> many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn<sup>b</sup> the present honours, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, but prize the right<sup>c</sup> and the honours that come from that above all things, and regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing, in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and administer their city?" "In what way?" he said. "All inhabitants above the age of ten," I said, "they will send out into the fields, and they will take over the children,<sup>d</sup> remove them from the manners and habits of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws which will be such as we have described. This is the speediest and easiest way in which such a city and constitution as we have portrayed could be established and prosper and bring most benefit to the people among whom it arises." "Much the easiest," he said, "and I think you have well explained the manner of its realization if it should ever be realized." "Then," said I, "have we not now said enough<sup>e</sup> about this state and the corresponding type of man—for it is evident what our conception of him will be?" "It is evident," he said, "and, to answer your question, I think we have finished."

415 D, and also *What Plato Said*, p. 625, on *Laws* 644 A and p. 638, on 813 D.

There is some confusion in this passage between the inauguration and the normal conduct of the ideal state, and Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 439 calls the idea "ein hingeworfener Einfall." But Plato always held that the reformer must have or make a clean slate. Cf. 501 A, *Laws* 735 E. And he constantly emphasizes the supreme importance of education; *Rep.* 377 A-B, 423 E, 416 C, *Laws* 641 B, 644 A-B, 752 C, 765 E-766 A, 788 C, 804 D.

For παραλαβόντες cf. *Phaedo* 82 E παραλαβοῦσα.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 535 A.

## H

- 543 I. Εἶεν ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὠμολόγηται, ὦ Γλαύκων, τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν γυναῖκας, κοινούς δὲ παῖδας εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν παιδείαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα κοινὰ ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ εἰρήνῃ, βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γεγονότας ἀρίστους. Ὁμολόγηται, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν καὶ B τὰδε ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, ὡς, ὅταν δὴ καταστῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἄγοντες τοὺς στρατιώτας κατοικιοῦσιν εἰς οἰκῆσεις οἷας προείπομεν, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐχούσας, κοινὰς δὲ πᾶσι· πρὸς δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις οἰκῆσεσι καὶ τὰς κτήσεσι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, διωμολογησάμεθά που οἶαι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς. Ἄλλὰ μνημονεύω, ἔφη, ὅτι γε οὐδὲν οὐδένα ὠόμεθα δεῖν κεκτῆσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀθλητάς τε C πολέμου καὶ φύλακας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς δεχομένους εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν τὴν εἰς ταῦτα τροφήν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτῶν τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως

<sup>a</sup> Strictly speaking, this applies only to the guardians, but *cf. Laws* 739 c ff. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1261 a 6 and 1262 a 41, like many subsequent commentators, misses the point.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf. supra* 445 D and *What Plato Said*, p. 539, on *Menex.* 238 c-d.

<sup>c</sup> So Jowett. Adam *ad loc.* insists that the genitive is partitive, "those of their number are to be kings."

## BOOK VIII

I. "Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon, that the state which is to achieve the height of good government must have community<sup>a</sup> of wives and children and all education, and also that the pursuits of men and women must be the same in peace and war, and that the rulers or kings<sup>b</sup> over them<sup>c</sup> are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy." "We are agreed," he said. "And we further granted this, that when the rulers are established in office they shall conduct these soldiers and settle them in habitations<sup>d</sup> such as we described, that have nothing private for anybody but are common for all, and in addition to such habitations we agreed, if you remember, what should be the nature of their possessions.<sup>e</sup>" "Why, yes, I remember," he said, "that we thought it right that none of them should have anything that ordinary men<sup>f</sup> now possess, but that, being as it were athletes<sup>g</sup> of war and guardians, they should receive from the others as pay<sup>h</sup> for their guardianship each year their yearly sustenance, and devote their entire attention to the

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 415 E.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 416 c.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 420 A.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. on 403 E and 521 D. Polyb. i. 6. 6 ἀθληται γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 416 E.

ἐπιμελείσθαι. Ὅρθως, ἔφην, λέγεις. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθῶμεν, πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν. Οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη. σχεδὸν γάρ, καθάπερ νῦν, ὡς διεληλυθὼς περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦ λέγων, ὡς ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷαν τότε

D διῆλθες, τιθείης πόλιν, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν ἐκείνη ὁμοιον, καὶ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικας, καλλίω ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῖν πόλιν

544 τε καὶ ἄνδρα· ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας ἔλεγες, εἰ αὕτη ὀρθή. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν ἔφησθα, ὡς μνημονεύω, τέτταρα εἶδη εἶναι, ὧν καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἶη ἔχειν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείναις αὐτῶν ὁμοίους, ἵνα πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδόντες καὶ ὁμολογησάμενοι τὸν ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα ἐπισκεψαίμεθα, εἰ ὁ ἄριστος εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ὁ κάκιστος ἀθλιώτατος ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοι· καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου, τίνας

B λέγοις τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας, ἐν τούτῳ ὑπέλαβε Πολέμαρχός τε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ σὺ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 424, note c, and *What Plato Said*, p. 640, on *Laws* 857 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 449 A-B.      <sup>c</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1275 b 1-2, 1289 b 9.

<sup>d</sup> *Aristot. Pol.* 1291-1292 censures the limitation to four. But cf. *supra*, *Introd.* p. xlv. Cf. *Laws* 693 D, where only two mother-forms of government are mentioned, monarchy and democracy, with *Aristot. Pol.* 1301 b 40 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 31 ff. The *Politicus* mentions seven (291 f., 301 f.). *Isoc. Panath.* 132-134 names three kinds—oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy—adding that others may say much more about them. See note *ad loc.* in *Loeb Isocrates and Class. Phil.* vol. vii. p. 91. Cf. *Hobbes, Leviathan* 19 "Yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not

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care of themselves and the state." "That is right," I said. "But now that we have finished this topic let us recall the point at which we entered on the digression<sup>a</sup> that has brought us here, so that we may proceed on our way again by the same path." "That is easy," he said; "for at that time, almost exactly as now, on the supposition that you had finished the description of the city, you were going on to say<sup>b</sup> that you assumed such a city as you then described and the corresponding type of man to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you had a still finer city and type of man to tell of; but at any rate you were saying that the others are aberrations,<sup>c</sup> if this city is right. But regarding the other constitutions, my recollection is that you said there were four species<sup>d</sup> worth speaking of<sup>e</sup> and observing their defects<sup>f</sup> and the corresponding types of men, in order that when we had seen them all and come to an agreement about the best and the worst man, we might determine whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it is otherwise.<sup>g</sup> And when I was asking what were the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus and Adeimantus thereupon broke in, and that was how you took up the discussion again and brought perhaps easily reduce them to three . . . as, for example, elective kingdoms," etc.

<sup>a</sup> For ὦν καὶ περὶ λόγον ἀξιὸν εἶη cf. *Laws* 908 B ἂ καὶ διακρίσεως ἀξια, *Laches* 192 A οὐ καὶ περὶ ἀξιὸν λέγειν, *Tim.* 82 C ἐν γένος ἐνὸν ἀξιὸν ἐπωνυμίας. Cf. also *Euthydem.* 279 C, *Aristot. Pol.* 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, *De part. an.* 654 a 13, *Demosth.* v. 16, *Isoc.* vi. 56, and *Vol. I.* p. 420, note f, on 445 c.

<sup>f</sup> For the relative followed by a demonstrative cf. also 357 B.

<sup>g</sup> Plato's main point again. Cf. 545 A, 484 A-B and *Vol. I.* p. xii, note d.

ἀναλαβὼν τὸν λόγον δεῦρ' ἀφίξει. Ὀρθότατα, εἶπον, ἐμνημόνευσας. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν παρέχε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἅπερ τότε ἔμελλες λέγειν. Ἐάνπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύνωμαι. Καὶ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι τίνας ἔλεγες τὰς

C τέτταρας πολιτείας. Οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀκούσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἄς λέγω, αἵπερ καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχουσι, ἧ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένη, ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνική αὕτη· καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία, συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία· ἧ τε ταύτη διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη δημοκρατία, καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, τέταρτόν τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα.

D ἢ τίνα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἧτις καὶ ἐν εἶδει διαφανεῖ τινὶ κείται; δυναστεῖαι γὰρ καὶ ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξὺ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὔροι δ' ἂν τις αὐτὰς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note e.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 13 D *eis τὰς ὁμοίας*, *Phaedr.* 236 B, *Laws* 682 E, *Aristoph. Clouds* 551 (Blaydes), *Knights* 841, *Lysist.* 672.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 596, on *Sophist* 267 D.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Crito* 52 E, *Norlin on Isoc. Nicocles* 24 (Loeb), *Laws* 712 D-E, *Aristot. Pol.* 1265 b 32, *Xen. Mem.* iii. 5. 15.

<sup>e</sup> ἡ . . . αὕτη, "ista." Cf. *Midsummer Night's Dream*, I. ii. *ad fin.* and *Gorg.* 502 B, 452 E.

<sup>f</sup> Of course ironical. Cf. *supra* 454 A, and *What Plato Said*, p. 592, on *Soph.* 231 B.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 552 C, *Protag.* 322 D, *Isoc. Hel.* 34, *Wilamowitz on*



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to this point.<sup>a</sup> "Your memory is most exact," I said. "A second time then, as in a wrestling-match, offer me the same hold,<sup>b</sup> and when I repeat my question try to tell me what you were then about to say." "I will if I can," said I. "And indeed," said he, "I am eager myself to hear what four forms of government you meant." "There will be no difficulty about that," said I. "For those I mean are precisely those that have names<sup>c</sup> in common usage: that which the many praise,<sup>d</sup> your<sup>e</sup> Cretan and Spartan constitution; and the second in place and in honour, that which is called oligarchy, a constitution teeming with many ills, and its sequent counterpart and opponent, democracy; and then the noble<sup>f</sup> tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and final malady<sup>g</sup> of a state. Can you mention any other type<sup>h</sup> of government, I mean any other that constitutes a distinct species<sup>i</sup>? For, no doubt, there are hereditary principalities<sup>j</sup> and purchased<sup>k</sup> kingships, and similar intermediate constitutions which one

Eurip. *Heracles* 542. For the effect of surprise *cf. Rep.* 334 A, 373 A, 555 A, *Theaet.* 146 A, *Phileb.* 46 A *κακόν* and 64 E *συμφορά*.

<sup>a</sup> *ἰδέαν*: *cf. Introd.* p. x.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* 445 c. For *διαφανεί* *cf. Tim.* 60 A, 67 A, *Laws* 634 c, and *infra* on 548 c, p. 253, note g.

<sup>c</sup> *δυναστεῖαι*: *cf. Laws* 680 B, 681 D. But the word usually has an invidious suggestion. See Newman on Aristot. *Pol.* 1272 b 10. *Cf. ibid.* 1292 b 5-10, 1293 a 31, 1298 a 32; also Lysias ii. 18, where it is opposed to democracy, Isoc. *Panath.* 148, where it is used of the tyranny of Peisistratus, *ibid.* 43 of Minos. *Cf. Panegy.* 39 and Norlin on *Panegy.* 105 (Loeb). Isocrates also uses it frequently of the power or sovereignty of Philip, *Phil.* 3, 6, 69, 133, etc. *Cf. also Gorg.* 492 B, *Polit.* 291 D.

<sup>d</sup> Newman on Aristot. *Pol.* 1273 a 35 thinks that Plato may have been thinking of Carthage. *Cf. Polyb.* vi. 56. 4.

οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἑλληνας. Πολλαὶ γοῦν καὶ ἄτοποι, ἔφη, λέγονται.

Π. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἶει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν  
 Ε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ρέψαντα τᾶλλα ἐφελκύσῃται; Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐντεῦθεν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πέντε, καὶ αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε ἂν εἶεν. Τί μὴν; Τὸν μὲν δὴ τῇ ἀριστοκρατία ὁμοιον διεληλύθαμεν ἤδη, ὃν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον ὀρθῶς  
 545 φαμέν εἶναι. Διεληλύθαμεν. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διυτέον τοὺς χεῖρους, τὸν φιλονικόν τε καὶ φιλότιμον, κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐστώτα πολιτείαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν, ἵνα τὸν ἀδικώτατον ἰδόντες ἀντιθῶμεν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ καὶ ἡμῖν τελέα ἢ σκέψις ἦ, πῶς ποτὲ ἢ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν τὴν ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε περί τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Plato, as often, is impatient of details, for which he was rebuked by Aristotle. Cf. also *Tim.* 57 D, 67 C, and the frequent leaving of minor matters to future legislators in the *Republic* and *Laws*, Vol. I. p. 294, note b, on 412 B.

<sup>b</sup> For the correspondence of individual and state cf. also 435 E, 445 C-D, 579 C and on 591 E. Cf. *Laws* 829 A, Isoc. *Peace* 120.

<sup>c</sup> Or "stock or stone," i.e. inanimate, insensible things. For the quotation ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας cf. *Odyssey* xix. 163, *Il.* xxii. 126 *aliter*, *Apol.* 34 D and Thompson on *Phaedrus* 275 B; also Stallbaum *ad loc.*

<sup>d</sup> The "mores," 435 E, 436 A. Cf. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, p. 206: "A lazy nation may be changed into an industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane,

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could find in even greater numbers among the barbarians than among the Greeks.<sup>a</sup>” “Certainly many strange ones are reported,” he said.

II. “Are you aware, then,” said I, “that there must be as many types of character among men as there are forms of government<sup>b</sup>? Or do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock<sup>c</sup> and not from the characters<sup>d</sup> of the citizens, which, as it were, by their momentum and weight in the scales<sup>e</sup> draw other things after them?” “They could not possibly come from any other source,” he said. “Then if the forms of government are five, the patterns of individual souls must be five also.” “Surely.” “Now we have already described the man corresponding to aristocracy<sup>f</sup> or the government of the best, whom we aver to be the truly good and just man.” “We have.” “Must we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior types, the man who is contentious and covetous of honour,<sup>g</sup> corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic and the tyrant, in order that,<sup>h</sup> after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or any combination of causes, however subtle, is strong enough to change the favourite and detested types of character.”

<sup>a</sup> For the metaphor *cf.* also 550 E and on 556 E.

<sup>f</sup> ἀριστοκρατία is used by both Plato and Aristotle sometimes technically, sometimes etymologically as the government of the best, whoever they may be. *Cf.* 445 D, and *Menex.* 238 C-D (*What Plato Said*, p. 539).

<sup>g</sup> *Cf.* *Phaedr.* 256 C 1, *supra* 475 A, 347 B.

<sup>h</sup> *Cf.* on 544 A, p. 237, note g.

ἀθλιότητος, ἵνα ἢ Θρασυμάχῳ πειθόμενοι διώ-  
 B κωμεν ἀδικίαν ἢ τῷ νῦν προφαινομένῳ λόγῳ  
 δικαιοσύνην; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτω  
 ποιητέον. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὡσπερ ἠρξάμεθα ἐν ταῖς  
 πολιτείαις πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἦθη ἢ ἐν τοῖς  
 ἰδιώταις, ὡς ἐναργέστερον ὄν, καὶ νῦν οὕτω πρῶ-  
 τον μὲν τὴν φιλότιμον σκεπτέον πολιτείαν· ὄνομα  
 γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον ἄλλο· ἢ τιμοκρατίαν ἢ  
 τιμαρχίαν αὐτὴν κλητέον· πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὸν  
 C τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα σκεψόμεθα, ἔπειτα ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ  
 ἄνδρα ὀλιγαρχικόν, αὐθις δὲ εἰς δημοκρατίαν  
 ἀποβλέψαντες θεασόμεθα ἄνδρα δημοκρατικόν, τὸ  
 δὲ τέταρτον εἰς τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἐλθόντες καὶ  
 ἰδόντες, πάλιν εἰς τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν βλέποντες,  
 πειρασόμεθα περὶ ὧν προῦθέμεθα ἱκανοὶ κριταὶ  
 γενέσθαι; Κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτω  
 γίγνοιτο ἢ τε θέα καὶ ἢ κρίσις.

\* In considering the progress of degeneration portrayed in the following pages, it is too often forgotten that Plato is describing or satirizing divergences from an ideal rather than an historical process. Cf. Rehm, *Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken*, p. 11: "Plato gibt eine zum Mythos gesteigerte Naturgeschichte des Staates, so wie Hesiod eine als Mythos zu verstehende Natur-, d.h. Entartungsgeschichte des Menschengeschlechts gibt." Cf. Sidney B. Fay, on Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, in "Methods of Social Science," edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: "... there was a widely spread belief in an earlier 'golden age' of simplicity, which had been followed by a degeneration and decay of the human race. Plato's theory of degradation set forth a gradual deterioration through the successive stages of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. The Greek theory of 'cycles,' with its endless, monotonous iteration, excluded the possibility of permanent advance or 'progress.'"

Kurt Singer, *Platon der Gründer*, p. 141, says that the timocratic state reminds one of late Sparta, the democratic

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either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue justice? "Assuredly," he said, "that is what we have to do.<sup>a</sup>" "Shall we, then, as we began by examining moral qualities in states before individuals, as being more manifest there, so now consider first the constitution based on the love of honour? I do not know of any special name<sup>b</sup> for it in use. We must call it either timocracy<sup>c</sup> or timarchy. And then in connexion with this we will consider the man of that type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will contemplate the democratic man; and fourthly, after coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul,<sup>d</sup> and so try to make ourselves competent judges<sup>e</sup> of the question before us." "That would be at least<sup>f</sup> a systematic and consistent way of conducting the observation and the decision," he said.

of Athens after Pericles, the oligarchic is related to Corinth, and the tyrannical has some Syracusan features. Cicero, *De div.* ii., uses this book of the *Republic* to console himself for the revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius's theory of the natural succession of governments is derived from it, with modifications (Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. *Cf.* vi. 9. 10 *αὐτῆς πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις*). Aristotle objects that in a cycle the ideal state should follow the tyranny.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* on 544 c, p. 238, note b.

<sup>c</sup> In Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 33-34, the meaning is "the rule of those who possess a property qualification."

<sup>d</sup> *Cf.* 577 a-b.

<sup>e</sup> *Cf.* 582 a ff.

<sup>f</sup> For the qualified assent *cf.* *Hamlet* i. i. 19 "What? is Horatio there? A piece of him." It is very frequent in the *Republic*, usually with γούν. *Cf.* 442 d, 469 b, 476 c, 501 c, 537 c, 584 a, 555 b, 604 d, and Vol. I. p. 30, note a, on 334 a; also 460 c and 398 b, where the interlocutor adds a condition, 392 b, 405 b, 556 e, 581 b, and 487 a, where he uses the corrective μὲν οὖν.



III. Φέρε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειρώμεθα λέγειν, τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀριστο-  
 D κρατίας. ἢ τόδε μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται· ὁμοιοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ἦ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι; Ἔστι γὰρ οὕτως. Πῶς οὖν δῆ, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῆ στασιάζουσιν οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς; ἢ βούλει, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, εὐχόμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον  
 E στάσις ἔμπεσε, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἔρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῆ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν;  
 546 Πῶς; Ὡδέ πως· χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω ξυστᾶσαν· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἡ τοιαύτη ξύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται· λύσις δὲ ἦδε. οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζώοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι, βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας·

<sup>a</sup> For the idea that the state is destroyed only by factions in the ruling class cf. also *Laws* 683 E. Cf. 465 B, Lysias xxv. 21, Aristot. *Pol.* 1305 b, 1306 a 10 ὁμοιοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὐτῆς, 1302 a 10, Polybius, Teubner, vol. ii. p. 298 (vi. 57). Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. p. 521, says that Aristotle "does not remark on Plato's observation . . . though he cannot have agreed with it." Cf. Halévy, *Notes et souvenirs*, p. 153 "l'histoire est là pour démontrer clairement que, depuis un siècle, nos gouvernements n'ont jamais été renversés que par eux-mêmes"; Bergson, *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion*, p. 303: "Mais



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III. "Come, then," said I, "let us try to tell in what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristocracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself,<sup>a</sup> when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible?" "Yes, that is so." "How, then, Glaucon," I said, "will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses<sup>b</sup> to tell 'how faction first fell upon them,' and say that these goddesses playing with us and teasing us as if we were children address us in lofty, mock-serious tragic<sup>c</sup> style?" "How?" "Somewhat in this fashion. Hard in truth<sup>d</sup> it is for a state thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but since for everything that has come into being destruction is appointed,<sup>e</sup> not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for plants that grow from the earth but also for animals that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barrenness<sup>f</sup> for soul and body as often as the revolutions of their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for the short-lived and oppositely for the opposite; but the instinct résiste. Il ne commence à céder que lorsque la classe supérieure elle-même l'y invite."

<sup>b</sup> For the mock-heroic style of this invocation cf. *Phaedr.* 237 A, *Laws* 885 C.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 413 B, *Meno* 76 E, Aristot. *Meteorol.* 353 b 1, Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 146.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Alc. I.* 104 E.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 627 on *Laws* 677 A; also Polyb. vi. 57, Cic. *De rep.* ii. 25.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Pindar, *Nem.* vi. 10-12 for the thought.

γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ  
 Β ὄντες σοφοί, οὓς ἠγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε,  
 οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται,  
 ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε  
 οὐ δέον. ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος, ἣν  
 ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ἐν  
 ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευό-  
 μεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὄρους λα-  
 βούσαι ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ  
 αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα καὶ  
 C ῥητὰ πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀπέφηναν· ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν  
 πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται τρεῖς  
 αὐξηθεῖς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκεις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκεις,  
 τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν  
 ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομέ-  
 νων ἑνὸς ἐκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ  
 κύβων τριάδος. ζύμπας δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεω-  
 μετρικὸς τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χει-  
 D ρόνων γενέσεων, ἃς ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν οἱ  
 φύλακες συνοικίζωσι νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρὸν,  
 οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ' εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται· ὧν  
 καταστήσουσι μὲν τοὺς ἀρίστους οἱ πρότεροι, ὅμως  
 δὲ ὄντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων αὐτῶν δυνάμεις  
 ἐλθόντες, ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν φύλακες  
 ὄντες, παρ' ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἠγησάμενοι τὰ  
 μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς· ὅθεν ἀ-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 28 A δόξη μετ' αἰσθήσεως.

<sup>b</sup> For its proverbial obscurity cf. Cic. *Ad Att.* vii. 13  
 "est enim numero Platonis obscurius," Censorinus, *De die*  
*natali* xi. See *supra*, Introd. p. xlv for literature on this  
 "number."  
<sup>c</sup> προσήγορα: cf. *Theaet.* 146 A.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 534 D; also *Theaet.* 202 B ῥητάς.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 409 D.

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laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race, the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation,<sup>a</sup> but they will escape them, and there will be a time when they will beget children out of season. Now for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect number,<sup>b</sup> and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all things conversable<sup>c</sup> and commensurable with one another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, the other of equal length one way but oblong,—one dimension of a hundred numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in each case, or of the irrational<sup>d</sup> lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. And this entire geometrical number is determinative of this thing, of better and inferior births. And when your guardians, missing this, bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably,<sup>e</sup> the offspring will not be well-born or fortunate. Of such offspring the previous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in office, but still these, being unworthy, and having entered in turn<sup>f</sup> into the powers of their fathers, will first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too little heed to music<sup>g</sup> and then to gymnastics, so that

<sup>f</sup> *av*: cf. my note in *Class. Phil.* xxiii. (1923) pp. 285-287.

<sup>g</sup> This does not indicate a change in Plato's attitude toward music, as has been alleged.

μουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων  
 Ε ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοὶ καταστήσονται πρὸς  
 547 τὸ δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἑσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ'  
 ὑμῖν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν  
 καὶ σιδηροῦν· ὁμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῶ  
 καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῶ ἀνομοιότης ἐγγενήσεται καὶ  
 ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγέ-  
 νηται, ἀεὶ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν. ταύτης τοι  
 γενεᾶς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσις, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται  
 ἀεὶ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, αὐτὰς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φή-  
 σομεν. Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε  
 Β οὔσας. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν αἱ  
 Μοῦσαι; Στάσεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γενομένης εἰλκέτην  
 ἄρα ἑκατέρω τῷ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλ-  
 κοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτήσιν καὶ οἰκίας  
 χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργύρου, τῷ δ' αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε  
 καὶ ἀργυροῦν, ἅτε οὐ πενομένω, ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντε  
 πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν  
 ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἠγέτην· βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ  
 ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις, εἰς μέσον ὠμολόγησαν  
 γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατανειμαμένους ἰδιώσασθαι,  
 C τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέ-  
 ρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφείας δουλωσάμενοι τότε  
 περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ πολέμου  
 τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι,  
 ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ μετάβασις ἐντεῦθεν γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκ-  
 οῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν μέσῳ τις ἂν εἴη ἀριστοκρατίας

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 415 A-B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 159 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Homer, Il.* vi. 211.

<sup>d</sup> *γε ἔν τῳ ὅρῳ.* Cf. 379 A-B.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *supra* 416 E-417 A, 521 A, *Phaedrus* 279 B-C.

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our young men will deteriorate in their culture; and the rulers selected from them will not approve themselves very efficient guardians for testing Hesiod's and our races of gold, silver, bronze and iron.<sup>a</sup> And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and the bronze with the gold will engender unlikeness<sup>b</sup> and an unharmonious unevenness, things that always beget war and enmity wherever they arise. 'Of this lineage,<sup>c</sup> look you,' we must aver the dissension to be, wherever it occurs and always." "And rightly too," he said, "we shall affirm that the Muses answer." "They must needs," I said, "since they are<sup>d</sup> Muses." "Well, then," said he, "what do the Muses say next?" "When strife arose," said I, "the two groups were pulling against each other, the iron and bronze towards money-making and the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver, and the other two, the golden and silvern, not being poor, but by nature rich in their souls,<sup>e</sup> were trying to draw them back to virtue and their original constitution, and thus, striving and contending against one another, they compromised<sup>f</sup> on the plan of distributing and taking for themselves the land and the houses, enslaving and subjecting as *perioeci* and serfs<sup>g</sup> their former friends<sup>h</sup> and supporters, of whose freedom they had been the guardians, and occupying themselves with war and keeping watch over these subjects." "I think," he said, "that this is the starting-point of the transformation." "Would not this polity, then," said I, "be in some sort inter-

<sup>f</sup> For *εἰς μέσον* cf. *Protag.* 338 A; *infra* 572 D, 558 B.

<sup>g</sup> An allusion to Sparta. On slavery in Plato cf. Newman i. p. 143. Cf. 549 A, 578-579, *Laws* 776-777; *Aristot. Pol.* 1259 a 21 f., 1269 a 36 f., 1330 a 29.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 417 A-B.

τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

IV. Μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω· μεταβᾶσα δὲ  
 D πῶς οἰκήσει; ἢ φανερόν ὅτι τὰ μὲν μιμήσεται τὴν  
 προτέραν πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἅτ' ἐν  
 μέσῳ οὔσα, τὸ δέ τι καὶ αὐτῆς ἔξει ἴδιον; Οὕτως,  
 ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ  
 γεωργιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ  
 χειροτεχνιῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου χρηματισμοῦ, ξυσ-  
 σίτια δὲ κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ  
 τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πᾶσι τοῖς  
 τοιούτοις τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται; Naί. Τῷ δέ  
 E γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγειν,  
 ἅτε οὐκέτι κεκτημένην ἀπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς τοὺς  
 τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μικτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς  
 τε καὶ ἀπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πό-  
 548 λεμον μᾶλλον πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, καὶ τοὺς  
 περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐντίμως ἔχειν,  
 καὶ πολεμοῦσα τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον διάγειν, αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆς  
 αὖ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἔξει; Naί.  
 Ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρημάτων οἱ  
 τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις,  
 καὶ τιμῶντες ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ  
 ἄργυρον, ἅτε κεκτημένοι ταμιεῖα καὶ οἰκείους  
 θησαυρούς, οἱ θέμενοι ἂν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν, καὶ αὖ  
 περιβόλους οἰκήσεων, ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιᾶς ἰδίας,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1328 b 41 and Newman i. pp. 107-108.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 416 E, 458 c, *Laws* 666 B, 762 c, 780 A-B, 781 c, 806 E, 839 c, *Critias* 112 c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 397 E, Isoc. ii. 46 ἀπλοῦς δ' ἡγούνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας. Cf. the psychology of Thucyd. iii. 83.

<sup>d</sup> This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf. Newman on Aristot. *Pol.* 1270 a 13, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 14. 2-3



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mediate between aristocracy and oligarchy?" "By all means."

IV. "By this change, then, it would arise. But after the change what will be its way of life? Is it not obvious that in some things it will imitate the preceding polity, in some the oligarchy, since it is intermediate, and that it will also have some qualities peculiar to itself?" "That is so," he said. "Then in honouring its rulers and in the abstention of its warrior class from farming<sup>a</sup> and handicraft and money-making in general, and in the provision of common public tables<sup>b</sup> and the devotion to physical training and expertness in the game and contest of war—in all these traits it will copy the preceding state?" "Yes." "But in its fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has of this kind are no longer simple<sup>c</sup> and strenuous but of mixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war than for peace, and in honouring the stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying itself with war most of the time—in these respects for the most part its qualities will be peculiar to itself?" "Yes." "Such men," said I, "will be avid of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish a fierce secret lust for gold<sup>d</sup> and silver, owning store-houses<sup>e</sup> and private treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosures<sup>f</sup> of their homes, literal private love-nests<sup>g</sup> in which they can lavish

and 7. 6, and the Chicago Dissertation of P. H. Epps, *The Place of Sparta in Greek History and Civilization*, pp. 180-184.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 416 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 681 A, *Theaet.* 174 E.

<sup>c</sup> νεοττίας suggests Horace's "tu nidum servas" (*Epist.* i. 10. 6). Cf. also *Laws* 776 A.

- B ἐν αἷς ἀναλίσκοντες γύναιξί τε καὶ οἷς ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῶντο. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρημάτων, ἅτε τιμῶντες καὶ οὐ φανερώς κτώμενοι, φιλιαναλωταὶ δὲ ἄλλοτρίων δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρα τὰς ἡδονὰς καρπούμενοι, ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ
- C φιλοσοφίας ἡμεληκένοι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικὴν μουσικῆς τετιμηκένοι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, λέγεις μεμιγμένην πολιτείαν ἐκ κακοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. Μέμικται γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἓν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦντος, φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι. Σφόδρα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτω γεγωνῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἂν τις εἴη, ὡς
- D λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι, διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὸν τε δικαιοτάτον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἶναι πάσας μὲν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 806 A-C, 637 B-C, *Aristot. Pol.* 1269 b 3, and Newman ii. p. 318 on the Spartan women. Cf. Epps, *op. cit.* pp. 322-346.

<sup>b</sup> *φιλιαναλωταί*, though different, suggests Sallust's "alieni appetens sui profusus" (*Cat.* 5). Cf. *Cat.* 52 "publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 587 A, *Laws* 636 D, *Symp.* 187 E, *Phaedr.* 251 E.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1270 b 34 with Newman's note; and *Euthyphro* 2 c "tell his mother the state."

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laws* 720 D-E. This is not inconsistent with *Polit.* 293 A, where the context and the point of view are different.

<sup>f</sup> This is of course not the mixed government which Plato approves *Laws* 691-692, 712 D-E, 759 B. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 629.

<sup>g</sup> For *διαφανέστατον* cf. 544 D. The expression *διαφανέστα-*

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their wealth on their women<sup>a</sup> and any others they please with great expenditure." "Most true," he said. "And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others' wealth<sup>b</sup> because of their appetites, enjoying<sup>c</sup> their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father,<sup>d</sup> since they have not been educated by persuasion<sup>e</sup> but by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and because of their preference of gymnastics to music?" "You perfectly describe," he said, "a polity that is a mixture<sup>f</sup> of good and evil." "Why, yes, the elements have been mixed," I said, "but the most conspicuous<sup>g</sup> feature in it is one thing only, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely contentiousness and covetousness of honour.<sup>h</sup>" "Very much so," said he. "Such, then, would be the origin and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms<sup>i</sup>

των . . . ἐν τι μόνον, misunderstood and emended by Apelt, is coloured by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius i. 877-878:

illud

apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta.

Anaxag. fr. 12 *in fine*, Diels i.<sup>3</sup> p. 405 ἀλλ' ὅτων πλείστα ἐνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἐστι καὶ ἦν. Cf. *Phaedr.* 238 Δ, *Cratyl.* 393 D, misunderstood by Dümmler and emended (ἐναργής for ἐγκρατής) with the approval of Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 350.

<sup>a</sup> There is no contradiction between this and *Laws* 870 c if the passage is read carefully.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. on 544 D, p. 240, note a.

πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἤθη μηδὲν παραλιπόντα διελθεῖν. Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

V. Τίς οὖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνὴρ; πῶς τε γενόμενος ποῖός τέ τις ὢν; Οἶμαι μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος  
 E τουτουῖ τείνειν ἔνεκά γε φιλονικίας. Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τουτοῦ γε ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ τάδε οὐ κατὰ τουτον πεφυκέναι. Τὰ ποῖα; Αὐθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον, φιλόμουσον δὲ καὶ φιλήκοον μὲν, ῥητορικὸν δ'  
 549 οὐδαμῶς. καὶ δούλοις μὲν τις ἂν ἄγριος εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὐ καταφρονῶν δούλων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος, ἐλευθέροις δὲ ἡμερος, ἀρχόντων δὲ σφόδρα ὑπήκοος, φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιῶν ἄρχειν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοιούτου οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἔργων τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστής τέ τις ὢν καὶ φιλόθηρος. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τουτο τὸ ἦθος ἐκείνης τῆς πολιτείας. Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων,  
 B ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τοιοῦτος νέος μὲν ὢν καταφρονοῖ ἂν, ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον αἰεὶ ἀσπάζοιτο ἂν τῷ τε μετέχειν τῆς τοῦ φιλοχρημάτου φύσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἰλικρινῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 65 A, Porphyry, *De abst.* i. 27, Teubner, p. 59 ἐγγύς τείνειν ἀποσιτίας.

<sup>b</sup> αὐθαδέστερον. The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. *P. V.* 1034, 1037) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, who imitates or parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 "A little inaccessible to ideas and light," and pp. 54-55 "The peculiar serenity of aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their never having had any ideas to trouble them."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 475 D, 535 D, *Lysis* 206 C.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 C, and Newman ii. p. 317. In

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of government without omitting any, and all customs and qualities of men." "Quite right," he said.

V. "What, then, is the man that corresponds to this constitution? What is his origin and what his nature?" "I fancy," Adeimantus said, "that he comes rather close<sup>a</sup> to Glaucon here in point of contentiousness." "Perhaps," said I, "in that, but I do not think their natures are alike in the following respects." "In what?" "He will have to be somewhat self-willed<sup>b</sup> and lacking in culture,<sup>c</sup> yet a lover of music and fond of listening<sup>d</sup> to talk and speeches, though by no means himself a rhetorician; and to slaves such a one would be harsh,<sup>e</sup> not scorning them as the really educated do, but he would be gentle with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a lover of office and of honour,<sup>f</sup> not basing his claim to office<sup>g</sup> on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting.<sup>h</sup>" "Why, yes," he said, "that is the spirit of that polity."<sup>i</sup> "And would not such a man be disdainful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew the more he would love it because of his participation in the covetous nature and because his virtue i. p. 143, n. 3 he says that this implies slavery in the ideal state, in spite of 547 c.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Lysias xix. 18. Lysias xxi. portrays a typical φιλότιμος. Cf. *Phaedr.* 256 c, Eurip. *I.A.* 527. He is a Xenophontic type. Cf. Xen. *Oecon.* 14. 10, *Hiero* 7. 3, *Agesil.* 10. 4. Isoc. *Antid.* 141 and 226 uses the word in a good sense. Cf. "But if it be a sin to covet honour," Shakes. *Henry V.* iv. iii. 28.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. the ἀξιώματα of *Laws* 690 A, Aristot. *Pol.* 1280 a 8 ff., 1282 b 26, 1283-1284.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Arnold on the "barbarians" in *Culture and Anarchy*, pp. 73, 82, 84.

<sup>i</sup> For the ἦθος of a state cf. Isoc. *Nic.* 31.



τὸ ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ ἀρίστου φύλακος; Τίνος; ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Ἀδείμαντος. Λόγου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μουσικῇ κεκραμένου· ὅς μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτῆρ ἀρετῆς διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι. Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Καὶ ἔστι μὲν γ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτος ὁ τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας, τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐοικῶς. Πάνυ C μὲν οὖν. Γίνεται δέ γ', εἶπον, οὗτος ᾧδέ πως ἐνίοτε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὦν νέος υἱὸς ἐν πόλει οἰκοῦντος οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένη, φεύγοντος τὰς τε τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν φιλοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι, ὥστε πράγματα μὴ ἔχειν. Πῆ δὴ, ἔφη, γίνεται; Ὅταν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούη ἀχθομένης, D ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐστι, καὶ ἐλαττομένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἔπειτα ὀρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιδορούμενον ἰδία τε ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ραθύμως πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσ-

<sup>a</sup> The Greek words *λόγος* and *μουσική* are untranslatable. Cf. also 560 B. For *μουσική* cf. 546 D. Newman i. p. 414 fancies that this is a return to the position of Book IV. from the disparagement of music in 522 A. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of Plato's opinions.

<sup>b</sup> *ἐέ γ'* marks the transition from the description of the type to its origin. Cf. 547 E, 553 B, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D, 561 E, 563 B, 566 E. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There are no cases in the first five pages.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Lysias xix. 18 *ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*, with the contrasted type *ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι*, Isoc. *Antid.* 227 *ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει*. Cf. *πολυπραγμοσύνη* 444 B, 434 B, Isoc. *Antid.* 48, *Peace* 108, 30,



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is not sincere and pure since it lacks the best guardian?" "What guardian?" said Adeimantus. "Reason," said I, "blended with culture,<sup>a</sup> which is the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that possesses it." "Well said," he replied. "This is the character," I said, "of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name." "By all means." "His origin<sup>b</sup> is somewhat on this wise: Sometimes he is the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids honours and office and law-suits and all such meddlesomeness<sup>c</sup> and is willing to forbear something of his rights<sup>d</sup> in order to escape trouble.<sup>e</sup>" "How does he originate?" he said. "Why, when, to begin with," I said, "he hears his mother complaining<sup>f</sup> that her husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason she is slighted among the other women, and when she sees that her husband is not much concerned about money and does not fight and brawl in private law-suits and in the public assembly, but takes all such matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self-

and 26, with Norlin's note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph. *Knights* 261.

<sup>a</sup> ἐλαττοῦσθαι: cf. Thuc. i. 77. 1, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1198 b 26-32, *Pol.* 1319 a 3.

<sup>b</sup> For πράγματα ἔχειν cf. 370 a, *Gorg.* 467 d, *Alc. I.* 119 b, Aristoph. *Birds* 1026, *Wasps* 1392. Cf. πράγματα παρέχειν, *Rep.* 505 a, 531 b, *Theages* 121 d, Herod. i. 155, Aristoph. *Birds* 931, *Plutus* 20, 102.

<sup>f</sup> Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 434 with some exaggeration says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, *Four Years in Germany*, p. 115 "Now if a lawyer gets to be about forty years old and is not some kind of a *Rat* his wife begins to nag him . . ."

έχοντα αεί αισθάνηται, έαυτήν δέ μήτε πάνυ τιμῶντα μήτε ατιμάζοντα· έξ άπάντων τούτων άχθομένης τε και λεγούσης ως ανανδρός τε αυτώ ο πατήρ και λίαν ανειμένος, και άλλα δή όσα και

Ε οία φιλοϋσιν αι γυναίκες περι τών τοιούτων ύμνεΐν. Και μάλ', έφη ο 'Αδείμαντος, πολλά τε και όμοια έαυταις. Οΐσθα ουν, ην δ' έγώ, ότι και οι οικείται τών τοιούτων ενίοτε λάθρα προς τους υίεις τοιαυτα λέγουσιν, οι δοκουντες εϋνοι εΐναι, και εαν τινα ιδωσιν η οφείλοντα χρηματα, ω μη επεξέρχεται ο πατήρ, η τι άλλο αδικουντα, διακελεύονται όπως, επειδαν ανήρ γένηται, τιμωρήσεται πάντας τους

550 τοιούτους και ανήρ μάλλον εσται του πατρός και εξιων ετερα τοιαυτα ακουει και ορα, τους μεν τα αυτων πραττοντας εν τη πόλει ηλιθίους τε καλουμένους και εν σμικρῶ λόγω οντας, τους δε μη τα αυτων τιμωμένους τε και επαινουμένους. τότε δη ο νεος πάντα τα τοιαυτα ακουων τε και ορων, και αυ τους του πατρός λόγους ακουων τε και ορων τα επιτηδεύματα αυτου εγγυθεν παρα τα των άλλων, ελκόμενος υπ' αμφοτέρων τούτων, του μεν

Β πατρός αυτου το λογιστικόν εν τη ψυχῃ αρδοντός τε και αυξοντος, των δε άλλων τό τε επιθυμητικόν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 174 D, *Isoc. Antid.* 227.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. the husband in *Lysias* i. 6.

<sup>c</sup> λιαν ανειμένος: one who has grown too slack or negligent. Cf. *Didot, Com. Fr.* p. 728 τίς ωδε μωρος και λιαν ανειμένος; *Porphyr., De abst.* ii. 58.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 60 A. For Plato's attitude towards women cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 632, on *Laws* 731 D.

<sup>e</sup> ύμνεΐν. Cf. *Euthydem.* 297 D, *Soph. Ajax* 292. Commentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato's style in this sentence. Cf. *Wilamowitz, Platon*, ii. p. 385.

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absorbed<sup>a</sup> in his thoughts and neither regards nor disregards her overmuch,<sup>b</sup> and in consequence of all this laments and tells the boy that his father is too slack<sup>c</sup> and no kind of a man, with all the other complaints with which women<sup>d</sup> nag<sup>e</sup> in such cases." "Many indeed," said Adeimantus, "and after their kind.<sup>f</sup>" "You are aware, then," said I, "that the very house-slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of thing.<sup>g</sup> Men who mind their own affairs<sup>h</sup> in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people's affairs are honoured and praised. Then it is<sup>i</sup> that the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle<sup>j</sup> in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate<sup>k</sup>;

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Aristoph. *Thesm.* 167 ὁμοία γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει.

<sup>g</sup> ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: cf. on 488 B; also *Gorg.* 481 E, 482 A, 514 D, *Euthyd.* 298 E, *Protag.* 326 A, *Phaedo* 58 D, 80 D, *Symp.* 201 E, etc.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 480, on *Charm.* 161 B.

<sup>i</sup> τότε δὴ: cf. 551 A, 566 C, 330 E, 573 A, 591 A, *Phaedo* 85 A, 96 B and D, *Polit.* 272 E. Cf. also τότε ἡδη, on 565 C.

<sup>j</sup> Cf. on 439 D, Vol. I. p. 397, note d.

<sup>k</sup> For these three principles of the soul cf. on 435 A ff., 439 D-E ff., 441 A.

καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ὁμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς κεχρηῆσθαι, εἰς τὸ μέσον ἐλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἦλθε, καὶ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν παρέδωκε τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος ἀνὴρ. Κομιδῆ μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς τὴν τούτου γένεσιν διεληλυθέναι.

C Ἐχομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν τε δευτέραν πολιτείαν καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἄνδρα. Ἐχομεν, ἔφη.

VI. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν ἄλλον ἄλλη πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Εἴη δέ γ' ἂν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ὀλιγαρχία ἢ μετὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. Λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν; Τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείαν, ἐν ἣ ὀί μὲν

D πλούσιοι ἄρχουσι, πένητι δὲ οὐ μέτεστιν ἀρχῆς. Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ῥητέον; Ναί. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλῷ γε δῆλον ὡς μεταβαίνει. Πῶς; Τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο ἐκάστῳ χρυσίου πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὐτοῖς ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρ-  
E ἄγουσιν, ἀπειθοῦντες αὐτοί τε καὶ γυναῖκες αὐτῶν. Εἰκόσ, ἔφη. Ἐπειτά γε, οἶμαι, ἄλλος ἄλλον ὀρώων

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the fragment of Menander, φθειρουσιν ἥθη χρησθ' ὁμιλίας κακαί, quoted in 1 Cor. xv. 33 (Kock, C.A.F. iii. No. 218). Cf. also *Phaedr.* 250 A ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν, Aesch. *Seven Against Thebes* 599 ἔσθ' ὁμιλίας κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. p. 249, note f.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *infra* 553 B-C, 608 B.

<sup>d</sup> ὑψηλόφρων is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. *I.A.* 919

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and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications,<sup>a</sup> under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise<sup>b</sup> and turns over the government in his soul<sup>c</sup> to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul<sup>d</sup> and covetous of honour.<sup>e</sup>” “You have, I think, most exactly described his origin.” “Then,” said I, “we have our second polity and second type of man.” “We have,” he said.

VI. “Shall we then, as Aeschylus<sup>f</sup> would say, tell of another champion before another gate, or rather, in accordance with our plan,<sup>g</sup> the city first?” “That, by all means,” he said. “The next polity, I believe, would be oligarchy.” “And what kind of a régime,” said he, “do you understand by oligarchy?” “That based on a property qualification,<sup>h</sup>” said I, “wherein the rich hold office and the poor man is excluded.” “I understand,” said he. “Then, is not the first thing to speak of how democracy passes over into this?” “Yes.” “And truly,” said I, “the manner of the change is plain even to the proverbial blind man.<sup>i</sup>” “How so?” “That treasure-house<sup>j</sup> which each possesses filled with gold destroys that polity; for first they invent ways of expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end, and neither they nor their wives obey them.” “That is likely,” he said. “And then, I take it, by observing

<sup>a</sup> Cf. p. 255, note f.

<sup>f</sup> *Seven Against Thebes* 451 λέγ' ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πόλαις εἰληχότα.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Laws* 743 c, and *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 345.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 33, *Isoc. Panath.* 131, *Laws* 698 b *aliter*.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. 465 d, *Soph.* 241 d.

<sup>j</sup> Cf. 548 a, 416 d.

Timocracy  
Oligarchy  
?



καὶ εἰς ζῆλον ἰὼν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἀπειργάσαντο. Εἰκός. Τοῦντεῦθεν τοῖνυν, εἶπον, προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ὅσω ἂν τοῦτο τιμιώτερον ἡγῶνται, τοσοῦτω ἀρετὴν ἀτιμοτέραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου ἀεὶ τοῦναντίον ρέποντε; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Τιμωμένου δὴ πλούτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἀτιμοτέρα ἀρετὴ τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί. Δῆλον. Ἀσκεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀεὶ τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμαζόμενον. Οὕτως. Ἀντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλούσιον ἐπαινοῦσί τε καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσι, τὸν δὲ πέννητα ἀτιμάζουσιν. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ νόμον<sup>Β</sup> τίθενται ὄρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὐ μὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχία, πλεόν, οὐ δ' ἦττον, ἔλαττον, προειπόντες ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχειν, ὥ ἂν μὴ ἦ οὐσία εἰς τὸ ταχθὲν τίμημα, ταῦτα δὲ ἢ βία μεθ' ὅπλων διαπράττονται, ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες κατεστήσαντο τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτω μὲν

<sup>a</sup> εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν: cf. 437 A, 604 B, Prot. 339 D, Symp. 174 D, Polit. 272 D, Soph. 258 C, 261 B, Alc. I. 132 B, Protag. 357 D where ἦς is plainly wrong, Aristoph. Knights 751.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 591 D, Laws 742 E, 705 B, 831 C ff., 836 A, 919 B with Rep. 421 D; also Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37-38.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 544 E, Demosth. v. 12.

<sup>d</sup> This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 2 "honus alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque inprobantur." Themistius and Libanius worked it into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, *The Emperor Julian*, p. 70, n. 3. Cf. also Stallbaum *ad loc.* For ἀσκεῖται cf. Pindar, *Ol.* viii. 22.



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and emulating one another they bring the majority of them to this way of thinking." "That is likely," he said. "And so, as time goes on, and they advance<sup>a</sup> in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in honour the less they honour virtue. May not the opposition of wealth and virtue<sup>b</sup> be conceived as if each lay in the scale<sup>c</sup> of a balance inclining opposite ways?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "So, when wealth is honoured in a state, and the wealthy, virtue and the good are less honoured." "Obviously." "And that which men at any time honour they practise,<sup>d</sup> and what is not honoured is neglected." "It is so." "Thus, finally, from being lovers of victory and lovers of honour they become lovers of gain-getting and of money, and they commend and admire the rich man and put him in office but despise the man who is poor." "Quite so." "And is it not then that they pass a law defining the limits<sup>e</sup> of an oligarchical polity, prescribing<sup>f</sup> a sum of money, a larger sum where it is more<sup>g</sup> of an oligarchy, where it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall hold office whose property does not come up to the required valuation? And this law they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by terrorization.<sup>h</sup> Is not that the way of it?" "It is." "The

<sup>a</sup> *δρον*: cf. 551 c, *Laws* 714 c, 962 d, 739 d, 626 b, *Menex.* 238 d, *Polit.* 293 e, 296 e, 292 c, *Lysis* 209 c, *Aristot. Pol.* 1280 a 7, 1271 a 35, and Newman i. p. 220, *Eth. Nic.* 1138 b 23. Cf. also *τέλος Rhet.* 1366 a 3. For the true criterion of office-holding see *Laws* 715 c-d and *Isoc.* xii. 131. For wealth as the criterion cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1273 a 37.

<sup>f</sup> For *ταξάμενοι* cf. Vol. I. p. 310, note c, on 416 e.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1301 b 13-14.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 557 a.

οὖν. Ἡ μὲν δὴ κατάστασις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν αὕτη. Ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἔφαμεν αὐτὴν ἀμαρτήματα

C ἔχειν;

VII. Πρῶτον μὲν, ἔφην, τοῦτο αὐτό, ὅρος αὐτῆς οἴος ἐστιν. ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις ποιοῖτο κυβερνήτας ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ πένητι, εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικώτερος εἶη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι. Πονηράν, ἧ δ' ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλλεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἄλλου οὕτως ὄτουοῦν [ἢ τινος]<sup>1</sup> ἀρχῆς; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Πλὴν πόλεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἧ καὶ πόλεως πέρι; Πολύ γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, ὅσω χαλεπωτάτη καὶ μεγίστη ἡ ἀρχή.

D Ἐν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἂν ἔχοι ἀμάρτημα. Φαίνεται. Τί δαί; τόδε ἄρά τι τούτου ἔλαττον; Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν, τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἰεὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοις. Οὐδὲν μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ἔλαττον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, τὸ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι ἴσως πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ χρωμένους τῷ πλήθει ὀπλι-

E σμένω δεδιέναι μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ μὴ

<sup>1</sup> ἢ τινος bracketed by Stallbaum, Burnet, and Hermann: ἦστινος ci. Ast.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 488, and *Polit.* 299 B-C, *What Plato Said*, p. 521, on *Euthydem.* 291 D.

<sup>b</sup> Stallbaum says that ἐπιτρέποι is used absolutely as in 575 D, *Symp.* 213 E, *Lysis* 210 B, etc. Similarly Latin *permitto*. Cf. Shorey on Jowett's translation of *Meno* 92 A-B, *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 367. See too *Diog.* L. i. 65.

<sup>c</sup> Men are the hardest creatures to govern. Cf. *Polit.* 292 D, and *What Plato Said*, p. 635, on *Laws* 766 A.

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establishment then, one may say, is in this wise." "Yes," he said; "but what is the character of this constitution, and what are the defects that we said it had?"

VII. "To begin with," said I, "consider the nature of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose men should appoint the pilots<sup>a</sup> of ships in this way, by property qualification, and not allow<sup>b</sup> a poor man to navigate, even if he were a better pilot." "A sorry voyage they would make of it," he said. "And is not the same true of any other form of rule?" "I think so." "Except of a city," said I, "or does it hold for a city too?" "Most of all," he said, "by as much as that is the greatest and most difficult<sup>c</sup> rule of all." "Here, then, is one very great defect in oligarchy." "So it appears." "Well, and is this a smaller one?" "What?" "That such a city should of necessity be not one,<sup>d</sup> but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting<sup>e</sup> against one another." "No, by Zeus," said he, "it is not a bit smaller." "Nor, further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that they will not be able to wage war, because of the necessity of either arming and employing the multitude,<sup>f</sup> and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves

<sup>a</sup> For the idea that a city should be a unity *cf.* *Laws* 739 D and *supra* on 423 A-B. *Cf.* also 422 E with 417 A-B, *Livy* ii. 24 "adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat." *Aristot. Pol.* 1316 b 7 comments ἀποπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικὴν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων . . . and tries to prove the point by his topical method.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* 417 B.

<sup>f</sup> For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people *cf.* *Thuc.* iii. 27, *Livy* iii. 15 "consules et armare plebem et inermem pati timebant."

χρωμένους ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς φανῆναι ἐν  
 αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα χρήματα μὴ ἐθέλειν  
 εἰσφέρειν, ἅτε φιλοχρημάτους. Οὐ καλόν. Τί δέ;  
 ὁ πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν γεωρ-  
 552 γοῦντας καὶ χρηματιζομένους καὶ πολεμοῦντας  
 ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἣ δοκεῖ  
 ὀρθῶς ἔχειν; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. Ὅρα δὴ, τούτων  
 πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τόδε μέγιστον αὕτη πρώτη  
 παραδέχεται. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ  
 αὐτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ ἄλλω κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου,  
 καὶ ἀποδόμενον οἰκεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν  
 τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουρ-  
 γὸν μήτε ἰπέα μήτε ὀπλίτην, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ  
 Β ἄπορον κεκλημένον. Πρώτη, ἔφη. Οὐκουν δια-  
 κωλύεται γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ τοιοῦτον·  
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλοιοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παν-  
 τάπασι πένητες. Ὅρθῶς. Τόδε δὲ ἄθρει· ἄρα  
 ὅτε πλούσιος ὢν ἀνήλισκεν ὁ τοιοῦτος, μᾶλλον τι  
 τότε ἦν ὄφελος τῇ πόλει εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν;  
 ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ  
 οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης ἦν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν  
 ἐτοίμων ἀναλωτῆς; Οὕτως, ἔφη· ἐδόκει, ἦν δὲ  
 C οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀναλωτῆς. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

<sup>a</sup> He plays on the word. In 565 c ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς is used in a different sense. Cf. *Symp.* 181 A ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδημος, *Phaedo* 80 D εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 374 B, 434 A, 443 D-E. For the specialty of function cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 480, on *Charm.* 161 E.

<sup>c</sup> So in the *Laws* the householder may not sell his lot; *Laws* 741 B-C, 744 D-E. Cf. 755 A, 857 A, *Aristot. Pol.* 1270 a 19, *Newman* i. p. 376.

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on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,<sup>a</sup> and rulers over a few. And to this must be added their reluctance to contribute money, because they are lovers of money." "No, indeed, that is not admirable." "And what of the trait we found fault with long ago<sup>b</sup>—the fact that in such a state the citizens are busybodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers and soldiers all in one? Do you think that is right?" "By no manner of means." "Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils." "What?" "The allowing a man to sell all his possessions,<sup>c</sup> which another is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go on living in the city, but as no part of it,<sup>d</sup> neither a money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper<sup>e</sup> and a dependent." "This is the first," he said. "There certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens would not be excessively rich, and others out and out paupers." "Right." "But observe this. When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of any more use to the state in the matters of which we were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods<sup>f</sup>?" "It is so," he said; "he only seemed, but was just a spendthrift." "Shall we, then, say of him that as

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1326 a 20, Newman i. pp. 98 and 109. Cf. Leslie Stephen, *Util.* ii. 111 "A vast populace has grown up outside of the old order."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1266 b 13.

<sup>f</sup> ἐροίμων: "things ready at hand." Cf. 573 A, Polyb. vi. (Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace *Epist.* i. 2. 27 "fruges consumere nati."



φῶμεν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐν κηρίῳ κηφὴν ἐγγίγνεται, σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ κηφῆνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφῆνας πάντας ἀκέντρος ὁ θεὸς πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκέντρος, ἐνίους δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας

D τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κεκεντρωμένων πάντες ὅσοι κέκληνται κακοῦργοι; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Δῆλον ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει, οὐ ἂν ἴδης πτωχοὺς, ὅτι εἰσὶ που ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμμένοι κλέπται τε καὶ βαλαντιατόμοι καὶ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πόλεσι πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὁρᾶς ἐνότας; Ὀλίγου γ', ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχόντων. Μὴ οὖν οἴο-

E μεθα, ἔφη ἐγώ, καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐπιμελεία βία κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί; Οἴομεθα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφήν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας φήσομεν τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτόθι ἐγγίγνεσθαι; Φήσομεν. Ἄλλ' οὖν δὴ τοιαύτη γέ τις ἂν εἴη ἢ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ τοσαῦτα κακὰ ἔχουσα, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω. Σχεδόν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 901 A, *Hesiod, Works and Days* 300 f., *Aristoph. Wasps* 1071 ff., *Eurip. Suppl.* 242, *Xen. Oecon.* 17. 15, and *Virgil, Georg.* iv. 168 "ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent."

The sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to Ruhnken on *Tim.* 157 ff. for many illustrations, and to Petavius *ad Themist. Orat.* xxiii. p. 285 D. Cf. Shelley, *Song to the Men of England*:



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the drone<sup>a</sup> springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the state?" "By all means, Socrates," he said. "And has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but has armed others with terrible stings? And from the stingless finally issue beggars in old age,<sup>b</sup> but from those furnished with stings all that are denominated<sup>c</sup> malefactors?" "Most true," he said. "It is plain, then," said I, "that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighbourhood concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime." "Clearly," he said. "Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see beggars?" "Nearly all are such," he said, "except the ruling class." "Are we not to suppose, then, that there are also many criminals in them furnished with stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly<sup>d</sup> restrain?" "We must think so," he said. "And shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is the result of a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state?" "We shall." "Well, at any rate such would be the character of the oligarchical state, and these, or perhaps even more than these, would be the evils that afflict

Wherefore, Bees of England, forge  
 Many a weapon, chain and scourge,  
 That these stingless drones may spoil  
 The forced produce of your toil?

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 498 A, *Laws* 653 A; also the modern distinction between defectives and delinquents.

<sup>c</sup> κέκληνται: cf. 344 B-C.

<sup>d</sup> βίᾱ is so closely connected with κατέχουσιν that the double dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes ἐπιμελείᾱ as an adverb.

553 τι, ἔφη. Ἀπειργάσθω δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ πολιτεία, ἣν ὀλιγαρχίαν καλοῦσιν, ἐκ τιμημάτων ἔχουσα τοὺς ἄρχοντας. τὸν δὲ ταύτη ὁμοιον μετὰ ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν, ὡς τε γίγνεται οἷός τε γενόμενος ἔστιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

VIII. Ἄρ' οὖν ὧδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει; Πῶς; Ὅταν αὐτοῦ παῖς γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζηλοῖ τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἵχνη διώκη, ἔπειτα αὐτὸν ἴδη ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτόν, ἢ στρατηγήσαντα ἢ τιν' ἄλλην μεγάλην ἀρχὴν ἄρξαντα, εἶτα εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα, βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν, ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Ἰδὼν δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα δείσας, οἶμαι, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκείνο, καὶ ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 550 c, p. 261, note h.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 410 b, Homer, *Od.* xix. 436 ἵχνη ἐρευνῶντος, ii. 406, iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38 μετ' ἵχνια βαίνε.

<sup>c</sup> For πταίσαντα cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 926, *Ag.* 1624 (Butl. emend.).

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1007, *Eumen.* 564, Thuc. vii. 25. 7, and Thompson on *Phaedr.* 255 d.

<sup>e</sup> Lit. "spilling." Cf. Lucian, *Timon* 23, Shakes. *Merchant of Venice*, i. i. 31 ff.:

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it." "Pretty nearly these," he said. "Then," I said, "let us regard as disposed of the constitution called oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property qualification.<sup>a</sup> And next we are to consider the man who resembles it—how he arises and what after that his character is." "Quite so," he said.

VIII. "Is not the transition from that timocratic youth to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise?" "How?" "When a son born to the timocratic man at first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps<sup>b</sup>; and then sees him suddenly dashed,<sup>c</sup> as a ship on a reef,<sup>d</sup> against the state, and making complete wreckage<sup>e</sup> of both his possessions and himself—perhaps he has been a general, or has held some other important office, and has then been dragged into court by mischievous sycophants and put to death or banished<sup>f</sup> or outlawed and has lost all his property——" "It is likely," he said. "And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and losing his property, grows timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong<sup>g</sup> from his bosom's throne<sup>h</sup> that principle of love of honour and that high spirit, and being humbled by poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily<sup>i</sup> and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard

. . . dangerous rocks  
 Would scatter all her spices on the stream,  
 Enrobe the roaring waters with my silks.

<sup>f</sup> For ἐκπεσόντα cf. 560 A, 566 A. In Xen. An. vii. 5. 13 it is used of shipwreck. Cf. ἐκβάλλοντες 488 c.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Herod. vii. 136.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Aesch. Ag. 983, Shakes. *Romeo and Juliet* v. i. 3:

My bosom's lord sits lightly in his throne,

and *supra* 550 B.

<sup>i</sup> For γλίσχωρος cf. on 488 A, *Class. Phil.* iv. p. 86 on Diog. L. iv. 59, Aelian, *Epist. Rust.* 18 γλίσχωρος τε καὶ κατ' ὀλίγον.

ξυλλέγεται. ἄρ' οὐκ οἶει τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς  
 μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκείνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ  
 φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν  
 ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας  
 παραζωννύντα; "Εγὼγ', ἔφη. Τὸ δέ γε, οἶμαι,  
 D λογιστικόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς χαμαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν  
 παρακαθίσας ὑπ' ἐκείνῳ καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος,  
 τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐὰν λογιζέσθαι οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἄλλ'  
 ἢ ὁπόθεν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων χρημάτων πλείω ἔσται, τὸ  
 δὲ αὐτὸ θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτόν  
 τε καὶ πλουσίους, καὶ φιλοτιμείσθαι μηδ' ἐφ' ἐνὶ  
 ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ ἐάν τι ἄλλο εἰς  
 τοῦτο φέρῃ. Οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη, ἔφη, μεταβολὴ οὕτω  
 ταχεῖά τε καὶ ἰσχυρά ἐκ φιλοτίμου νέου εἰς  
 E φιλοχρήματον. Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 ὀλιγαρχικός ἐστιν; Ἡ γοῦν μεταβολὴ αὐτοῦ ἐξ  
 ὁμοίου ἀνδρός ἐστι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ὀλιγαρχία  
 554 μετέστη. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὁμοῖος ἂν εἴη. Σκο-  
 πῶμεν.

IX. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ  
 πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι ὁμοῖος ἂν εἴη; Πῶς δ' οὐ;  
 Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς  
 ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ  
 ἀποπιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρ-  
 εχόμενος, ἀλλὰ δουλούμενος τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας  
 ὡς ματαίους. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Αὐχμηρὸς γέ τις, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, ὦν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος,

<sup>a</sup> ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν: cf. *Protag.* 315 b, *Tim.* 46 c, *Critias* 117 c, etc., *Herod.* iv. 175.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 554 a, 556 c, *Xen. Mem.* ii. 6. 4 μηδὲ πρὸς ἐν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτὸς τι κερδαίνει, and *Aristot. Pol.* 1257 b 4-7, and *supra* 330 c. See too Inge, *Christian Ethics*,

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work collects property. Do you not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold, and girt with the Persian sword?" "I do," he said. "And under this domination he will force the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch lowly to right and left<sup>a</sup> as slaves, and will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little,<sup>b</sup> and the other to admire and honour nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that?" "There is no other transformation so swift and sure of the ambitious youth into the avaricious type." "Is this, then, our oligarchical man?" said I. "He is developed, at any rate, out of a man resembling the constitution from which the oligarchy sprang." "Let us see, then, whether he will have a like character." "Let us see."

IX. "Would he not, in the first place, resemble it in prizing wealth above everything?" "Inevitably." "And also by being thrifty and laborious, satisfying only his own necessary<sup>c</sup> appetites and desires and not providing for expenditure on other things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable?" "By all means." "He would be a squalid<sup>d</sup> fellow," said I, "looking for a surplus of

p. 220: "The *Times* obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills) will suffice. 'Money-making is an art by itself; it demands for success the devotion of the whole man,' etc. For the phrase σκοπεῖν ὀρθῶς cf. Isoc. *Areop.* 83, *Panegy.* 133-134 σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὄν.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 558 D, p. 291, note i.

<sup>d</sup> ἀρχμηρός: cf. *Symp.* 203 D.



- B θησαυροποιὸς ἀνὴρ· οὓς δὴ καὶ ἐπαιεῖ τὸ πλῆθος· ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῆ τοιαύτῃ πολιτεία ὁμοιος; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ· χρήματα γοῦν μάλιστα ἔντιμα τῆ τε πόλει καὶ παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παιδεία ὁ τοιοῦτος προσέσχηκεν. Οὐ δοκῶ, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα.<sup>1</sup> Εὐ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τόδε δὲ σκόπει· κηφηνῶδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἀπαιδευσίαν μὴ φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι,
- C τὰς μὲν πτωχικάς, τὰς δὲ κακούργους, κατεχομένας βία ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Οἴσθ' οὖν, εἶπον, οἱ ἀποβλέψας κατόψει αὐτῶν τὰς κακουργίας; Ποῖ; ἔφη. Εἰς τὰς τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις καὶ εἴ πού τι αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτον ξυμβαίνει, ὥστε πολλῆς ἐξουσίας λαβέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. Ἀληθῆ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τούτῳ δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ
- D ἑαυτοῦ βία κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας,

<sup>1</sup> ἐτίμα μάλιστα Schneider. The ἐτι μάλιστα of the mss. is impossible.

<sup>a</sup> For περιουσίαν cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 50 and *Theaet.* 154 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 256 E, *Meno* 90 A-B by implication. Numenius (ed. Mullach iii. 158) relates of Lacydes that he was "a bit greedy (ὕπογλισχρότερος) and after a fashion a thrifty manager (οἰκονομικός)—as the expression is—the sort approved by most people." Emerson, *The Young American*, "They recommend conventional virtues, whatever will earn and preserve property." But this is not always true in an envious democracy: cf. Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America to-day.



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profit<sup>a</sup> in everything, and a hoarder, the type the multitude approves.<sup>b</sup> Would not this be the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity?" "I certainly think so," he said. "Property, at any rate, is the thing most esteemed by that state and that kind of man." "That, I take it," said I, "is because he has never turned his thoughts to true culture." "I think not," he said, "else he would not have made the blind<sup>c</sup> one leader of his choir and first in honour."<sup>d</sup> "Well said," I replied. "But consider this. Shall we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appetites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly, others the rascally, but that they are forcibly restrained by his general self-surveillance and self-control<sup>e</sup>?" "We shall indeed," he said. "Do you know, then," said I, "to what you must look to discern the rascalities of such men?" "To what?" he said. "To guardianships of orphans,<sup>f</sup> and any such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity." "True." "And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better<sup>g</sup> element in himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling

<sup>c</sup> Plato distinctly refers to the blind god Wealth. Cf. Aristoph. *Plutus*, Eurip. fr. 773, *Laws* 631 c πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλός which was often quoted. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 624, Otto, p. 60.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *supra* 552 ε ἐπιμελεία βία. For ἄλλης cf. 368 β ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ἡμετέρου τρόπου.

<sup>f</sup> For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a test of character cf. *Laws* 777 d-e, Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 330, and Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, pp. 84-85, who, however, errs on the meaning of αἰδώς. For orphans cf. also *Laws* 926-928, 766 c, 877 c, 909 c-d.

<sup>g</sup> ἐπιεικεῖ is here used generally, and not in its special sense of "sweet reasonableness."

οὐ πείθων, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ' ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων; Καὶ πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Καὶ νῆ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὐρήσεις, ὅταν δέη τὰλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἶη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἰς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ

E ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους χειρόνων. Ἔστιν οὕτως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶη· ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν. Δοκεῖ μοι. Καὶ μὴν ἀνταγωνιστῆς γε ἰδία ἐν

555 πόλει ὁ φειδωλὸς φαῦλος ἢ τινος νίκης ἢ ἄλλης φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν, χρήματά τε οὐκ ἐθέλων εὐδοξίας ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγῶνων ἀναλίσκειν, δεδιὼς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἀναλωτικὰς ἐγείρειν καὶ ξυμπαρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ ξυμμαχίαν τε καὶ φιλονικίαν, ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἠττάται καὶ πλουτεῖ. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ἔτι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπιστοῦμεν, μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν ὁμοιότητι τὸν φειδωλὸν

B τε καὶ χρηματιστὴν τετάχθαι; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

X. Δημοκρατίαν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, μετὰ τοῦτο

<sup>a</sup> For ἐνούσας cf. *Phileb.* 16 D, *Symp.* 187 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 463 D. For the idea here cf. *Phaedo* 68-69, *What Plato Said*, p. 527.

<sup>c</sup> For the idea "at war with himself," cf. *supra* 440 B and E (στάσις), *Phaedr.* 237 D-E, and *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1099 a 12 f.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 397 E.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. on 443 D-E, Vol. I. p. 414, note e; also *Phaedo* 61 A, and *What Plato Said*, p. 485, on *Laches* 188 D.

<sup>f</sup> ὀλιγαρχικῶς keeps up the analogy between the man and

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within,<sup>a</sup> not persuading them that it 'is better not'<sup>b</sup> nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally." "Quite so," he said. "Yes, by Zeus," said I, "my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites." "Most emphatically." "Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension.<sup>c</sup> He would not be really one, but in some sort a double<sup>d</sup> man. Yet for the most part, his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse." "It is so." "And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony<sup>e</sup> with itself would escape him and dwell afar." "I think so." "And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honourable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchical<sup>f</sup> fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself rich!<sup>g</sup>" "Yes indeed," he said. "Have we any further doubt, then," I said, "as to the correspondence and resemblance<sup>h</sup> between the thrifty and money-making man and the oligarchical state?" "None," he said.

X. "We have next to consider, it seems, the origin the state. Cf. my "Idea of Justice," *Ethical Record*, Jan. 1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.

<sup>g</sup> i.e. he saves the cost of a determined fight. For the effect of surprise cf. on 544 c, p. 239, note f.

<sup>h</sup> ὁμοίτητι: cf. 576 c.

- σκεπτόον, τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον γενομένη τε ποῖόν τινα ἔχει, ἴν' αὖ τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς τρόπον γνόντες παραστησώμεθ' αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν. Ὅμοίως γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πορευοίμεθα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινα τοιόνδε ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, δι' ἀπληστίαν τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον
- C δεῖν γίνεσθαι; Πῶς δὴ; Ἄτε, οἶμαι, ἄρχοντες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἶργειν νόμῳ τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι γίνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὠνούμενοι τὰ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰσδανείζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίνωνται. Παντός γε μᾶλλον. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο ἐν πόλει, ὅτι πλοῦτον τιμᾶν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἅμα ἱκανῶς κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς
- D πολίταις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἢ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀμελεῖν ἢ τοῦ ἐτέρου; Ἐπιεικῶς, ἔφη, δῆλον. Παραμελοῦντες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ἐφίεντες ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἀγεινεῖς ἐνίοτε ἀθρώπους πένητας ἠνάγκασαν γενέσθαι. Μάλα γε. Κάθηνται δὴ, οἶμαι, οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν
- E καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες. Ἔστι

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 55 c εἰς τὴν κρίσιν, *Laws* 856 c, 943 c.

<sup>b</sup> The σκοπός or ὄρος. Cf. on 551 a, p. 263, note e, and *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1094 a 2.

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and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgement.<sup>a</sup> "That would at least be a consistent procedure." "Then," said I, "is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good,<sup>b</sup> the attainment of the greatest possible wealth?" "In what way?" "Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed." "By all means." "And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honouring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship,<sup>c</sup> but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected." "That is pretty clear," he said. "And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness<sup>d</sup> in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality."<sup>e</sup> "It surely has." "And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution."<sup>f</sup> "'Tis so."

<sup>a</sup> Ackermann, *Das Christliche bei Plato*, compares *Luke* xvi. 13 "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." Cf. also *Laws* 742 D-E, 727 E f., 831 c.

<sup>b</sup> ἀκολασταίνειν: cf. *Gorg.* 478 A, *Phileb.* 12 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 832 A οὐκ ἀφνειῖς. For the men reduced to poverty swelling the number of drones cf. *Eurip. Herc. Fur.* 588-592, and Wilamowitz *ad loc.*

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1305 b 40-41, 1266 b 14.



ταῦτα. Οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύψαντες, οὐδὲ  
δοκοῦντες τούτους ὄρᾶν, τῶν λοιπῶν τὸν αἰεὶ ὑπ-  
εἰκόντα ἐνιέντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες, καὶ τοῦ  
πατρὸς ἐγγόνους τόκους πολλαπλασίους κομιζό-  
556 μνοι, πολὺν τὸν κηφῆνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ  
πόλει. Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, οὐ πολὺν; Οὔτε γ' ἐκείνη,  
ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἐθέλουσιν  
ἀποσβεννύναι, εἴργοντες τὰ αὐτοῦ ὅποι τις βού-  
λεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῆδε, ἣ αὐτὰ κατὰ ἕτερον νόμον  
τὰ τοιαῦτα λύεται. Κατὰ δὴ τίνα; Ὅς μετ'  
ἐκείνόν ἐστι δεύτερος καὶ ἀναγκάζων ἀρετῆς  
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας. εἴαν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ  
κινδύνῳ τὰ πολλὰ τις τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων  
B προστάτῃ ξυμβάλλειν, χρηματίζονται μὲν ἂν  
ἦττον ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττω δ' ἐν αὐτῇ  
φύοιτο τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, οἷων νῦν δὴ εἶπομεν.  
Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἣ δ' ὅς. Νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, διὰ  
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν δὴ ἀρχομένους οὕτω  
διατιθέασιν ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ ἄρχοντες· σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς  
καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἄρ' οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους  
καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς  
C τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Persius, *Sat.* ii. 61 "o curvae in terras animae, et caelestium inanes," Rossetti, *Niniveh, in fine*, "That set gaze never on the sky," Dante, *Purg.* xix. 71-73:

Vidi gente per esso che piangea,  
Giacendo a terra tutta volta in giuso.  
*Adhaesit pavimento anima mea*, etc.

Cf. *infra* 586 A κεκυφότες. Cf. also on 553 D for the general thought.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Euthyph.* 5 C, *Polit.* 287 A, Aristoph. *Peace* 1051, *Plut.* 837, Eurip. *Hippol.* 119, *I.T.* 956, *Medea* 67, Xen. *Hell.* iv. 5. 6.

<sup>c</sup> Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, "the poison of  
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“ But these money-makers with down-bent heads,<sup>a</sup> pretending not even to see<sup>b</sup> them, but inserting the sting of their money<sup>c</sup> into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state.”

“ They do indeed multiply it,” he said. “ And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own,<sup>d</sup> or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses.” “ What law?”

“ The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue.<sup>e</sup> For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts<sup>f</sup> should be at the contractor’s risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there.” “ Much fewer,”

he said. “ But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their offspring, do they not make the young spoiled<sup>g</sup> wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand

their money.” *τιτρώσκοιτες* suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For *ἐπιέντες* cf. Eurip. *Bacchae* 851 *ἐνεῖς . . . λύσσαν*, “implanting madness.” In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest, cf. 507 A, p. 96.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 552 A, *Laws* 922 E-923 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 327 D *ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελείσθαι*, *Symp.* 185 B, and for *ἐπιμελείσθαι* cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 464, on *Apol.* 29 D-E.

<sup>f</sup> For refusing to enforce monetary contracts cf. *Laws* 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254 on *Aristot. Pol.* 1263 b 21.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 483, on *Laches* 179 D, and *Aristot. Pol.* 1310 a 23.

τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργούς; Τί μὴν; Αὐτοὺς δὲ πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμεληκότας, καὶ οὐδὲν πλείω ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένους ἀρετῆς ἢ τοὺς πένητας; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὕτω δὲ παρεσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἢ κατὰ θεωρίας ἢ κατὰ στρατείας, ἢ ξύμπλοι γιγνόμενοι ἢ συστρατιῶται, D ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι, μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἰσχνὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἠλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἐσκιατροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδη ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἀρ' οἶει αὐτὸν οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι κακία τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλῳ παραγγέλλειν, ὅταν E ἰδία ξυγγίγνωνται, ὅτι ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ παρ' οὐδέν<sup>1</sup>; Εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσιν. Οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρᾶς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ ταῦτὸ ἐκείνῳ διακειμένη πόλις ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς προφάσεως, ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένων ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης

<sup>1</sup> ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ παρ' οὐδέν Baiter: γὰρ οὐδέν AFDM: ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι Adam.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 429 c-d, *Laches* 191 d-e, *Laws* 633 d.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Tucker on Aesch. *Suppl.* 726.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Soph. *Ajax* 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα.

<sup>d</sup> For a similar picture cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 1086-1098. Cf. also *Gorg.* 518 c, and for the whole passage Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5. 15, Aristot. *Pol.* 1310 a 24-25.

<sup>e</sup> The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For κακία τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακία τῇ αὐτῶν, *Rhesus*

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up against pleasure and pain,<sup>a</sup> and mere idlers?" "Surely." "And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit?" "Little they care." "And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in way-faring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt<sup>b</sup> pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh,<sup>c</sup> and sees him panting and helpless<sup>d</sup>—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice<sup>e</sup> of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another 'our men are good for nothing'?" "Nay, I know very well that they do," said he. "And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse<sup>f</sup> from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion,<sup>g</sup> the one party bringing in<sup>h</sup> allies

813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρία, *Phaedrus* 248 B, *Symp.* 182 D, *Crito* 45 E, Eurip. *Androm.* 967, Aristoph. *Thesm.* 868 τῇ κοράκων πονηρία.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Soph. *O.T.* 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ' εὐνάξει ῥοπή, "a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep," Demosth. *Olynth.* ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, *apud* Höffding, i. 30 "Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile," with *Tim.* 89 B.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.

πόλεως ξυμμαχίαν ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατου-  
 μένης, νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτὴ αὐτῇ μάχεται, ἐνίοτε δὲ  
 557 καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει; Καὶ σφόδρα γε.  
 Δημοκρατία δὴ, οἶμαι, γίννεται, ὅταν οἱ πένητες  
 νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἐτέρων, τοὺς  
 δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐξ ἴσου μεταδῶσι  
 πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ  
 κλήρων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῇ γίννονται. "Ἔστι γάρ,  
 ἔφη, αὐτὴ ἢ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, εἴαν τε καὶ  
 δι' ὄπλων γένηται εἴαν τε καὶ διὰ φόβον ὑπεξ-  
 ελθόντων τῶν ἐτέρων.

XI. Τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοι τρόπον  
 Β οἰκοῦσι; καὶ ποία τις ἢ τοιαύτη αὐτῶν πολιτεία;  
 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις  
 ἀναφανήσεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν  
 δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἢ πόλις μεστή καὶ  
 παρρησίας γίννεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν  
 ὃ τί τις βούλεται; Λέγεταιί γε δὴ, ἔφη. "Ὅπου  
 δέ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδίαν ἕκαστος ἂν κατα-  
 σκευὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ,

<sup>a</sup> στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, "grievously ill of faction." Cf. *supra* on 554 D, p. 276, note c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 488 c, 560 A, *Gorg.* 466 c, 468 D, *Prot.* 325 B. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted *cum grano salis*.

<sup>c</sup> ἐξ ἴσου: one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 B

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from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises<sup>a</sup>?" "Most emphatically." "And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out<sup>b</sup> others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share<sup>c</sup> in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.<sup>d</sup>" "Why, yes," he said, "that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism<sup>e</sup> resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties."

XI. "What, then," said I, "is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man." "It is plain," he said. "To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence<sup>f</sup> to do as he likes?" "So it is said," he replied. "And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan<sup>g</sup> for leading his

and c, 599 B, 617 C, *Laws* 919 D, *Alc. I.* 115 D, *Crito* 50 E, *Isoc. Archid.* 96, *Peace* 3.

<sup>a</sup> But *Isoc. Areop.* 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin *ad loc.* For the use of the lot in Plato *cf. Laws* 759 B, 757 E, 690 C, 741 B-C, 856 D, 946 B, *Rep.* 460 A, 461 E. *Cf. Apelt*, p. 520.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* 551 B.

<sup>c</sup> *ἐξουσία*: *cf. Isoc.* xii. 131 *τὴν δ' ἐξουσίαν ὃ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν.* *Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy*, chap. ii. Doing as One Likes.

<sup>d</sup> *κατασκευή* is a word of all work in Plato. *Cf.* 419 A, 449 A, 455 A, *Gorg.* 455 E, 477 B, etc.



- ἤτις ἕκαστον ἀρέσκοι. Δῆλον. Παντοδαποὶ δὲ  
 C ἂν, οἶμαι, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ' ἐγ-  
 γίνοντο ἄνθρωποι. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Κινδυνεύει,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι·  
 ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλ-  
 μένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἡθεσι πεποικιλμένη  
 καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο· καὶ ἴσως μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ  
 ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ  
 ποικίλα θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν.  
 D Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Καὶ ἔστι γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ. Τί δῆ;  
 "Ὅτι πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν,  
 καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν,  
 ὃ νῦν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς  
 δημοκρατουμένην ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὅς ἂν αὐτὸν  
 ἀρέσκη τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς  
 παντοπῶλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξα-  
 μένῳ οὕτω κατοικίξειν. "Ἴσως γοῦν, ἔφη, οὐκ  
 E ἂν ἀποροῖ παραδειγμάτων. Τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην,  
 εἶπον, εἶναι ἄρχειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, μηδ'

<sup>a</sup> παντοδαπός usually has an unfavourable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-c, 561 d, 567 e, 559 d, *Symp.* 198 b, *Gorg.* 489 c, *Laws* 788 b, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favourable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does.

For the mixture of things in a democracy cf. *Xen. Rep. Ath.* 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένη ἐξ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων; and *Laws* 681 d. Libby, *Introduction to History of Science*, p. 273, says "Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato's judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state." De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.



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own life in the way that pleases him." "Obvious." "All sorts<sup>a</sup> and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other?" "Of course." "Possibly," said I, "this is the most beautiful of polities; as a garment of many colours, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps," I said, "many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women<sup>b</sup> when they see bright-coloured things." "Yes indeed," he said. "Yes," said I, "and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution." "Why so?" "Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar<sup>c</sup> of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own." "Perhaps at any rate," he said, "he would not be at a loss for patterns." "And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a

<sup>b</sup> For the idea that women and children like many colours cf. Sappho's admiration for Jason's mantle mingled with all manner of colours (*Lyr. Graec.* i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys cf. *Laws* 658 D, Shakes. *As You Like It*, III. ii. 435 "As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this colour," Faguet, *Nineteenth Century* "Lamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Dion* 53. Burke says "A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species." Cf. *Laws* 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, *Patriarcha*, misquotes this, saying "The Athenians sold justice . . ., which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold."

ἂν ἤσ ικανὸς ἄρχειν, μηδὲ αὐτὸς ἄρχεσθαι, εἰ μὴ  
 βούλη, μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμούντων, μηδὲ εἰρήνην  
 ἄγειν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγόντων, εἰ μὴ ἐπιθυμῆς  
 εἰρήνης, μηδ' αὐτὸς, εἰ μὴ τις ἄρχειν νόμος σε δια-  
 κωλύῃ ἢ δικάζειν, μηδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ  
 558 δικάζειν, εἰ μὴ αὐτῷ σοὶ ἐπίη, ἄρ' οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ  
 ἠδεῖα ἢ τοιαύτη διαγωγὴ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα; Ἴσως,  
 ἔφη, ἔν γε τούτῳ. Τί δαί; ἢ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν  
 δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὐπω εἶδες ἐν τοιαύτῃ  
 πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου  
 ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἤττον αὐτῶν μεόντων τε καὶ  
 ἀναστρεφομένων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος  
 οὔτε ὀρώντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἦρως;  
 Καὶ πολλοὺς γ', ἔφη. Ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ'  
 Β ὀπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις  
 ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν  
 ὠκίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μὴ τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι,  
 οὐποτ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὧν  
 εὐθύς παῖζοι ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοι τὰ τοιαῦτα

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1271 a 12 δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. 347 b-c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 955 b-c, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. *Acharn. passim*.

<sup>c</sup> διαγωγὴ: cf. 344 e, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also *Theaet.* 177 a, *Polit.* 274 d, *Tim.* 71 d, *Laws* 806 e. Aristot. *Met.* 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, *Aristot.* ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 562 d. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51, Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. *Antid.* 20, *Areopagit.* 67-68, *Hel.* 37; also *Menex.* 243 e and also *Euthydem.* 303 d δημοτικόν

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city, even if you are qualified,<sup>a</sup> or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,<sup>b</sup> or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment<sup>c</sup> for the time being?" "Perhaps," he said, "for so long." "And is not the placability<sup>d</sup> of some convicted criminals exquisite<sup>e</sup>? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out<sup>f</sup> like a *revenant*<sup>g</sup>?" "Yes, many," he said. "And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority<sup>h</sup> to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain for our solemn<sup>i</sup> pronouncements<sup>j</sup> made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent<sup>k</sup> natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things

τι καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word *πραότης* is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.

<sup>c</sup> κομψή: cf. 376 A, *Theæt.* 171 A.

<sup>f</sup> For *περινοστέι* cf. Lucian, *Bis Acc.* 6, Aristoph. *Plut.* 121, 494, *Peace* 762.

<sup>g</sup> His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering "spirit," "one returned from the dead" (a perfectly possible meaning for *ἤρωσ*. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 435 translates "Geist") than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam *ad loc.*

<sup>h</sup> For οὐδ' ὀπωστῖον *συμκρολογία* cf. on 532 B ἐτι ἀδυναμία.

<sup>i</sup> *σεμνόνοντες* here has an ironical or colloquial tone—"high-brow," "top-lofty."

<sup>j</sup> Cf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A, *Laws* 643 B, Delacroix, *Psychologie de l'art*, p. 46.

<sup>k</sup> For *ὑπερβεβλημένη* cf. *Laws* 719 D, Eurip. *Alcest.* 153.

πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς καταπατήσας ἅπαντα ταῦτα οὐδὲν φροντίζει, ἐξ ὁποίων ἂν τις ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ἴων πράττη, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶ,  
C ἔαν φῆ μόνον εὖνους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, γενναία.<sup>1</sup> Ταῦτά τε δὴ, ἔφην, ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἀναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, γνώριμα λέγεις.

XII. Ἄθρει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδία. ἢ πρῶτον σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐσκεψάμεθα, τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται; Ναί, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὧδε; τοῦ φειδωλοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ  
D γένοιτ' ἂν, οἶμαι, υἱὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τετραμμένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἡθεσιν; Τί γὰρ οὐ; Βία δὴ καὶ οὗτος ἄρχων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν, ὅσαι ἀναλωτικαὶ μὲν, χρηματιστικαὶ δὲ μή, αἱ δὴ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι κέκληνται. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα, πρῶτον ὀρισώμεθα τὰς τε ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς μή; Βούλομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ἄς τε οὐκ ἂν οἶοι

<sup>1</sup> γενναία M, γενναία AFD.

<sup>a</sup> μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 c, *Symp.* 199 c, *Charm.* 175 c, *Theaet.* 161 c, *Meno* 94 b, *Polit.* 277 b, *Hipp. Maj.* 291 e.

<sup>b</sup> In Aristoph. *Knights* 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 732 f., 741 and *passim*. *Andoc.* iv. 16 εὖνους τῷ δήμῳ. Émile Faguet, *Moralistes*, iii. p. 84, says of Tocqueville, "Il est bien je crois le premier qui ait dit que la démocratie abaisse le niveau intellectuel des gouvernements." For the other side of the democratic shield see Thucyd. ii. 39.

<sup>d</sup> For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544 c, *Soph.* 231 b, *Theaet.* 209 e.

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fair and good,—how superbly <sup>a</sup> it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices <sup>b</sup> and way of life a man turns to politics, but honouring him if only he says that he loves the people! <sup>c</sup>” “It is a noble <sup>d</sup> polity, indeed!” he said. “These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful <sup>e</sup> form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike! <sup>f</sup>” “Yes,” he said, “everybody knows that.”

XII. “Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type?” “Yes,” he said. “Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty <sup>g</sup> oligarchical man would have a son bred in his father’s ways.” “Why not?” “And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary.” “Obviously.” “And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define <sup>h</sup> our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites <sup>i</sup>?” “Let us do so.” “Well,

<sup>e</sup> ἡδέια: cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government, τοῖς χρωμένους ἡδίους.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 634, on *Laws* 744 B-C, and *ibid.* p. 508 on *Gorg.* 508 A, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1131 a 23-24, Newman, i. p. 248, *Xen. Cyr.* ii. 2. 18.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 572 c, *Theogn.* 915 f., *Anth. Pal.* x. 41, *Democr.* fr. 227 and 228, *Diels* ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 106, and *Epicharm. fr.* 45, *Diels* i.<sup>3</sup> p. 126.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 485, on *Laches* 190 B, and p. 551, on *Phaedr.* 237 E.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. 554 A, 571 B, *Phaedo* 64 D-E, *Phileb.* 62 E, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. *Cic. De fin.* i. 13. 45, *Tusc.* v. 33, 93, *Porphyry, De abst.* i. 49. *Ath.* xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.



τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο,  
 E καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελούσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων  
 γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη.  
 559 ἢ οὐ; Καὶ μάλα. Δικαίως δὴ τοῦτο ἐπ' αὐταῖς  
 ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Δικαίως. Τί δαί; ἄς γέ  
 τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν, εἰ μελετῶ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς  
 οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τούναντίον,  
 πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαίους φαῖμεν εἶναι, ἄρ'  
 οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Καλῶς μὲν οὖν. Προ-  
 ελώμεθα δὴ τι παράδειγμα ἐκατέρων, αἷ εἰσιν, ἵνα  
 τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς; Οὐκοῦν χρή. Ἄρ' οὖν  
 οὐχ ἢ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι ὑγείας τε καὶ εὐεξίας καὶ  
 B αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἴη; Οἶμαι.  
 Ἡ μὲν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀναγκαῖα,  
 ἢ τε ὠφέλιμος ἢ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα οὐ δυνατή.<sup>1</sup>  
 Naί. Ἡ δὲ ὄψου, εἴ πῃ τινα ὠφέλειαν πρὸς  
 εὐεξίαν παρέχεται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; ἢ  
 πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων  
 ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ  
 παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ  
 βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τε  
 C φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἄρα γε ὀρθῶς οὐκ  
 ἀναγκαῖα ἂν καλοῖτο; Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν. Οὐκ-  
 οὖν καὶ ἀναλωτικὰς φῶμεν εἶναι ταύτας, ἐκείνας  
 δὲ χρηματιστικὰς διὰ τὸ χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα  
 εἶναι; Τί μῆν; Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων  
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φήσομεν; Οὕτω. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ

<sup>1</sup> παῦσαι ζῶντα οὐ δυνατή Hermann, παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή  
 AFDM, μὴ παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή Mon., Burnet, παῦσαι πεινῶν-  
 τας Athenaeus, παύσασθαι ζῶντος ἀδυνατεῖ Wilamowitz (Platon,  
 ii. pp. 385-386).



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then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so?" "Most assuredly." "Then we shall rightly use the word 'necessary' of them?" "Rightly." "And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?" "Fairly indeed." "Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type.<sup>a</sup>" "Let us do so." "Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite for mere bread and relishes<sup>b</sup> be necessary?" "I think so." "The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die." "Yes." "And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?" "By all means." "And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction<sup>c</sup> and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul's attainment of intelligence and sobriety?" "Nay, most rightly." "And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable,<sup>d</sup> because they help production?" "Surely." "And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?" "The same." "And were

<sup>a</sup> Or "grasp them in outline."

<sup>b</sup> For *δψον* cf. on 372 c, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.

<sup>c</sup> For *κολαζομένη* cf. 571 b, *Gorg.* 505 b, 491 e, 507 d. For the thought cf. also *supra* 519 A-B.

<sup>d</sup> Lit. "money-making." Cf. 558 d.

ὄν νῦν δὴ κηφήνα ὠνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, τὸν δὲ  
 D ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλὸν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν.  
 Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν;

XIII. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγωμεν, ὡς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. φαίνεται δέ μοι τά γε πολλὰ ὧδε γίνεσθαι. Πῶς; Ὄταν νέος τετραμμένος ὡς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδευτῶς τε καὶ φειδωλῶς, γεύσῃται κηφήνων μέλιτος καὶ ξυγγένηται αἴθῳσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδαπὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἐχούσας δυναμένοις σκευάζειν, ἐνταῦθ' αὖτε οἷον εἶναι ἀρχὴν  
 E αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς δημοκρατικὴν.<sup>1</sup> Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὡσπερ ἡ πόλις μετέβαλλε βοηθησάσης τῷ ἐτέρῳ μέρει ξυμμαχίας ἔξωθεν ὁμοίας ὁμοίῳ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νεανίας μεταβάλλει βοηθοῦντος αὐτῷ εἰδούς ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔξωθεν τῷ ἐτέρῳ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνῳ ξυγγενοῦς τε καὶ ὁμοίου; Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. Καὶ εἰ μὲν, οἶμαι, ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ ξυμμαχία, ἢ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς  
 560 ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων νουθετούντων τε καὶ κακιζόντων, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντίστασις καὶ μάχη

<sup>1</sup> So MSS.: μεταβολῆς . . . ὀλιγαρχικῆς Burnet, μεταβολῆς ὀλιγαρχίας . . . δημοκρατίαν, or insert πολιτείας after ἐαυτῷ Adam. Jowett and Campbell suggest inserting ἐξ after μεταβολῆς.

<sup>a</sup> For γέμοντα cf. 577 D, 578 A, 603 D, 611 B, Gorg. 525 A, 522 E, etc.

<sup>b</sup> αἴθῳν occurs only here in Plato. It is common in Pindar and tragedy. Ernst Maass, "Die Ironie des Sokrates," *Sokrates*, 11, p. 94 "Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats, von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefährliche Fuchsbestien genannt." (Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* xi. 20.)

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we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems <sup>a</sup> with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man ? ” “ Why, surely.”

XIII. “ To return, then,” said I, “ we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type. I think it is usually in this way.” “ How ? ” “ When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce <sup>b</sup> and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety <sup>c</sup> and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy.” “ Quite inevitably,” he said. “ May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred <sup>d</sup> group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul ? ” “ By all means,” he said. “ And if, I take it, a counter-alliance <sup>e</sup> comes to the rescue of the oligarchical part of his soul, either it may be from his father or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arises faction <sup>f</sup> and counter-

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 557 c, p. 286, note a.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 554 d.

<sup>e</sup> For the metaphor cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθη ἐκείνῳ χρωμένῳ συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν, “ they [Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions.” (Loeb tr.)

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *supra* on 554 d, p. 276, note c.

- ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν τότε γίγνεται. Τί μὴν; Καὶ ποτὲ μὲν, οἶμαι, τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ, καὶ τινες τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον, αἰδοῦς τινὸς ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμήθη πάλιν. Γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ἔφη. Αὐθις δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν ἐκπεσουσῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄλλαι ὑπο-
- B τρεφόμεναι ξυγγενεῖς δι' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς πατρὸς πολλαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραὶ ἐγένοντο. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίνεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν εἴλκυσάν τε πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὀμιλίας, καὶ λάθρα ξυγγιγνόμεναι πλήθος ἐνέτεκον. Τί μὴν; Τελευτῶσαι δὴ, οἶμαι, κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν, αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, οἱ δὲ ἄριστοι φρουροὶ τε
- C καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσὶ διανοίαις. Καὶ πολὺ γ', ἔφη. Ψευδεῖς δὲ καὶ ἀλαζόνες, οἶμαι, λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἀντ' ἐκείνων ἀναδραμόντες κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιούτου. Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς λωτοφάγους ἐλθὼν φανερώς κατοικεῖ, καὶ εἰ παρ' οἰκείων τις βοήθεια τῷ φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφικνῆται, κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι ἐκείνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας
- D οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν παριᾶσιν οὔτε πρέσβεις

<sup>a</sup> τινες . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δέ. For the partitive apposition cf. 566 E, 584 D, *Gorg.* 499 c. Cf. also *Protag.* 330 A, *Gorg.* 450 c, *Laws* 626 E, *Eurip. Hec.* 1185-1186.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 90 A.

<sup>c</sup> For the idea of guardians of the soul cf. *Laws* 961 D, *supra* 549 B. Cf. also on *Phaedo* 113 D, *What Plato said*, p. 536.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 92 D.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for

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faction and internal strife in the man with himself." "Surely." "And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others<sup>a</sup> expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man's soul and order is restored." "That sometimes happens," he said. "And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father's ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong." "Yes, that is wont to be the way of it." "And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude." "Yes indeed." "And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel<sup>b</sup> of the young man's soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honourable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians<sup>c</sup> in the minds of men who are dear to the gods." "Much the best," he said. "And then false and braggart words<sup>d</sup> and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth." "They do indeed." "And then he returns, does he not, to those Lotus-eaters<sup>e</sup> and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support<sup>f</sup> comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys

classes of people; cf. *Rep.* 415 D γηγενεῖς, *Theaet.* 181 A βέοντας, *Soph.* 248 A εἰδῶν φίλους, *Phileb.* 44 E τοῖς δυσχερέειν. So Arnold in *Culture and Anarchy* uses Populace, Philistines, Barbarians, Friends of Culture, etc., Friends of Physical Science, *Lit. and Dogma*, p. 3.

<sup>f</sup> βοήθεια: cf. *Aristot. De an.* 404 a 12.



πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν<sup>1</sup> εἰσδέχονται, αὐτοὶ τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἡλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἔξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὔσαν πείθοντες ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὲ γέ που κενώ-

Εσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατὰ γουσι ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλο-  
561 πρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτω πως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νέος ὢν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν; Καὶ μάλα γ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναργῶς. Ζῆ

<sup>1</sup> Badham, followed by Apelt, reads δι' ὧτων. See Adam's note and Appendix IV. to Book VIII.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 474 D, Thucyd. iii. 82. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. 435-436 says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But cf. Gomperz iii. 331, and *What Plato Said*, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. *Antid.* 284 σκώπτειν καὶ μιμῆσθαι δυναμένους εὐφνεῖς καλοῦσι, etc., *Areop.* 20 and 49, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 7. 25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, *Cat.* c. 52 "iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus," etc., Shakes., *Sonnet lxxvi.*, "And simple truth miscalled simplicity . . .," Thomas Wyatt, *Of the Courtier's Life*:

As drunkenness good fellowship to call; . . .  
Affirm that favel hath a goodly grace  
In eloquence; and cruelty to name  
Zeal of justice and change in time and place, etc.



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to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe 'folly'<sup>a</sup> thrust it forth, a dishonoured fugitive. And temperance they call 'want of manhood' and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are 'rusticity' and 'illiberality,' and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border.<sup>b</sup> "They do indeed." "And when they have emptied and purged<sup>c</sup> of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed<sup>d</sup> and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites,<sup>e</sup> they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent<sup>f</sup> in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence 'good breeding,' licence 'liberty,' prodigality 'magnificence,' and shamelessness 'manly spirit.' And is it not in some such way as this," said I, "that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires?" "Yes, your description is most vivid," said he. "Then, in his subsequent life,

<sup>b</sup> ὑπερορίζουσι: cf. *Laws* 855 c ὑπερορίαν φηγάδα, 866 d.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 567 c and 573 b, where the word is also used ironically, and *Laws* 735, *Polit.* 293 d, *Soph.* 226 d.

<sup>d</sup> κατέχομαι is used of divine "possession" or inspiration in *Phaedr.* 244 e, *Ion* 533 e, 536 b, etc., *Xen. Symp.* 1. 10.

<sup>e</sup> Plato frequently employs the language of the mysteries for literary effect. Cf. *Gorg.* 497 c, *Symp.* 210 a and 218 b, *Theaet.* 155 e-156 a, *Laws* 666 b, 870 d-e, *Phaedr.* 250 b-c, 249 c, *Phaedo* 81 a, 69 c, *Rep.* 378 a, etc., and Thompson on *Meno* 76 e.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Eurip. fr.* 628. 5 (Nauck), *Soph. El.* 1130.

δή, οἶμαι, μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς· ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὐτυχῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῆ, ἀλλά τι καὶ  
 B πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος, τοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρελθόντος, μέρη τε καταδέξεται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ τοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὄλον ἐαυτὸν ἐνδῶ, εἰς ἴσον δὴ τι καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παραπιπτούσῃ ἀεὶ ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν παραδιδούς, ἕως ἂν πληρωθῆ, καὶ αὖθις ἄλλη, οὐδεμίαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ λόγον γ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παριείς εἰς τὸ φρούριον, ἐάν  
 C τις λέγῃ ὡς αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, αἱ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν χρῆ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησὶν ἀπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου. Σφόδρα γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτω διακείμενος τοῦτο δρᾶ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ διαζῆ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν οὕτω χαριζόμενος τῇ προσπιπτούσῃ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος, αὖθις δὲ ὑδροποτῶν

<sup>a</sup> For the ironical *δή* cf. 562 D, 563 B, 563 D, 374 B, 420 E and on 562 E, p. 307, note h.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 241 A μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἀρχοντα ἐν αὐτῶ. For this type of youth cf. Thackeray's Barnes Newcome. For the lot cf. *supra*, p. 285, note d, on 557 A.

<sup>c</sup> Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage. Cf. 557 A.

<sup>d</sup> An obvious reference to the *Gorgias*. Cf. *Gorg.* 494 E, *Phileb.* 13 B ff., *Protag.* 353 D ff., *Laws* 733.

<sup>e</sup> The Greek says "throws back his head"—the character-

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I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth,<sup>a</sup> and so lives turning over the guard-house<sup>b</sup> of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.<sup>c</sup> "Quite so." "And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honourable and good desires, and others from those that are base,<sup>d</sup> and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head<sup>e</sup> at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed." "Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct." "And does he not," said I, "also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute<sup>f</sup> and again drinking only water and dieting;

istic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. *Acharn.* 115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says.

<sup>f</sup> For the word *καταλούμενος* cf. 411 A, *Laws* 790 E, Lucian, *Bis acc.* 17, and for the passive Eur. *I.T.* 367. Cf. also Philetaerus, *Philaulus*, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. fr. 187. *Ἔ μολπαῖσι δ' ἠσθεὶς τοῦτ' ἀεὶ θηρέεται.* For the type cf. Theophrastus, *Char.* 11, Aristoph. *Wasps* 1475 ff.

D καὶ κατισχναινόμενος, τοτὲ δ' αὖ γυμναζόμενος, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀργῶν καὶ πάντων ἀμελῶν, τοτὲ δ' ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων· πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὃ τι ἂν τύχη λέγει τε καὶ πράττει· κἄν ποτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, ταύτη φέρεται, ἢ χρηματιστικούς, ἐπὶ τοῦτ' αὖ, καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἔπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἡδύν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον

E τοῦτον χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός. Παντάπασι, ἢ δ' ὅς, διελέλυθας βίον ἰσονομικοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρός. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπὸν τε καὶ πλείστων ἡθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι· ὃν πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλώσειαν τοῦ βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων πλείστα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντα. Οὔτω γάρ, ἔφη, ἔστιν.

562 Τί οὖν; τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσ-  
αγορευόμενος; Τετάχθω, ἔφη.

XIV. Ἡ καλλίστη δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε καὶ ὁ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ λοιπὰ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη διελθεῖν, τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος. Κομιδῆ γ', ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ᾧ φίλε ἑταίρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει, σχεδὸν δῆλον. Δῆλον. Ἄρ' οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 319 D.

<sup>b</sup> For ὃ τι ἂν τύχη cf. on 536 A, p. 213, note f, ὅταν τύχη Eurip. *Hippol.* 428, *I.T.* 722, Eurip. *fr.* 825 (Didot), ὅπου ἂν τύχωσιν Xen. *Oec.* 20. 28, ὃν ἂν τύχῃς Eurip. *Tro.* 68.

<sup>c</sup> παντοδαπὸν: cf. on 557 c.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 557 D.

<sup>e</sup> For the irony cf. 607 E τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν, supra 544 c γενναία, 558 c ἡδεῖα.

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and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up<sup>a</sup> and says and does whatever enters his head.<sup>b</sup> And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end." "That is a perfect description," he said, "of a devotee of equality." "I certainly think," said I, "that he is a manifold<sup>c</sup> man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city<sup>d</sup> he is the fair and many-coloured one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities." "Yes, that is so," he said. "Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?" "Let that be his place," he said.

XIV. "And now," said I, "the fairest<sup>e</sup> polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant." "Certainly," he said. "Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.<sup>f</sup> That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain." "Yes, plain." "Is it, then, in a sense, in the same

<sup>f</sup> *τις τρόπος . . . γίνεται* is a mixture of two expressions that need not be pressed. Cf. *Meno* 96 D, *Epist.* vii. 324 B. A. G. Laird, in *Class. Phil.*, 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks it means "What *τρόπος* (of the many *τρόποι* in a democracy) develops into a *τρόπος* of tyranny; for that tyranny is a transformation of democracy is fairly evident." That would be a recognition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers overlooked in their classification of polities.



ἐκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ  
 Β δημοκρατίας τυρανίς; Πῶς; Ὁ προὔθεντο, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' οὗ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθ-  
 ἴστατο—τοῦτο δ' ἦν πλοῦτος<sup>1</sup>. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Ἡ  
 πλοῦτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέ-  
 λεια διὰ χρηματισμὸν αὐτὴν ἀπώλλυ. Ἀληθῆ,  
 ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁ δημοκρατία ὀρίζεται ἀγαθόν,  
 ἡ τούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει; Λέγεις  
 δ' αὐτὴν τί ὀρίζεσθαι; Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον.  
 τοῦτο γάρ που ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει ἀκούσαις  
 C ἂν ὡς ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ  
 ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκεῖν ὅστις φύσει ἐλεύθερος. Λέ-  
 γεται γὰρ δῆ, ἔφη, καὶ πολὺ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα. Ἄρ'  
 οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἦα νῦν δὴ ἐρῶν, ἡ τοῦ τοιού-  
 του ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια καὶ ταύ-  
 την τὴν πολιτείαν μεθίστησί τε καὶ παρασκευάζει  
 τυραννίδος δεηθῆναι; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅταν, οἶμαι,  
 δημοκρατουμένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα κακῶν  
 D οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχῃ, καὶ πορρωτέρω  
 τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῆ, τοὺς ἄρχοντας  
 δῆ, ἂν μὴ πάνυ πρᾶοι ὦσι καὶ πολλὴν παρέχωσι

<sup>1</sup> πλοῦτος F, ὑπέρπλουτος ADM, που πλοῦτος Campbell, εἶπερ τι πλοῦτος Apelt, ὑπέρπλουτος πλοῦτος Stallbaum.

<sup>a</sup> Their idea of good. Cf. *supra* 555 B προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ. Cf. *Laws* 962 E with *Aristot. Pol.* 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also *Aristot. Pol.* 1304 b 20 αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκραταὶ μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν. Cf. also p. 263, note e on 551 B (ἄρος) and p. 139, note c on 519 c (σκοπός).

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 552 B, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, note b, on 550 E.

<sup>c</sup> Zeller, *Aristot.* ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with the Platonic thought that every form of government brings ruin on itself by its own excess.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 43 "The central



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way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy ? ” “ How is that ? ” “ The good that they proposed to themselves<sup>a</sup> and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth,<sup>b</sup> was it not ? ” “ Yes. ” “ Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making was the cause of its undoing. ” “ True, ” he said. “ And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it<sup>c</sup> too ? ” “ What do you say its criterion to be ? ” “ Liberty,<sup>d</sup> ” I replied ; “ for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live.<sup>e</sup> ” “ Why, yes, ” he replied, “ you hear that saying everywhere. ” “ Then, as I was about to observe,<sup>f</sup> is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship ? ” “ How ? ” he said. “ Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders<sup>g</sup> and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine,<sup>h</sup> and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it

idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty.”

<sup>a</sup> Aristot. *Pol.* 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in Plato's *Republic*.

<sup>f</sup> ἡα . . . ἐρῶν : cf. 449 A, *Theaet.* 180 c.

<sup>g</sup> Or “ protectors, ” “ tribunes, ” προστατούντων. Cf. *infra* on 565 c, p. 318, note d.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Livy xxxix. 26 “ velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem, ” Seneca, *De benefic.* i. 10 “ male dispensata libertas, ” Taine, *Letter*, Jan. 2, 1867 “ nous avons proclamé et appliqué l'égalité . . . C'est un vin pur et généreux ; mais nous avons bu trop du nôtre. ”

τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς. Δρῶσι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο. Τοὺς δέ γε, εἶπον, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκόους προπηλακίζει ὡς ἐθελοδούλους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀρχομένοις, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἄρχουσιν ὁμοίους ἰδία τε καὶ δημοσία ἐπαινεῖ τε  
 Ε καὶ τιμᾶ. ἀρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἰέναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Καὶ καταδύεσθαι γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, εἰς τε τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην. Πῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν; Οἶον, ἔφην, πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι παιδὶ ὅμοιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς υἱεῖς, υἱὸν δὲ πατρί, καὶ μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι τοὺς  
 563 γονέας, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἦ· μέτοικον δὲ ἀστῶ καὶ ἀστὸν μετοίκῳ ἐξισοῦσθαι, καὶ ξένον ὡσαύτως. Γίνεται γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη. Ταῦτά τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε ἄλλα γίνεται· διδάσκαλός τε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει,

<sup>a</sup> μιαρούς is really stronger, "pestilential fellows." Cf. *Apol.* 23 D, *Soph. Antig.* 746. It is frequent in Aristophanes.

<sup>b</sup> For the charge of oligarchical tendencies cf. *Isoc. Peace* 51 and 133, *Areop.* 57, *Antid.* 318, *Panath.* 148.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 184 c, 183 A. Cf. the essay of Estienne de la Boétie, *De la servitude volontaire*. Also Gray, *Ode for Music*, 6 "Servitude that hugs her chain."

<sup>d</sup> For οὐδὲν ὄντας cf. 341 c, *Apol.* 41 E, *Symp.* 216 E, *Gorg.* 512 c, *Erastae* 134 c, *Aristoph. Eccles.* 144, *Horace, Sat.* ii. 7. 102 "nil ego," *Eurip. I.A.* 371, *Herod.* ix. 58 οὐδένας ἐόντες.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laws* 699 E ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν, *Aristoph. Lysistr.* 543 ἐπὶ πᾶν ἰέναι, *Soph. El.* 615 εἰς πᾶν ἔργον.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 563 c, *Laws* 942 D.

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and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly, it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed<sup>a</sup> oligarchs.<sup>b</sup>”

“ Yes, that is what they do,” he replied. “ But those who obey the rulers,” I said, “ it reviles as willing slaves<sup>c</sup> and men of naught,<sup>d</sup> but it commends and honours in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths<sup>e</sup> ? ” “ Of course. ” “ And this anarchical temper,” said I, “ my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.<sup>f</sup> ” “ Just what do we mean by that ? ” he said. “ Why,” I said, “ the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents,<sup>g</sup> so that he may be forsooth a free man.<sup>h</sup> And the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise. ” “ Yes, these things do happen,” he said. “ They do,” said I, “ and such other trifles as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns

<sup>a</sup> A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. *Areop.* 49, Aristoph. *Clouds*, 998, 1321 ff., Xen. *Rep. Ath.* 1. 10, *Mem.* iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan, *Souvenirs*, xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and liberty; Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, “ Modern Democracies,” in *Methods of Social Science*, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376: “ The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old. This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family relations depend much more on the social, structural and religious ideas of a race than on forms of government ”; Whitman, “ Where the men and women think lightly of the laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves . . . there the great city stands. ”

<sup>b</sup> For the ironical *ἴνα δῆ* cf. on 561 B. Cf. *Laws* 962 E *ἐλεύθερον δῆ*, *Meno* 86 D and Aristoph. *Clouds* 1414.

φοιτηταί τε διδασκάλων ὀλιγωροῦσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγῶν· καὶ ὅλως οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέροις ἀπεικάζονται καὶ διαμιλλῶνται καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες ξυγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις

B εὐτραπελίας τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ ἐμπίπλονται, μιμούμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀηδεῖς εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τὸ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔσχατον, ὦ φίλε, τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει, ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἔωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἔωνημένοι μηδὲν ἦττον ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι τῶν πριαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ δὲ πρὸς ἄνδρας καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς γυναῖκας ὅση ἢ ἰσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, ὀλίγου ἐπελαθόμεθ' εἰπεῖν. Οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, ἐροῦμεν ὅ τι νῦν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα; Πάνυ γε, εἶπον. καὶ ἔγωγε οὕτω λέγω· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσω ἐλευθερώτερα ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἂν τις πείθοιτο ἄπειρος. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἷ τε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οἰαίπερ αἱ δέσποιναι γίνονται τε δὴ καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄνοι, πάνυ ἐλευθέρως καὶ σεμνῶς εἰθισμένοι πορεύεσθαι, κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἀπαντῶντι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξίστηται· καὶ τὰλλα πάντα οὕτω

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 336 A, *Theaet.* 174 A, 168 B.

<sup>b</sup> For εὐτραπελίας cf. *Isoc.* xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1108 a 24. In *Rhet.* 1389 b 11 he defines it as πεπαιδευμένη ὑβρις. Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Xen. Rep. Ath.* 1. 10 τῶν δούλων δ' αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία, *Aristoph. Clouds init.*, and on slavery *Laws* 777 E, *supra* p. 249, note g on 547 c and 549 A.

<sup>d</sup> Nauck fr. 351. Cf. *Plut. Amat.* 763 B, *Themist. Orat.* iv. p. 52 B; also Otto, p. 39, and Adam *ad loc.*

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upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either. And in general the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating<sup>a</sup> themselves to the young, are full of pleasantry<sup>b</sup> and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative." "By all means," he said. "And the climax of popular liberty, my friend," I said, "is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free<sup>c</sup> than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men." "Shall we not, then," said he, "in Aeschylean phrase,<sup>d</sup> say 'whatever rises to our lips'?" "Certainly," I said, "so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how much freer the very beasts<sup>e</sup> subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify the adage<sup>f</sup> and 'like their mistresses become.' And likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside.<sup>g</sup> And so all things

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 562 ε, Julian, *Misopogon*, 355 B . . . μέχρι τῶν ὄνων ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν καμήλων; ἀγοσι τοὶ καὶ ταύτας οἱ μισθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοῶν ὥσπερ τὰς νύμφας, ". . . what great independence exists among the citizens, even down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though they were brides." (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, *Vit. Pythag.* Teubner, p. 22, § 23 μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων δικνεῖτο αὐτοῦ ἢ νοθέτησις.

<sup>f</sup> Otto, p. 119. Cf. "Like mistress, like maid."

<sup>g</sup> Eurip. *Ion* 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city life.



D μεστὰ ἐλευθερίας γίγνεται. Τὸ ἐμόν γ', ἔφη, ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὄναρ· αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντων τούτων ξυνηθροισμένων ἐννοεῖς, ὡς ἀπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, ὥστε καὶ ὀτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται, ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι; τελευτῶντες γάρ που οἴσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων φροντίζουσι γεγραμμένων ἢ E ἀγράφων, ἵνα δὴ μηδαμῆ μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἢ δεσπότης. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οἶδα.

XV. Αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἢ ἀρχὴ οὕτωςι καλὴ καὶ νεανικὴ, ὅθεν τυραννὶς φύεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. Νεανικὴ δῆτα, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; Ταυτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλέον τε καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγγενόμενον καταδουλοῦται δημοκρατίαν· καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the reflections in *Laws* 698 f., 701 A-C, *Epist.* viii. 354 D, *Gorg.* 461 E; Isoc. *Areop.* 20, *Panath.* 131, Eurip. *Cyclops* 120 ἀκούει δ' οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός, Aristot. *Pol.* 1295 b 15 f.

Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth "liberty" in the style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with Goethe (*Eckermann* i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) "Nicht das macht frei, das wir nichts über uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben, dass wir etwas verehren, das über uns ist."

Libby, *Introd. to Hist. of Science*, p. 273, not understanding the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling tribute of a hostile critic.



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everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty.<sup>a</sup> "It is my own dream<sup>b</sup> you are telling me," he said; "for it often happens to me when I go to the country." "And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive<sup>c</sup> that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude<sup>d</sup> and will not endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay no heed even to the laws<sup>e</sup> written or unwritten,<sup>f</sup> so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them." "I know it very well," said he.

XV. "This, then, my friend," said I, "is the fine and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my opinion." "Vigorous indeed," he said; "but what next?" "The same malady," I said, "that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused and more violent as a result of this licence, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to

In *Gorg.* 484 A Callicles sneers at equality from the point of view of the superman. Cf. also on 558 c, p. 291, note f; Hobbes, *Leviathan* xxi. and Theopompus's account of democracy in *Byzantium*, fr. 65. Similar phenomena may be observed in an American city street or Pullman club car.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Callimachus, *Anth. Pal.* vi. 310, and xii. 148 μή λέγε . . . τοῦμόν δνειρον ἐμολ, Cic. *Att.* vi. 9. 3, Lucian, *Somnium seu Gallus* 7 ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῦμόν ἐνύπνιον ἰδών, Tennyson, "Lucretius": "That was mine, my dream, I knew it."

<sup>c</sup> This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval, is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf. also Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 51 "And so if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the streets impassable he says he is being butchered by the aristocracy."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 491 E δουλεύων ὄτρωδν, *Laws* 890 A.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laws* 701 B νόμων ζητεῖν μή ὑπηκόοις εἶναι.

<sup>f</sup> For unwritten law cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 637, on *Laws* 793 A.

564 φιλεῖ εἰς τὸναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναί, ἐν  
 ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ  
 ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα. Εἰκὸς, ἔφη. Ἡ γὰρ  
 ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν  
 δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτη καὶ πόλει.  
 Εἰκὸς γάρ. Εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης  
 πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας,  
 ἐξ οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλείστη  
 τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη. Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. Ἄλλ'  
 οὐ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποῖον  
 Β νόσημα ἐν ὀλιγαρχία τε φυόμενον ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν  
 δημοκρατία δουλοῦται αὐτήν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.  
 Ἐκείνο τοίνυν, ἔφην, ἔλεγον, τὸ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ  
 δαπανηρῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρειότατον  
 ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀνανδρότερον ἐπόμενον·  
 οὓς δὴ ἀφωμοιοῦμεν κηφῆσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα  
 ἔχουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντροις. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.  
 Τούτῳ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταραττετον ἐν πάσῃ  
 C πολιτεία ἐγγιγνομένῳ, οἷον περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τε  
 καὶ χολή· ὧ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν τε καὶ  
 νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἦττον ἢ σοφὸν μελιττουργόν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. 5, Cic. *De rep.* i. 44  
 "nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus prin-  
 cipum, sic hunc nimis liberum . . ." etc.; Emerson, *History*,  
 "A great licentiousness treads on the heels of a reformation."  
 Cf. too Macaulay on the comic dramatists of the Restoration;  
 Arnold, *Lit. and Dogma*, p. 322 "After too much glorifica-  
 tion of art, science and culture, too little; after Rabelais,  
 George Fox;" Tennyson:

He that roars for liberty  
 Faster binds the tyrant's power.

See Coleridge's *Table Talk*, p. 149, on the moral law of  
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bring about a corresponding reaction<sup>a</sup> to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies,<sup>b</sup> and most especially in political societies." "Probably," he said. "And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state." "Yes, that is probable." "Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution<sup>c</sup> than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude." "That is reasonable," he said. "That, however, I believe, was not your question,<sup>d</sup> but what identical<sup>e</sup> malady arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it?" "You say truly," he replied. "That then," I said, "was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones,<sup>f</sup> some equipped with stings and others stingless." "And rightly too," he said. "These two kinds, then," I said, "when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body<sup>g</sup> by phlegm and gall. And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar

polarity. Émile Faguet says that this law of reaction is the only one in which he believes in literary criticism.

<sup>b</sup> For the generalization *cf.* *Symp.* 188 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf.* 565 D. The slight exaggeration of the expression is solemnly treated by Apelt as a case of logical false conversion in Plato.

<sup>d</sup> Plato keeps to the point. *Cf.* on 531 c, p. 193, note i.

<sup>e</sup> ταῦτόν implies the concept. *Cf.* *Parmen.* 130 D, *Phileb.* 34 E, 13 B, *Soph.* 253 D. *Cf.* also *Tim.* 83 c, *Meno* 72 c, *Rep.* 339 A.

<sup>f</sup> *Cf.* 555 D-E.

<sup>g</sup> *Cf.* the parallel of soul and body in 444 c f., *Soph.* 227 E, *Crito* 47 D f., *Gorg.* 504 B-C, 505 B, 518 A, 524 D.

For φλέγμα *cf.* *Tim.* 83 c, 85 A-B.

πόρρωθεν εὐλαβείσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὁ τι τάχιστα ξὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον. Naὶ μὰ Δία, ἧ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί γε. Ὡδε τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λάβωμεν, ἵν' εὐκρινέστερον ἴδωμεν ὁ βουλόμεθα. Πῶς; Τριχῆ διαστησώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει. ἐν D μὲν γάρ που τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφύεται δι' ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχουμένη. Ἔστιν οὕτως. Πολὺν δέ γε δριμύτερον ἐν ταύτῃ ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ. Πῶς; Ἐκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγύμναστον καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται· ἐν δημοκρατία δὲ τοῦτό που τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ E οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου διοικεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ χωρὶς τινων ὀλίγων. Μάλα γε, ἧ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλο τοῖνυν τοιόνδε αἰεὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους. Τὸ ποῖον; Χρηματιζομένων που πάντων οἱ κοσμιώτατοι φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατοι γίγνονται. Εἰκός. Πλείστον δῆ, οἶμαι, τοῖς κηφῆσι μέλι καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλίπτεται. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, παρά γε τῶν σμικρὰ ἐχόντων

<sup>a</sup> μάλιστα μὲν . . . ἂν δέ: cf. 378 A, 414 C, 461 C, 473 B, *Apol.* 34 A, *Soph.* 246 D.

<sup>b</sup> For εὐκρινέστερον cf. *Soph.* 242 C.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 23 C, which Stenzel says argues an advance

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against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly<sup>a</sup> to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all." "Yes, by Zeus," he said, "by all means." "Then let us take it in this way," I said, "so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.<sup>b</sup>" "How?" "Let us in our theory make a tripartite<sup>c</sup> division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class, as we have described, grows up in it because of the licence, no less than in the oligarchic state." "That is so." "But it is far fiercer in this state than in that." "How so?" "There, because it is not held in honour, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker's stand and keeps up a buzzing<sup>d</sup> and tolerates<sup>e</sup> no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state." "Quite so," he said. "And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort." "What sort?" he said. "When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest." "It is likely." "Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract.<sup>f</sup>" "Why, yes," he said, "how could one squeeze it out of those who have

over the *Sophist*, because Plato is no longer limited to a bipartite division.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 573 A.

<sup>b</sup> ἀνέχεται: cf. Isoc. viii. 14 ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὐσης οὐκ ἔστι παρησία, etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 305 οὐκ ἀνασχέσομαι, *Wasps* 1337.

<sup>f</sup> For βλίττεται cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Knights* 794.



τις βλίσειεν; Πλούσιοι δῆ, οἶμαι, οἱ τοιοῦτοι  
καλοῦνται, κηφήνων βοτάνη. Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη.

565 XVI. Δῆμος δ' ἂν εἶη τρίτον γένος, ὅσοι αὐτ-  
ουργοί τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὐ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτη-  
μένοι· ὃ δὲ πλείστον τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν  
δημοκρατία, ὅταν περ ἀθροισθῆ. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη·  
ἀλλ' οὐ θαμὰ ἐθέλει ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ μέλιτός  
τι μεταλαμβάνη. Οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει, ἦν δ'  
ἐγώ, αἰεὶ, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς  
ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ  
δῆμῳ τὸ πλείστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν. Μεταλαμβάνει  
B γὰρ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως. Ἀναγκάζονται δῆ,  
οἶμαι, ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντές τε ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ καὶ  
πράττοντες ὅπῃ δύνανται, οὗτοι ὧν ἀφαιροῦνται.  
Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Αἰτίαν δὲ ἔσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων,  
κὰν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι  
τῷ δῆμῳ καὶ εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχικοί. Τί μῆν; Οὐκ-  
οὖν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὰν ὀρώσι τὸν δῆμον

<sup>a</sup> That is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. "the rich."

<sup>b</sup> For the classification of the population cf. Vol. I. pp. 161-163, Eurip. *Suppl.* 238 ff., Aristot. *Pol.* 1328 b ff., 1289 b 33, 1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97.

<sup>c</sup> ἀπράγμονες: cf. 620 c, Aristoph. *Knights* 261, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1381 a 25, Isoc. *Antid.* 151, 227. But Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in *Class. Phil.* xv. (1920) pp. 300-301.

<sup>d</sup> αὐτουργοί: cf. *Soph.* 223 D, Eurip. *Or.* 920, Shorey in *Class. Phil.* xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1318 b 12.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους.

<sup>g</sup> For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Knights* 1295. For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4. 30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc. *Areop.* 32 ff.,

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little?" "The capitalistic<sup>a</sup> class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones." "Pretty much so," he said.

XVI. "And the third class,<sup>b</sup> composing the 'people,' would comprise all quiet<sup>c</sup> cultivators of their own farms<sup>d</sup> who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly." "Yes, it is," he said, "but it will not often do that,<sup>e</sup> unless it gets a share of the honey." "Well, does it not always share," I said, "to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing<sup>f</sup> to the people what they take from the well-to-do,<sup>g</sup> to keep the lion's share for themselves<sup>h</sup>?"

"Why, yes," he said, "it shares in that sense. "And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power." "Of course." "And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.<sup>i</sup>" "Surely." "And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will<sup>j</sup> but through

*Peace* 131, *Dem. De cor.* 105 ff., on his triarchic law; and also *Eurip. Herc. Fur.* 588-592, *Shakes. Richard II.* i. iv. 49 f.:

Whereto, when they shall know what men are rich.

They shall subscribe them for large sums of gold.

*Cf. Inge, More Lay Thoughts of a Dean*, p. 13.

<sup>a</sup> *Cf. Aristoph. Knights* 717-718, 1219-1223, and *Achilles in Il.* ix. 363.

<sup>b</sup> *i.e.* reactionaries. *Cf. supra* on 562 D, p. 306, note *b*, *Aeschines* iii. 168, and 566 *c* *μισθδημος*. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the "disharmony" between Plato's upper-class sympathies and his liberal philosophy.

<sup>j</sup> So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. *Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn.* 515-516.

οὐχ ἐκόντα, ἀλλ' ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντα  
 C ὑπὸ τῶν διαβαλλόντων, ἐπιχειροῦντα σφᾶς ἀδικεῖν,  
 τότε ἤδη, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, ὡς ἀληθῶς  
 ὀλιγαρχικοὶ γίνονται, οὐχ ἐκόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκεῖνος ὁ κηφήν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν  
 αὐτούς. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. Εἰσαγγελίαι δὴ καὶ  
 κρίσεις καὶ ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων γίνονται. Καὶ  
 μάλα. Οὐκοῦν ἓνα τινὰ αἰεὶ δῆμος εἶωθε δια-  
 φερόντως προΐστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν  
 τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν; Εἶωθε γάρ. Τοῦτο μὲν  
 D ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δῆλον, ὅτι, ὅταν περ φύηται  
 τύραννος, ἐκ προστατικῆς ρίζης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν  
 ἐκβλαστάνει. Καὶ μάλα δῆλον. Τίς ἀρχὴ οὖν  
 μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; ἢ δῆλον  
 ὅτι ἐπειδὴν ταῦτὸν ἄρξῃται δρᾶν ὁ προστάτης τῷ  
 ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, ὃς περὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδία τὸ τοῦ Διὸς  
 τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν λέγεται; Τίς, ἔφη. Ὡς ἄρα  
 ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχχνου, ἐν  
 ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἐνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου,  
 E ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας  
 τὸν λόγον; Ἔγωγε. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν  
 δήμου προεστῶς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον,  
 μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ' ἀδίκως

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension (δι' ἀγνοίαν) are involuntary.

<sup>b</sup> For τότε ἤδη cf. 569 A, *Phaedo* 87 E, *Gorg.* 527 D, *Laches* 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note i.

<sup>c</sup> So Aristotle, *Pol.* 1304 b 30 ἠναγκάσθησαν σύσταντες καταλύσαι τὸν δῆμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν δνειδίζοντες . . . ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 562 D, Eurip. *Or.* 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. *Knights* 1128. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, *S.I.G.* 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476.

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misapprehension,<sup>a</sup> and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then,<sup>b</sup> whether they wish it or not,<sup>c</sup> they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them." "Precisely." "And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side." "Yes, indeed." "And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector<sup>d</sup> and cherish and magnify him?" "Yes, it is." "This, then, is plain," said I, "that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root<sup>e</sup> and from nothing else." "Very plain." "What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector's acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia<sup>f</sup>?" "What is that?" he said. "The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale?" "I have." "And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob,<sup>g</sup> does not withhold his hand from the shedding of

The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. *supra* Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1310 b 14 *οἱ πλείστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν*, etc., *ibid.* 1304 b 20 ff.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook's *Zeus*, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of Plato's feeling. Cf. the language of the *Laws* on homicide, 865 ff.

<sup>g</sup> Note the difference of tone from 502 b. Cf. *Phaedr.* 260 c.

ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια  
 ἄγων μαιφονῆ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττη τε  
 καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γεύομενος φόνου ξυγγενοῦς,  
 566 καὶ ἀνδρηλατῆ καὶ ἀποκτινύη καὶ ὑποσημαίνη  
 χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἄρα τῷ  
 τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἴμαρται ἢ  
 ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ  
 ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.  
 Οὗτος δὴ, ἔφην, ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς  
 ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας. Οὗτος. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκπεσῶν  
 μὲν καὶ κατελθὼν βία τῶν ἐχθρῶν τύραννος ἀπ-  
 ειργασμένος κατέρχεται; Δῆλον. Ἐὰν δὲ ἀδύ-  
 B νατοι ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὸν ὧσιν ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι διαβάλ-  
 λοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν  
 ἀποκτινύναι λάθρα. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτω  
 γίγνεσθαι. Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύ-  
 λητον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες  
 ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινος τοῦ  
 σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ἦ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός.  
 C Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Διδόασι δὴ, οἶμαι, δείσαντες μὲν  
 ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν. Καὶ  
 μάλα. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ὅταν ἴδῃ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἔχων

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* ii. 32; Lucan i. 331 :

nullus semel ore receptus  
 pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.

<sup>b</sup> For ἀφανίζων cf. *Gorg.* 471 b.

<sup>c</sup> The apparent contradiction of the tone here with *Laws* 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another "disharmony." Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen.* ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, *Les Idées*



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tribal blood,<sup>a</sup> but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out<sup>b</sup> a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands<sup>c</sup>—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate<sup>d</sup> that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf? ” “ It is quite inevitable,” he said. “ He it is,” I said, “ who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.<sup>e</sup> ” “ Yes, he.” “ May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant? ” “ Obviously.” “ And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth.” “ That is certainly wont to happen,” said he. “ And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition<sup>f</sup> of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe<sup>g</sup> for the friend of democracy.” “ They do indeed,” he said. “ And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves.” “ Yes, indeed.” “ And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth

*politiques d'Isocrate*, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. *De myst.* 88, Plato, *Laws* 684, Demosth. *Against Timocr.* 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques*, 1317, the oath at Itanos.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 619 c.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 565 A.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Herod. i. 59, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1357 b 30 ff. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρόλητον cf. *Phaedo* 100 b.

<sup>g</sup> For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 A, Vol. I. p. 65, note c.

καὶ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αἰτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι, τότε δὴ οὗτος, ὡς ἑταῖρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσω γενόμενον χρησμόν

πολυψήφίδα παρ' Ἑρμον

φεύγει, οὐδὲ μένει, οὐδ' αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, δεύτερον αὖθις αἰδεσθείη. Ὁ δέ γε, οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοται. Ἀνάγκη. Ὁ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἐκείνος αὐτὸς δῆλον δὴ ὅτι μέγας μεγαλωστί, οὐ κείται, ἀλλὰ  
 D καταβαλὼν ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἔστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως, τύραννος ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετελεσμένος. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη.

XVII. Διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ἧ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος βροτὸς ἐγγένηται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, διέλθωμεν. Ἄρ' οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελαῖ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται πάντας, ὧς ἂν περιτυγχάνη, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός  
 E φησιν εἶναι, ὑπισχνεῖται τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε, καὶ γῆν διένειμε δῆμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτὸν, καὶ πᾶσιν ἰλεῶς τε καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι προσποιεῖται; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ὅταν δέ γε, οἶμαι, πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς αἰεὶ κινεῖ, ἢ ἐν χρεῖα ἠγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ἦ. Εἰκός

<sup>a</sup> For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 474, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph. *Knights* 787, *Clouds* 1187.

<sup>b</sup> Herod. i. 55.

<sup>c</sup> In *Il.* xvi. 776 Cebriones, Hector's charioteer, slain by Patroclus, κείτο μέγας μεγαλωστί, "mighty in his mightiness." (A. T. Murray, Loeb tr.)

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the repute of hostility to democracy,<sup>a</sup> then in the words of the oracle <sup>b</sup> delivered to Croesus,

By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos  
Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the  
white feather."

"No, for he would never get a second chance to blush." "And he who is caught, methinks, is delivered to his death." "Inevitably." "And then obviously that protector does not lie prostrate, 'mighty with far-flung limbs,' in Homeric overthrow,<sup>c</sup> but overthrowing many others towers in the car of state<sup>d</sup> transformed from a protector into a perfect and finished tyrant." "What else is likely?" he said.

XVII. "Shall we, then, portray the happiness," said I, "of the man and the state in which such a creature arises?" "By all means let us describe it," he said. "Then at the start and in the first days does he not smile<sup>e</sup> upon all men and greet everybody he meets and deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in private and public, and having freed men from debts, and distributed lands to the people and his own associates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all?" "Necessarily," he said. "But when, I suppose, he has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies<sup>f</sup> and has got others destroyed and is no longer disturbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring up some war<sup>g</sup> so that the people may be in need of

<sup>a</sup> For the figure cf. *Polit.* 266 ε. More common in Plato is the figure of the ship in this connexion. Cf. on 488.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Eurip. *I.A.* 333 ff., Shakes. *Henry IV.* Part I. i. iii. 246 "This king of smiles, this Bolingbroke."

<sup>c</sup> Not "foreign enemies" as almost all render it. Cf. my note on this passage in *Class. Rev.* xix. (1905) pp. 433-439, 573 Β ξξω ὠθεῖν, *Theognis* 56, *Thuc.* iv. 66 and viii. 64.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 308 Δ, and in modern times the case of Napoleon.

567 γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες  
 γιγνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζονται  
 εἶναι καὶ ἦττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσιν; Δῆλον.  
 Καὶ ἂν γέ τινας, οἶμαι, ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονή-  
 ματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, ὅπως  
 ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ, ἐνδοὺς τοῖς  
 πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἔνεκα τυράννω αἰεὶ  
 ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταραττεῖν; Ἀνάγκη. Ταῦτα δὴ  
 Β ποιοῦντα ἔτοιμον μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολί-  
 ταις; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν καὶ τινας τῶν  
 ξυγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρ-  
 ρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους,  
 ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οἳ ἂν τυγχάνω-  
 σιν ἀνδρικώτατοι ὄντες; Εἰκός γε. Ὑπεξαιρεῖν  
 δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει  
 ἄρξειν, ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων μήτ' ἐχθρῶν λίπη  
 μηδένα, ὅτου τι ὄφελος. Δῆλον. Ὅξέως ἄρα δεῖ  
 C ὁρᾶν αὐτόν, τίς ἀνδρεῖος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, τίς  
 φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος· καὶ οὕτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν,  
 ὥστε τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἴτε βούλεται  
 εἴτε μή, πολεμίῳ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, ἕως ἂν  
 καθήρῃ τὴν πόλιν. Καλόν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν.  
 Naί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώματα·

<sup>a</sup> For ταραττεῖν in this sense cf. Dem. *De cor.* 151 ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐταράχθη, Soph. *Antig.* 795 νεῖκος . . . ταραξας.

<sup>b</sup> ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. *Prom.* 307 of those who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. See also Xen. *Ages.* 2. 31, Isoc. *Panegy.* 126.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δῆ, as often in the *Timaeus*, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. *Tim.* 67 c, 69 a, 77 c, 82 b, and *passim*.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i.

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a leader." "That is likely." "And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?" "Obviously." "And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars<sup>a</sup>?" "Yes, he is compelled to do so." "And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?" "Of course." "And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish<sup>b</sup> and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?" "Yes, it is likely." "Then the tyrant must do away<sup>c</sup> with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe." "Obviously." "He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich; and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.<sup>d</sup>" "A fine purification," he said. "Yes," said I, "just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For

p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men *cf.* *Laws* 832 c, *Gorg.* 510 b-c, *Xen. Hiero* 5. 1, *Isoc.* viii. 112, *Eurip. Ion* 626-628, *Milton, Tenure of Kings*, etc., *init.*, *Shakes., Richard II.* III. iv. 33 ff.:

Go thou, and like an executioner  
Cut off the heads of too fast growing sprays  
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.  
All must be even in our government.

But *cf.* *Pindar, Pyth.* iii. 71, of *Hiero*, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς.



οὐ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χεῖριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπouσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τούναντίον. Ὡς ἔοικε γάρ, αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει.

XVIII. Ἐν μακαρία ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη  
 D δέδεται, ἣ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν  
 πολλῶν οἰκεῖν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον ἢ μὴ  
 ζῆν. Ἐν τοιαύτῃ, ἣ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχί, ὅσω  
 ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν,  
 τοσοῦτῳ πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων  
 δεήσεται; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τίνες οὖν οἱ πιστοί, καὶ  
 πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται; Αὐτόματοι, ἔφη,  
 πολλοὶ ἤξουσι πετόμενοι, εἰάν τὸν μισθὸν διδῶ.  
 Κηφῆνας, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς αὐ τινὰς  
 E μοι λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς. Ἀληθῆ  
 γάρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι. Τί δέ; αὐτόθεν<sup>1</sup> ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν  
 ἐθελήσειεν; Πῶς; Τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς  
 πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν δορυφόρων  
 ποιήσασθαι. Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη· ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ πιστό-  
 τατοι αὐτῷ οὔτοί εἰσιν. Ἡ μακάριον, ἣν δ' ἐγώ,  
 λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα, εἰ τοιούτοις φίλοις τε καὶ  
 568 πιστοῖς ἀνδράσι χρῆται, τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους  
 ἀπολέσας. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρῆται.  
 Καὶ θαυμάζουσι δῆ, εἶπον, οὔτοι οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτὸν  
 καὶ ξύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολῖται, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικέις μισοῦσί

<sup>1</sup> τί δέ; αὐτόθεν Hermann, Adam: τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν; AFDM: τί δὲ αὐτόθεν Mon. (without punctuation): τοὺς δὲ αὐτόθεν Stephanus.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Laws 952 E, Rep. 467 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics in the Soviet armies.

THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII

while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse." "Yes, for apparently he must," he said, "if he is to keep his power."

XVIII. "Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him," said I, "which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life." "Such it is," he said. "And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards?" "Of course." "Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them?" "Unbidden," he said, "they will wing their way<sup>a</sup> to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage." "Drones, by the dog," I said, "I think you are talking of again, an alien<sup>b</sup> and motley crew.<sup>c</sup>" "You think rightly," he said. "But what of the home supply,<sup>d</sup> would he not choose to employ that?" "How?" "By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard." "Assuredly," he said, "since these are those whom he can most trust." "Truly," said I, "this tyrant business<sup>e</sup> is a blessed<sup>f</sup> thing on your showing, if such are the friends and 'trusties' he must employ after destroying his former associates." "But such are indeed those he does make use of," he said. "And these companions admire him," I said, "and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him."

<sup>a</sup> παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 c.

<sup>b</sup> For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρώμονος, Thuc. i. 11, Xen. *Ages.* 1. 28.

<sup>c</sup> For the idiomatic and colloquial χρῆμα cf. Herod. i. 36, Eurip. *Androm.* 181, *Theaet.* 209 ε, Aristoph. *Clouds* 1, *Birds* 826, *Wasps* 933, *Lysistr.* 83, 1085, *Acharn.* 150, *Peace* 1192, *Knights* 1219, *Frogs* 1278.

<sup>f</sup> For the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. p. 368, note a.

τε καὶ φεύγουσιν; Τί δ' οὐ μέλλουσιν; Οὐκ ἐτός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τε τραγωδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ. Τί δὴ; "Οτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγγετο, Β ὡς ἄρα σοφοὶ τύραννοί εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία. καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς ζύνεστιν. Καὶ ὡς ἰσόθεόν γ', ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκωμιάζει, καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Τοιγάρτοι, ἔφην, ἄτε σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιηταί συγγιγνώσκουσιν ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἐκείνοις, ὅσοι ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται, ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἄτε τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς. Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη, συγγιγνώ- C σκουσιν ὅσοιπέρ γε αὐτῶν κομψοί. Εἰς δέ γε, οἶμαι, τὰς ἄλλας περιμόντες πόλεις, συλλέγοντες τοὺς ὄχλους, καλὰς φωνὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς μισθωσάμενοι εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας ἔλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας. Μάλα γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ προσέτι τούτων μισθοὺς λαμβάνουσι καὶ τιμῶνται, μάλιστα μὲν, ὥσπερ τὸ εἰκόσ, ὑπὸ τυράννων, δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας· ὅσω δ' ἂν ἀνωτέρω ἴωσι πρὸς τὸ ἀναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον D ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἢ τιμῆ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος ἀδυνατουῦσα πορεύεσθαι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

<sup>a</sup> For *οὐκ ἐτός* cf. 414 E. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph. Cf. e.g. *Acharn.* 411, 413, *Birds* 915, *Thesm.* 921, *Plut.* 404, 1166, *Eccl.* 245.

<sup>b</sup> This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the admirers of Euripides.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *πυκνὰ φρένες* *Iliad* xiv. 294, *πυκνὸς νόος* xv. 41, etc.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Theages* 125 B f. The line is also attributed to Sophocles. Cf. Stemplinger, *Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur*, p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Dümmler, *Akademika*, p. 16. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 119 thinks this an

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“Why should they not?” “Not for nothing,<sup>a</sup>” said I, “is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians.<sup>b</sup>” “Why, pray?” “Because among other utterances of pregnant thought<sup>c</sup> he said, ‘Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.’<sup>d</sup> He meant evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise.” “Yes, he and the other poets,” he said, “call the tyrant’s power ‘likest God’s’<sup>e</sup> and praise it in many other ways.” “Wherefore,” said I, “being wise as they are, the poets of tragedy will pardon us and those whose politics resemble ours for not admitting them<sup>f</sup> into our polity, since they hymn the praises of tyranny.” “I think,” he said, “that the subtle minds<sup>g</sup> among them will pardon us.” “But going about to other cities, I fancy, collecting crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices,<sup>h</sup> they draw the politics towards tyrannies or democracies.” “Yes, indeed.” “And, further, they are paid and honoured for this, chiefly, as is to be expected, by tyrants, and secondly by democracy.<sup>i</sup> But the higher they go, breasting constitution hill, the more their honour fails, as it were from lack of breath<sup>j</sup> unable to proceed.” “Quite so.”

allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus of Macedon.

Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii. 3-5 contrasts their education unfavourably with that of the ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly thinking of Plato.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 119, note c, Eurip. *Tro.* 1169, Isoc. ii. 5.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 394 D. *What Plato Said*, p. 561, *infra* 598 ff.

<sup>c</sup> κομψοί is used playfully or ironically.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 502 B ff., *Laws* 817 c, and for the expression *Protag.* 347 D.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laches* 183 A-B.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Shakes. *Ant.* and *Cleop.* III. x. 25 “Our fortune on the sea is out of breath.”

XIX. Ἄλλὰ δὴ, εἶπον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐξέβημεν· λέγωμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον τὸ καλόν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδέποτε ταῦτόν, πόθεν θρέψεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἴαν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ἢ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐξαρκῆ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων,<sup>1</sup> ἐλάττους εἰσφοράς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον  
 E εἰσφέρειν. Τί δ' ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλείπη; Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρώων θρέψεται αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι. Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον θρέψει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἑταίρους. Πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη. Πῶς δὲ λέγεις; εἶπον· εἴαν δὲ ἀγανακτῆ τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος, ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς υἱὸν ἠβῶντα, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ὑπὸ  
 569 υἱέος πατέρα, οὔτε τούτου αὐτὸν ἔνεκα ἐγέννησέ τε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, τότε αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὐτοῦ δούλοις τρέφοι ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ ξυγκλύδων ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν καγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθῆι ἐκεῖνου προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεύει ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὥσπερ πατὴρ υἱὸν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν ξυμποτῶν ἐξελαύνων; Γνώσεταιί γε, νῆ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, τότ'  
 B ἤδη ὁ δῆμος, οἷος οἷον θρέμμα γεννῶν ἡσπάζετό

<sup>1</sup> καὶ τὰ Baiter, τὰ mss.; ἀπολομένων A<sup>2</sup>, ἀποδομένων AFDM, πωλουμένων ci. Campbell. See Adam, App. VI.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note e.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 574 D, Diels<sup>1</sup> p. 578, Anon. Iambl. 3.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Soph. O.T. 873 ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον.



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XIX. "But this," said I, "is a digression.<sup>a</sup> Let us return to that fair, multitudinous, diversified and ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and tell how it will be supported." "Obviously," he said, "if there are sacred treasures in the city he will spend these as long as they last and the property of those he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller contributions from the populace." "But what when these resources fail<sup>b</sup>?" "Clearly," he said, "his father's estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his fellows and his she-fellows." "I understand," I said, "that the people which begot the tyrant<sup>c</sup> will have to feed him and his companions." "It cannot escape from that," he said. "And what have you to say," I said, "in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called 'better classes,'<sup>d</sup> and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels<sup>e</sup> from his house a son together with troublesome revellers?" "The demos, by Zeus," he said, "will then learn to its cost<sup>f</sup> what it is and what<sup>g</sup> a creature it

<sup>a</sup> For *καλῶν κάγαθῶν* cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 185, and Blaydes on 735. See also *supra* on 489 E, p. 27, note d.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 123.

<sup>f</sup> For the threatening *γνώσεται* cf. 362 A, 466 c, *Il.* xviii. 270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 *τάχα γνώση*, and Lucian, *Timon* 33 *εἰσεται*.

<sup>g</sup> For the juxtaposition *ὄλος ὄλον* cf. *Symp.* 195 A, Sophocles *El.* 751, *Ajax* 557, 923, *Trach.* 995, 1045.

τε καὶ ηὔξε, καὶ ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὢν ἰσχυροτέ-  
 ρους ἐξελαύνει. Πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμή-  
 σαι τὸν πατέρα βιάζεσθαι, κὰν μὴ πείθῃται, τύπ-  
 τειν ὁ τύραννος; Naί, ἔφη, ἀφελόμενός γε τὰ  
 ὄπλα. Πατραλοίαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τύραννον  
 καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο δὴ  
 ὁμολογουμένη ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καὶ τὸ λεγόμε-  
 νον ὁ δῆμος φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν δουλείας ἐλευθέ-  
 ρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐμπεπτωκῶς  
 εἴη, ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθε-  
 ρίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων  
 δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ταῦτα  
 οὕτω γίγνεται. Τί οὖν; εἶπον· οὐκ ἐμμελῶς  
 ἡμῖν εἰρήσεται, ἐὰν φῶμεν ἱκανῶς διεληλυθέναι,  
 ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννὶς ἐκ δημοκρατίας, γενομένη  
 τε οἷα ἐστίν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* on 574 c, pp. 346-347, note e.

<sup>b</sup> As we say, "Out of the frying-pan into the fire." Cf. *Anth. Pal.* ix. 17. 5 ἐκ πυρὸς ὡς αἶνος ἴπες ἐς φλόγα, Theodoret, *Therap.* iii. p. 773 καὶ τὸν καπνὸν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, ὡς ἔοικε, φύγοντες, εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ἐμπεπτώκαμεν. See Otto, p. 137; also Solon 7 (17) (*Anth. Lyr.*, Bergk-Hiller, 9 in Edmonds, *Greek Elegy and Iambus*, i. p. 122, Loeb Classical

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begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger." "What do you mean?" said I; "will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him<sup>a</sup>?" "Yes," he said, "after he has once taken from him his arms." "A very parricide," said I, "you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire<sup>b</sup> of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty<sup>c</sup> has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.<sup>d</sup>" "Yes indeed," he said, "that is just what happens." "Well, then," said I, "shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself?" "Quite sufficiently," he said.

Library) *εις δὲ μονάρχου δῆμος ἀιδρεῖη δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν*, Herod. iii. 81 *τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἀνδρας ἐς δήμου ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν*, and for the idea *Epist.* viii. 354 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Epist.* viii. 354 D.

<sup>d</sup> For the rhetorical style cf. *Tim.* 41 *Ἄ θεοὶ θεῶν*, *Polit.* 303 *σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς*, and the biblical expressions, God of Gods and Lord of Lords, e.g. *Deut.* x. 17, *Ps.* cxxxvi. 2-3, *Dan.* xi. 36, *Rev.* xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on *Soph. O.T.* 1063 *τρίδουλος*.

571 I. Αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ σκέψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ δημοκρατικοῦ, γενόμενός τε ποῖός τις ἔστι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζῆ, ἄθλιον ἢ μακάριον. Λοιπὸς γὰρ οὖν ἔτι οὗτος, ἔφη. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ποθῶ ἔτι; Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οἰαί τε καὶ ὄσαι εἰσίν, οὗ μοι δοκοῦμεν ἰκανῶς διηρηῆσθαι. τούτου δὴ  
 B ἐνδεῶς ἔχοντος, ἀσαφεστέρα ἔσται ἢ ζήτησις οὗ ζητοῦμεν. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτ' ἐν καλῷ<sup>1</sup>; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ σκόπει γ' ὁ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι ἰδεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τόδε. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἠδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσί τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, αἱ κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, κολαζόμεναι δὲ ὑπὸ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντάπασιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγαι λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς,  
 C τῶν δὲ ἰσχυρότεροι καὶ πλείους. Λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας, ἔφη, ταύτας; Τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον, ἦν δ'

<sup>1</sup> ἐν καλῷ M and almost all editions: ἐγκαλῷ AFD, defended by Apelt, *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1895, p. 965.

<sup>a</sup> For ἐν καλῷ cf. Soph. *El.* 348, Eurip. *Heracleid.* 971, Aristoph. *Eccl.* 321, *Thesm.* 292.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 558 D.

<sup>c</sup> For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1102 b 5 ff. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς

## BOOK IX

I. "There remains for consideration," said I, "the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy." "Why, yes, he still remains," he said. "Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss?" "What?" "In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness." "Well," said he, "will our consideration of them not still be opportune<sup>a</sup>?" "By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures<sup>b</sup> and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled<sup>c</sup> by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous." "What desires do you mean?" he said. "Those," said I, "that are awakened in sleep<sup>d</sup> when

ἡκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον, etc.; also his *Problem.* 957 a 21 ff. Cic. *De divin.* i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph. *O.T.* 981-982.

Hazlitt writes "We are not hypocrites in our sleep," a modern novelist, "In sleep all barriers are down."

The Freudians have at last discovered Plato's anticipation



ἐγώ, ἐγειρομένας, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς ψυχῆς εὐδῆ, ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἡμερον καὶ ἄρχον ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριῶδες τε καὶ ἄγριον, ἣ σίτων ἢ μέθης πλησθέν, σκιρτᾷ τε καὶ ἀπώσάμενον τὸν ὕπνον ζητῆ ἰέναι καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ αὐτοῦ ἥθη· οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τολμᾷ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονήσεως. μητρί τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖν  
D μίγνυσθαι, ὡς οἶεται, οὐδὲν ὀκνεῖ, ἄλλω τε ὄτωοῦν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων, μαιφονεῖν τε ὄτιοῦν, βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ οὔτε ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει οὔτ' ἀναισχυντίας. Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὅταν δέ γε, οἶμαι, ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχη αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ σωφρόνως, καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕπνον ἴῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐστιάσας λόγων καλῶν καὶ σκέψεων, εἰς σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀφικόμενος, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν  
E δὲ μήτε ἐνδεία δούς μήτε πλησμονῆ, ὅπως ἂν

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of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 74: "It has been perhaps Freud's most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field." "The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep" sentimentally observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, *The New Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. xiii. and *ibid.* p. 93: "Freud refers to Plato's view that the virtuous man contents himself with dreaming that which the wicked man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the *Republic*. . . ." Cf. *ibid.* p. 95: "The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable."

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the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavours to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.<sup>a</sup> You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly<sup>b</sup> and shamelessness." "Most true," he said. "But when, I suppose, a man's condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appeti-

Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. *Eumen.* 104, Pindar, *fr.* 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: εὔδει δὲ πρᾶσσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὐδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς οὐεῖροις | δεικνυσι τέρπων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, "but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful." (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. *De div.* i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici*, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of *Tim.* 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart's "Myths of Plato," *Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods*, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.

<sup>a</sup> The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἦθος, φύσις and such words.

<sup>b</sup> For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph. *Trach.* 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 533 A, p. 200, note b.

572 κοιμηθῆ καὶ μὴ παρέχη θόρυβον τῷ βελτίστῳ  
 χαῖρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ' ἕα αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ  
 μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι του καὶ  
 αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἢ  
 ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ  
 θυμοειδὲς πραῦνας καὶ μὴ τισιν εἰς ὄργας ἔλθων  
 κεικινημένῳ τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδη, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάσας μὲν  
 τὸ δύο εἶδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας, ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρονεῖν  
 ἐγγίγνεται, οὕτως ἀναπαύηται, οἶσθ' ὅτι τῆς τ'  
 ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἄπτεται καὶ  
 Β ἤκιστα παράνομοι τότε αἱ ὄψεις φαντάζονται τῶν  
 ἐνυπνίων. Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὕτως.  
 Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνυν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐξήχθημεν εἰπεῖν· ὃ δὲ  
 βουλόμεθα γινῶναι, τόδ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ  
 ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἐκάστῳ ἔνεστι,  
 καὶ πάνυ δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι·  
 τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γίγνεται ἐνδηλον. εἰ  
 οὖν τί δοκῶ λέγειν καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς, ἄθρει. Ἄλλὰ  
 ξυγχωρῶ.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Browning, *Bishop Blougram's Apology*, "And body gets its sop and holds its noise."

Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the *Republic*, *Laws*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedo*. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, "Was Plato an Ascetic?" *Philos. Rev.*, 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, *Christian Ethics*, p. 90: "The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane and moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism."

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Ephesians* iv. 26 "Let not the sun go down upon your wrath."

<sup>c</sup> ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, *Lysis* 212 C, *Laws* 625 D.

<sup>d</sup> This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, "Pater's complaint that Plato's sentences are long may be regarded as Pater's single excursion into humour." But

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tive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep<sup>a</sup> and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future ; and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep<sup>b</sup> with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case<sup>c</sup> he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.”<sup>d</sup> “I certainly think so,” he said. “This description has carried us too far,<sup>e</sup> but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,<sup>f</sup> a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it.” “Well, I do.”

Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato's example. He calls this passage Plato's evening prayer.

<sup>e</sup> Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 c, 471 c, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, *Phaedo* 78 B, *Theaet.* 177 c, *Protag.* 359 A, *Crat.* 438 A, *Polit.* 287 A-B, 263 c, 302 B, *Laws* 682 E, 697 c, 864 c, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθη, Demosth. *De cor.* 211, Aristot. *De an.* 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato's carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 c, *Theaet.* 182 c, 206 c, *Meno* 93 A-B, *Gorg.* 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc.

<sup>f</sup> For the irony of the expression cf. *Laws* 633 D, *Aesch. Eumen.* 373, and for the thought *Othello* III. iii. 138:

who has a breast so pure  
But some uncleanly apprehensions  
Keep leets and law-days, and in session sit  
With meditations lawful?

- II. Τὸν τοίνυν δημοτικὸν ἀναμνήσθητι οἶον  
 C ἔφαμεν εἶναι. ἦν δέ που γεγωνῶς ἐκ νέου ὑπὸ  
 φειδωλῶ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος, τὰς χρηματιστικὰς  
 ἐπιθυμίας τιμῶντι μόνας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους,  
 ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἔνεκα γιγνο-  
 μένας, ἀτιμάζοντι. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Συγγενόμενος  
 δὲ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι  
 διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὀρμήσας εἰς ὕβριν τε πᾶσαν  
 καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος μίσει τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φειδω-  
 λίας, φύσιν δὲ τῶν διαφθειρόντων βελτίω ἔχων,  
 D ἀγόμενος ἀμφοτέρωσε κατέστη εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν  
 τοῖν τρόποιν, καὶ μετρίως δῆ, ὡς ᾤετο, ἐκάστων  
 ἀπολαύων οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον βίον  
 ζῆν, δημοτικὸς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γεγωνῶς. Ἦν γάρ,  
 ἔφη, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα περὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον.  
 Θεὸς τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν τοῦ τοιούτου ἡδῆ  
 πρεσβυτέρου γεγωνότος νέον υἱὸν ἐν τοῖς τούτου  
 αὐτῷ ἦθεσι τεθραμμένον. Τίθημι. Τίθει τοίνυν καὶ  
 τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνα περὶ αὐτὸν γιγνόμενα, ἅπερ καὶ  
 E περὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ, ἀγόμενόν τε εἰς πᾶσαν  
 παρανομίαν, ὀνομαζομένην δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγόντων  
 ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασαν, βοηθοῦντά τε ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ  
 ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις πατέρα τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους  
 οἰκείους, τοὺς δ' αὐτῷ παραβοηθοῦντας· ὅταν δ'  
 ἐλπίσωσιν οἱ δεινοὶ μάγοι τε καὶ τυραννοποιοὶ  
 οὔτοι μὴ ἄλλως τὸν νέον καθέξειν, ἔρωτά τινα  
 αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμποιῆσαι προστάτην τῶν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 559 D f.

<sup>b</sup> εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f.

<sup>c</sup> Ironic δῆ. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on "moderate" drinking and "moderate" preparedness.

<sup>d</sup> ὡς ᾤετο is another ironical formula like *ἴνα δῆ, ὡς ἄρα*, etc.



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II. "Now recall<sup>a</sup> our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so?" "Yes." "And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father's niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise<sup>b</sup> between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,<sup>c</sup> as he supposes,<sup>d</sup> he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat." "That was and is our belief about this type." "Assume,<sup>e</sup> then, again," said I, "that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn<sup>f</sup> in his ways of life." "I so assume." "And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his otherkin lend support to<sup>g</sup> these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group. And when these dread magi<sup>h</sup> and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in

<sup>a</sup> *θέσ*: cf. *Theaet.* 191 c, *Phileb.* 33 d.

<sup>f</sup> This is the *αὐ* of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note *f*.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 559 E.

<sup>h</sup> An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.

573 ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτοιμα διανεμομένων ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφήνά τινα· ἢ τι<sup>1</sup> ἄλλο οἶει εἶναι τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἔρωτα; Οὐδὲν ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλ' ἢ τοῦτο. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων, ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὔξουσαί τε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρον ἐμποιήσωσι τῷ κηφήνι, τότε δὴ Β δορυφορεῖταιί τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ οἰστρά<sup>2</sup> οὔτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἐάν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, μανίας<sup>2</sup> δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. Παντελῶς, ἔφη, τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τύραννος ὁ Ἔρως λέγεται; Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, καὶ C μεθυσθεῖς ἀνὴρ τυραννικόν τι φρόνημα ἴσχει; Ἴσχει γάρ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἐλπίζει δυνατὸς εἶναι ἄρχειν. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Τυραννικὸς δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ

<sup>1</sup> ἢ τι A: ἢ τι FDM.

<sup>2</sup> μανίας FD: καὶ μανίας AM.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 205 D.

<sup>b</sup> προστάτην: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D.

<sup>c</sup> For τὰ ἔτοιμα cf. 552 B, *Symp.* 200 D and E, and Horace, *Odes* i. 31. 17 "frui paratis."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Alc. I.* 135 E ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178):

τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα  
ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ' ὑπόπτερον;

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his soul a ruling passion<sup>a</sup> to be the protector<sup>b</sup> of his idle and prodigal<sup>c</sup> appetites, a monstrous winged<sup>d</sup> drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?" "Nothing but that," he said. "And when the other appetites, buzzing<sup>e</sup> about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,<sup>f</sup> why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,<sup>g</sup> and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted<sup>h</sup> worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges<sup>i</sup> him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside."<sup>j</sup> "A perfect description," he said, "of the generation of the tyrannical man." "And is not this analogy," said I, "the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant<sup>k</sup>?" "That may well be," he said. "And does not a drunken man,<sup>l</sup> my friend," I said, "have something of this tyrannical temper?" "Yes, he has." "And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods." "Yes indeed, he does," he said. "Then a man becomes

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 564 D.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus* 253 E.

<sup>g</sup> For *οιστρᾶ* cf. *Phaedr.* 240 D.

<sup>h</sup> For *ποιουμένας* in this sense cf. 538 c, 498 A, 574 D.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.

<sup>j</sup> *ἐπακτοῦ*: cf. 405 B, Pindar, *Pyth.* vi. 10, Aesch. *Seven against Thebes* 583, Soph. *Trach.* 259.

<sup>k</sup> Cf. 573 D, Eurip. *Hippol.* 538, *Andromeda*, fr. 136 (Nauck) *θεῶν τύραννε* . . . *Ἔρωσ*, and *What Plato Said*, p. 546 on *Symp.* 197 B.

<sup>l</sup> For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood cf. *Laws* 649 B, 671 B, *Phaedr.* 238 B.

δαιμόνιε, ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἢ φύσει ἢ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικός τε καὶ ἔρωτικός καὶ μελαγχολικός γένηται. Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

III. Γίγνεται μὲν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ. ζῆ δὲ δὴ πῶς; Τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, ἔφη, D τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς. Λέγω δὴ, ἔφην. οἶμαι γὰρ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑορταὶ γίνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κῶμοι καὶ θάλειαι καὶ ἐταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὧν ἂν Ἔρως τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν διακυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πολλαὶ καὶ δειναὶ παραβλασάνουσι ἐπιθυμίαι ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἐκάστης, πολλῶν δεόμεναι; Πολλαὶ μέντοι. Ταχὺ ἄρα ἀναλίσκονται, εἴαν τινες ὦσι πρόσοδοι. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Καὶ μετὰ E τοῦτο δὴ δανεισμοὶ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραιρέσεις. Τί μὴν; Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πάντ' ἐπιλείπη, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοᾶν πυκνάς τε καὶ σφοδράς ἐννεοοττευμένας, τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων ἐλαυνομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος, πάσαις ταῖς ἄλλαις ὥσπερ δορυφόροις ἡγουμένους, οἰστρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν, τίς τι ἔχει, ὃν δυνατόν ἀφελέσθαι ἀπατή- 574 σαντα ἢ βιασάμενον; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Ἀναγκαῖον δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἢ μεγάλαις ὠδισί τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Adam *ad loc.*, who insists it means *his* origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in c and before.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 25 B and perhaps *Rep.* 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace to-day. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the *Philebus*.

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tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend," I said, "when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal." "Assuredly."

III. "Such, it seems, is his origin and character,<sup>a</sup> but what is his manner of life?" "As the wits say, you shall tell *me*.<sup>b</sup>" "I do," I said; "for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans<sup>c</sup> and all the doings of those whose<sup>d</sup> souls are entirely swayed<sup>e</sup> by the indwelling tyrant Eros." "Inevitably," he said. "And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things?" "Many indeed." "And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended." "Of course." "And after this there are borrowings and levyings<sup>f</sup> upon the estate?" "Of course." "And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings<sup>g</sup> of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?" "Most certainly." "And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 160, note *a*, on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous.

<sup>d</sup> ὧν ἄν: cf. 441 D-E *δ*του, etc., 583 A *ἐν* ᾧ, and my review of Jowett and Campbell, *A.J.P.* xvi. p. 237.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 238 B-C.

<sup>f</sup> For *παραίσεις* cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. *Pol.* 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.

<sup>g</sup> ἐννεοστυμμένας: cf. *Alc. I.* 135 E, *Laws* 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph. *Birds* 699, 1108.



ὀδύνας ξυνέχεσθαι. Ἄναγκαῖον. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέον εἶχον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἀφηροῦντο, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀξιώσει νεώτερος ὢν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς πλέον ἔχειν καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐὰν τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀναλώσῃ, ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν πατρῶων; Ἄλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη. Ἄν δὲ δὴ αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, B ἄρ' οὐ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπιχειροῖ ἂν κλέπτειν καὶ ἀπατᾶν τοὺς γονέας; Πάντως. Ὅποτε δὲ μὴ δύναίτο, ἀρπάξοι ἂν καὶ βιάζοιτο μετὰ τοῦτο; Οἶμαι, ἔφη. Ἄντεχομένων δὴ καὶ μαχομένων, ὧ θαυμάσιε, γέροντός τε καὶ γραός, ἄρ' εὐλαβηθείη ἂν καὶ φείσαιο μή τι δρᾶσαι τῶν τυραννικῶν; Οὐ πάννυ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε θαρρῶ περὶ τῶν γονέων τοῦ τοιούτου. Ἄλλ', ὧ Ἀδείμαντε, πρὸς Διός, ἔνεκα νεωστὶ φίλης καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας ἐταίρας γεγонуίας C τὴν πάλαι φίλην καὶ ἀναγκαίαν μητέρα, ἣ ἔνεκα ὠραίου νεωστὶ φίλου γεγονότος οὐκ ἀναγκαίου τὸν ἄωρόν τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον πρεσβύτην πατέρα καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀρχαιότατον δοκεῖ ἂν σοι ὁ τοιοῦτος πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι καὶ καταδουλώσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὺς ὑπ' ἐκείνοις, εἰ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἀγάγοιτο; Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς. Σφόδρα γε μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τυραννικὸν υἱὸν τεκεῖν. Πάννυ γ', ἔφη. Τί δ', ὅταν δὴ τὰ πατρός καὶ μητρὸς

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Aesch. *Eumen.* 554.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 494 A ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Vol. I.* 349 B f.

<sup>d</sup> The word ἀναγκαῖαν means both "necessary" and "akin." Cf. *Eurip. Androm.* 671 τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους.

<sup>e</sup> For the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι cf. *Phaedr.* 254 E

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source<sup>a</sup> or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.<sup>b</sup> "He is." "And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better<sup>c</sup> of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father's estate." "Of course," he said, "what else?" "And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them?" "Certainly." "And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force?" "I think so," he said. "And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant?" "I am not without my fears," he said, "for the parents of such a one." "Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven's name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found *belle amie* bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity<sup>d</sup> and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found *bel ami*, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows<sup>e</sup> upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favourites if he brought them under the same roof?" "Yes, by Zeus," he said. "A most blessed lot it seems to be," said I, "to be the parent of a tyrant son." "It does indeed," he said. "And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted<sup>f</sup> and

*ὀδύνας ἔδωκεν* with Thompson's note. Cf. 566 c *θανάτω δέδοται*. For striking his father cf. *supra* 569 B, *Laws* 880 E ff., Aristoph. *Clouds* 1375 ff., 1421 ff.

<sup>f</sup> For *ἐπιλείπη* cf. 568 E, 573 E.

D ἐπιλείπη τὸν τοιοῦτον, πολὺ δὲ ἤδη ξυνειλεγμένον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν σμῆνος, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν οἰκίας τινὸς ἐφάψεται τοίχου ἢ τινος ὀψὲ νύκτωρ ἰόντος τοῦ ἱματίου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἱερὸν τι νεωκορήσει; καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν, ἄς πάλαι εἶχε δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχυρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι μετ' ἐκείνου, αἱ πρότερον μὲν ὄναρ ἐλύοντο ἐν ὕπνῳ,

E ὅτε ἦν αὐτὸς ἔτι ὑπὸ νόμοις τε καὶ πατρὶ δημοκρατούμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ· τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ ἔρωτος, οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος αἰετι γεγόμενος, οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται οὔτε βρώματος οὔτ' ἔργου, ἀλλὰ τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἔρωσ ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχία καὶ ἀνομία ζῶν, ἄτε αὐτὸς ὦν μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πόλιν ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν, ὅθεν αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν θόρυβον θρέψει, τὸν μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ κακῆς ὀμιλίας, τὸν δ' ἔνδοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα. ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιούτου; Οὗτος μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Καὶ ἂν μὲν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι

B ἐν πόλει ὧσι καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος σωφρονη,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Meno* 72 A, *Cratyl.* 401 E, Blaydes on *Aristoph. Clouds* 297.

<sup>b</sup> He becomes a *τοιχωρύχος* or a *λωποδύτης* (*Aristoph. Frogs* 772-773, *Birds* 497, *Clouds* 1327). Cf. 575 B, *Laws* 831 E.

<sup>c</sup> *νεωκορήσει* is an ironical litotes. So *ἐφάψεται* in the preceding line.

<sup>d</sup> For *ποιουμένας* cf. 573 B. For the thought cf. 538 C.

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fail such a one, and the swarm <sup>a</sup> of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall <sup>b</sup> of someone's house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep <sup>c</sup> of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honourable and the base, the opinions accounted just, <sup>d</sup> will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated <sup>e</sup> and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul. But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity, <sup>f</sup> so to speak, of him in whom it dwells <sup>g</sup> to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen, <sup>h</sup> in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one? ” “ It is this,” he said. “ And if,” I said, “ there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 567 E.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. on 591 E.

<sup>g</sup> τὸν ἔχοντα: cf. *Phaedr.* 239 c, *Laws* 837 B, *Soph. Antig.* 790 and also *Rep.* 610 c and E.

<sup>h</sup> For the tyrant's companions cf. Newman, i. p. 274, note 1.

ἔξελθόντες ἄλλον τινὰ δορυφοροῦσι τύραννον ἢ μισθοῦ ἐπικουροῦσιν, ἐάν που πόλεμος ἦ· ἐάν δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ γένωνται, αὐτοῦ δὴ ἐν τῇ πόλει κακὰ δρῶσι σμικρὰ πολλά. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις; Οἷα κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλαντιοτομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἱεροσυλοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται· ἔστι δ' ὅτε συκοφαντοῦσιν, ἐὰν δυνατοὶ ὦσι λέγειν, καὶ ψευδομαρτυροῦσι καὶ δωροδοκοῦσιν. Σμικρὰ γ', ἔφη, κακὰ λέγεις, ἐὰν ὀλίγοι ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Τὰ γὰρ σμικρὰ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ ἐστὶ, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πρὸς τύραννον πονηρία τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐδ' ἴκταρ βάλλει. ὅταν γὰρ δὴ πολλοὶ ἐν πόλει γένωνται οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ ξυνεπόμενοι αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἰσθωνται ἑαυτῶν τὸ πλήθος, τότε οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τὸν τύραννον γεννῶντες μετὰ δήμου ἀνοίας ἐκείνων, ὃς ἂν αὐτῶν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ μέγιστον καὶ πλείστον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύραννον ἔχη. Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, τυραννικώτατος γὰρ ἂν εἴη. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν ἐκόντες ὑπέικωσιν· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπη ἡ πόλις, ὥσπερ τότε μητέρα καὶ πατέρα ἐκόλαζεν, οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα, ἐὰν οἶός τ' ἦ, κολάσεται ἐπεισαγόμενος νέους ἐταίρους, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις δὴ δουλεύουσαν τὴν πάλαι φίλην

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the similar lists of crimes in *Gorg.* 508 ε, *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 62.

<sup>b</sup> So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.



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minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils." "What kind of evils do you mean?" "Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,<sup>a</sup> and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes." "Yes, small evils indeed,<sup>b</sup>" he said, "if the men of this sort are few." "Why, yes," I said, "for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don't come within hail<sup>c</sup> of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul." "Naturally," he said, "for he would be the most tyrannical." "Then if the people yield willingly—'tis well,<sup>d</sup> but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear mother-

<sup>c</sup> οὐδ' ἵκταρ βάλλει was proverbial, "doesn't strike near," "doesn't come within range." Cf. Aelian, *N.A.* xv. 29. Cf. also οὐδ' ἐγγύς, *Symp.* 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth. *De cor.* 97.

<sup>d</sup> In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. *Protag.* 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, *Mn.* xix. pp. 338 f.

μητρίδα τε, Κρήτες φασι, καὶ πατρίδα ἕξει τε καὶ  
 θρέψει· καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τέλος ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας  
 Ε τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός. Τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί  
 γε. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοί γε τοιοῖδε γίνονται  
 ἰδία καὶ πρὶν ἄρχειν· πρῶτον μὲν οἷς ἂν ξυνῶσιν,  
 ἢ κόλαξιν ἑαυτῶν ξυνόντες καὶ πᾶν ἐτοίμοις  
 576 ὑπηρετεῖν, ἢ ἑάν τού τι δέωνται, αὐτοὶ ὑποπεσόν-  
 τες, πάντα σχήματα τολμῶντες ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκείοι,  
 διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ἀλλότριοι; Καὶ σφόδρα γε.  
 Ἐν παντὶ ἄρα τῷ βίῳ ζῶσι φίλοι μὲν οὐδέποτε  
 οὐδενί, αἰεὶ δέ του δεσπόζοντες ἢ δουλεύοντες  
 ἄλλῳ, ἐλευθερίας δὲ καὶ φιλίας ἀληθοῦς τυραννικῆ  
 φύσις αἰεὶ ἄγευστος. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν  
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν;  
 Πῶς δ' οὐ; Καὶ μὴν ἀδίκους γε ὡς οἶόν τε  
 Β μάλιστα, εἶπερ ὀρθῶς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡμολο-  
 γήσαμεν περὶ δικαιοσύνης, οἶόν ἐστιν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν,  
 ἦ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς γε. Κεφαλαιωσώμεθα τοίνυν, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, τὸν κάκιστον. ἔστι δέ που, οἶον ὄναρ δι-  
 ἤλθομεν, ὅς ἂν ὑπαρ τοιοῦτος ἦ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.  
 Οὐκοῦν οὗτος γίγνεται, ὅς ἂν τυραννικώτατος  
 φύσει ὢν μοναρχήσῃ, καὶ ὅσω ἂν πλείω χρόνον ἐν  
 τυραννίδι βιῶ, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος. Ἀνάγ-  
 κη, ἔφη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον ὁ Γλαύκων.

<sup>a</sup> So also the Hindus of Bengal, *The Nation*, July 13, 1911, p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18 μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 E (*An seni resp.*) ἡ δὲ πατρὶς καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρήτες καλοῦσι. Cf. Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on 414 E, *Menex.* 239 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne's refrain, "This is the end of every man's desire" (*Ballad of Burdens*).

<sup>c</sup> ὑποπεσόντες: cf. on 494 c ὑποκείσονται.

<sup>d</sup> σχήματα was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf.

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land<sup>a</sup>—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man's desire.<sup>b</sup> "Yes," he said, "this, just this." "Then," said I, "is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn<sup>c</sup> and shrink from no contortion<sup>d</sup> or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.<sup>e</sup>" "Yes indeed," he said. "Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom<sup>f</sup> or true friendship." "Quite so." "May we not rightly call such men faithless<sup>g</sup>?" "Of course." "Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice." "But surely," he said, "we were right." "Let us sum up,<sup>h</sup> then," said I, "the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state." "Quite so." "And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes." "Inevitably," said Glaucon, taking up the argument.

*Laws* 669 D, Aristoph. *Peace* 323, Xen. *Symp.* 7. 5, Eurip. *Cyclops* 221. Isoc. *Antid.* 183 uses it of gymnastics.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 241 A ἄλλος γεγωνῶς, Demosth. xxxiv. 13 ἕτερος ἤδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Lucian, *Nigrinus* 15 ἀγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ἀπείρατος δὲ παρρησίας, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1176 b 19, 1179 b 15.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Laws* 730 c, 705 A.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 239 D ἐν κεφάλαιον.

IV. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅς ἂν φαίνηται πονη-  
 C ρότατος, καὶ ἀθλιώτατος φανήσεται; καὶ ὅς ἂν  
 πλείστον χρόνον καὶ μάλιστα τυραννεύσῃ, μάλιστα  
 τε καὶ πλείστον χρόνον τοιοῦτος γεγωνῶς τῇ ἀλη-  
 θείᾳ; τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ. Ἄνάγκη,  
 ἔφη, ταῦτα γοῦν οὕτως ἔχειν. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, ὃ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην  
 πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοιότητι, δημοτικὸς δὲ κατὰ δημο-  
 κρατουμένην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτως; Τί μὴν; Οὐκ-  
 οὖν, ὃ τι πόλις πρὸς πόλιν ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδαιμονία,  
 D τοῦτο καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς ἀνδρα; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί  
 οὖν ἀρετῇ τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς βασιλευομένην,  
 οἷαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν; Πᾶν τούναντίον, ἔφη·  
 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρίστη, ἢ δὲ κακίστη. Οὐκ ἐρήσομαι,  
 εἶπον, ὅποτέραν λέγεις· δῆλον γάρ· ἀλλ' εὐ-  
 δαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως  
 κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον  
 ἕνα ὄντα βλέποντες, μηδ' εἴ τινες ὀλίγοι περὶ  
 ἐκείνον, ἀλλ' ὡς χρὴ ὄλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας  
 E θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἅπασαν καὶ ἰδόντες  
 οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινόμεθα. Ἄλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη,  
 προκαλεῖ· καὶ δῆλον παντί, ὅτι τυραννουμένης μὲν  
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθλιωτέρα, βασιλευομένης δὲ οὐκ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Gorgias* 473 c-e.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. the defiance of 473 A and 579 D *κἂν εἰ μή τω δοκεῖ*, *Phaedr.* 277 E *οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ*, and *Phileb.* 67 B, also *Gorg.* 473 E "you say what nobody else would say," and perhaps 500 D *διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή*. Cf. Schopenhauer's "The public has a great many bees in its bonnet."

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IV. "And shall we find," said I, "that the man who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable<sup>a</sup> in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.<sup>b</sup>" "That much, certainly," he said, "most needs be true." "Does not the tyrannical man," said I, "correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,<sup>c</sup> the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise?" "Surely." "And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man?" "Of course." "What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it?" "They are direct contraries," he said; "the one is the best, the other the worst." "I'll not ask which is which," I said, "because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzled<sup>d</sup> by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few<sup>e</sup> of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole." "That is a fair challenge," he said, "and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 75 D, *Rep.* 555 A, *Parmen.* 133 A. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 E.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 577 A, 591 D, 619 A ἀνέκπληκτος, *Crat.* 394 B, *Gorg.* 523 D, *Protag.* 355 B. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις, and Shelley, ". . . accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye."

<sup>e</sup> εἰ τινες: cf. *Gorg.* 521 B εἰάν τι ἔχω.



577 εὐδαιμονεστέρα. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ  
 τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλούμενος ὀρθῶς  
 ἂν προκαλοίμην, ἀξιῶν κρίνειν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνου,  
 ὃς δύναται τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἠῆθος ἐνδύς διδεῖν,  
 καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἕξωθεν ὄρων ἐκπλήττεται  
 ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως, ἦν πρὸς  
 τοὺς ἕξω σχηματίζονται, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς διοραῖ; εἰ  
 οὖν οἰοίμην δεῖν ἐκείνου πάντα ἡμᾶς ἀκούειν, τοῦ  
 δυνατοῦ μὲν κρίναι, ξυνωκηκότος δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ  
 καὶ παραγεγονότος ἐν τε ταῖς κατ' οἰκίαν πράξεσιν,  
 Β ὡς πρὸς ἐκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους ἔχει, ἐν οἷς  
 μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθείῃ τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς,  
 καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις, καὶ ταῦτα  
 πάντα ἰδόντα κελεύοιμεν ἐξαγγέλλειν, πῶς ἔχει  
 εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος πρὸς τοὺς  
 ἄλλους; Ὅρθότατ' ἂν, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα προκαλοῖο.  
 Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, προσποιησώμεθα ἡμεῖς  
 εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρίναι καὶ ἤδη ἐντυχόντων  
 τοιούτοις, ἵνα ἔχωμεν ὅστις ἀποκρινεῖται ἃ  
 ἐρωτῶμεν; Πάνυ γε.  
 C V. Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἔφην, ὦδε σκόπει. τὴν ὁμοιό-

<sup>a</sup> For the contrast of tyranny and kingdom cf. 587 b, *Polit.* 276 e. It became a commonplace in later orations on the true king. Cf. Dümmler, *Prolegomena*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>b</sup> The word *προστάσεως* is frequent in Polybius. Cf. also Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1 *Maccabees* xv. 32, "When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver plate, and his great attendance [*παράστασιν*]." Cf. also Isoc. ii. 32 ὄψιν, and Shakes. *Measure for Measure* II. ii. 59 "ceremony that to great ones 'longs," *Henry V.* iv. i. 280 "farced title running 'fore the king."

<sup>c</sup> For *σχηματίζονται* cf. Xen. *Oecon.* 2. 4 ὅν σχῆμα ὃ σὺ περιβέβλησαι, Dio Cass. iii. fr. 13. 2 *σχηματίσας* . . . ἐαυτὸν and *σχηματισμός*, *Rep.* 425 b, 494 d.

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that governed by a true king.<sup>a</sup>” “And would it not also be a fair challenge,” said I, “to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants’ great attendance,<sup>b</sup> and the pomp and circumstance which they assume<sup>c</sup> in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant<sup>d</sup> and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped<sup>e</sup> of his vesture of tragedy,<sup>f</sup> and who had likewise observed his behaviour in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men?” “That also would be a most just challenge,” he said. “Shall we, then, make believe,” said I, “that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?”

“By all means.”

V. “Come, then,” said I, “examine it thus. Re-

<sup>a</sup> It is an easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself and Dionysius I. Cf. *Laws* 711 A.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex, Hazlitt, “Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest?” also *Gorg.* 523 E, Xen. *Hiero* 2. 4, Lucian, *Somnium seu Gallus* 24 ἦν δὲ ὑποκύψας ἰδὼς τὰ γ’ ἐνδον . . . , Boethius, *Cons.* iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for the thought Herod. i. 99.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Longinus, *On the Sublime* 7 τὸ ἐξωθεν προστραγῶδόμενον, and Dümmler, *Akademika* p. 5.

τητα ἀναμιμνησκόμενος τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει ἀθρῶν, τὰ παθήματα ἑκατέρου λέγε. Τὰ ποῖα; ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν, ἐλευθέραν ἢ δούλην τὴν τυραννουμένην ἐρεῖς; Ὡς οἶόν τ', ἔφη, μάλιστα δούλην. Καὶ μὴν ὄρας γε ἐν αὐτῇ δεσπότας καὶ ἐλευθέρους. Ὅρω, ἔφη, σμικρὸν γέ τι τοῦτο· τὸ δὲ ὄλον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικέστατον ἀτίμως τε καὶ ἀθλίως δούλον. Εἰ οὖν, εἶπον, ὅμοιος ἀνὴρ τῇ πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἐνεῖναι, καὶ πολλῆς μὲν δουλείας τε καὶ ἀνελευθερίας γέμειν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη δουλεύειν, ἅπερ ἦν ἐπιεικέστατα, σμικρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχθηρότατον καὶ μανικώτατον δεσπόζειν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; δούλην ἢ ἐλευθέραν τὴν τοιαύτην φήσεις εἶναι ψυχὴν; Δούλην δὴ που ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν ἢ γε αὖ δούλη καὶ τυραννουμένη πόλις ἤκιστα ποιεῖ ἃ βούλεται; Πολύ γε. Καὶ ἡ τυραννουμένη ἄρα ψυχὴ ἤκιστα ποιήσει ἃ ἂν βουλευθῇ, ὡς περὶ ὅλης εἰπεῖν ψυχῆς· ὑπὸ δὲ οἴστρου αἰεὶ ἐλκομένη βία ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστὴ ἔσται. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Πλουσίαν δὲ ἢ πενομένην ἀνάγκη τὴν τυ-  
 578 ραννουμένην πόλιν εἶναι; Πενομένην. Καὶ ψυχὴν

<sup>a</sup> In *Menex.* 238 E Plato says that other states are composed of slaves and masters, but Athens of equals.

<sup>b</sup> For τάξιν cf. 618 B ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν.

<sup>c</sup> γέμειν: cf. 544 C, 559 C, *Gorg.* 522 E, 525 A.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 445 B, *Gorg.* 467 B, where a verbal distinction is

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call the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them." "What things?" he said. "In the first place," said I, "will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state?" "Utterly enslaved," he said. "And yet you see in it masters and freemen." "I see," he said, "a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.<sup>a</sup>" "If, then," I said, "the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion<sup>b</sup> obtain in him, and his soul teem<sup>c</sup> with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot?" "Inevitably," he said. "Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free?" "Enslaved, I should suppose." "Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes<sup>d</sup>?" "Decidedly so." "Then the tyrannized soul—to speak of the soul as a whole<sup>e</sup>—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.<sup>f</sup>" "Of course." "And must the tyrannized city be rich or poor?" "Poor." "Then the tyrant

drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In *Laws* 661 в ἐπιθυμῇ is used. Cf. *ibid.* 688 в τὰναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν, and Herod. iii. 80.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Cratyl.* 392 c ὡς τὸ δλον εἰπεῖν γένος.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Julian, *Or.* ii. 50 c. In the Stoic philosophy the *stultus* repents, and "omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui." Cf. also Seneca, *De benef.* iv. 34 "non mutat sapiens consilium . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit," Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.* iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33, Stob. *Ec.* ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of *Eclogues* ii. 104. 6 W. in *Class. Phil.* xi. p. 338.

ἄρα τυραννικὴν πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι. Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τί δέ; φόβου γέμειν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὴν τε τοιαύτην πόλιν τὸν τε τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα; Πολλή γε. Ὀδυρμούς δὲ καὶ στεναγμούς καὶ θρήνους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας οἶε ἐν τινι ἄλλῃ πλείους εὐρήσειν; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἐν ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἡγεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ πλείω εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ μαινομένῳ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμιῶν τε καὶ ἐρώτων τούτῳ τῷ τυραννικῷ; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη. Εἰς πάντα  
 Β δῆ, οἶμαι, ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας τὴν γε πόλιν τῶν πόλεων ἀθλιωτάτην ἔκρινας. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; ἔφη. Καὶ μάλα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὐτοῦ τυραννικοῦ τί λέγεις εἰς ταῦτά ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων; Μακρῶ, ἔφη, ἀθλιώτατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτ' ὀρθῶς λέγεις. Πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐπω, ἔφην, οἶμαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα. Ἄλλὰ τίς μήν; Ὅδε ἴσως σοι ἔτι δόξει εἶναι  
 C τούτου ἀθλιώτερος. Ποῖος; Ὅς ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυραννικὸς ὢν μὴ ἰδιώτην βίον καταβιῶ, ἀλλὰ δυστυχῆς ἦ καὶ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ τινος συμφορᾶς ἐκπορισθῆ ὥστε τυράννω γενέσθαι. Τεκμαίρομαί σε, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶεσθαι χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' εὖ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 832 A πεινώσι τὴν ψυχὴν, *Xen. Symp.* 4. 36 πεινώσι χρημάτων, *Oecon.* xiii. 9 πεινώσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου, *Aristot. Pol.* 1277 a 24 "Jason said he was hungry when he was not a tyrant," *Shakes. Tempest* 1. ii. 112 "so dry he was for sway." Cf. *Novotny*, p. 192, on *Epist.* vii. 335 b, also *Max. Tyr. Diss.* iv. 4 τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πενέστερον ἀνδρὸς ἐπιθυμοῦντος διηνεκῶς . . . ; *Julian, Or.* ii. 85 b, *Teles* (Hense),



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soul also must of necessity always be needy<sup>a</sup> and suffer from unfulfilled desire." "So it is," he said. "And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms?" "It must indeed." "And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city?" "By no means." "And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions?" "How could it be so?" he said. "In view of all these and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities." "And was I not right?" he said. "Yes, indeed," said I. "But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things?" "That he is far and away the most miserable of all," he said. "I cannot admit," said I, "that you are right in that too." "How so?" said he. "This one," said I, "I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.<sup>b</sup>" "Then who has?" "Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched." "What one?" "The one," said I, "who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live out<sup>c</sup> his life in private station<sup>d</sup> but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant." "I infer from what has already been said," he replied, "that you speak truly." "Yes," said I, "but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by

pp. 32-33. For the thought see also *Gorg.* 493-494. Cf. also *supra* 521 A with 416 E, *Phaedr.* 279 c, and *Epist.* 355 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* on 508 E, p. 104, note c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 355 A, *Alc. I.* 104 E, 579 c.

<sup>d</sup> Stallbaum quotes Plut. *De virtut. et vit.* p. 101 D, Lucian, *Herm.* 67 ἰδιώτην βίον ζῆν, Philo, *Vit. Mos.* 3.

μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ<sup>1</sup> λόγῳ σκοπεῖν. περὶ γάρ τοι τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ σκέψις, ἀγαθοῦ τε βίου καὶ κακοῦ. Ὁρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς. Σκόπει δῆ, εἰ ἄρα τὶ λέγω.

D δοκεῖ γάρ μοι δεῖν ἐννοῆσαι ἐκ τῶνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοποῦντας. Ἐκ τίνων; Ἐξ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι πλούσιοι ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνδράποδα πολλὰ κέκτηνται. οὗτοι γὰρ τοῦτό γε προσόμοιον ἔχουσι τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ πολλῶν ἄρχειν· διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἐκείνου πλήθος. Διαφέρει γάρ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι οὗτοι ἀδεῶς ἔχουσι καὶ οὐ φοβοῦνται τοὺς οἰκέτας; Τί γὰρ ἂν φοβοῖντο; Οὐδέν, εἶπον· ἀλλὰ τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοεῖς; Ναί, ὅτι γε πᾶσα ἡ πόλις

E ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ βοηθεῖ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. τί δέ; εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα ἓνα, ὅτῳ ἔστιν ἀνδράποδα πεντήκοντα ἢ πλείω, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας θεΐῃ εἰς ἐρημίαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τε καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, ἐν ποίῳ ἂν τινι καὶ πόσῳ φόβῳ οἶει γενέσθαι αὐτόν περὶ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικός, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν; Ἐν παντί, ἦ δ' 579 ὅς, ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν τινας ἤδη θωπεύειν αὐτῶν τῶν δούλων, καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι

<sup>1</sup> On τῷ τοιούτῳ, the reading of the mss., see note a below.

<sup>a</sup> Adam *ad loc.* emends τῷ τοιούτῳ to τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, insisting that the ms. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* Vol. I. p. 71, note f on 344 D-E and *What Plato Said*, p. 484, on *Laches* 185 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 259 B. But Plato is not concerned with the question of size or numbers here.

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reason and an argument such as this.<sup>a</sup> For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things,<sup>b</sup> the good life or the bad life." "Quite right," he replied. "Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples." "From which?" "From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant's numbers are greater.<sup>c</sup>" "Yes, they are." "You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves?" "What should they fear?" "Nothing," I said; "but do you perceive the reason why?" "Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each citizen." "You are right," I said. "But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves<sup>d</sup> and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no free-man could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,<sup>e</sup> do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves?" "The greatest in the world,<sup>f</sup>" he said, "if you ask me." "And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them

<sup>a</sup> Plato's imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later history, and suggests to an American many analogies.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Critias, *fr.* 37, Diels ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 324, on Sparta's fear of her slaves.

<sup>f</sup> For *ἐν παντί* cf. 579 B, *Symp.* 194 A *ἐν παντί* εἰς, *Euthyd.* 301 A *ἐν παντί ἐγερόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας*, *Xen. Hell.* v. 4. 29, *Thucyd.* vii. 55, *Isoc.* xiii. 20 *ἐν πάσιν . . . κακοῖς*. Cf. *παροῖος εἶναι (γίνεσθαι)* *Herod.* ix. 109, vii. 10. 3, iii. 124, *Lucian, Pro lapsu* 1.

πολλὰ καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν οὐδὲν δεόμενος, καὶ κόλαξ αὐτὸς ἂν θεραπόντων ἀναφανείη; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ἢ ἀπολωλέναι. Τί δ', εἰ καὶ ἄλλους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεὸς κύκλω κατοικίσειε γείτονας πολλοὺς αὐτῷ, οἳ μὴ ἀνέχοιντο, εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσπόζειν ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' εἴ πού τινα τοιοῦτον λαμβάνοιεν, ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωροῦντο τιμωρίαις; Ἔτι  
 Β ἂν, ἔφη, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἶη, κύκλω φρουρούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τοιούτῳ μὲν δεσμοτηρίῳ δέδεται ὁ τύραννος, φύσει ὢν οἶον διεληλύθαμεν, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων μεστός· λίχνῳ δὲ ὄντι αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἀποδημῆσαι ἕξεστιν οὐδαμῶσε οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἰσι, καταδεδυκῶς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῆ,  
 C φθονῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ἐάν τις ἕξω ἀποδημῆ καὶ τι ἀγαθὸν ὄρα; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

VI. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρπούται ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἂν κακῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολιτευόμενος, ὃν νῦν δὴ σὺ ἀθλιώτατον ἔκρινας, τὸν τυραννικόν,

<sup>a</sup> For the idiom οὐδὲν δεόμενος cf. 581 E, 367 A-B, 410 B, 405 c, *Prot.* 331 c, and Shorey in *Class. Journ.* ii. p. 171.

<sup>b</sup> For ancient denials of the justice of slavery cf. Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, *fr.* 95 (Kock ii. p. 508) κἂν δούλος ἐστί, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δούλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ. ἢ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο, and *Anth. Pal.* vii. 553 with Mackail's note, p. 415.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant's terrors cf. Menander, *Ἄσπλις* (*fr.* 74, Kock iii. p. 24), Tacitus, *Ann.* vi. 6, 579 E and Xen. *Hiero* 6. 8. The tyrant sees enemies everywhere.

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many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish<sup>a</sup>? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants." "He would certainly have to," he said, "or else perish." "But now suppose," said I, "that god established round about him numerous neighbours who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,<sup>b</sup> but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands." "I think," he said, "that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies." "And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy<sup>c</sup> and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals<sup>d</sup> that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,<sup>e</sup> envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing." "Most certainly," he said.

VI. "And does not such a harvest of ills<sup>f</sup> measure the difference between the man who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Xen. *Hiero* 1. 12 οἱ δὲ τύραννοι οὐ μάλα ἀμφὶ θεωρίας ἔχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἰέναι αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλές. Cf. *Crito* 52 B ἐπὶ θεωρίαν.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 781 c, *Gorg.* 485 D.

<sup>f</sup> τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical soul in private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 366.



μὴ ὡς ἰδιώτης καταβιῶ, ἀλλ' ἀναγκασθῆ ὑπό τινος  
τύχης τυραννεῦσαι, καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ὦν ἀκράτωρ ἄλλων  
ἐπιχειρήσῃ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις κάμνοντι σώματι  
καὶ ἀκράτορι ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἰδιωτεύων ἀλλ' ἀγωνιζό-  
D μενος πρὸς ἄλλα σώματα καὶ μαχόμενος ἀναγκά-  
ζοιτο διάγειν τὸν βίον. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ὁμοιό-  
τατά τε καὶ ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, παντελῶς τὸ  
πάθος ἄθλιον, καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ σοῦ κριθέντος χαλεπώ-  
τατα ζῆν χαλεπώτερον ἔτι ζῆ ὁ τυραννῶν; Κομιδῆ  
γ', ἔφη. Ἔστιν ἄρα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, κὰν εἰ μὴ τῷ  
δοκεῖ, ὁ τῷ ὄντι τύραννος τῷ ὄντι δούλος τὰς  
E μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας καὶ κόλαξ τῶν  
πονηροτάτων· καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν  
ἀποπιμπλάς, ἀλλὰ πλείστων ἐπιδεέστατος καὶ  
πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φαίνεται, ἐάν τις ὄλην ψυχὴν  
ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, καὶ φόβου γέμων διὰ παντὸς  
τοῦ βίου, σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδυνῶν πλήρης, εἴπερ  
τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἡς ἄρχει ἔοικεν. ἔοικε δέ·  
580 ἦ γάρ; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τού-  
τοις ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἂ τὸ πρότερον  
εἴπομεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον  
γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθο-  
νερῷ, ἀπίστω, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ, καὶ πάσης  
κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ, καὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *infra* 580 c and *What Plato Said*, p. 506, on *Gorg.* 491 d.

<sup>b</sup> For the analogy of soul and body cf. 591 b and on 564 b, p. 313, note g.

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does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself<sup>a</sup> attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent body<sup>b</sup> should not live the private life but should be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons?" "Your analogy is most apt and true,<sup>c</sup> Socrates," he said. "Is not that then, dear Glaucon," said I, "a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant's life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst?" "Precisely so," he said. "Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,<sup>d</sup> that the real tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,<sup>e</sup> envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse<sup>f</sup> of all iniquity, and so in consequence be

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Soph.* 252 c *δμοίων τε καὶ ἀληθές.*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 576 c, p. 354, note b.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 576 B-C.

<sup>f</sup> *πανδοκεύς* is a host or inn-keeper; cf. *Laws* 918 B. Here the word is used figuratively. Cf. *Aristoph. Wasps* 35 *φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια*, "an all-receptive grampus" (Rogers).

τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ εἶναι, ἔπειτα  
 δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι.  
 Οὐδεὶς σοι, ἔφη, τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἀντερεῖ. Ἴθι  
 B δὴ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἤδη, ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων  
 κριτῆς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὕτω, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ  
 τὴν σὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονία καὶ τίς δεύτερος, καὶ  
 τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξῆς πέντε ὄντας κρίνε, βασιλικόν,  
 τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν, τυραν-  
 νικόν. Ἀλλὰ ραδία, ἔφη, ἡ κρίσις. καθάπερ γὰρ  
 εἰσηλθόν, ἔγωγε ὥσπερ χοροὺς κρίνω ἀρετῇ καὶ  
 κακίᾳ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ. Μισθωσώ-  
 μεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἀνείπω, ὅτι  
 C ὁ Ἀρίστωνος υἱὸς τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ δικαιοτάτον  
 εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν  
 βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὐτοῦ, τὸν δὲ  
 κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον, τοῦτον  
 δὲ αὖ τυγχάνειν ὄντα, ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος ὦν  
 ἑαυτοῦ τε ὃ τι μάλιστα τυραννῇ καὶ τῆς πόλεως;  
 Ἀνειρήσθω σοι, ἔφη. Ἡ οὖν προσαναγορεύω,  
 εἶπον, εἴαν τε λανθάνωσι τοιοῦτοι ὄντες εἴαν τε μὴ

<sup>a</sup> On the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen. *Hiero passim*, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. The *Hiero* is Xenophon's rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, *Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon*, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic. *De amicis*. 15, Isoc. *Nic.* 4-5, *Peace* 112, *Hel.* 32 ff. But in *Euag.* 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny "is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine." In *Epist.* 6. 11 ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant's. But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further *Gorg.* 473 E, *Alc. I.* 135 B, *Phaedr.* 248 E, *Symp.* 182 C, Eurip. *Ion* 621 ff., *Suppl.* 429 ff., *Medea* 119 ff., *I.A.* 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. *Ajax* 1350 "not easy for a tyrant to be pious"; also Dio Chrys.

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himself most unhappy <sup>a</sup> and make all about him so?" "No man of sense will gainsay that," he said. "Come then," said I, "now at last, even as the judge of last instance <sup>b</sup> pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man." "Nay," he said, "the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary." "Shall we hire a herald, <sup>c</sup> then," said I, "or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man <sup>d</sup> and the most righteous to be the happiest, <sup>e</sup> and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself; <sup>f</sup> and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, becomes most of a tyrant over himself and over the state?" "Let it have been so proclaimed by you," he said. "Shall I add the clause 'alike whether their character

*Or.* iii. 58 f., Anon. *Iambl. fr.* 7. 12, Diels ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, *Greek and Barbarian*, pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, *Prolegomena*, p. 31, Baudrillart, *J. Bodin et son temps*, pp. 292-293 "Bodin semble . . . se souvenir de Platon flétrissant le tyran. . . ."

<sup>b</sup> Adam has an exhaustive technical note on this.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 66 Α ὑπὸ τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων, etc., Eurip. *Alc.* 737 κηρύκων ὑπο. Grote and other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato's moral conviction. See *What Plato Said*, p. 364, *Laws* 662-663, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 25.

<sup>d</sup> Plato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns cf. *Gorg.* 463 E, 481 D, 513 B, *Rep.* 600 B, 614 B, *Symp.* 174 B, 185 C, 198 C.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laws* 664 B-C.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. on 579 c, p. 367, note a.

πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς; Προσαναγόρευε, ἔφη.

VII. Εἶεν δὴ, εἶπον· αὕτη μὲν ἡμῖν ἢ ἀπόδειξις  
 D μία ἂν εἴη· δευτέραν δὲ ἰδέ<sup>1</sup> τήνδε, εἴαν τι δόξῃ  
 εἶναι. Τίς αὕτη; Ἐπειδὴ, ὥσπερ πόλις, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, διήρηται κατὰ τρία εἶδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ  
 ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τριχῆ, [τὸ λογιστικὸν]<sup>2</sup> δέξεται, ὡς  
 ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν ἀπόδειξιν. Τίνα ταύτην;  
 Τήνδε. τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μοι φαί-  
 νονται, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μία ἰδία· ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡς-  
 αὐτως καὶ ἀρχαί. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν,  
 φασὲν, ἦν ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ᾧ θυμοῦται,  
 τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυειδιᾶν ἐνὶ οὐκ ἔσχομεν ὀνό-  
 E ματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὁ μέγιστον καὶ  
 ἰσχυρότατον εἶχεν ἐν αὐτῷ, τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν·  
 ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν διὰ σφοδρό-  
 τητα τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσιν  
 καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα, καὶ  
 φιλοχρήματον δὴ, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα  
 581 ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς  
 γ', ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ  
 φιλίαν εἰ φαίμεν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους, μάλιστ' ἂν εἰς

<sup>1</sup> δὲ ἰδέ Adam: δεῖ δὲ AFDM: δὲ δεῖ mss. recc.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ λογιστικὸν A, λογιστικὸν A<sup>2</sup>FDm, λογιστικὸν ἐπιθυμη-  
 τικὸν θυμικὸν Par. 1642: omitted by more recent mss.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 367 E, 427 D, 445 A, *infra* 612 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 435 B-C ff.

<sup>c</sup> Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 D ἔοικεν, 497 C δηλώσει and δείξει, hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of "ability to reckon," and he compares *Charm.* 174 B and the double sense of λογιστικόν in *Rep.* 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like *Polit.* 257 A.



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is known to all men and gods or is not known 'a? " "Add that to the proclamation," he said.

VII. "Very good," said I; "this, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it." "What is it?" "Since," said I, "corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite,<sup>b</sup> it will admit,<sup>c</sup> I think, of another demonstration also." "What is that?" "The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls." "What do you mean?" he said. "One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,<sup>d</sup> we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name,<sup>e</sup> but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element; for we called it the appetitive part<sup>f</sup> because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,<sup>g</sup> because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires." "And rightly," he said. "And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 26 c τὸ . . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. p. 492, n. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Here again the concept is implied (cf. *supra* on 564 B, p. 313, note *e* and *Intro.* pp. x-xi). Cf. *Parmen.* 132 c, 135 B, *Phileb.* 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1130 b 2 ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and *eis ἐν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα*, 581 A, Schleiermacher's interpretation of which, "so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen," approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 596, on *Soph.* 267 D.

<sup>f</sup> Vol. I. 439 D.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note *b*.

ἐν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δηλοῦν, ὅποτε τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγοιμεν, καὶ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοκρήματος καὶ φιλοκερδῆς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τὸ θυμοειδῆς οὐ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν μέντοι φάμεν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν B ἀεὶ ὄλον ὠρμηῆσθαι; Καὶ μάλα. Εἰ οὖν φιλόνικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγορεύοιμεν, ἢ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι; Ἐμμελέστατα μὲν οὖν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧ γε μανθάνομεν, παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅπῃ ἔχει πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται, καὶ χρημάτων τε καὶ δόξης ἤκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει. Πολύ γε. Φιλομαθῆς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν, C ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἄρχει ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν μὲν τοῦτο, τῶν δὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκείνων, ὀπότερον ἂν τύχη; Οὔτως, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδῆς; Κομιδῆ γέ. Καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία εἶδη, ὑποκείμενον<sup>1</sup> ἐν ἐκάστῳ τούτων; Πάνυ γε.

<sup>1</sup> ὑποκείμενον AFD, ὑποκείμενα A<sup>2</sup>M defended by Adam.

<sup>a</sup> Since there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience' sake. See also p. 371, note e.

<sup>b</sup> Or "is bent on," τέταται. Cf. 499 A ζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως, *Symp.* 222 A and Bury *ad loc.*, *Symp.* 186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought cf. also *Phileb.* 58 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 67 B τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 338 D, 342 C.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. my review of Jowett in *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (*Republic*) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also *Phaedo* 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, "The

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should we not thus best bring it together under one head<sup>a</sup> in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part?"

"I, at any rate, think so," he said. "And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute?" "Yes, indeed."

"And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honour?" "Most appropriately."

"But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavour of the part by which we learn is ever towards<sup>b</sup> knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation."

"Much the least." "Lover of learning<sup>c</sup> and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that." "Quite so," he said. "Is it not also true," I said, "that the ruling principle<sup>d</sup> of men's souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen?"

"That is so," he said. "And that is why we say that the primary classes<sup>e</sup> of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain."

"Precisely so." "And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively

three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (*Rep.* 581). . . .

Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (*apud Cic. Tusc.* v. 3). . . ." Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also *Diog. L.* vii. 130 on Stoics, *Plutarch, De liber. educ.* x. (8 A), *Renan, Avenir de la science*, p. 8. *Isoc. Antid.* 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honour. For the entire argument cf. *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and *supra*, *Introd.* pp. liv-lv.

Οἴσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ θέλοις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον ἀνερωτᾶν, τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἡδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; ὃ γε<sup>1</sup> χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς  
 D τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ  
 μαθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι  
 αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Τί δὲ ὁ  
 φιλότιμος; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρη-  
 μάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικὴν τινα ἡγεῖται, καὶ αὖ τὴν  
 ἀπὸ τοῦ μαθάνειν, ὃ τι μὴ μάθημα τιμὴν φέρει,  
 καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν; Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τὸν δὲ  
 φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας  
 E ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τἀληθὲς ὅπη  
 ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μαθάνοντα;  
 τῆς ἡδονῆς<sup>2</sup> οὐ πάνυ πόρρω, καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι

<sup>1</sup> ὃ γε Hermann, followed by Adam, ὃ τε MSS.

<sup>2</sup> τῆς ἡδονῆς punctis notata in A, secl. Baiter: . . . μαθάνοντα τῆς ἡδονῆς; οὐ . . . Adam.

<sup>a</sup> For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, *Gorg.* 496 B, *Laws* 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, *Polit.* 265 A; contrasted with ἐν τῷ μέρει, *Meno* 92 E, *Gorg.* 462 A, 474 A.

The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. καινὸν οὐδέν (*Gorg.* 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν (*Phaedo* 100 B); τοῦ λόγου ἔνεκα (*Rep.* 612 C) is different from λόγου ἔνεκα (*Theaet.* 191 C—*dicis causa*); πάντα τἀγαθὰ (*Laws* 631 B) has no connexion with the idiomatic πάντα τἀγαθὰ (*Rep.* 471 C, cf. *supra ad loc.*); nor Pindar's πολλ' ἄνω τὰ δ' αὖ κάτω (*Ol.* xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in *Phaedo* 96 B, *Gorg.* 481 D, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃ *Prot.* 319 C with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ 317 C, νῶ ἔχειν *Rep.* 490 A with ἐν νῶ ἔχειν 344 D, etc., τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν *Phaedr.* 235 E with παντὸς ἀμαρτάνειν 237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλίχοιρος would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὁμοιοσύνη and ὁμοιοσύνη were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered.

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to each?" "By all means." "Are you aware, then," said I, "that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,<sup>a</sup> which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own<sup>b</sup>? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honour or of learning are of no value except in so far as they produce money." "True," he said. "And what of the lover of honour<sup>c</sup>?" said I; "does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar<sup>d</sup> and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honour, mere fume<sup>e</sup> and moonshine?" "It is so," he said. "And what," said I, "are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truth<sup>f</sup> and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,<sup>g</sup> and call<sup>h</sup> them literally<sup>i</sup>

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Laws* 658 on judging different kinds of literature.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. p. 255, note *f*, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In *Mem.* iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians "excel all others . . . in love of honour, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honour and renown" (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. *Epist.* 320 A, *Symp.* 178 D, and also Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 2. 1, *Mem.* iii. i. 10.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1095 b 16, and *supra* on 528 E.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 320, and Turgeniev's novel, *Smoke*. <sup>f</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 58 c on dialectic.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 598 B, *Epist.* iii. 315 c, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1 πρόρω φιλοσοφίας. Hermann's text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πρόρω must express the philosopher's opinion of the pleasurable nature of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 366.

<sup>h</sup> For the infinitive cf. 492 c καὶ φῆσειν, 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν.

<sup>i</sup> τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note *a*.



ἀναγκαίας, ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν; Εὐ, ἔφη, δεῖ εἰδέναί.

VIII. Ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἐκάστου τοῦ εἶδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μῆδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἡδίον καὶ ἀλυ-  
 582 πότερον, πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν, τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ἔχω εἰπεῖν. Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. τίμη χρὴ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐμπειρία τε καὶ φρονήσῃ καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἔχει ἂν τις βέλτιον κριτήριον; Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ· τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ὧν εἴπομεν ἡδονῶν; πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδής, μαθάνων αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἷόν ἐστιν, ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ  
 Β σοὶ εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναί ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν; Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξαμένῳ· τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, ὅπῃ πέφυκε τὰ ὄντα μαθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς γλυκεῖά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι οὐδ' ἐμπείρω γίνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ ράδιον. Πολὺ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερδοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρία ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν.  
 C Πολὺ μέντοι. Τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; ἄρα μᾶλλον

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 558 D f.

<sup>b</sup> This anticipates *Laws* 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> i.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 D δι' οὗ, *Sext. Empir. Bekker*, p. 60 (*Pyrrh. Hypotyp.* ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (*Adv. Math.* vii. 35). Cf. *Diog. L. Prologue* 21, and *Laches* 184 E. For the idea that the better soul is the better judge cf. also *Laws* 663 c, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1176 a 16-19.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 582 D, *On Virtue* 373 D, *Xen. Mem.* iii. 3. 11.

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the pleasures of necessity,<sup>a</sup> since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?"

"We may be sure of that," he said.

VIII. "Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honourable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable<sup>b</sup> or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly?" "In faith, I cannot tell," he said. "Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged<sup>c</sup> rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussion<sup>d</sup>? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these?" "How could he?" he said. "Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain?" "There is a vast difference," he said; "for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,<sup>e</sup> but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it." "The lover of wisdom, then," said I, "far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure." "Yes, far." "And how does he compare with the lover of honour? Is he more un-

<sup>a</sup> The force of *ob* extends through the sentence. Cf. *Class. Phil.* vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on *Tim.* 77 B in *A.J.P.* x. p. 74. Cf. *Il.* v. 408, xxii. 283, Pindar, *Nem.* iii. 15, *Hymn Dem.* 157.

ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν; Ἄλλὰ τιμὴ μὲν, ἔφη, εἰάνπερ ἐξεργάζωνται ἐπὶ ὃ ἕκαστος ὤρμηκε, πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἔπεται· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ ὁ σοφός, ὥστε ἀπὸ γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷόν ἐστι, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔμπειροι· τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἷαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλω γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

D Ἐμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἔνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὗτος. Πολύ γε. Καὶ μὴν μετὰ γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγωνῶς ἔσται. Τί μὴν; Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ δι' οὗ γε δεῖ ὄργανον κρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου. Τὸ ποῖον; Διὰ λόγων που ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι. ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει ἄριστα ἐκρίνετο

E τὰ κρινόμενα, ἃ ἐπῆνει ὁ φιλοκερδῆς καὶ ἔψευγεν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα εἶναι. Πολλή γε. Εἰ δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἄρ' οὐχ ἃ ὁ φιλότιμός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόνικος; Δῆλον. Ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπειρία καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἃ ὁ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἐπαινεῖ, 583 ἀληθέστατα εἶναι. Τριῶν ἄρ' οὐσῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ μανθάνομεν, ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ

<sup>a</sup> For the periphrasis γεγωνῶς ἔσται cf. *Charm.* 174 D ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 508 B, 518 C, 527 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 582 A, p. 376, note d.

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acquainted with the pleasure of being honoured than that other with that which comes from knowledge ? ” “ Nay, honour,” he said, “ if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honoured by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honour brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savoured the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings.” “ Then,” said I, “ so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three.” “ By far.” “ And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied<sup>a</sup> by intelligence.” “ Surely.” “ And yet again, that which is the instrument, or *ὄργανον*, of judgement<sup>b</sup> is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honour, but of the lover of wisdom.” “ What is that ? ” “ It was by means of words and discussion<sup>c</sup> that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not ? ” “ Yes.” “ And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher.” “ Of course.” “ Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real.” “ Quite necessarily.” “ And if honour, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honour and victory ? ” “ Obviously.” “ But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows ? ” “ Of necessity,” he said, “ that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.” “ There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasur-

τούτου βίος ἡδιστος; Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη· κύριος γοῦν ἐπαιέτης ὢν ἐπαιεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος. Τίνα δὲ δεύτερον, εἶπον, βίον καὶ τίνα δευτέραν ἡδονὴν φησιν ὁ κριτῆς εἶναι; Δῆλον ὅτι τὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ τε καὶ φιλοτίμου· ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ. Ὑστατην δὲ τὴν τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν. Τί μὴν; ἢ δ' ὅς.

- B IX. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω δὺ' ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἶη καὶ δις νενικηκῶς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον· τὸ δὲ τρίτον Ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτηρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Δί, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθῆς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρὰ, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι. καίτοι τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων. Πολύ γε· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις; Ὡδ', εἶπον, ἐξευρήσω, C σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ζητῶν ἅμα. Ἐρώτα δὴ, ἔφη. Λέγε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμέν λύπην ἡδονῇ; Καὶ μάλα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μῆτε χαίρειν μῆτε λυπεῖσθαι εἶναί τι; Εἶναι μέντοι. Με-

<sup>a</sup> The third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the Saviour, and τρίτος σωτήρ became proverbial. Cf. *Charm.* 167 A, *Phileb.* 66 D, *Laws* 692 A, 960 C, *Epist.* vii. 334 D, 340 A. Cf. Hesychius s.v. τρίτος κρατήρ. Brochard, *La Morale de Platon*, missing the point, says, "Voici enfin un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu'il l'appelle une victoire vraiment olympique." For the idea of a contest cf. *Phileb.* passim.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 36 C, 44 D ἡδοναὶ ἀληθείς. For the unreality of the lower pleasures cf. *Phileb.* 36 A ff. and esp. 44 C-D, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 23-25, *What Plato Said*, pp. 322-323 and 609-610, *supra* *Introd.* pp. lvi-lix, Rodier, *Remarques sur le Philèbe*, p. 281.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 52 C καθαρὰς ἡδονάς, and 53 C καθαρὰ λύπης.



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able." "How could it be otherwise?" he said. "At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life." "And to what life and to what pleasure," I said, "does the judge assign the second place?" "Obviously to that of the warrior and honour-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker." "And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems." "Surely," said he.

IX. "That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour<sup>a</sup> and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real<sup>b</sup> or pure,<sup>c</sup> but is a kind of scene-painting,<sup>d</sup> as I seem to have heard from some wise man<sup>e</sup>; and yet<sup>f</sup> this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.<sup>g</sup>" "Much the greatest. But what do you mean?" "I shall discover it," I said, "if you will answer my questions while I seek." "Ask, then," he said. "Tell me, then," said I, "do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?" "We certainly do." "And is there not such a thing as a neutral state<sup>h</sup>?" "There is." "Is it not intermediate be-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 663 c, *Phaedo* 69 B, *supra* 365 c, 523 B, 602 D, 586 B, Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 266.

<sup>e</sup> One of Plato's evasions. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 513, on *Meno* 81 A, *Phileb.* 44 B. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 266 misses the point and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.

<sup>f</sup> For this rhetorical *καίτοι* cf. 360 c, 376 B, 433 B, 440 D, *Gorg.* 452 E, *Laws* 663 E, 690 c.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 22 E, Aesch. *Prom.* 919, Soph. *Antig.* 1046.

<sup>h</sup> If any inference could be drawn from the fact that in the *Philebus* 42 D ff. and 32 E the reality of the neutral state has to be proved, it would be that the *Philebus* is earlier, which it is not.

ταξὺ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ὃν ἡσυχίαν τινα  
 περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὸ λέγεις;  
 Οὕτως, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ' οὐ μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν  
 κάμνωσιν; Ποίους; Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡδίων  
 D τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν,  
 ἡδιστον ὄν. Μέμνημαι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν  
 περιωδυνία τινὶ ἐχομένων ἀκούεις λεγόντων, ὡς  
 οὐδὲν ἡδίων τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμενον; Ἄκούω.  
 Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε, οἶμαι, πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνει  
 γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶν-  
 ται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιού-  
 του ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἡδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν.  
 Τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν  
 E γίγνεται, ἡσυχία. Καὶ ὅταν παύσῃται ἄρα, εἶπον,  
 χαίρων τις, ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται.  
 Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων  
 ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφοτέρα  
 ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή. Ἔοικεν. Ἡ καὶ  
 δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὃν ἀμφοτέρα γίνεσθαι; Οὐ  
 μοι δοκεῖ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμε-  
 νον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησις τις ἀμφοτέρω ἔσθ' ὄν.  
 584 ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Τὸ δὲ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδὺ οὐχὶ  
 ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτοις ἐφάνη ἄρτι;  
 Ἐφάνη γάρ. Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν  
 ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν; Οὐδαμῶς.  
 Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

<sup>a</sup> For ἐν μέσῳ cf. *Phileb.* 35 ε.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. perhaps *Phileb.* 45 β, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1095 a 24, and *Heracleit. fr.* 111, *Diels i.*<sup>3</sup> p. 99 νοῦσος ὑγιεινὴν ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 43 ε, *Hipp. Maj.* 300 β f.

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tween them, and in the mean,<sup>a</sup> being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it?" "It is that," said he. "Do you not recall the things men say in sickness?" "What sort of things?" "Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,<sup>b</sup> though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were ill." "I remember," he said. "And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering?" "I do." "And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight." "Yes," he said, "for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace." "And so," I said, "when a man's delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful." "It may be so," he said. "What, then, we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure." "It seems so." "Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both<sup>c</sup>?" "I think not." "And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,<sup>d</sup> are they not?" "Yes." "And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?" "Yes, we did." "How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?" "In no way." "This is not a reality, then, but an illusion," said I; "in such case the quietude

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in his *Topics* and *De anima*.

- παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἢ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιές τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. Ἰδὲ τοίνυν,
- B ἔφην ἐγώ, ἡδονάς, αἱ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰηθῆς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τοῦτο πεφυκέναι, ἡδονὴν μὲν παύλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονῆς. Πουὶ δὴ, ἔφη, καὶ ποίας λέγεις; Πολλαὶ μὲν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μάλιστα δ' εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὁσμὰς ἡδονάς. αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίνονται, παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσιν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Μὴ ἄρα πειθώ-
- C μεθα καθαρὰν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγὴν, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονῆς. Μὴ γάρ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἶ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναὶ σχεδὸν αἱ πλείσταί τε καὶ μέγιστα τούτου τοῦ εἶδους εἰσὶ, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλλαγαί. Εἰσὶ γάρ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ πρὸ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγνόμεναι προησθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχουσιν; Κατὰ ταῦτά.
- D X. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαί εἰσι καὶ ᾧ μάλιστα εἰοίκασιν; Τῷ; ἔφη. Νομίζεις τι, εἶπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 586 c, and *Phileb.* 42 b and 41 e.

<sup>b</sup> For οὐδὲν ὑγιές in this sense cf. on 523 b.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 44 c-d, Xen. *Oecon.* 1. 20 προσποιούμεναι ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, etc.

<sup>d</sup> For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain cf. *Tim.* 65 a, *Phileb.* 51 b and e, and Siebeck, *Platon als Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten*, p. 161.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 493-494, *Phileb.* 42 c ff., and *Phaedr.* 258 e, which Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 267 overlooks.

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in juxtaposition<sup>a</sup> with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearing<sup>b</sup> on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.<sup>c</sup> "So at any rate our argument signifies," he said. "Take a look, then," said I, "at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure." "Where shall I look," he said, "and what pleasures do you mean?" "There are many others," I said, "and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell.<sup>d</sup> For these with no antecedent pain<sup>e</sup> suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them." "Most true," he said. "Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain." "No, we must not." "Yet, surely," said I, "the affections that find their way through the body<sup>f</sup> to the soul<sup>g</sup> and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.<sup>h</sup>" "Yes, they are." "And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them?" "It is."

X. "Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble?" "What?" he said. "Do you think that there is such a thing in nature<sup>i</sup>

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 65 A, *Phaedr.* 258 E, Vol. I. p. 8, note a, on 328 D, and *supra* p. 8, note b.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 45 D (of sensations) μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς, *Laws* 673 A, *Rep.* 462 C πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη. Cf. also *Phileb.* 33 D-E, 34, 43 B-C, and *What Plato Said*, p. 608.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 44 B, 44 C λυπῶν . . . ἀποφυγᾶς, *Protag.* 354 B.

<sup>i</sup> For ἐν τῇ φύσει cf. *Parmen.* 132 D.



μέσον; Ἔγωγε. Οἶει οὖν ἂν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον ἄλλο τι οἶεσθαι ἢ ἄνω φέρεσθαι; καὶ ἐν μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορῶντα ὅθεν ἐνήνεκται, ἄλλοθί που ἂν ἠγεῖσθαι εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄνω, μὴ ἐωρακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω; Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἄλλως οἶμαι οἰηθῆναι ἂν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

Ε' Ἄλλ' εἰ πάλιν γ', ἔφην, φέροίτο, κάτω τ' ἂν οἶοιτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἶοιτο; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω; Δῆλον δῆ. Θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν, εἰ καὶ οἱ ἄπειροι ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιεῖς δόξας ἔχουσι, πρὸς τε ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω διάκεινται, ὥστε, ὅταν μὲν

585 ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε οἶονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξὺ, σφόδρα μὲν οἶονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρία λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρία ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται; Μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει. Ὡδέ γ' οὖν, εἶπον, ἐννόει· οὐχὶ πείνα καὶ δίψα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κενώσεις

<sup>a</sup> For the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the popular view of up and down, which is corrected in *Tim.* 62 c-d and perhaps by the ironical δῆ in *Phaedo* 112 c. Cf. Zeller, *Aristotle* (Eng.) i. p. 428.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Met.* 1011 b 30-31 and *Eth. Nic.* 1154 a 30 διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.

<sup>c</sup> The argument from the parallel of body and mind here belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 528, on *Phaedo* 78 b. The figurative use of repletion and nutrition is not to be pressed in proof of con-

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as up and down and in the middle?" "I do."

"Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the centre would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward?"

And if he took his stand at the centre and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "I do not think that such a person would have any other notion."

"And if he were borne back," I said, "he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly." "Of course."

"And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle?"

"Obviously." "Would it surprise you, then," said I, "if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that,

when they are moved in the direction of the painful, they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that

they are approaching fulfilment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,<sup>b</sup> so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain?"

"No, by Zeus," he said, "it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so."

"In *this* way, then, consider it.<sup>c</sup> Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or

traditions with the *Philebus* or *Gorgias*. Cf. *Matthew* v. 6 "Hunger and thirst after righteousness."

Β τινές εἰσι τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἕξεως; Τί μῆν;  
 Ἄγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἄρ' οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ τῆς  
 περὶ ψυχὴν αὐτῆς ἕξεως; Μάλα γε. Οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ'  
 ἂν ὁ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἰσχων;  
 Πῶς δ' οὐ; Πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἤττον  
 ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; Δῆλον, ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον.  
 Πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας  
 μετέχειν, τὰ οἶον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ  
 ξυμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ  
 C ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ ξυλλήβδην αὐτῆς πάσης  
 ἀρετῆς; ὧδε δὲ κρίνε· τὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον  
 καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὄν  
 καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἰναί σοι δοκεῖ,  
 ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ  
 τοιοῦτο καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον; Πολύ, ἔφη,  
 διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ ὁμοίου. Ἡ οὖν ἀνομοίου<sup>1</sup>  
 οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;  
 Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ', ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ  
 ἀληθείας ἤττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκ-  
 D οὖν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη  
 τῶν γενῶν αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν

<sup>1</sup> ἀνομοίου Hermann: αἰεὶ ὁμοίου mss. followed by Ast and Stallbaum. Adam reads αἰεὶ ἀνομοίου and inserts ἡ before ἐπιστήμης. C. Ritter treats αἰεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία as a marginal note and reads Ἡ οὖν οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει (*Philologus* 67, pp. 312-313). Apelt entirely recasts the passage (*Woch. f. kl. Phil.*, 1903, pp. 348-350).

<sup>a</sup> For κενώσεις cf. *Phileb.* 35 B, 42 C-D, *Tim.* 65 A.

<sup>b</sup> For the figure of nourishment of the soul cf. *Protag.* 313 C, *Phaedr.* 248 B, and *Soph.* 223 E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 517, on *Meno* 98 A-B.

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emptinesses<sup>a</sup> of the bodily habit?" "Surely." "And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul?" "It is indeed." "And he who partakes of nourishment<sup>b</sup> and he who gets wisdom fills the void and is filled?" "Of course." "And which is the truer filling and fulfilment, that of the less or of the more real being?" "Evidently that of the more real." "And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,<sup>c</sup> knowledge and reason,<sup>d</sup> and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent<sup>e</sup>? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing?" "That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses," he said. "Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge?" "By no means." "Or of truth and reality?" "Not of that, either." "And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence?" "Necessarily." "And is it not generally true that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than

<sup>a</sup> Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and D *διάνοια*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. *Protag.* 358 A-B.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 209 A *φρόνησιν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν*.

ἦττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει; Πολύ γε.  
 Σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἶει οὕτως; Ἐγωγε.  
 Οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον καὶ  
 αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν  
 ἦττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἦττον ὄν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
 Εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων  
 ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῶ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον  
 Ε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν  
 ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεί, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἦττον ὄντων  
 μεταλαμβάνον ἦττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως  
 πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἦττον  
 ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι. Ἀναγκαιότατα, ἔφη. Οἱ  
 586 ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐωχίαις δὲ  
 καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις αἰεὶ ξυνόντες, κάτω, ὡς ἔοικε,  
 καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονται τε καὶ  
 ταύτη πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο  
 πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε  
 ἠνέχθησαν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τῶ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν,  
 οὐδὲ βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἐγεύσαντο,  
 ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω αἰεὶ βλέποντες καὶ  
 κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται  
 Β χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες, καὶ ἔνεκα τῆς τούτων

<sup>a</sup> For ξυνόντες see Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 1404.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 528, on *Phaedo* 79 c for πλανᾶω of error in thought. This is rather the *errare* of Lucretius ii. 10 and the post-Aristotelian schools.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 576 Α ἄγευστος, and for the thought of the whole sentence cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p. 240, and William Watson, "The things that are more excellent":

To dress, to call, to dine . . .  
 How many a soul for these things lives  
 With pious passion, grave intent . . .  
 And never even in dreams hath seen  
 The things that are more excellent.



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those that serve the soul?" "Much less." "And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul?" "I do." "Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things?" "Of course." "If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure." "Most inevitably," he said. "Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to <sup>a</sup> feasting and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the centre, and so sway and roam <sup>b</sup> to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted <sup>c</sup> stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth <sup>d</sup> and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle, <sup>e</sup> grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Milton, *Comus*, "Ne'er looks to heaven amid its gorgeous feast," Rossetti, "Nineveh," *in fine*, "That set gaze never on the sky," etc. Cf. S. O. Dickermann, *De Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obriis e structura hominis et animalium petitis*, Halle, 1909, who lists Plato's *Symp.* 190 A, *Rep.* 586 A, *Cratyl.* 396 B, 409 C, *Tim.* 90 A, 91 E, and many other passages.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1095 b 20 βοσκημάτων βίον. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 611, on *Phileb.*, *in fine*.

πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὄπλαῖς ἀποκτιννύασι δι' ἀπληστίαν, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς οὔσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες. Παντελῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρησμο-  
 δεῖς βίον. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδοναῖς ξυν-  
 εῖναι μεμιγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀληθοῦς  
 ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρ'  
 C ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραινομέναις, ὥστε σφοδρούς  
 ἑκατέρας φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἔρωτας ἑαυτῶν λυττῶντας  
 τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐντίκτειν καὶ περιμαχῆτους εἶναι,  
 ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης εἶδωλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ  
 Στησίχορος φησι γενέσθαι περιμάχητον ἀγνοία τοῦ  
 ἀληθοῦς; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτὸ  
 εἶναι.

XI. Τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα  
 ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, ὅς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται  
 ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βία διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ  
 D θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ  
 νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ  
 νοῦ; Τοιαῦτα, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο  
 εἶναι. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 373 E, *Phaedo* 66 c ff., Berkeley, *Siris* 330  
 "For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble."

<sup>b</sup> τὸ στέγον: cf. *Gorg.* 493 B, *Laws* 714 A.

<sup>c</sup> Plato laughs at himself. Cf. *supra* 509 c and 540 B-C. The picturesque, allegorical style of oracles was proverbial. For *χρησμοδεῖν* cf. *Crat.* 396 D, *Apol.* 39 c, *Laws* 712 A.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. on 584 A, p. 384, note a.

<sup>e</sup> For *περιμαχῆτους* cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1168 b 19, *Eth. Eud.* 1248 b 27, and *supra* on 521 A, p. 145, note e.

<sup>f</sup> For the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy cf. *Phaedr.* 243 A-B, Eurip. *Hel.* 605 ff., *Elect.* 1282-1283, Isoc. *Hel.* 64,

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of these delights; and in their greed<sup>a</sup> kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part<sup>b</sup> of their souls." "You describe in quite oracular style,<sup>c</sup> Socrates," said Glaucon, "the life of the multitude." "And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so coloured by contrary juxtaposition<sup>d</sup> as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for,<sup>e</sup> as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen<sup>f</sup> was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth?" "It is quite inevitable," he said, "that it should be so."

XI. "So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honour by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger, pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason?" "The same sort of thing," he said, "must necessarily happen in this case too." "Then," said I, "may we

and *Philologus* 55, pp. 634 ff. Dümmler, *Akademika* p. 55, thinks this passage a criticism of Isoc. *Helena* 40. Cf. also Teichmüller, *Lit. Fehden*, i. pp. 113 ff. So Milton, *Reason of Church Government*, "A lawny resemblance of her like that air-born Helena in the fables." For the ethical symbolism cf. 520 c-d, Shelley, "Adonais" 39:

'Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep  
With phantoms an unprofitable strife.

Arnold, "Dover Beach," *in fine*:

And we are here as on a darkling plain  
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,  
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδές καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμῖαι εἰσὶν, αἱ μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγήται, λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψονται, ὡς οἶόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθεία ἐπομένων, καὶ τὰς  
 Ε ἑαυτῶν οἰκειάς, εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον; Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, οἰκειότατόν γε. Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἐπομένης ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἐκάστω τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἶς τε τᾶλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας  
 587 καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατόν τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἐτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκειν, τὰ τε ἄλλ' ἀναγκάζειν ἄλλοτρίαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώκειν. Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἂ πλείστον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ λόγου ἀφέστηκε, μάλιστ' ἂν τοιαῦτα ἐξεργάζοιτο; Πολύ γε. Πλείστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμου τε καὶ τάξεως; Δῆλον δὴ. Ἐφάνησαν δὲ πλείστον ἀφεστῶσαι οὐχ αἱ ἐρωτικάί τε καὶ τυραννικαὶ ἐπιθυμῖαι;

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 69 B, and *Theaet.* 176 B μετὰ φρονήσεως.

<sup>b</sup> ἐξηγήται has a religious tone. See on ἐξηγητής 427 c. Cf. 604 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 583 B, p. 380, note b.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 491, on *Lysis* 221 E.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. 352 A, 440 B and E, 442 D, 560 A, *Phaedr.* 237 E.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 480 on *Charm.* 161 B.

<sup>g</sup> For εἰς τὸ δυνατόν cf. 500 D, 381 C, *Laws* 795 D, 830 B, 862 B, 900 C.

<sup>h</sup> What follows (587 B-588 A) is not to be taken too seriously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the satisfaction of Plato's feelings by confirmations

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not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,<sup>a</sup> take only those pleasures which reason approves,<sup>b</sup> will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest<sup>c</sup> pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its 'own'<sup>d</sup>?"

"But indeed," he said, "it is most truly its very own." "Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension,<sup>e</sup> the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task<sup>f</sup> and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible,<sup>g</sup> the truest." "Precisely so." "And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true." "That is so," he said. "And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect<sup>h</sup>?" "Quite so," he said. "And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order?" "Obviously." "And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites?" "Quite so." "And

and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 B f. and William Temple, *Plato and Christianity*, p. 55: "Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add that the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . ." See however A. G. Laird in *Class. Phil.* xi. (1916) pp. 465-468.



- B Πολύ γε. Ἐλάχιστον δὲ αἱ βασιλικαὶ τε καὶ κόσμιαι; Naί. Πλείστον δὴ, οἶμαι, ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ οἰκείας ὁ τύραννος ἀφεστήξει, ὁ δὲ ὀλίγιστον. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ἀηδέστατα ἄρα, εἶπον, ὁ τύραννος βιώσεται, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἡδιστα. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ ἀηδέστερον ζῆν τύραννος βασιλέως; Ἄν εἶπης, ἔφη. Τριῶν ἡδονῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐσῶν, μιᾶς μὲν γνησίας, δυοῖν C δὲ νόθαιν, τῶν νόθων εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὑπερβάς ὁ τύραννος, φυγῶν νόμον τε καὶ λόγον, δούλαις τισὶ δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς ξυνοικεῖ, καὶ ὀπόσῳ ἐλαττοῦται οὐδὲ πάνυ ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν, πλὴν ἴσως ᾧδε. Πῶς; ἔφη. Ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τρίτος που ὁ τύραννος ἀφειστήκει· ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς ἦν. Naί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡδονῆς τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ξυνοικοῖ ἄν, εἰ τὰ πρόσθεν ἀληθῆ; Οὕτως. Ὁ δέ γε ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ D βασιλικοῦ αὖ τρίτος, εἴαν εἰς ταῦτόν ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν τιθῶμεν. Τρίτος γάρ. Τριπλασίου ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τριπλάσιον ἀριθμῶ ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς ἀφέστηκεν τύραννος. Φαίνεται. Ἐπίπεδον ἄρ', ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ εἶδωλον κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς ἄν εἴη. Κομιδῆ γε. Κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὐξὴν δῆλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν ὅσῃν ἀφεστηκῶς γίνεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη, τῷ γε λογιστικῷ. Οὐκοῦν εἴαν τις E μεταστρέψας ἀληθεία ἡδονῆς τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ τυράννου ἀφεστηκότα λέγη, ὅσον ἀφέστηκεν,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 257 b ἀφεστᾶσιν.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 d and *supra* p. 344, note b, on 573 d.

<sup>c</sup> For εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα cf. *Phaedo* 112 b and *supra* 509 b.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note b, on 445 d and *Menex.* 238 d.

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least so the royal and orderly?" "Yes." "Then the tyrant's place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove<sup>a</sup> from true and proper pleasure, and the king's at the least." "Necessarily." "Then the tyrant's life will be least pleasurable and the king's most." "There is every necessity of that." "Do you know, then," said I, "how much less pleurably the tyrant lives than the king?" "I'll know if you tell me,<sup>b</sup>" he said. "There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious, the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond<sup>c</sup> the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus." "How?" he said. "The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between." "Yes." "And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true?" "That is so." "And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.<sup>d</sup>" "Yes, the third." "Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure." "Apparently." "The phantom<sup>e</sup> of the tyrant's pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number." "Quite so." "But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes." "It is clear," he said, "to a reckoner." "Then taking it the other way about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 66 c εἰδῶλων, where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures.

ἐννεακαίεικοσικαίεπτακοσιοπλασιάκισ ἤδιον αὐτὸν ζῶντα εὐρήσει τελειωθείση τῇ πολλαπλασιώσει, τὸν δὲ τύραννον ἀνιαιρότερον τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ ἀποστάσει. Ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λογισμὸν καταπεφόρηκας τῆς διαφορότητος τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ 588 τοῦ ἀδίκου, πρὸς ἡδονὴν τε καὶ λύπην. Καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντά γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βίοις ἀριθμὸν, εἴπερ αὐτοῖς προσήκουσιν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες καὶ μῆνες καὶ ἐνιαυτοί. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, προσήκουσιν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοσοῦτον ἡδονῆ νικᾷ ὁ ἀγαθός τε καὶ δίκαιος τὸν κακὸν τε καὶ ἄδικον, ἀμηχάνω δὴ ὅσω πλείον νικήσει εὐσχημοσύνη τε βίου καὶ κάλλει καὶ ἀρετῇ; Ἀμηχάνω μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἔφη.

XII. Εἶεν δὴ, εἶπον· ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα λόγου Β γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ δεῦρ' ἤκομεν· ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον, λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελέως μὲν ἀδίκω, δοξαζομένω δὲ δικαίω. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέχθη; Οὕτω μὲν οὖν. Νῦν δὴ, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἦν ἐκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν. Πῶς; ἔφη. Εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, ἵνα εἰδῆ ὁ ἐκεῖνα C λέγων οἷα ἔλεγεν. Ποίαν τινά; ἢ δ' ὅς. Τῶν τοιούτων τινά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαι μυθολογοῦνται παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἢ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, p. 14 "Hence estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth." For the mathematical jest cf. *Polit.* 257 A-B.

<sup>b</sup> Humorous as in 509 c ὑπερβολῆς.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 13 A, 14 A, *Parmen.* 141 c, *Theaet.* 209 A and D.

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pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant's life is more painful by the same distance.<sup>d</sup> "An overwhelming<sup>b</sup> and baffling calculation," he said, "of the difference<sup>c</sup> between the just and the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain!" "And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them." "They certainly do," he said. "Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue." "Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus," he said.

XII. "Very good," said I. "And now that we have come to this point in the argument, let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass.<sup>d</sup> It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust<sup>e</sup> man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition?" "Yes, that." "Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct." "How?" he said. "By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying." "What sort of an image?" he said. "One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of," said I, "as that of the Chimaera<sup>f</sup> or Scylla<sup>g</sup> or Cerberus,<sup>h</sup> and

<sup>d</sup> Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 B, *Phileb.* 27 c, and p. 339, note e, on 572 B.      <sup>e</sup> Cf. 348 B, 361 A.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Homer, *Il.* vi. 179-182, *Phædr.* 229 D.

<sup>g</sup> *Od.* xii. 85 ff.

<sup>h</sup> Hesiod, *Theog.* 311-312.

Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβέρου, καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς συχναὶ λέγονται ξυμπεφυκυῖαι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι. Λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη. Πλάττε τοίνυν μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἡμέρων δὲ θηρίων ἔχοντος κεφαλὰς κύκλω καὶ ἀγρίων, καὶ δυνατοῦ μεταβάλλειν καὶ φύειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα  
 D ταῦτα. Δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον· ὁμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγος, πεπλάσθω. Μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου· πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ἔστω τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον τὸ δεύτερον. Ταῦτα, ἔφη, ράω· καὶ πέπλασται. Σύναπτε τοίνυν αὐτὰ εἰς ἓν τρία ὄντα, ὥστε πη ξυμπεφυκέναι ἀλλήλοις. Συνῆπται, ἔφη. Περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ  
 E δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὄρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλτρον ὄρῶντι, ἐν ζῶον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον. Περιπέπλασται, ἔφη. Λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ λέγοντι,

<sup>a</sup> Stallbaum *ad loc.* gives a long list of writers who imitated this passage. Hesiod, *Theog.* 823 f., portrays a similar monster in Typhoeus, who had a hundred serpent-heads. For the animal in man *cf.* *Tim.* 70 E, *Charm.* 155 D-E, *Phaedr.* 230 A, 246 A ff., Boethius, *Cons.* iv. 2-3, Horace, *Epist.* i. 1. 76, Iamblichus, *Protrept.* chap. iii., Machiavelli, *Prince* xvii. (La Bestia), Emerson, *History*: "Every animal in the barnyard . . . has contrived to get a footing . . . in some one or other of these upright heaven-facing speakers. Ah, brother, hold fast to the man and awe the beast," etc. *Cf.* Tennyson, lines "By an Evolutionist":

But I hear no yelp of the beast, and the Man is quiet at last.



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the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one." "Yes, they do tell of them." "Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast<sup>a</sup> that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths." "It is the task of a cunning artist,<sup>b</sup>" he said, "but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax<sup>c</sup> and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned." "Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest<sup>d</sup> and the second second in size." "That is easier," he said, "and is done." "Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together." "They are so united," he said. "Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within<sup>e</sup> but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man." "The sheath is made fast about him," he said. "Let us,

"In Memoriam," cxviii.:

Move upward, working out the beast,  
And let the ape and tiger die.

A modern scientific man solemnly writes: "The theory of evolution has prepared us to acknowledge the presence of something of the ape and tiger in us." For an example of modern nimiety or too-muchness *cf.* Sandburg's "There is a wolf in me. . . . There is a fox in me. . . . There is a hog in me. . . . O, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie inside my ribs." *Cf.* Brunetière, *Questions actuelles*, p. 114.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* 596 c.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf.* Cic. *De or.* iii. 45 "sicut mollissimam ceram . . . fingimus." Otto, p. 80, says it is a proverb. For the development of this figure *cf.* Pliny, *Epist.* vii. 9 "ut laus est ceræ, mollis cedensque sequatur." For the idea that word is more precise or easy than deed *cf. supra* 473 A, *Phædo* 99 E, *Laws* 636 A, 736 B, *Tim.* 19 E.

<sup>d</sup> *Cf.* 442 A.

<sup>e</sup> *Cf.* 577 A.

ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τούτῳ ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν οὐ συμφέρει, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φησὶν ἢ λυσιτελεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐωχοῦντι ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν  
 589 λέοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον λιμοκτονεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀσθενῆ, ὥστε ἔλκεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκείνων ὀπότερον ἄγῃ, καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ ξυνεθίζειν μηδὲ φίλον ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔαν αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δάκνεσθαι τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἐσθίειν ἄλληλα. Παντάπασι γάρ, ἔφη, ταῦτ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐπαινῶν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁ τὰ δίκαια λέγων λυσιτελεῖν φαίη ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν, ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ  
 Β ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος, καὶ τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται ὥσπερ γεωργός, τὰ μὲν ἡμέρα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι, ξύμμαχον ποιησάμενος τὴν τοῦ λέοντος φύσιν, καὶ κοινῇ πάντων κηδόμενος, φίλα ποιησάμενος ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ αὐτῷ, οὕτω θρέψει; Κομιδῆ γὰρ αὖ λέγει ταῦτα ὁ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπαινῶν. Κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δὲ ὁ μὲν  
 C τὰ δίκαια ἐγκωμιάζων ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ψεύδοιτο. πρὸς τε γὰρ ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν σκοπουμένῳ ὁ μὲν ἐπαινέτης τοῦ δικαίου ἀληθεύει, ὁ δὲ ψέκτης οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ'

<sup>a</sup> The whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 b ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 352 c περιελκομένης, with *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* 1145 b 24.

<sup>c</sup> Perhaps a latent allusion to *Hesiod, Works and Days* 278.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. "the inward man," *Romans* vii. 22, *2 Cor.* iv. 16, *Ephes.* iii. 16.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Arnold, Culture and Anarchy*, p. 10 "Religion says: 'The kingdom of God is within you'; and culture, in

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then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the man<sup>a</sup> and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about<sup>b</sup> whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.<sup>c</sup>” “Yes,” he said, “that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say.” “And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us<sup>d</sup> complete domination<sup>e</sup> over the entire man and make him take charge<sup>f</sup> of the many-headed beast—like a farmer<sup>g</sup> who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an ally<sup>h</sup> of the lion’s nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth.” “Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice.” “From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real know-

like manner, places human perfection in an *internal* condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality.”

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 516 A-B.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 167 B-C, and *What Plato Said*, p. 456, on *Euthyphro* 2 D.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 441 A.

εἰδὼς ψέγει ὃ τι ψέγει. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδαμῆ γε. Πείθωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὸν πράως, οὐ γὰρ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει, ἐρωτῶντες· ὦ μακάριε, οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ νόμιμα διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἂν φαῖμεν γεγονέναι· τὰ μὲν καλὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, μαῖλλον δὲ ἴσως τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ θεῷ τὰ θηριώδη ποιοῦντα τῆς φύσεως, αἰσχρὰ δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀγρίῳ τὸ ἡμερον δουλούμενα; ξυμφήσει ἢ πῶς; Ἐάν μοι, ἔφη, πείθεται. Ἔστιν οὖν, εἶπον, ὅτω λυσιτελεῖ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου χρυσίον λαμβάνειν ἀδίκως, εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι γίνεται, λαμβάνων τὸ χρυσίον ἅμα καταδουλοῦται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτοῦ τῷ μοχθηροτάτῳ; ἢ εἰ μὲν λαβὼν χρυσίον υἱὸν ἢ θυγατέρα ἐδουλοῦτο, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἀγρίων τε καὶ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλυσιτέλει οὐδ' ἂν πάμπολυ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ θεϊότατον ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθεωτάτῳ τε καὶ μιαρωτάτῳ δουλοῦται καὶ μηδὲν ἐλεεῖ, οὐκ ἄρα ἄθλιός ἐστι καὶ 590 πολὺ ἐπὶ δειντέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ χρυσὸν δωροδοκεῖ ἢ Ἐριφύλη ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ τὸν ὄρμον δεξαμένη; Πολὺ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαῦκων· ἐγὼ γάρ σοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

XIII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν οἶει διὰ τοιαῦτα πάλαι ψέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἀνίεται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ

<sup>a</sup> *πράως*: cf. the use of ἡρέμα 476 E, 494 D.

<sup>b</sup> Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary and due to ignorance. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 640, on *Laws* 860 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra* 501 B, Tennyson, "Locksley Hall Sixty Years after," *in fine*, "The highest Human Nature is divine."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Matt.* xvi. 26, *Mark* viii. 36, "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" A typical *argumentum ex contrario*. Cf. 445 A-B and

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ledge of what he censures in him who disparages it." "None whatever, I think," said he. "Shall we; then, try to persuade him gently,<sup>a</sup> for he does not willingly err,<sup>b</sup> by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason—the fair and honourable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,<sup>c</sup> while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not?" "He will if he is counselled by me." "Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,<sup>d</sup> no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle<sup>e</sup> did when she received the necklace as the price<sup>f</sup> of her husband's life?" "Far more," said Glaucon, "for I will answer you in his behalf."

XIII. "And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because

Vol. I. p. 40, note c. On the supreme value of the soul *cf.* *Laws* 726-728, 743 E, 697 B, 913 B, 959 A-B. *Cf. supra* 585 D.

<sup>a</sup> *Cf. Od.* xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb). Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, *Nem.* ix. 37 ff., and Pausan. x. 29. 7.

<sup>f</sup> For *ἐπί* in this sense *cf.* Thompson on *Meno* 90 D. *Cf. Apol.* 41 A *ἐπὶ πᾶσι*, Demosth. xlv. 66.



τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα ἐκείνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμμα  
 πέρα τοῦ δέοντος; Δῆλον, ἔφη. Ἡ δ' αὐθάδεια  
 B καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδες τε  
 καὶ ὀφεῶδες αὐξήται καὶ συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως;  
 Πάνν μὲν οὖν. Τρυφή δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἐπὶ  
 τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται,  
 ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποιῇ; Τί μὴν; Κολακεία  
 δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ  
 θυμοειδές, ὑπὸ τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιῇ, καὶ ἔνεκα  
 χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προπηλα-  
 κιζόμενον ἐθίζῃ ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον  
 C γίνεσθαι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Βαναυσία δὲ καὶ  
 χειροτεχνία διὰ τί, οἶει, ὄνειδος φέρει; ἢ δι' ἄλλο  
 τι φήσομεν ἢ ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ  
 βελτίστου εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν τῶν  
 ἐν αὐτῷ θρεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκείνα, καὶ  
 τὰ θωπεύματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μαθάνειν;  
 Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ  
 ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἷουπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, δούλον αὐτόν  
 D φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν  
 αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου

<sup>a</sup> See Adam *ad loc.* on the asyndeton.

<sup>b</sup> αὐθάδεια: *cf. supra* 548 E.

<sup>c</sup> Not mentioned before, but, as Schleiermacher says, might be included in τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα. *Cf. Adam ad loc.* Or Plato may be thinking of the chimæra (*Il. vi. 181*).

<sup>d</sup> *Cf. 620 c.*

<sup>e</sup> *Cf. p. 49, note e.*

<sup>f</sup> For the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man *cf. Alc. I. 135 b-c, Polit. 296 b-c, Democr. fr. 75 (Diels ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 77), Xen. Mem. i. 5. 5 δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν, Xen. Cyr. viii. 1. 40 βελτίονας εἶναι. Cf. also Laws 713 d-714 a, 627 E, Phædo 62 d-e, and Laws 684 c. Cf. Ruskin, *Queen of the Air*, p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): "The first duty of every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own*

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that sort of thing emancipates that dread,<sup>a</sup> that huge and manifold beast overmuch?" "Obviously," he said. "And do we not censure self-will<sup>b</sup> and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake<sup>c</sup> in us?" "By all means." "And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it?" "Surely." "And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape<sup>d</sup> instead of a lion?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "And why do you suppose that 'base mechanic'<sup>e</sup> handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them?" "So it seems," he said. "Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best man<sup>f</sup> who has within

good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that inferior's good, conquer him." Inge, *Christian Ethics*, p. 252: "It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free." Carlyle (*apud* M. Barton and O. Sitwell, *Victoriana*): "Surely of all the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest." Plato's idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle's theory of slavery, though differently expressed. *Cf.* Aristot. *Pol.* 1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. *Cf.* also *Polit.* 309 a f., *Epist.* vii. 335 d, and Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iii. p. 106.

οιόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ὤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὄν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔξωθεν ἐφ-  
 εστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι; Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.  
 Ε Δηλοῖ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος, ὅτι τοιοῦτον  
 βούλεται,<sup>1</sup> πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμμαχος ὢν  
 καὶ ἡ τῶν παιδῶν ἀρχή, τὸ μὴ εἶν ἐλευθέρους  
 εἶναι, ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν  
 καταστήσωμεν, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπεύσαντες  
 591 τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιούτῳ ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα  
 ὅμοιον καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλεύθερον  
 ἀφίεμεν. Δηλοῖ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πῆ δὴ οὖν φήσο-  
 μεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ κατὰ τίνα λόγον λυσιτελεῖν  
 ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀκολασταίνειν ἢ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ἐξ ὧν  
 πονηρότερος μὲν ἔσται, πλείω δὲ χρήματα ἢ ἄλλην  
 τινὰ δύναμιν κεκτήσεται; Οὐδαμῆ, ἦ δ' ὅς.  
 Πῆ δ' ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ διδόναι δίκην  
 Β λυσιτελεῖν; ἢ οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λανθάνων ἔτι πονηρότερος  
 γίννεται, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λανθάνοντος καὶ κολαζομένου  
 τὸ μὲν θηριῶδες κοιμίζεται καὶ ἡμεροῦται, τὸ  
 δὲ ἡμερον ἐλευθεροῦται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς  
 τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν καθισταμένη τιμιωτέραν ἔξιν

<sup>1</sup> βούλεται Iamblichus and Stobaeus: βουλεύεται ADM.  
 See Adam, *ad loc.*

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 343 B-C.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Lysis* 207 E ff., *Laws* 808 D, *Isoc.* xv. 290, *Antiphon*, *fr.* 61 (Diels ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 303).

<sup>c</sup> Cf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. on 501 D, p. 74, note a.

<sup>e</sup> The paradoxes of the *Gorgias* are here seriously re-affirmed. Cf. especially *Gorg.* 472 E ff., 480 A-B, 505 A-B,

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himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasy-machus<sup>a</sup> did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same?" "Yes, and rightly so," he said. "And it is plain," I said, "that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state, and this is the aim of our control of children,<sup>b</sup> our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them<sup>c</sup> and, by fostering the best element in them with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free." "Yes, that is plain," he said. "In what way,<sup>d</sup> then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power?" "In no way," he said. "And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penalty<sup>e</sup>? Or is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquir-

509 A f. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 187, 380 Β οἱ δὲ ὠνίαντο κολαζόμενοι, and *Laws* 728 c; and for the purpose of punishment, *What Plato Said*, p. 495, on *Protag.* 324 A-B.

- λαμβάνει, σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένη, ἢ σῶμα ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ υἰγείας λαμβάνον, τοσοῦτω ὅσῳ περ ψυχὴ σώματος τιμιωτέρα; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
- C Οὐκοῦν ὁ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνας βιώσεται, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ μαθήματα τιμῶν, ἃ τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεργάσεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλ' ἀτιμάζων; Δῆλον, ἔφη. "Ἐπειτά γ', εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφήν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς υἰγείαν βλέπων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ υἰγῆς ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, εἴαν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἀρμοστούμενος φανέιται.<sup>1</sup> Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἴαν περ μέλλῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μουσικὸς εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν

<sup>1</sup> φανέιται Iamblichus: φαίνεται ADM, φαίνεται pr. F. Bracketed by Hermann.

<sup>a</sup> The *a fortiori* argument from health of body to health of soul is one of the chief refutations of the immoralists. Cf. *supra* 445 D-E f., *Gorg.* 479 B, *Crito* 47 D-E. For the supreme importance of the soul cf. on 589 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 507 D, *Isoc. Epist.* vi. 9, *Xen. Ages.* 7. 1.

<sup>c</sup> Health in the familiar skolion (cf. *Gorg.* 451 E, *Laws* 631 c, 661 A, 728 D-E, *Euthydem.* 279 A-B, *Meno* 87 E, *Soph. frag.* 356) is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods. Cf. *Gorg.* 452 A-B, *Crito* 47 D, *Eryxias* 393 c. In fact, for Plato as for modern "scientific" ethics, health in the higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate sanction. Cf. Vol. I. *Introd.* pp. xvi and xxi, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 26, *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that "not even health,"



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ing sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body<sup>a</sup> does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body?" "Most assuredly," he said. "Then the wise man will bend all his endeavours<sup>b</sup> to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others." "Clearly," he said. "And then," I said, "he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim,<sup>c</sup> nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit, but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul.<sup>d</sup>" "By all means," he replied, "if he is to be a true musician.<sup>e</sup>" "And will he not deal likewise

highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true interests of the soul. Cf. *Laws* 661 c-e ff., 728 d-e, 744 a, 960 d, *Laches* 195 c; and Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 17 "Bodily health and vigour . . . have a more real and essential value . . . but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth and population are." This idea may be the source of the story from which the Christian Fathers and the Middle Ages derived much edification, that Plato intentionally chose an unhealthy site for the Academy in order to keep down the flesh. Cf. Aelian, *Var. Hist.* ix. 10, perhaps the first mention, Porphyry, *De abstinentia* i. 36, Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 1.<sup>4</sup> 416, n. 2; Camden on Cambridge, Gosse, *Gossip in a Library*, p. 23, and Himerius, *Ecl.* iii. 18 (Diels ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 18) ἐκὼν δὲ ἐνθουσει σῶμα Δημόκριτος, ἵνα ἰγυαίνῃ τὰ κρείττονα.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 485, on *Laches* 188 d.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 61 a.

ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει ξύνταξίν τε καὶ  
 ξυμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους οὐκ  
 ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ  
 ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων; Οὐκ  
 Εὐοῖμαι, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ἀποβλέπων γε, εἶπον, πρὸς  
 τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν καὶ φυλάττων, μή τι  
 παρακινῆ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλήθος οὐσίας ἢ δι'  
 ὀλιγότητα, οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀνα-  
 λώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἴος τ' ᾖ. Κομιδῆ  
 μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμὰς γε, εἰς  
 592 ταῦτ' ἀποβλέπων, τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται  
 ἐκῶν, ἃς ἂν ἠγῆται ἀμείνω αὐτὸν ποιήσειν, ἃς δ'  
 ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν, φεύξεται ἰδία καὶ  
 δημοσία. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἔφη, τά γε πολιτικὰ ἐθελήσει  
 πράττειν, εἰς ἅπαντα τούτου κήδηται. Νῆ τὸν κύνα,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. p. 355, note *d*, on 576 D.

<sup>b</sup> ὄγκον: cf. Horace's use of *acervus*, Shorey on *Odes* ii. 2. 24.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 163, note *g*, Newman i. p. 136. For the evils of wealth cf. *Laws* 831 c ff., 870 B-C, *Rep.* 434 B, 550 D ff., etc.

<sup>d</sup> This analogy pervades the *Republic*. Cf. 579 c and p. 240, note *b*, on 544 D-E, *Introd.* Vol. I. p. xxxv. Cf. ὡσπερ ἐν πόλει 590 E, 605 B. For the subordination of everything to the moral life cf. also 443 D and p. 509, note *d*, on 618 c.

<sup>e</sup> As in the state, extremes of wealth and poverty are to be avoided. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 645, on *Laws* 915 B.

<sup>f</sup> Almost Aristotle's use of *ἕξις*.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. pp. 52-55 on 496 D-E. The later schools debated the question whether the "sage" would take part in politics. Cf. Seneca, *De otio*, xxx. 2 f. and Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.* i. p. 62. 22 f.: "Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit;" *ibid.* iii. p. 158. 31 ff.: "consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos;" *ibid.* p. 174. 32: "negant

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with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions ? He will not let himself be dazzled <sup>a</sup> by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass <sup>b</sup> of his wealth without measure, <sup>c</sup> involving himself in measureless ills." "No, I think not," he said. "He will rather," I said, "keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul, <sup>d</sup> and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth, <sup>e</sup> will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be." "Precisely so," he said. "And in the matter of honours and office too this will be his guiding principle : He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit <sup>f</sup> of his soul." "Then, if that is his chief concern," he said, "he will not willingly take part in politics. <sup>g</sup>" "Yes, by the dog, <sup>h</sup>" said I, "in his own

nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum ;" *ibid.* 37 ff. : "praeterea, cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam, etiamsi recesserit ;" *ibid.* iii. p. 157. 40 ff. ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστα' ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας ; *ibid.* p. 172. 18 f. δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύεσθαι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον . . . ; *ibid.* 173. 19 ff. ἔφαμεν δ' ὅτι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον οἶόν ἐστι. μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ εἴαν τι <κωλύη> καὶ μάλιστα' <ἀν> μηδὲν ὠφελεῖν μέλλῃ τὴν πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν ὑπολαμβάνῃ μεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ; *ibid.* p. 175. 3 f. πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μὴ τι κωλύη, ὡς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων ; *ibid.* 6 ff. Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων, οὕτω ῥητορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 399 E, *Phaedr.* 228 B, *Gorg.* 466 C, 461 A, 482 B, *Phaedo* 98 E, *supra* 567 E.

μέντοι ἴσως ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι, ἔὰν μὴ θεία τις  
 ξυμβῆ τύχη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ἧ νῦν διήλθομεν  
 οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη,  
 Β ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. Ἄλλ', ἦν

<sup>a</sup> *θεία . . . τύχη.* So *θεία μοῖρα* is often used to account for an exception, e.g. *supra* 493 A, *Laws* 875 c, 642 c, *Meno* 99 E, etc. Cf. *θεῖον . . . ἐξαιρώμεν λόγου* 492 E.

<sup>b</sup> Lit. "in words." This is one of the most famous passages in Plato, and a source of the idea of the City of God among both Stoics and Christians. Cf. Marc. Aurel. ix. 29 *μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἐλπίζε*, Justin Martyr's *ἐπὶ γῆς διατρέβουσιν ἀλλ' ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται*, which recalls *Philippians* iii. 20 *ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει*, and also *Heb.* xii. 22, xi. 10 and 16, xiii. 14, *Eph.* ii. 19, *Gal.* iv. 26, *Rev.* iii. 12 and xxi. 2 ff. Ackermann, *Das Christliche bei Platon*, p. 24, compares *Luke* xvii. 21 "the kingdom of God is within you." Cf. also *John* xviii. 36. Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses origines*, p. 207, says, "Platon dit de sa République précisément ce qu'on a dit plus tard du royaume de Dieu, qu'elle n'est pas de ce monde." Cf. also Caird, *Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy*, ii. p. 170, Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma* (tr. Buchanan), vol. i. p. 332, ii. pp. 73-74 and 338, Proclus, *Comm.* § 352 (Kroll i. 16); Pater, *Marius the Epicurean*, p. 212 "Marcus Aurelius speaks often of that City on high, of which all other cities are but single habitations . . .," p. 213 ". . . the vision of a reasonable, a divine order, not in nature, but in the condition of human affairs, that unseen Celestial City, Uranopolis, Callipolis. . ."; *ibid.* p. 158 "thou hast been a citizen in this wide city," and pp. 192-193. Cf. further Inge, *Christian Ethics*, pp. 104-105, "let us fly hence to our dear country, as the disciples of Plato have repeated one after another. There are a few people who are so well adjusted to their environment that they do not feel, or rarely feel, this nostalgia for the infinite . . ." Lamartine, in his poem, "Isolement" (*apud* Faguet, *Dix-Neuvième Siècle*, p. 89) beautifully expresses this nostalgia for the home of the ideal:

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city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture.<sup>a</sup> "I understand," he said; "you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal;<sup>b</sup> for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.<sup>c</sup>" "Well," said I, "per-

Là, je m'enivrerais à la source où j'aspire ;  
Là, je retrouverais et l'espoir et l'amour,  
Et ce bien idéal que toute âme désire,  
Et qui n'a pas de nom au terrestre séjour.

Likewise the lovely sonnet of Du Bellay which in an English version might run as follows:

If our brief life is to eternity  
But as a span; if our ephemeral sun,  
Gilding the shadows that before it flee,  
Chases our days to darkness one by one,  
Why, O my soul, pent in this prison obscure,  
Wilt thou in these dim shadows take delight,  
When to soar upward to the eternal pure  
Luminous heavens thy wings are spread for flight?  
There is the good for which all hearts do burn.  
There is the peace for which all creatures yearn.  
There is the love supreme without a stain.  
There too is pleasure that is not bought with pain.  
There upon heaven's dome and outmost shore  
Thou'lt know the ideas and recognize once more  
The beauty whose image here thou must adore.

Somewhat different is the Stoic idea of a world state and of the sage as citizen of the world, *e.g.* Marc. Aurel. iv. 4, Sen. *De otio* 31, Cic. *Nat. deor.* ii. 62 (154). Cf. Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. p. 92; also *ibid.* pp. 87-88. For the identification of the *πόλις* with philosophy cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 15 and vii. 40, Lucian, *Hermotim.* 22, *Sale of Lives* 17, *Ver. Hist.* 17, Proclus i. 16 (Kroll). Diogenes Laertius, ii. 7, reports that, when Anaxagoras was reproached for not concerning himself with the affairs of his country, he replied, "Indeed, I am greatly concerned with my country," and pointed to heaven.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 499 c-d.



δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ  
 βουλομένῳ ὄρᾶν καὶ ὄρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίσειν·  
 διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν, εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ  
 γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς.  
 Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

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<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Theaet.* 176 E, which Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 179  
 says must refer to the *Republic*, *Laws* 739 D-E, 746 B, and  
*What Plato Said*, p. 458, on *Euthyphro* 6 E.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX

haps there is a pattern<sup>a</sup> of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen.<sup>b</sup> But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being.<sup>c</sup> The politics of this city only will be his and of none other." "That seems probable," he said.

<sup>b</sup> *ἑαυτὸν κατοικίσειν*: Adam "found a city in himself." See his note *ad loc.* Cf. Jebb on *Soph. Oed. Col.* 1004.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 499 c-d, 472 b-e, and *What Plato Said*, p. 564.

## I

595 I. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ὑκίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἦκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω. Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Τὸ μηδαμῆ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὄση μιμητικὴ· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς  
 B ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διήρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδη. Πῶς λέγεις; Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι—οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς—λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα. Πῆ δὴ, ἔφη, διανοούμενος λέγεις; Ῥητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδῶς ἐκ

<sup>a</sup> In Book III. On the whole question see Introd. pp. lxi-lxiii. Max. Tyr. *Diss.* 23 *Εἰ καλῶς Πλάτων "Ὀμηρον τῆς Πολιτείας παρητήσατο*, and 32 *Εἰ ἔστι καθ' "Ὀμηρον αἵρεσις*. Strabo i. 2 § 3. Athenaeus v. 12. 187 says that Plato himself in the *Symposium* wrote worse things than the poets whom he banishes. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 138, thinks that the return to the poets in Book X. is intended to justify the poetry of Plato's dialogues. On the banishment of the

## BOOK X

I. "And truly," I said, "many other considerations assure me that we were entirely right in our organization of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter of poetry.<sup>a</sup>" "What about it?" he said. "In refusing to admit<sup>b</sup> at all so much of it as is imitative<sup>c</sup>; for that it is certainly not to be received is, I think, still more plainly apparent now that we have distinguished the several parts<sup>d</sup> of the soul." "What do you mean?" "Why, between ourselves<sup>e</sup>—for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption<sup>f</sup> of the mind of all listeners who do not possess as an antidote<sup>g</sup> a knowledge of its real nature." "What is your idea in saying this?" he said. "I must speak out," I said, "though a certain love and

poets and Homer *cf.* also Minucius Felix (Halm), pp. 32-33, Tertullian (Oehler), lib. ii. c. 7, Olympiodorus, Hermann vi. p. 367, Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, ii. xiv.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra* 394 D, 568 B, and on 398 A-B, *infra* 607 A.

<sup>c</sup> In the narrower sense. *Cf.* Vol. I. p. 224, note c, on 392 D, and *What Plato Said*, p. 561.

<sup>d</sup> Lit. "species." *Cf.* 435 B ff., 445 C, 580 D, 588 B ff., *Phaedr.* 271 D, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 42.

<sup>e</sup> *Cf.* *Gorg.* 462 B, *Protag.* 309 A, 339 E.

<sup>f</sup> *Cf.* 605 C, *Meno* 91 C, *Laws* 890 B.

<sup>g</sup> *φάρμακον*: this passage is the source of Plutarch's view of literature in education; see *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat* 15 C.

παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.  
 C ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπάντων τούτων τῶν  
 τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν  
 γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας  
 τιμητέος ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον. Πάνυ μὲν  
 οὖν, ἔφη. Ἄκουε δὴ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνου.  
 Ἐρώτα. Μίμησιν ὅλως ἔχοις ἂν μοι εἰπεῖν ὃ τί  
 ποτ' ἐστίν; οὐδὲ γὰρ τοι αὐτὸς πάνυ τι ξυνοῶ,  
 τί βούλεται εἶναι. Ἡ που ἄρ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ συν-  
 νοήσω. Οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄτοπον, ἐπεὶ πολλά  
 596 τοι ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὀρώντες  
 πρότεροι εἶδον. Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ σοῦ  
 παρόντος οὐδ' ἂν προθυμηθῆναι οἴός τε εἶην εἰπεῖν,  
 εἴ τί μοι καταφαίνεται· ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὄρα. Βούλει  
 οὖν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰ-  
 ωθυίας μεθόδου; εἶδος γὰρ πού τι ἐν ἕκαστον  
 εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς

<sup>a</sup> Isoc. ii. 48-49 is perhaps imitating this. For Homer as a source of tragedy cf. also 598 D, 605 C-D, 607 A, 602 B, *Theaet.* 152 E, schol. Trendelenburg, pp. 75 ff.; Dryden, *Discourse on Epic Poetry*: "The origin of the stage was from the epic poem . . . those episodes of Homer which were proper for the state the poets amplified each into an action," etc. Cf. Aristot. *Poet.* 1448 b 35 f., Diog. Laert. iv. 20, and *supra* 393 A ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 532, on *Phaedo* 91 c, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 16 ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἔντοιν φίλου ὄσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, Henri-Pierre Cazac, *Polémique d'Aristote contre la théorie platonicienne des Idées*, p. 11, n.: "Platon lui-même, critiquant Homère, . . . fait une semblable réflexion, 'On doit plus d'égards à la vérité qu'à un homme.' Cousin croit, après Camérarius, que c'est là l'origine du mot célèbre d'Aristote." Cf. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* x. 30 "homini praeponit veritatem."

<sup>c</sup> For ἦ που cf. *Phaedo* 84 D.

<sup>d</sup> Perhaps a slight failure in Attic courtesy. Cf. *Laws*



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

reverence for Homer<sup>a</sup> that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking. For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all these beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must not honour a man above truth,<sup>b</sup> but, as I say, speak our minds." "By all means," he said. "Listen, then, or rather, answer my question." "Ask it," he said. "Could you tell me in general what imitation is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what it would be at." "It is likely, then,<sup>c</sup>" he said, "that I should apprehend!" "It would be nothing strange," said I, "since it often happens that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener."<sup>d</sup> "That is so," he said; "but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it." "Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure<sup>e</sup>? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form<sup>f</sup> in the case of the various multiplicities to

715 D-E, and for δξύτερον βλέπόντων 927 B, *Euthydem.* 281 D, *Rep.* 404 A, *Themist. Orat.* ii. p. 32 C. Cf. the saying πολλάκι καὶ κηποῦρος ἀνὴρ μάλα καίριον εἶπεν.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 76 D, 100 B, *Phileb.* 16 D, *supra* 479 E, Thompson on *Meno* 72 D. See Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 1. p. 560. The intentional simplicity of Plato's positing of the concept here (cf. 597 A), and his transition from the concept to the "idea," has been mistaken for a primitive aspect of his thought by many interpreters. It is quite uncritical to use Aristot. *Met.* 991 b 6 ff. to prove that Plato's "later" theory of ideas did not recognize ideas of artefacts, and therefore that this passage represents an earlier phase of the theory. He deliberately expresses the theory as simply as possible, and a manufactured object suits his purpose here as it does in *Cratyl.* 389. See also *supra*, *Introd.* pp. xxii-xxiii.

<sup>f</sup> "Forms" with a capital letter is even more misleading than "ideas."

- ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις; Μανθάνω. Θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὅ τι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν.
- B οἶον, εἰ θέλεις, πολλαὶ πού εἰσι κλίνας καὶ τράπεζαι. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἄλλὰ ἰδέαι γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκευὴ δύο, μία μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ τραπέζης. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας, αἷς ἡμεῖς χρώμεθα, καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ ταῦτά; οὐ γάρ που τὴν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν· πῶς γάρ; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' ὄρα δὴ
- C καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς τὸν δημιουργόν. Τὸν ποῖον; Ὅς πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσαπερ εἰς ἕκαστος τῶν χειροτεχνῶν. Δεινόν τινα λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα. Οὕτω γε, ἀλλὰ τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις. ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ οὗτος χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἷός τε σκευὴ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἅπαντα ποιεῖ καὶ ζῶα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται. Πάνυ θαυμαστόν,
- D ἔφη, λέγεις σοφιστήν. Ἀπιστεῖς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ μοι εἶπέ· τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Cratyl.* 389 A-B. There is no contradiction, as many say, with 472 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Emerson, *The Poet*: "and therefore the rich poets—as Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare and Raphael—have no limits to their riches except the limits of their lifetime, and resemble a mirror carried through the streets ready to render an image of every created thing." (Cf. 596 D-E *κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν* and Julian, *Or.* v. 163 D.) Empedocles, *fr.* 23 (Diels i.<sup>3</sup> pp. 234-235):

ὡς δ' ὀπτόταν γραφέες . . .

δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας . . .

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

which we give the same name. Do you not understand?" "I do." "In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables." "Of course." "But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table." "Yes." "And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes<sup>a</sup> on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?" "By no means." "But now consider what name you would give to this craftsman." "What one?" "Him who makes all the things<sup>b</sup> that all handicraftsmen severally produce." "A truly clever and wondrous man you tell of." "Ah, but wait,<sup>c</sup> and you will say so indeed, for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals, including himself,<sup>d</sup> and thereto earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth." "A most marvellous sophist,<sup>e</sup>" he said. "Are you incredulous?" said I. "Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility

<sup>a</sup> Climax beyond climax. Cf. on 508 E, p. 104, note c.

<sup>b</sup> It is a tempting error to refer this to God, as I once did, and as Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 604 does. So Cudworth, *True Intel. System of the Universe*, vol. ii. p. 70: "Lastly, he is called *ὁς πάντα τὰ τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτὸν*, 'he that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself.'" But the producer of everything, including himself, is the imitator generalized and then exemplified by the painter and the poet. Cf. *Soph.* 234 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> Eurip. *Hippol.* 921 *δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας*.

τοιούτος δημιουργός, ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπῳ γενέσθαι ἄν τούτων ἀπάντων ποιητής, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἄν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι κἂν αὐτὸς οἶός τ' εἴης πάντα ταῦτα ποιῆσαι τρόπῳ γέ τινι; Καὶ τίς, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος οὗτος; Οὐ χαλεπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ πολλαχῆ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργούμενος· τάχιστα δέ που, εἰ θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῆ· ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαντόν τε καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα καὶ σκεύη καὶ φυτὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο. Ναί, ἔφη, φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εἰς δέον ἔρχει τῷ λόγῳ. τῶν τοιούτων γάρ, οἶμαι, δημιουργῶν καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος ἐστίν. ἢ γάρ; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἀλλὰ φήσεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἢ ποιεῖ. καίτοι τρόπῳ γέ τινι καὶ ὁ ζω-

<sup>a</sup> καὶ τίς is sceptical as in Aristoph. *Acharn.* 86.

<sup>b</sup> Art is deception. Diels ii.<sup>3</sup> p. 339, *Dialex.* 3 (10) ἐν γὰρ τραγωιδιοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις <κε> πλείστα ἐξαπατῆ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 10. 1 γραφικὴ ἐστὶν εἰκασία τῶν ὀρωμένων. Cf. Plut. *Quomodo adolescens* 17 F-18 Δ on painting and poetry. There are many specious resemblances between Plato's ideas on art and morality and those of the "lunatic fringe" of Platonism. Cf. Jane Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual*, pp. 21-22, Charles F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, p. 332. Cf. further R. G. Collingwood, "Plato's Philosophy of Art," *Mind*, 34, pp. 154-172. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 60, fancifully says: "Between the lines of Plato's criticism of bad art here, as copying the particular, we must read the doctrine that true art copies or in some way sets forth the idea." But the defenders of poetry have always taken this line. Cf. Hartley Coleridge's sonnet:

The vale of Tempe had in vain been fair  
 . . . . . if the sight inspired  
 Saw only what the visual organs show,  
 If heaven-born phantasy no more required

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

of such a craftsman, or do you admit that in a sense there could be such a creator of all these things, and in another sense not? Or do you not perceive that you yourself would be able to make all these things in a way?" "And in what way," I ask you," he said. "There is no difficulty," said I, "but it is something that the craftsman can make everywhere and quickly. You could do it most quickly if you should choose to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere. You will speedily produce the sun and all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke." "Yes," he said, "the appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth." "Excellent," said I, "and you come to the aid of the argument opportunely. For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class of producers, does he not?" "Of course." "But you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real and true. And yet, after a fashion, the painter <sup>b</sup> too

Than what within the sphere of sense may grow.  
The beauty to perceive of earthly things  
The mounting soul must heavenward prune her wings.

Mrs. Browning, "Aurora Leigh":

. . . Art's the nature of what is  
Behind this show. If this world's show were all,  
Then imitation would be all in art.

William Temple, *Plato and Christianity*, p. 89: "In the tenth book of the *Republic* he says that, whereas the artificer in making any material object imitates the eternal idea, an artist only imitates the imitation (595 A-598 D); but in Book v. he said that we do not blame an artist who depicts a face more beautiful than any actual human face either is or ever could be (472 D)." But this does not affect Plato's main point here, that the artist imitates the "real" world, not the world of ideas. The artist's imitation may fall short of or better its model. But the model is not the (Platonic) idea.



γράφος κλίνην ποιεῖ. ἦ οὐ; Ναί, ἔφη, φαινομένην γε καὶ οὗτος.

- 597 Π. Τί δὲ ὁ κλινοποιός; οὐκ ἄρτι μέντοι ἔλεγες, ὅτι οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά; Ἔλεγον γάρ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ὃ ἔστι ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὄν ποιοῖ, ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτον οἶον τὸ ὄν, ὄν δὲ οὐ· τελέως δὲ εἶναι ὄν τὸ τοῦ κλινουργοῦ ἔργον ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς χειροτέχνου εἴ τις φαίη, κινδυνεύει οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγειν; Οὐκουν, ἔφη, ὡς γ' ἂν δόξειε τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιούσδε λόγους διατρίβουσιν. Μηδὲν ἄρα θαυμάζωμεν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀμυδρόν τι τυγχάνει ὄν πρὸς Β ἀλήθειαν. Μὴ γάρ. Βούλει οὖν, ἔφην, ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσωμεν τὸν μιμητὴν τούτου, τίς ποτ' ἐστίν; Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες κλῖναι αὐται γίνονται· μία μὲν ἢ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὔσα, ἣν φαίμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι. ἦ τίς ἄλλον; Οὐδένα, οἶμαι. Μία δέ γε ἦν ὁ τέκτων. Ναί, ἔφη. Μία δὲ ἦν ὁ ζωγράφος. ἦ γάρ; Ἔστω. Ζωγράφος δὴ, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἶδεσι κλινῶν. Ναὶ C τρεῖς. Ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, εἴτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἴτε τις

<sup>a</sup> ὃ ἔστι belongs to the terminology of ideas. Cf. *Phaedo* 74 D, 75 B, 75 D, *Rep.* 507 B.

<sup>b</sup> τελέως . . . ὄν: cf. *supra* 477 A, and *Soph.* 248 E παντελῶς ὄντι.

<sup>c</sup> An indirect reference to Plato and his school like the "friends of ideas" in *Soph.* 248 A.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 597 C, 598 A, 501 B φύσει, *Phaedo* 103 B, *Parmen.* 132 D.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

makes a couch, does he not?" "Yes," he said "the appearance of one, he too."

II. "What of the cabinet-maker? Were you not just now saying that he does not make the idea or form which we say is the real couch, the couch in itself,<sup>a</sup> but only some particular couch?" "Yes, I was." "Then if he does not make that which really is, he could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that. But if anyone should say that being in the complete sense<sup>b</sup> belongs to the work of the cabinet-maker or to that of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would say what is not true." "That would be the view," he said, "of those who are versed<sup>c</sup> in this kind of reasoning." "We must not be surprised, then, if this too is only a dim adumbration in comparison with reality." "No, we must not." "Shall we, then, use these very examples in our quest for the true nature of this imitator?" "If you please," he said. "We get, then, these three couches, one, that in nature,<sup>d</sup> which, I take it, we would say that God produces,<sup>e</sup> or who else?" "No one, I think." "And then there was one which the carpenter made." "Yes," he said. "And one which the painter. Is not that so?" "So be it." "The painter, then, the cabinet-maker, and God, there are these three presiding over three kinds of couches." "Yes, three." "Now God, whether because he so willed or because some compulsion was

\* Proclus says that this is not seriously meant (*apud* Beckmann, *Num Plato artificorum Ideas statuerit*, p. 12). Cf. Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 1, p. 666, who interprets the passage correctly; A. E. Taylor, in *Mind*, xii. p. 5 "Plato's meaning has been supposed to be adequately indicated by such half-jocular instances as that of the idea of a bed or table in *Republic* x.," etc.

ἀνάγκη ἐπὴν μὴ πλέον ἢ μίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτὸν κλίην, οὕτως ἐποίησε μίαν μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὃ ἔστι κλίην· δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ πλείους οὔτε ἐφυτεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ φυῶσιν. Πῶς δὴ; ἔφη. Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δύο μόνας ποιήσεις, πάλιν ἂν μία ἀναφανείη, ἧς ἐκεῖναι ἂν αὐ ἀμφοτέραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἂν ὃ ἔστι κλίην ἐκείνη, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ δύο. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη. Ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, εἰδὼς ὁ θεός, βουλόμενος

D εἶναι ὄντως κλίης ποιητῆς ὄντως οὔσης, ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις, μίαν φύσει αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν. Ἔοικεν. Βούλει οὖν τοῦτον μὲν φυτοργὸν τούτου προσαγορεύωμεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον; Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ περ φύσει γε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὰλλα πάντα πεποίηκεν. Τί δὲ τὸν τέκτονα; ἄρ' οὐ δημιουργὸν κλίης; Ναί. Ἡ καὶ τὸν ζωγράφον δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τοιούτου; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλὰ τί αὐτὸν κλίης φήσεις εἶναι;

E Τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ μετριώτατ' ἂν προσαγορεύεσθαι, μιμητῆς οὗ ἐκεῖνοι δημιουργοί. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητὴν καλεῖς; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,

<sup>a</sup> In *Tim.* 31 A the same argument is used for the creation of one world ἵνα . . . κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὁμοιον ἢ τῷ παντελεῖ ζῳφ. See my *De Plat. Idearum doct.* p. 39. Cf. Renan, *Dialogues Phil.* p. 25: "Pour forger les premières tenailles, dit le Talmud, il fallut des tenailles. Dieu les créa."

<sup>b</sup> The famous argument of the third man. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 585, on *Parmen.* 132 A and *Introd.* p. xxiii.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Soph.* 265 E θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιείσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* i. 3. 4 "those things which Nature is said to do are by divine art performed, using nature as an instrument," Browne, *apud J. Texte, Études de littérature européenne*, p. 65 "la nature est l'art de

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laid upon him<sup>a</sup> not to make more than one couch in nature, so wrought and created one only,<sup>b</sup> the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being." "How so?" he said. "Because," said I, "if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two." "Right," he said. "God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the real author of the couch that has real being and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinet-maker, produced it in nature unique." "So it seems." "Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind?" "That would certainly be right," he said, "since it is by and in nature<sup>c</sup> that he has made this and all other things." "And what of the carpenter? Shall we not call him the creator of a couch?" "Yes." "Shall we also say that the painter is the creator and maker of that sort of thing?" "By no means." "What will you say he is in relation to the couch?" "This," said he, "seems to me the most reasonable designation for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which those others produce." "Very good," said I; "the producer of the product three removes<sup>d</sup> from nature you call the imitator?" "By all means," he said.

Dieu," Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 13 "deoque tribuenda, id est mundo," *De leg.* i. 7. 21, Seneca, *De benef.* iv. 7 "quid enim aliud est natura quam deus?" Höfding, *Hist. of Mod. Philos.* ii. 115 "Herder uses the word Nature in his book in order to avoid the frequent mention of the name of God."

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 587 c, *Phaedr.* 248 E, where the imitator is sixth in the scale.

ἔφη. Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγωδοποιός, εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μιμηταί. Κινδυνεύει. Τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὠμολογήκαμεν·

598 εἰπέ δέ μοι περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε· πότερα ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα; Τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἔφη. Ἐρα οἶα ἔστιν ἢ οἶα φαίνεται; τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Ὄδε κλίνη, εἴαν τε ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτὴν θεᾷ εἴαν τε κατακτικρὺ ἢ ὀπηοῦν, μή τι διαφέρει αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς, ἢ διαφέρει μὲν οὐδέν, φαίνεται δὲ ἄλλοία; καὶ τᾶλλα ὡσαύτως; Οὕτως, ἔφη· φαίνεται, διαφέρει B δ' οὐδέν. Τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ σκόπει· πρὸς πότερον ἢ γραφικὴ πεποιήται περὶ ἕκαστον; πότερα πρὸς τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει, μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς φαίνεται, φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὔσα μίμησις; Φαντάσματος, ἔφη. Πόρρω ἄρα πού τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἢ μιμητικὴ ἐστὶ καί, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεργάζεται, ὅτι σμικρόν τι ἐκάστου ἐφάπτεται, καὶ τοῦτο εἶδωλον. οἶον ὁ ζωγράφος, φάμεν, ζωγραφῆσει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλ-

C λους δημιουργοὺς, περὶ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐπαῖων τῶν τεχνῶν· ἀλλ' ὅμως παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους, εἰ ἀγαθὸς εἶη ζωγράφος, γράψας ἂν τέκτονα καὶ πόρρωθεν ἐπιδεικνὺς ἐξαπατῶ ἂν τῷ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 488 D, *Soph.* 222 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Soph.* 263 B, *Cratyl.* 385 B, *Euthydem.* 284 c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 599 A, *Soph.* 232 A, 234 E, 236 B, *Prot.* 356 D.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 581 E.

<sup>e</sup> For εἶδωλον cf. p. 197, note e.



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“This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators.” “It would seem so.” “We are in agreement, then, about the imitator. But tell me now this about the painter. Do you think that what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen?” “The works of the craftsmen,” he said. “Is it the reality of them or the appearance? Define that further point.<sup>a</sup>” “What do you mean?” he said. “This: Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things?” “That is the way of it,” he said; “it appears other but differs not at all.” “Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is<sup>b</sup> or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth?” “Of a phantasm,<sup>c</sup>” he said. “Then the mimetic art is far removed<sup>d</sup> from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom<sup>e</sup>; as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen, though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts,<sup>f</sup> but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and

<sup>f</sup> Commentators sometimes miss the illogical idiom. So Adam once proposed to emend τεχνῶν to τεχνίτων, but later withdrew this suggestion in his note on the passage. Cf. *supra* 373 c, *Critias* 111 e, and my paper in *T.A.P.A.* xlvii. (1916) pp. 205-234.

δοκεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα εἶναι. Τί δ' οὔ;  
 Ἄλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, τόδε δεῖ περὶ πάντων  
 τῶν τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι· ἐπειδάν τις ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλῃ  
 περὶ τοῦ, ὡς ἐνέτυχεν ἀνθρώπῳ πάσας ἐπισταμένῳ  
 τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, ὅσα  
 D εἷς ἕκαστος οἶδεν, οὐδέν ὃ τι οὐχὶ ἀκριβέστερον  
 ὄτουοῦν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ,  
 ὅτι εὐήθης τις ἄνθρωπος, καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχῶν  
 γότητί τινι καὶ μιμητῇ ἐξηπατήθῃ, ὥστε ἔδοξεν  
 αὐτῷ πάσσοφος εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἶός τ'  
 εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν  
 ἐξετάσαι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

III. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον  
 τήν τε τραγωδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον,  
 ἐπειδή τινων ἀκούομεν, ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας  
 E ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Soph.* 234 B.

<sup>b</sup> So Dryden, *Essay on Satire*: "Shakespeare . . . Homer . . . in either of whom we find all arts and sciences, all moral and natural philosophy without knowing that they ever studied them," and the beautiful rhapsody of Andrew Lang, *Letters to Dead Authors*, p. 238: "They believe not that one human soul has known every art, and all the thoughts of women as of men," etc. Pope, pref. to his translation of the *Iliad*: "If we reflect upon those innumerable knowledges, those secrets of nature and physical philosophy which Homer is generally supposed to have wrapped up in his allegories, what a new and ample scene of wonder may this consideration afford us." Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4. 6. Brunetière, *Époques*, p. 105, says: "Corneille . . . se piquait de connaître à fond l'art de la politique et celui de la guerre." For the impossibility of universal knowledge cf. *Soph.* 233 A, *Charm.* 170 B, Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. p. 146 on *Hipp. Min.* 366 c ff. Cf. also *Ion* 536 E, 541 B, 540 B, and *Tim.* 19 D. Tate, "Plato and Allegorical Inter-

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foolish men,<sup>a</sup> and make them believe it to be a real carpenter." "Why not?" "But for all that, my friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind in all such cases: When anyone reports to us of someone, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts and everything else<sup>b</sup> that men severally know, and that there is nothing that he does not know<sup>c</sup> more exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all-wise,<sup>d</sup> because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance<sup>e</sup> and imitation." "Most true," he said.

III. "Then," said I, "have we not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer,<sup>f</sup> since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all

pretation," *Class. Quarterly*, Jan. 1930, p. 2 says: "The true poet is for Plato philosopher as well as poet. He must know the truth." This ignores the *ἀρα* in 598 ε. Plato there is not stating his own opinion but giving the arguments of those who claim omniscience for the poet. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 313 n. 1 completely misunderstands and misinterprets the passage. Cf. *Class. Phil.* xxvii. (1932) p. 85. E. E. Sikes, *The Greek View of Poetry*, p. 175, says Rymer held that "a poet is obliged to know all arts and sciences." Aristotle from a different point of view says we expect the wise man to know everything in the sense in which that is possible, *Met.* 982 a 8.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *οὐδένος ὄρον οὐχί Charm.* 175 c, *οὐδὲν ὄρι οὐ Alc. I* 105 ε, *Phil.* 54 β, *Phaedo* 110 ε, *Euthyph.* 3 c, *Euthydem.* 294 δ, *Isoc. Panegy.* 14, *Herod.* v. 97.

<sup>d</sup> *πάσσοφος* is generally ironical in Plato. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 489, on *Lysis* 216 α.

<sup>e</sup> For *ἀνεπιστημοσύνην* cf. *Theaet.* 199 ε f.

<sup>f</sup> For Homer as tragedian cf. on 595 β-c, p. 420, note a.

καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τά γε θεΐα· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῆ καλῶς ποιῆσειν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν. δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον μιμηταῖς τούτοις οὔτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν  
 599 ὄρωντες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ῥάδια ποιεῖν μὴ εἰδότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν· φαντάσματα γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν· ἢ τί καὶ λέγουσι καὶ τῷ ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασι περὶ ὧν δοκοῦσι τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐξεταστέον. Οἶει οὖν, εἴ τις ἀμφοτέρα δύναιτο ποιεῖν, τό τε μιμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἰδωλον, ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν εἰδώλων δημιουργίᾳ ἑαυτὸν ἀφεῖναι ἂν σπουδάζειν καὶ τοῦτο προστήσασθαι  
 Β τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου ὡς βέλτιστον ἔχοντα; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλ' εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων πέρι, ἄπερ καὶ μιμεῖται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἂν σπουδάσειεν ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μιμήμασι, καὶ πειρώτο ἂν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἑαυτοῦ καταλιπεῖν μνημεῖα, καὶ εἶναι προθυμοῖτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ ἐγκωμιαζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἐγκωμιάζων. Οἶμαι, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἤ τε τιμὴ καὶ ἡ ὠφέλεια. Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων πέρι μὴ ἀπαιτῶμεν λόγον Ὅμηρον  
 C ἢ ἄλλον ὄντιναοῦν τῶν ποιητῶν ἐρωτῶντες, εἰ ἰατρικὸς ἦν τις αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ μιμητῆς μόνον ἰατρικῶν λόγων, τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητῆς τις τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὥσπερ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 598 B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 598 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Petit de Julleville, *Hist. lit. française* vii. p. 233, on the poet Lamartine's desire to be a practical statesman, and *ibid.*: "Quand on m'apprendrait que le divin Homère a refusé les charges municipales de Smyrne ou de Colophon,

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things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create. So we must consider whether these critics have not fallen in with such imitators and been deceived by them, so that looking upon their works they cannot perceive that these are three removes from reality, and easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms,<sup>a</sup> not realities, that they produce. Or is there something in their claim, and do good poets really know the things about which the multitude fancy they speak well?" "We certainly must examine the matter," he said. "Do you suppose, then, that if a man were able to produce both the exemplar and the semblance, he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashioning of phantoms<sup>b</sup> and set this in the forefront of his life as the best thing he had?" "I do not." "But, I take it, if he had genuine knowledge of the things he imitates he would far rather devote himself to real things<sup>c</sup> than to the imitation of them, and would endeavour to leave after him many noble deeds<sup>d</sup> and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the theme of praise than the praiser." "I think so," he said; "for there is no parity in the honour and the gain." "Let us not, then, demand a reckoning<sup>e</sup> from Homer or any other of the poets on other matters by asking them, if any one of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a physician's talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have restored to health as Asclepius

je ne croirais jamais qu'il eût pu mieux mériter de la Grèce en administrant son bourg natal qu'en composant l'*Iliade* et l'*Odyssée*."

<sup>a</sup> But *cf.* *Symp.* 209 D.

<sup>e</sup> For the challenge to the poet to specify his knowledge *cf.* *Ion* 536 E f.



Ἄσκληπιός, ἢ τινὰς μαθητὰς ἰατρικῆς κατελίπετο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐγγόνους, μῆδ' αὖ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αὐτοὺς ἐρωτῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐῷμεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων ἐπιχειρεῖ λέγειν Ὅμηρος, πολέμων τε πέρι καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ

D διοικήσεων πόλεων καὶ παιδείας πέρι ἀνθρώπου, δίκαιόν που ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν πυνθανομένους· ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε, εἶπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἰ ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδώλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ὠρισάμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος, καὶ οἶός τε ἦσθα γινώσκεις, ποῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα βελτίους ἢ χείρους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν τίς τῶν πόλεων διὰ σέ βέλτιον ᾤκησεν, ὥσπερ διὰ Λυκούργον Λακεδαίμων καὶ δι' ἄλλους πολλοὺς

E πολλαὶ μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραί· σέ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὠφεληκένας; Χαρώνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλων· σέ δὲ τίς; ἔξει τινὰ εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· οὐκ οὐ λέγεται γε οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτῶν Ὅμηριδῶν. Ἄλλὰ

600 δὴ τις πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὁμήρου ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἄρχοντος ἢ ξυμβουλευόντος εὖ πολεμηθεὶς μνημονεύεται; Οὐδεὶς. Ἄλλ' οἶα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλαὶ ἐπίνοιαί καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχνας ἢ τινὰς ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὥσπερ αὖ Θαλέω τε πέρι

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Ion* 541 A f.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 515 B, *Laches* 186 B.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Laws* 630 D, 632 D, 858 E, *Symp.* 209 D, *Phaedr.* 258 B, *Minos* 318 c, *Herod.* i. 65-66, *Xen. Rep. Lac.* 1. 2 and *passim*, *Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus.*

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 209 D, *Phaedr.* 258 B, 278 c, *Charm.* 155 A,

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did, or what disciples of the medical art he left after him as Asclepius did his descendants ; and let us dismiss the other arts and not question them about them ; but concerning the greatest and finest things of which Homer undertakes to speak, wars and generalship <sup>a</sup> and the administration of cities and the education of men, it surely is fair to question him and ask, ' Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth and reality in human excellence, being merely that creator of phantoms whom we defined as the imitator, but if you are even in the second place and were capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was better governed owing to you, <sup>b</sup> even as Lacedaemon was because of Lycurgus, <sup>c</sup> and many other cities great and small because of other legislators. But what city credits you with having been a good legislator and having benefited them ? Italy and Sicily say this of Charondas and we of Solon. <sup>d</sup> But who says it of you ? ' Will he be able to name any ? " " I think not, " said Glaucon ; " at any rate none is mentioned even by the Homerids themselves. " " Well, then, is there any tradition of a war in Homer's time that was well conducted by his command or counsel ? " " None. " " Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions <sup>e</sup> for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as

157 E, *Prot.* 343 A, *Tim.* 20 E ff., Herod. i. 29 ff. and 86, ii. 177, v. 113, Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* v. ff., Diog. Laert. i. 45 ff., Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, Freeman, *The Work and Life of Solon*.

<sup>e</sup> On the literature of " inventions, " *εὐρήματα*, see Newman ii. p. 382 on Aristot. *Pol.* 1274 b 4. Cf. Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 663 " inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes, " and *Symp.* 209 A.

- τοῦ Μιλησίου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου; Οὐδαμῶς τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. Ἀλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσία, ἰδία τισὶν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι, οἱ ἐκείνῳ ἡγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσία
- B καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδὸν τινα παρέδωσαν βίου Ὀμηρικὴν, ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις; Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον οὐδέν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρεώφυλος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἴσως, ὁ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἑταῖρος, τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν φανεῖη, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀληθῆ. λέγεται γάρ, ὡς πολλή τις ἀμέλεια περὶ αὐτὸν ἦν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ<sup>1</sup> ἐκείνου, ὅτε ἔζη.
- C IV. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' οἶει, ὃ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἴός τ' ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὅμηρος, ἅτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμῆσθαι ἀλλὰ γινώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν πολλοὺς ἑταίρους ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἡγαπᾶτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν; ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ'
- D ἑαυτῶν παριστάναι ἰδία ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ὡς οὔτε

<sup>1</sup> ὑπ' αὐτοῦ Ast, Adam: ἐπ' αὐτοῦ MSS.

<sup>a</sup> Diog. Laert. i. 23-27.

<sup>b</sup> Diog. Laert. i. 105 says he was reported to be the inventor of the anchor and the potter's wheel.

<sup>c</sup> In the (spurious?) seventh epistle, 328 A, Plato speaks of the life and λόγος advocated by himself. Cf. Novotny, *Plato's Epistles*, p. 168.

<sup>d</sup> Diels i.<sup>3</sup> pp. 27 f.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. ὀρφικοὶ . . . βλοὶ *Laws* 782 c.

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they are of Thales<sup>a</sup> the Milesian and Anacharsis<sup>b</sup> the Scythian?" "Nothing whatever of the sort." "Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him and transmitted to posterity a certain Homeric way of life<sup>c</sup> just as Pythagoras<sup>d</sup> was himself especially honoured for this, and his successors, even to this day, denominating a certain way of life the Pythagorean,<sup>e</sup> are distinguished among their contemporaries?" "No, nothing of this sort either is reported; for Creophylos,<sup>f</sup> Socrates, the friend of Homer, would perhaps be even more ridiculous than his name<sup>g</sup> as a representative of Homeric culture and education, if what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition is that Homer was completely neglected in his own lifetime by that friend of the flesh."

IV. "Why, yes, that is the tradition," said I; "but do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had really been able to educate men<sup>h</sup> and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honoured and loved by them? But are we to believe that while Protagoras<sup>i</sup> of Abdera and Prodicus<sup>j</sup> of Ceos and many others are able by private teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the

<sup>f</sup> "Of the beef-clan." The scholiast says he was a Chian and an epic poet. See Callimachus's epigram *apud* Sext. Empir., Bekker, p. 609 (*Adv. Math.* i. 48), and Suidas *s.v.* κρεώφυλος.

<sup>g</sup> Modern Greeks also are often very sensitive to the etymology of proper names. Cf. also on 580 B, p. 369, note *d*.

<sup>h</sup> See on 540 B, p. 230, note *d*.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. *Prot.* 315 A-B, 316 C.

<sup>j</sup> See *What Plato Said*, p. 486, on *Laches* 197 D.

οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν οἰοί τ' ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσι τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὔτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐταῖροι. Ὅμηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, εἶπερ οἶός τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὀνινάει ἀνθρώπους, ἢ Ἡσίοδον ραψωδεῖν ἂν περιόντας εἶων, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν ἀντεῖχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἡνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιον

Ε οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδ-  
αγώγουν ὅπῃ ἤεσαν, ἕως ἰκανῶς παιδείας μετα-  
λάβοιεν; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώ-  
κρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν ἀπὸ Ὅμηρου  
ἀρξάμενους πάντας τοὺς ποιητικoὺς μιμητὰς εἰδώ-  
λων ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ποιουσί,  
τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας οὐχ ἄπτεσθαι; ἀλλ' ὥσπερ νῦν  
δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει  
601 δοκοῦντα εἶναι, αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαῖων περὶ σκυτο-  
τομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαῖουσιν, ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων  
δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὔν.  
Οὔτω δὴ, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν

<sup>a</sup> For διοικεῖν cf. *Protag.* 318 E.

<sup>b</sup> See Thompson on *Meno* 70 B.

<sup>c</sup> On μόνον οὐκ cf. *Menex.* 235 C, *As.* 365 B.

<sup>d</sup> Stallbaum refers to Themist. *Orat.* xxii. p. 254 A δὲ ἡμεῖς διὰ ταύτην τὴν φαντασίαν μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρομεν, Erasmus, *Chiliad* iv. Cent. 7 n. 98 p. 794, and the German idiom "einen auf den Händen tragen."

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 328 B.



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conviction that they will not be capable of governing their homes or the city<sup>a</sup> unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for this wisdom<sup>b</sup> that their companions all but<sup>c</sup> carry them about on their shoulders,<sup>d</sup> yet, forsooth, that Homer's contemporaries, if he had been able to help men to achieve excellence,<sup>e</sup> would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not have clung to them far rather than to their gold,<sup>f</sup> and constrained them to dwell with them<sup>g</sup> in their homes, or failing to persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wheresoever they went until they should have sufficiently imbibed their culture?" "What you say seems to me to be altogether true, Socrates," he said. "Shall we, then, lay it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer,<sup>h</sup> are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things that they 'create,<sup>i</sup>' and do not lay hold on truth? but, as we were just now saying, the painter will fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler's art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colours<sup>j</sup>?" "Certainly." "And similarly, I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing

<sup>f</sup> The article perhaps gives the word a contemptuous significance. So *Meno* 89 B τὸ χροστόν.

<sup>g</sup> οἴκοι εἶναι: J. J. Hartman, *Ad Platonis Remp.* 600 E, *Mnem.* 1916, p. 45, would change εἶναι to μείναι. But cf. *Cic. Att.* vii. 10 "erimus una."

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 366 E, *Gorg.* 471 C-D, *Symp.* 173 D.

<sup>i</sup> Or "about which they versify," playing with the double meaning of ποιεῖν.

<sup>j</sup> For the association of χρώματα and σχήματα cf. *Phileb.* 12 E, 47 A, 51 B, *Laws* 669 A, *Soph.* 251 A, *Meno* 75 A with Apelt's note, *Cratyl.* 431 C, *Gorg.* 465 B, *Phaedo* 100 D, *Aristot. Poet.* 1447 a 18-19.

χρώματ' ἅττα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι  
καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαίοντα  
ἀλλ' ἢ μιμῆσθαι, ὥστε ἐτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν  
B λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, εἴαν τε περὶ σκυτοτομίας  
τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνν  
εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, εἴαν τε περὶ στρατηγίας εἴαν  
τε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα  
μεγάλῃν τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε  
τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν,  
αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὐτῶν λεγόμενα, οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα  
φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γάρ που. "Ἐγὼ γ', ἔφη. Οὐκ-  
οῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικε τοῖς τῶν ὠραίων προσώ-  
ποις, καλῶν δὲ μή, οἷα γίγνεται ἰδεῖν, ὅταν αὐτὰ  
τὸ ἄνθος προλίπη; Παντάπασι, ἦ δ' ὅς. "Ἴθι δῆ,  
τόδε ἄθρει· ὁ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητῆς, ὁ μιμητῆς,  
φαμέν, τοῦ μὲν ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐπαῖει, τοῦ δὲ φαινο-  
C μένου· οὐχ οὕτως; Naί. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμίσεως

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 198 B, *Apol.* 17 c. The explicit discrimina-  
tion of ὀνόματα as names of agents and ῥήματα as names of  
actions is peculiar to *Soph.* 262. But cf. *Cratyl.* 431 B, 425 A,  
*Theaet.* 206 D. And in *Soph.* 257 B ῥήματι is used generally.  
See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 56-57. Cf. *Euthydem.*  
304 E with *Symp.* 187 A, *Phaedr.* 228 D, 271 C and my note  
in *Class. Phil.* xvii. (1922) p. 262.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 593 on *Soph.* 240 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 607 C, *Laws* 840 C, *Protag.* 315 A-B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 502 C εἰ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τὸ τε  
μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμόν, *supra* 392, *Ion* 530 B, *Epicharmus apud*  
*Diog. Laert.* iii. 17 περιδύσας τὸ μέτρον δ νῦν ἔχει, *Aeschines*,  
*In Ctes.* 136 περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ μέτρον, *Isoc. Evag.*  
11 τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ with *Horace, Sat.* i. 4. 62 "invenias  
etiam disiecti membra poetae," *Aristot. Rhet.* 1404 a 24 ἐπεὶ  
δ' οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδε  
τὴν δόξαν. *Sext. Empir.*, *Bekker*, pp. 665-666 (*Adv. Math.*  
ii. 288), says that the ideas of poets are inferior to those of  
the ordinary layman. Cf. also *Julian, Or.* ii. 78 D, *Coleridge*,

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but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases <sup>a</sup> the colours of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words, <sup>b</sup> will deem his words most excellent, whether he speak in rhythm, metre and harmony about cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell <sup>c</sup> that these adornments naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their musical colouring and taken by themselves, <sup>d</sup> I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them." "I have," he said. "Do they not," said I, "resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them? <sup>e</sup>" "By all means," he said. "Come, then," said I, "consider this point: The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance. Is not that so?" "Yes." "Let us not, then, leave it half said but con-

*Table Talk:* "If you take from Virgil his diction and metre what do you leave him?"

<sup>a</sup> Aristot. *Rhet.* 1406 b 36 f. refers to this. Cf. Tyrtaeus 8 (6). 28 ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς ἤβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἐχῆ, Mimnermus i. 4 ἤβης ἄνθη γίγνεται ἀρπαλέα, Theognis 1305:

παιδείας πολυηράτου ἄνθος  
ώκυτερον σταδίου,

Xen. *Symp.* 8. 14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δῆπου παρακμάζει, Plato, *Symp.* 183 ε τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, Spenser, "An Hymne in honour of Beautie":

For that same goodly hew of white and red  
With which the cheekes are sprinkled shal decay,

Ségur's refrain: "Ah! le Temps fait passer l'Amour," Emerson, *Beauty*: "The radiance of the human form . . . is only a burst of beauty for a few years or a few months, at the perfection of youth, and, in most, rapidly declines."

αὐτὸ καταλίπωμεν ῥηθέν, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς ἴδωμεν. Λέγε, ἔφη. Ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἡνίας τε γράφει καὶ χαλινόν; Ναί. Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπαίει οἷας δεῖ τὰς ἡνίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ γραφεύς; ἢ οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας, ὃ τε χαλκεύς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκείνος, ὃσπερ τούτοις ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, μόνος, ὁ ἵππικός; Ἀληθέστατα. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ πάντα οὕτω φήσομεν ἔχειν; Πῶς; Περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζώου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρείαν ἐστί, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ἢ πεπονημένον ἢ πεφυκός; Οὕτως. Πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἐκάστω ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἄγγελον γίνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ, οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ᾧ χρήται.

Ε οἷον αὐλητῆς που αὐλοποιῶ ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν, οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἷους δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὃ δ' ὑπηρετήσῃ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὃ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσει; Ναί. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὃ μὲν ποιητῆς πίστιν

<sup>a</sup> The δέ γε has almost the effect of a retort.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1094 a 10-11 καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν ἢ χαλινοποιικὴν . . .

<sup>c</sup> For the idea that the user knows best see *Cratyl.* 390 b, *Euthydem.* 289 b, *Phaedr.* 274 e. Zeller, *Aristotle* (Eng.) ii. p. 247, attributes this "pertinent observation" to Aristotle. Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1277 b 30 αὐλητῆς ὁ χρώμενος. See 1282 a 21, 1289 a 17. Coleridge, *Table Talk*: "In general

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sider it fully." "Speak on," he said. "The painter, we say, will paint both reins and a bit." "Yes." "But the maker<sup>a</sup> will be the cobbler and the smith." "Certainly." "Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only the man who understands the use of these things, the horseman<sup>b</sup>?" "Most true." "And shall we not say that the same holds true of everything?" "What do you mean?" "That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the user's art,<sup>c</sup> the maker's, and the imitator's." "Yes." "Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness<sup>d</sup> of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use<sup>e</sup> for which each is made or by nature adapted?" "That is so." "It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good or bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As, for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute-playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him." "Of course." "The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about the goodness or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make them." "Yes." "Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have

those who do things for others know more about them than those for whom they are done. A groom knows more about horses than his master." But Hazlitt disagrees with Plato's view.

<sup>d</sup> So in *Laws* 669 A-B, Plato says that the competent judge of a work of art must know three things, first, what it is, second, that it is true and right, and third, that it is good.

<sup>e</sup> For the reference of beauty to use see *Hipp. Maj.* 295 c ff.



ὀρθὴν ἔξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ  
 602 εἰδότος· ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην. Πάνυ γε.  
 Ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρήσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἔξει ὦν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή, ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ γράφειν; Οὐδέτερα. Οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητὴς περὶ ὦν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. Χαρίεις ἂν εἴῃ ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὦν ἂν ποιῇ. Οὐ πάνυ.  
 Β Ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ὁμως γε μιμήσεται, οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἐκάστου, ὅπῃ πονηρὸν ἢ χρηστὸν· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσι, τοῦτο μιμήσεται. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο; Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὡς γε φαίνεται, ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν διωμολόγηται, τὸν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὦν μιμῆται, ἀλλ' εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τοὺς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἀπτομένους ἐν ἱαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

С V. Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμῆσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτου μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποιὸν τί ἐστι

<sup>a</sup> πιστιν ὀρθὴν is used because of πιστεύων above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of δόξαν ὀρθὴν below, 602 A. Cf. 511 E.

<sup>b</sup> This does not contradict Book v. 477-478. For right opinion and knowledge cf. 430 B and *What Plato Said*, p. 517, on *Meno* 98 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> χαρίεις is ironical like χαριέντως in 426 A and καλὸν in *Theaet.* 183 A, but Glaucon in his answer takes it seriously.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

right belief<sup>a</sup> about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true knowledge." "Certainly." "And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion<sup>b</sup>?" "Neither." "Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations." "It seems not." "Most charming,<sup>c</sup> then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations." "Not at all." "Yet still he will none the less<sup>d</sup> imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude." "Why, what else?" "On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play,<sup>e</sup> not to be taken seriously,<sup>f</sup> and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambs or heroic verse,<sup>g</sup> are all altogether imitators." "By all means."

V. "In heaven's name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not?" "Yes." "And now again, to what

<sup>a</sup> Note the accumulation of particles in the Greek. Similarly in 619 B, *Phaedo* 59 D, 61 E, 62 B, 64 A, *Parmen.* 127 D, Demosth. xxiii. 101, *De cor.* 282, Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 64, Isoc. *Peace* 1, Aristot. *De gen. et corr.* 332 a 3, *Iliad* vii. 360.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. on 536 c, p. 214, note b.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 608 A.

<sup>g</sup> For ἐν ἑπεί cf. 607 A, 379 A, *Meno* 95 D.

τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει; Τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι λέγεις; Τοῦ τοιοῦδε. ταῦτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται. Οὐ γάρ. Καὶ ταῦτὰ καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδατι τε θεω- μένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοίλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὐτῶν πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ  
 D πᾶσά τις ταραχὴ δῆλη ἡμῖν ἐνοῦσα αὕτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ὧ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται μηχαναί. Ἀληθῆ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἰστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ πλεόν ἢ βαρύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρήσαν ἢ καὶ στήσαν;  
 E Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον. Τούτου γὰρ οὖν. Τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἐτέρων ἢ ἴσα τάναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταῦτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν  
 603 ἀδύνατον εἶναι; Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἔφαμεν. Τὸ παρὰ

<sup>a</sup> The antithesis of *περὶ* and *πρὸς* marks the transition.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 356 c, *supra* 523 c.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Tennyson ("The Higher Pantheism") "For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool." For the illusions of sense, and measurement as a means of correcting them cf. *Phileb.* 41 E-42 A f., 55 E, *Protag.* 356 c-d, *Euthyphro* 7 c.

<sup>d</sup> *ἐπιθεμένη* helps to personify *σκιαγραφία*. Cf. *Gorg.* 464 c.

<sup>e</sup> Adam's "leaves no magic art untried" is misleading. *ἀπολείπειν* is here used as in 504 c. For the idiomatic *οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει* see p. 200, note b, on 533 A.

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element<sup>a</sup> in man is its function and potency related?" "Of what are you speaking?" "Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far<sup>b</sup> does not appear equal." "Why, no." "And the same things appear bent and straight<sup>c</sup> to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colours, and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation<sup>d</sup> of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft,<sup>e</sup> and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances." "True." "And have not measuring and numbering and weighing<sup>f</sup> proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently<sup>g</sup> greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned<sup>h</sup> and numbered or even weighed?" "Certainly." "But this surely would be the function<sup>i</sup> of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates."<sup>j</sup> "Why, yes, of that." "And often when this has measured<sup>k</sup> and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary." "Yes." "And did we not say<sup>l</sup> that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?" "And we were right in affirming that." "The part of the soul, then, that opines in

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 9.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Protag. 356 D ἢ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις.

<sup>c</sup> λογισάμενον: cf. Laws 644 D, Crito 46 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 36, note a. Of course some of the modern connotations of "function" are unknown to Plato.

<sup>e</sup> For λογιστικοῦ cf. on 439 D.

<sup>f</sup> See p. 448, note c, and my *Platonism and the History of Science*, p. 176.

<sup>l</sup> 436 B, Vol. I. p. 383.

τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἶη ταυτόν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν εἶη τῆς ψυχῆς. Τί μὴν; Τὸ ἄρα τούτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἂν τι εἶη ἐν ἡμῖν. Ἄνάγκη. Τοῦτο τοίνυν διομολογήσασθαι βουλόμενος ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὄν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δ' αὖ φρονήσεως ὄντι τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταίρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ' ἀληθεῖ. Παντάπασι, ἡ δ' ὅς. Φαύλη ἄρα φαύλῳ ξυγγιγνομένη φαῦλα γεννᾷ ἡ μιμητικὴ. Ἔοικεν. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον, ἡ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἦν δὴ ποίησιν ὀνομάζομεν; Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην. Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ εἰκότι μόνον πιστεύσωμεν ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸ αὖ ἔλλθωμεν τῆς διανοίας τοῦτο, ᾧ προσομιλεῖ ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως μιμητικὴ, καὶ ἴδωμεν, φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖόν ἐστιν. Ἄλλὰ χρή. Ὡς δὴ προθώμεθα πρᾶττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἐκουσίας πράξεις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πρᾶττειν ἡ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσι ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαίροντας. μή τι ἄλλο ἦν<sup>1</sup> παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὐδέν. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐν ἅπασιν τούτοις ὁμοιοσητικῶς ἄνθρωπος διάκειται; ἢ ὡσπερ κατὰ

<sup>1</sup> ἦν Ast: ἦ AM, ἦ FD.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 604 D, *Phaedr.* 253 D and E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Lysias* ix. 4 ἐπὶ μηδενὶ ὑγιεῖ and for the idiom οὐδὲν ὑγιεῖ *supra* on 523 B, p. 153, note f.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 496 A, and on 489 D, p. 26, note b.



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contradiction of measurement could not be the same with that which conforms to it." "Why, no." "But, further, that which puts its trust in measurement and reckoning must be the best part of the soul." "Surely." "Then that which opposes it must belong to the inferior elements of the soul." "Necessarily." "This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon when I said that poetry, and in general the mimetic art, produces a product that is far removed from truth in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and is its companion and friend<sup>a</sup> for no sound and true purpose.<sup>b</sup>" "By all means," said he. "Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring.<sup>c</sup>" "It seems so." "Does that," said I, "hold only for vision or does it apply also to hearing and to what we call poetry?" "Presumably," he said, "to that also." "Let us not, then, trust solely to the plausible analogy<sup>d</sup> from painting, but let us approach in turn that part of the mind to which mimetic poetry appeals and see whether it is the inferior or the nobly serious part." "So we must." "Let us, then, put the question thus: Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting under compulsion or voluntarily,<sup>e</sup> and as a result of their actions supposing themselves to have fared well or ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy. Did we find anything else but this?" "Nothing." "Is a man, then, in all this of one mind with himself, or just as in the domain of sight there was faction

painting?  
↓

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 92 D διὰ τῶν εἰκόντων.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *supra* 399 A-B, *Laws* 655 D, 814 E ff., *Aristot. Poet.* 1448 A 1-2 ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι, *ibid.* 1449 b 36-37 f.

τὴν ὄψιν ἐστασίαζε καὶ ἐναντίας εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ  
 δόξας ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς  
 πράξεσι στασιάζει τε καὶ μάχεται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ;  
 ἀναμιμνήσκομαι δέ, ὅτι τοῦτό γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ  
 ἡμᾶς διομολογεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις  
 ἱκανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολογησάμεθα, ὅτι μυρίων  
 τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡ ψυχὴ  
 γέμει ἡμῶν. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη. Ὁρθῶς γάρ, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὁ τότε ἀπελίπομεν, νῦν μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγ-  
 604 Ε καῖον εἶναι διεξελεθῆναι. Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Ἀνήρ,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπεικῆς τοιαύσδε τύχης μετασχών, υἷον  
 ἀπολέσας ἢ τι ἄλλο ὦν περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται,  
 ἐλέγομέν που καὶ τότε ὅτι ῥᾶστα οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων.  
 Πάνυ γε. Νῦν δέ γε τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα· πότερον  
 οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον, μετριάσει  
 δέ πως πρὸς λύπην; Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τό γε  
 ἀληθές. Τόδε νῦν μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέ· πότερον  
 μᾶλλον αὐτὸν οἶει τῇ λύπῃ μαχεῖσθαι τε καὶ  
 ἀντιτείνειν, ὅταν ὁράται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἢ ὅταν  
 ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν γίγνηται; Πολύ  
 που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὁράται. Μονωθεὶς δέ γε,  
 οἶμαι, πολλὰ μὲν τολμήσει φθέγγασθαι, ἂ εἴ τις  
 αὐτοῦ ἀκούει αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἂ  
 οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρώντα. Οὕτως ἔχει,  
 ἔφη.

<sup>a</sup> See *What Plato Said*, p. 505, on *Gorg.* 482 A-B.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 554 D, and p. 394, note e, on 586 E.

<sup>c</sup> 439 B ff.

<sup>d</sup> Plato sometimes pretends to remedy an omission or to correct himself by an afterthought. So in *Book v.* 449 B-C ff., and *Tim.* 65 c.

<sup>e</sup> 387 D-E.

<sup>f</sup> This suggests the doctrine of *μετριοπάθεια* as opposed

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and strife and he held within himself contrary opinions at the same time about the same things,<sup>a</sup> so also in our actions there is division and strife <sup>b</sup> of the man with himself? But I recall that there is no need now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in our former discussion <sup>c</sup> we were sufficiently agreed that our soul at any one moment teems with countless such self-contradictions." "Rightly," he said. "Yes, rightly," said I; "but what we then omitted <sup>d</sup> must now, I think, be set forth." "What is that?" he said. "When a good and reasonable man," said I, "experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said, I believe, then too,<sup>e</sup> that he will bear it more easily than the other sort." "Assuredly." "But now let us consider this: Will he feel no pain, or, since that is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort be moderate <sup>f</sup> in his grief?" "That," he said, "is rather the truth." "Tell me now this about him: Do you think he will be more likely to resist and fight against his grief when he is observed by his equals or when he is in solitude alone by himself?" "He will be much more restrained," he said, "when he is on view." "But when left alone, I fancy, he will permit himself many utterances which, if heard by another, would put him to shame, and will do many things which he would not consent to have another see him doing." "So it is," he said.

to the Stoic ἀπάθεια. Joel ii. p. 161 thinks the passage a polemic against Antisthenes. Seneca, *Epist.* xcix. 15 seems to agree with Plato rather than with the Stoics: "inhumanitas est ista non virtus." So Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apol.* 3 (102 c f.). See also *ibid.* 22 (112 E-F). Cf. Horace, *Odes* ii. 3. 1 "aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem," and also *Laws* 732 c, 960 A.

VI. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον  
 Β λόγος καὶ νόμος ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἔλκον ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας  
 αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος; Ἀληθῆ. Ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς  
 γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα δύο  
 φαιμέν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν  
 τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἔτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ἧ ὁ  
 νόμος ἐξηγεῖται; Πῶς; Λέγει που ὁ νόμος, ὅτι  
 κάλλιστον ὃ τι μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐν ταῖς  
 ξυμφοραῖς καὶ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὡς οὔτε δήλου  
 ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε  
 εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς  
 C φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὄν μεγάλης  
 σπουδῆς, ὃ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὃ τι τάχιστα παρα-  
 γίνεσθαι ἡμῖν, τούτῳ ἐμποδῶν γιγνόμενον τὸ  
 λυπεῖσθαι. Τίνι, ἧ δ' ὅς, λέγεις; Τῷ βουλευέσθαι,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν πτώσει  
 κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ  
 πράγματα, ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν,  
 ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταίσαντας καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχο-  
 μένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοᾶν διατρίβειν, ἀλλ'  
 D ἀεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὃ τι τάχιστα γίνεσθαι πρὸς  
 τὸ ἰᾶσθαι τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 645 A, *Phaedr.* 238 c, and for the conflict in the soul also *Rep.* 439 B ff.

<sup>b</sup> The conflict proves that for practical purposes the soul has parts. Cf. 436 B ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Apology*, in *fine*.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Laws* 803 B and *Class. Phil.* ix. p. 353, n. 3, Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 143.

<sup>e</sup> Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 99, refers to Saxo's tale of the different effect which the news of the murder of Regner Lodbrog produced on his sons: he in whom the emotion was weakest had the greatest energy for action.

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VI. "Now is it not reason and law that exhorts him to resist, while that which urges him to give way to his grief is the bare feeling itself?" "True." "And where there are two opposite impulses<sup>a</sup> in a man at the same time about the same thing we say that there must needs be two things<sup>b</sup> in him." "Of course." "And is not the one prepared to follow the guidance of the law as the law leads and directs?" "How so?" "The law, I suppose, declares that it is best to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and not to chafe and repine, because we cannot know what is really good and evil in such things<sup>c</sup> and it advantages us nothing to take them hard, and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern,<sup>d</sup> and our grieving checks<sup>e</sup> the very thing we need to come to our aid as quickly as possible in such case." "What thing," he said, "do you mean?" "To deliberate,<sup>f</sup>" I said, "about what has happened to us, and, as it were in the fall of the dice,<sup>g</sup> to determine the movements of our affairs with reference to the numbers that turn up, in the way that reason indicates<sup>h</sup> would be the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one's hands to the stricken spot<sup>i</sup> and wasting the time in wailing, ever to accustom the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt and the raising up of what

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Shakes. *Richard II.* III. ii. 178:

My lord, wise men ne'er sit and wail their woes  
But presently prevent the ways to wail,

Herod. i. 20 πρὸς τὸ παρεῖν βουλευῆται.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. Eurip. *Electra* 639 and fr. 175 πρὸς τὸ πίπτου, *Iph. Aul.* 1343 and *Hippol.* 718 πρὸς τὰ νῦν πεπτωκότα, Epictet. ii. 5. 3. See also Stallbaum *ad loc.*

<sup>h</sup> Cf. 440 B, 607 B, Herod. i. 132.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. Demosthenes' description of how barbarians box iv. 40 (51), ἀεὶ τῆς πληγῆς ἔχεται.



νοσῆσαν, ἰατρικῇ θρηνωδίαν ἀφανίζοντα. Ὅρθό-  
 τατα γοῦν ἂν τις, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰς τύχας οὕτω  
 προσφέροιο. Οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον  
 τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἔπεσθαι. Δῆλον δῆ.  
 Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς  
 τοὺς ὄδυρμους ἄγον καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχον αὐτῶν  
 ἄρ' οὐκ ἀλόγιστόν τε φήσομεν εἶναι καὶ ἀργὸν καὶ  
 δειλίας φίλον; Φήσομεν μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν τὸ  
 Ε μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀγα-  
 νακτητικόν· τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος,  
 παραπλήσιον ὃν αἰεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, οὔτε ῥάδιον μιμή-  
 σασθαι οὔτε μιμούμενον εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως  
 τε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς  
 θέατρα ξυλληγομένοις. ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους  
 605 ἢ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.  
 Ὁ δῆ μιμητικὸς ποιητῆς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ  
 τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ γε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ  
 τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν  
 ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε  
 καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι. Δῆλον.  
 Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐπιλαμβανοίμεθα,  
 καὶ τιθεῖμεν ἀντίστροφον αὐτὸν τῷ ζωγράφῳ;  
 καὶ γὰρ τῷ φαῦλα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἔοικεν  
 αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὀμιλεῖν τῆς  
 Β ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ ταύτη  
 ὁμοίωται· καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκη οὐ παραδεχοί-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Soph. *Ajax* 582 θρηνεῖν ἐπὶ φῶδᾶς πρὸς τομῶντι πῆματι  
 with Ovid, *Met.* i. 190:

sed immedicabile vulnus  
 ense recidendum est.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

has fallen, banishing threnody<sup>a</sup> by therapy." "That certainly," he said, "would be the best way to face misfortune and deal with it." "Then, we say, the best part of us is willing to conform to these precepts of reason." "Obviously." "And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory on our suffering and impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice<sup>b</sup>?" "Yes, we will say that." "And does not the fretful part of us present<sup>c</sup> many and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when imitated, especially by a nondescript mob assembled in the theatre? For the representation imitates a type that is alien to them." "By all means." "And is it not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his cunning is not framed<sup>d</sup> to please it, if he is to win favour with the multitude, but is devoted to the fretful and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate?" "It is obvious." "This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart<sup>e</sup> of the painter; for he resembles him in that his creations are inferior in respect of reality; and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul and not to the best part is another point of resemblance. And so we may at last say that we should be

<sup>b</sup> Cf. on 603 B, p. 450, note a.

<sup>c</sup> ἔχει in the sense of "involves," "admits of," as frequently in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

<sup>d</sup> For πέπηγεν cf. 530 D.

<sup>e</sup> ἀντίστροφον is used as in Aristot. *Rhet.* 1354 a 1.

μεθα εἰς μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδιδῶ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ χαριεστέρους φθείρῃ· ταῦτόν καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς  
 C χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν μεγάλη ἡγουμένῳ, τοτὲ δὲ σμικρά, εἶδωλα εἰδωλοποιούντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

VII. Οὐ μέντοι πῶ τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἰκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινόν που. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, εἶπερ γε δρᾶ αὐτό; Ἄκουων σκόπει. οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὀμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδο-  
 D ποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς, ἢ καὶ ἄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἴσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα ξυμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ. Οἶδα· πῶς δ' οὔ; Ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὐτὸ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ  
 E καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκείνο δὲ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. p. 412, note d.      <sup>b</sup> Cf. p. 420, note a, on 595 B-C.

<sup>c</sup> For ἐν πένθει cf. Soph. *El.* 290, 846, Herod. i. 46.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 48 A.

<sup>e</sup> See the description in *Ion* 535 E, and *Laws* 800 D.

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justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as when in a state <sup>a</sup> one puts bad men in power and turns the city over to them and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same manner we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms farremoved from reality, and by currying favour with the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same thing now one, now the other." "By all means."

VII. "But we have not yet brought our chief accusation against it. Its power to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief cause for alarm." "How could it be otherwise, if it really does that?" "Listen and reflect. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer <sup>b</sup> or some other of the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief, <sup>c</sup> and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure, <sup>d</sup> and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness, <sup>e</sup> and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way." "I do know it, of course." "But when in our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also aware that we plume ourselves upon the opposite, on our ability to remain calm and endure, in the belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what we were praising in the theatre that of a woman. <sup>f</sup>" "I do note that." "Do you think, then," said I, "that

<sup>f</sup> This is qualified in 387 E-388 A by οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις. Cf. also 398 E.

γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπηνούμεν. Ἐννοῶ, ἔφη. Ἡ  
 καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ  
 ὀρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτὸν τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ  
 εἶναι ἀλλ' αἰσχύνοιτο ἄν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ  
 χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ  
 606 εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνη γ' αὐτὸ  
 σκοποίης. Πῆ; Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο, ὅτι τὸ βία κατ-  
 εχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις ξυμφοραῖς καὶ πε-  
 πεινηκός τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἰκανῶς  
 καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὃν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων  
 ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὸτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν  
 πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον  
 ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ  
 ἔθει, ἀνίησι τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους τούτου,  
 Β ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν  
 αἰσχρὸν ὄν, εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι  
 ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν· ἀλλ'  
 ἐκείνο κερδαίνειν ἠγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονὴν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν  
 δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας ὄλου  
 τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ὀλίγοις  
 τισὶ μέτεστιν, ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν  
 ἀλλοτριῶν εἰς τὰ οἰκεία· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις  
 ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν οὐ ράδιον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 509, note b, on 473 E.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Isoc. *Panegy.* 168 for a different application.

<sup>c</sup> This contains a hint of one possible meaning of the Aristotelian doctrine of *κάθαρσις*, *Poet.* 1449 b 27-28. Cf. *κουφίξεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς* *Pol.* 1342 a 14, and my review of Finsler, "Platon u. d. Aristot. Poetik," *Class. Phil.* iii. p. 462. But the tone of the Platonic passage is more like that of Ruskin, *Sesame and Lilies*: "And the human nature of us



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this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplating a character that we would not accept but would be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abominate it but take pleasure and approve?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "it does not seem reasonable." "Oh yes,<sup>a</sup>" said I, "if you would consider it in this way." "In what way?" "If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former case, in our own misfortunes,<sup>b</sup> was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered for tears and a good cry<sup>c</sup> and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire these things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard<sup>d</sup> over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain,<sup>e</sup> and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether. That is, I think, because few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves.<sup>f</sup> For after feeding fat<sup>g</sup> the emotion of pity there, it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings." "Most

imperatively requiring awe and sorrow of some kind, for the noble grief we should have borne with our fellows, and the pure tears we should have wept with them, we gloat over the pathos of the police court and gather the night dew of the grave."

<sup>d</sup> This anticipates the idea of the "censor" in modern psychology.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. τῆ δ' ἀσφαλείᾳ κερδανεῖς Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 604, which is frequently misinterpreted; Herod. viii. 60. 3.

<sup>f</sup> For the psychology cf. *Laws* 656 B and *supra* on 385 C-D.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 442 A.

- C πάθεισι κατέχειν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου, ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κωμωδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδία ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς ὡς πονηρά, ταῦτ' οὖν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις; ὁ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸν κατεῖχες ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβούμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τότε αὐτὸν ἀνίης καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξενεχθεὶς ὥστε
- D κωμωδοποιὸς γενέσθαι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἃ δὴ φαμεν πάσῃ πράξει ἡμῖν ἔπεσθαι, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργάζεται; τρέφει γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρδουσα, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησι, δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτά, ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλιωτέρων γινώμεθα. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι,
- E ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχῃς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητής, καὶ πρὸς διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἄξιός ἀναλαβόντι μαθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 211, note *f*, La Bruyère, *Des Ouvrages de l'esprit* (Œuvres, ed. M. G. Servois, i. p. 137): "D'où vient que l'on rit si librement au théâtre, et que l'on a honte d'y pleurer?"

<sup>b</sup> In the *Laws* 816 D-E Plato says that the citizens must witness such performances since the serious cannot be learned without the laughable, nor anything without its opposite; but they may not take part in them. That is left to slaves and foreigners. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 239, note *b*, on 396 E.

<sup>c</sup> *i.e.* as opposed to public performances. Cf. *Euthydem.*

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true," he said. "Does not the same principle apply to the laughable,<sup>a</sup> namely, that if in comic representations,<sup>b</sup> or for that matter in private talk,<sup>c</sup> you take intense pleasure in buffooneries that you would blush to practise yourself, and do not detest them as base, you are doing the same thing as in the case of the pathetic? For here again what your reason, for fear of the reputation of buffoonery, restrained in yourself when it fain would play the clown, you release in turn, and so, fostering its youthful impudence, let yourself go so far that often ere you are aware you become yourself a comedian in private." "Yes, indeed," he said. "And so in regard to the emotions of sex and anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures of the soul which we say accompany all our actions,<sup>d</sup> the effect of poetic imitation is the same. For it waters<sup>e</sup> and fosters these feelings when what we ought to do is to dry them up, and it establishes them as our rulers when they ought to be ruled, to the end that we may be better and happier men instead of worse and more miserable." "I cannot deny it," said he. "Then, Glaucon," said I, "when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas,<sup>f</sup> and that for the conduct and refinement<sup>g</sup> of human life he is worthy of our study

305 *Δ ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, Theaet. 177 B, Soph. 232 C ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, and Soph. 222 C προσομιλητικὴν* with Quintil. iii. 4. 4. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 285, fantastically says that it means prose and refers to Sophron. He compares 366 E. But see *Laws* 935 B-C.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 603 C.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 550 B.

<sup>f</sup> Isocrates, *Panegy.* 159, says Homer was given a place in education because he celebrated those who fought against the barbarians. Cf. also Aristoph. *Frogs* 1034 ff.

<sup>g</sup> The same conjunction is implied in Protagoras's teaching, *Protag.* 318 E and 317 B.

607 τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον κατασκευασάμενον ζῆν, φιλεῖν μὲν χρῆ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δέ, ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονὴ σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσεται ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῆ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου. Ἄλθθέστατα, ἔφη.

B VIII. Ταῦτα δὴ, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσι περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν τοιαύτην οὖσαν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἤρει. προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καὶ τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῶ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μὲν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητικῆ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπότην κύων ἐκείνη κραυγάζουσα, καὶ μέγας ἐν

<sup>a</sup> For the *μὲν* cf. *Symp.* 180 E, Herod. vii. 102.

<sup>b</sup> The condescending tone is that of *Euthydem.* 306 c-d.

<sup>c</sup> Aristotle, *Poet.* 1453 a 29, says that Euripides is *τραγικώτατος* of poets.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 605 c, 595 b-c.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Laws* 801 d-e, 829 c-d, *supra* 397 c-d, 459 E, 468 D, Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 142, and my review of Pater, *Plato and Platonism*, in *The Dial.* 14 (1893) p. 211.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Laws* 802 c τῆς γλυκέλας Μούσης. See Finsler, *Platon u. d. aristot. Poetik*, pp. 61-62.

<sup>g</sup> See on 604 c, p. 455, note h.

<sup>h</sup> For the quarrel between philosophy and poetry cf. *Laws* 967 c-d, Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. p. 136. It still goes on in modern times. Cf. Keats, "Lamia":

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and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet, we must love <sup>a</sup> and salute them as doing the best they can, <sup>b</sup> and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic <sup>c</sup> of poets and the first of tragedians, <sup>d</sup> but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men. <sup>e</sup> For if you grant admission to the honeyed muse <sup>f</sup> in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best." "Most true," he said.

VIII. "Let us, then, conclude our return to the topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we really had good grounds then for dismissing her from our city, since such was her character. For reason constrained us. <sup>g</sup> And let us further say to her, lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel <sup>h</sup> between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as 'the yelping hound barking at her master and might in the idle babble of fools,' <sup>i</sup>

Do not all charms fly  
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?

Wordsworth, "A Poet's Epitaph":

Philosopher! a fingering slave,  
One that would peep and botanize  
Upon his mother's grave.

But Anatole France thinks otherwise, "Les Torts de l'histoire," *Vie littéraire*, ii. p. 123: "J'ai remarqué que les philosophes vivaient généralement en bonne intelligence avec les poètes . . . Les philosophes savent que les poètes ne pensent pas; cela les désarme, les attendrit et les enchante."

<sup>i</sup> Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 252, conjectures that these quotations are from Sophron; cf. also *ibid.* ii. pp. 386-387.



- C ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι, καὶ ὁ τῶν διασόφων ὄχλος κρατῶν, καὶ οἱ λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες ὅτι ἄρα πένονται, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεῖα παλαιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως τούτων. ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω, ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἢ μίμησις, ὡς χρῆ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένη, ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα· ὡς ξύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι.
- D ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλεῖ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι' Ὀμήρου θεωρῆς αὐτήν; Πολύ γε. Οὐκοῦν δικαία ἐστὶν οὕτω κατιέναι, ἀπολογησαμένη<sup>1</sup> ἐν μέλει ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Δοῖμεν δέ γε που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστι· καὶ εὐμενῶς ἀκουσόμεθα.
- E κερδανοῦμεν γάρ που, ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἡδεῖα φανῆ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη. Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλομεν, ἔφη, κερδαίνειν; Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγήσωνται μὴ ὠφέλιμον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, βία μὲν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως, διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν

<sup>1</sup> ἀπολογησαμένη A, ἀπολογισαμένη FD, ἀπολογησομένη A<sup>2</sup>M.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. p. 420, note b, on 595 c.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra*, Introd. p. lxiii.

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and 'the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good,' and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor, and countless others are tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let it be declared that, if the mimetic and dulcet poetry can show any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit her, since we ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the same it would be impious to betray what we believe to be the truth.<sup>a</sup> Is not that so, friend? Do not you yourself feel her magic<sup>b</sup> and especially when Homer<sup>c</sup> is her interpreter?" "Greatly." "Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defence, whether in lyric or other measure?" "By all means." "And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause<sup>d</sup> in prose without metre, and show that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man. And we shall listen benevolently, for it will be clear gain for us if it can be shown that she bestows not only pleasure but benefit." "How could we help being the gainers?" said he. "But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen in love, if they think that the love is not good for them, hard though it be,<sup>e</sup> nevertheless refrain, so we,

<sup>a</sup> In *Laws* 658 D Plato says that old men would prefer Homer and epic to any other literary entertainment.

<sup>b</sup> This challenge was taken up by Aristotle (*Poetics*), Plutarch (*Quomodo adolescens*), Sidney (*Defense of Poesie*), and many others.

<sup>c</sup> *βία μὲν, ὄμως δέ*: cf. *Epist.* iii. 316 E, and vii. 325 A, and Raeder, *Rhein. Mus.* lxi. p. 470, Aristoph. *Clouds* 1363 *μόλις μὲν ἀλλ ὄμως*, Eurip. *Phoen.* 1421 *μόλις μὲν, ἐξέτεινε δ'*, and also Soph. *Antig.* 1105, *O.T.* 998, Eurip. *Bacch.* 1027, *Hec.* 843, *Or.* 1023, *El.* 753, *Phoen.* 1069, *I.A.* 688, 904.

ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν  
 608 πολιτειῶν τροφῆς, εὐνοὶ μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανῆναι  
 αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, ἕως δ' ἂν  
 μὴ οἶα τ' ἦ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθ' αὐτῆς  
 ἐπάδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέ-  
 γομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωδὴν, εὐλαβούμενοι  
 πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικὸν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν  
 πολλῶν ἔρωτα. αἰσθόμεθα<sup>1</sup> δ' οὖν, ὡς οὐ σπου-  
 δαστέον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε  
 ἀπτομένη καὶ σπουδαία, ἀλλ' εὐλαβητέον αὐτὴν<sup>2</sup>

B τῷ ἀκροωμένῳ, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας  
 δεδιότι, καὶ νομιστέα ἅπερ εἰρήκαμεν περὶ ποιή-  
 σεως. Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ξύμφημι. Μέγας  
 γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ  
 ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε  
 οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ  
 οὔδεμιᾶ οὔδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελήσαι δικαιο-  
 σύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς. Ξύμφημί σοι,  
 ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον  
 ὄντινοῦν.

C IX. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα  
 ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἄθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν·  
 Ἄμῆχανόν τι, ἔφη, λέγεις μέγεθος, εἰ τῶν εἰρημέ-

<sup>1</sup> αἰσθόμεθα AFDM, εἰσόμεθα scr. Mon., ἀσόμεθα Madvig, followed by Burnet.

<sup>2</sup> ADM have ὃν after αὐτὴν, F ὃν. More recent mss. omit it.

<sup>a</sup> Ironical, as καλλίστη in 562 A.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

owing to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us by our education in these fine <sup>a</sup> polities of ours, will gladly have the best possible case made out for her goodness and truth, but so long as she is unable to make good her defence we shall chant over to ourselves <sup>b</sup> as we listen the reasons that we have given as a counter-charm to her spell, to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude; for we have come to see that we must not take such poetry seriously as a serious thing <sup>c</sup> that lays hold on truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on his guard fearing for the polity in his soul <sup>d</sup> and must believe what we have said about poetry." "By all means," he said, "I concur." "Yes, for great is the struggle,<sup>e</sup>" I said, "dear Glaucon, a far greater contest than we think it, that determines whether a man prove good or bad, so that not the lure of honour or wealth or any office, no, nor of poetry either, should incite us <sup>f</sup> to be careless of righteousness and all excellence." "I agree with you," he replied, "in view of what we have set forth, and I think that anyone else would do so too."

IX. "And yet," said I, "the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes proposed for her we have not set forth." "You must have in mind an inconceivable <sup>g</sup> magnitude," he replied, "if there are other

<sup>b</sup> For ἐπῳδοῦντες cf. *Phaedo* 114 D, 77 E.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 602 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 114 C, 107 C, *Phaedr.* 247 B, *Gorg.* 526 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. *Peace* 276, and for the whole sentence *Phaedo* 83 B-C, *supra* 465 D, *infra* 618 B-C f. and p. 404, note d, on 589 E.

<sup>f</sup> ἐπαρθέντα: cf. 416 C.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *supra* 494 C, 509 A, 548 D, 584 B, 588 A, *Apol.* 41 C, *Charm.* 155 D.

νων μείζω ἐστὶν ἄλλα. Τί δ' ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ μέγα γένοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; οἶει ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσούτου δεῖν  
D χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός; Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέγεις; Οὐκ ἦσθησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται; καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν; Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γ', ἔφην· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύ· οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν. "Ἐμοιγ'", ἔφη· σοῦ δ' ἂν ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι τὸ οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο. Ἄκουοις ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Λέγε μόνον, ἔφη. Ἄγα-  
E θόν τι, εἶπον, καὶ κακὸν καλεῖς; "Ἐγωγε. Ἄρ' οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖ; Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ μὲν ἀπολλύον καὶ διαφθεῖρον πᾶν τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ σῶζον καὶ ὠφελούν τὸ ἀγαθόν. "Ἐγωγ',

<sup>a</sup> Clement, *Strom.* iv. p. 496 B ὁθούνεκ' ἀρετῆ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνῃ οὐκ ἐκ θυραίων τὰ πείχειρα λαμβάνει, αὐτὴ δ' ἑαυτὴν ἄθλα τῶν πόνων ἔχει. Tennyson, "Wages":

. . . if the wages of Virtue be dust,  
 Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm  
 and the fly?

She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,  
 To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky:  
 Give her the wages of going on, and not to die.

<sup>b</sup> Tennyson, "Locksley Hall Sixty Years After":

Good, for Good is Good, he follow'd, yet he look'd beyond  
 the grave . . .

Truth for truth, and good for good! The Good, the True,  
 the Pure, the Just—

Take the charm "For ever" from them, and they crumble  
 into dust.



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

things greater than those of which we have spoken.<sup>a</sup> "What great thing," said I, "could there be in a little time<sup>b</sup>? For surely the whole time from the boy to the old man would be small compared with all time.<sup>c</sup>" "Nay, it is nothing," he said. "What then? Do you think that an immortal thing<sup>d</sup> ought to be seriously concerned for such a little time, and not rather for all time?" "I think so," he said; "but what is this that you have in mind?" "Have you never perceived," said I, "that our soul is immortal and never perishes?" And he, looking me full in the face<sup>e</sup> in amazement,<sup>f</sup> said, "No, by Zeus, not I; but are you able to declare this?" "I certainly ought to be,<sup>g</sup>" said I, "and I think you too can, for it is nothing hard." "It is for me," he said; "and I would gladly hear from you this thing that is not hard.<sup>h</sup>" "Listen," said I. "Just speak on," he replied. "You speak of<sup>i</sup> good and evil, do you not?" "I do." "Is your notion of them the same as mine?" "What is it?" "That which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the

<sup>a</sup> Cf. on 486 A, p. 9, note *f* and 498 D.

<sup>b</sup> For the colourless use of *πρᾶγμα* see *What Plato Said*, p. 497, on *Protag.* 330 c-d. Cf. Shakes. *Hamlet*, i. iv. 67 "being a thing immortal as itself."

<sup>c</sup> *ἐμβλέψας*: cf. *Charmides* 155 c.

<sup>d</sup> Glaucon is surprised in spite of 498 D. Many uncertain inferences have been drawn from the fact that in spite of the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus* (245 c ff.) interlocutors in Plato are always surprised at the idea of immortality. Cf. *supra*, *Intro.* p. lxiv.

<sup>e</sup> For the idiomatic *εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ* cf. 430 E, *Charm.* 156 A, *Menex.* 236 B, *infra* 612 D.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Protag.* 341 A τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο, which is a little different, Herod. vii. 11 τὸ δεινὸν τὸ πείσσομαι.

<sup>g</sup> See Vol. I. p. 90, note *a* and *What Plato Said*, p. 567, on *Cratyl.* 385 B.

ἔφη. Τί δέ; κακὸν ἐκάστω τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν λέγεις;  
 609 οἶον ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀφθαλμίαν καὶ ξύμπαντι τῷ σώματι  
 νόσον, σίτῳ τε ἐρυσίβην, σηπεδόνα τε ξύλοις,  
 χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, σχεδὸν  
 πᾶσι ξύμφυτον ἐκάστω κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα;  
 Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῷ τι τούτων προσ-  
 γένηται, πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ᾧ προσεγένετο, καὶ τελευ-  
 τῶν ὅλον διέλυσε καὶ ἀπώλεσεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
 Τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία  
 ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσι, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν  
 Β ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἔτι διαφθείρειεν. οὐ γὰρ τό γε  
 ἀγαθὸν μὴ ποτέ τι ἀπολέσῃ, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ μήτε  
 κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν; ἔφη. Ἐὰν  
 ἄρα τι εὐρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν κακόν,  
 ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἶόν τε  
 αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύον, οὐκ ἤδη εἰσόμεθα, ὅτι τοῦ  
 πεφυκότος οὕτως ὄλεθρος οὐκ ἦν; Οὕτως, ἔφη,  
 εἰκός. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ψυχῇ ἂρ' οὐκ ἔστιν  
 ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακὴν; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἂ νῦν δὴ  
 C διῆμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία  
 καὶ ἀμαθία. Ἡ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτὴν διαλύει τε  
 καὶ ἀπόλλυσι; καὶ ἐννόει, μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν  
 οἰηθέντες τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν  
 ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας,  
 πονηρίας οὔσης ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ὥδε ποιεῖ· ὥσπερ  
 σῶμα ἢ σώματος πονηρία νόσος οὔσα τήκει καὶ  
 διόλλυσι καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι, καὶ ἂ

<sup>a</sup> Ruskin, *Time and Tide* § 52 (Brantwood ed. p. 68):  
 "Every faculty of man's soul, and every instinct of it by  
 which he is meant to live, is exposed to its own special form  
 of corruption"; Boethius, *Cons.* iii. 11 (L.C.L. trans. p. 283),  
 things are destroyed by what is hostile; Aristot. *Top.*  
 124 a 28 εἰ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτικὸν διαλυτικόν.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

good." "Yes, I think so," he said. "How about this: Do you say that there is for everything its special good and evil, as for example for the eyes ophthalmia, for the entire body disease, for grain mildew, rotting for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil and disease<sup>a</sup>?" "I do," he said. "Then when one of these evils comes to anything does it not make the thing to which it attaches itself bad, and finally disintegrate and destroy it?" "Of course." "Then the congenital evil of each thing and its own vice destroys it, or if that is not going to destroy it, nothing else remains that could; for obviously<sup>b</sup> the good will never destroy anything, nor yet again will that which is neutral and neither good nor evil<sup>c</sup>." "How could it?" he said. "If, then, we discover<sup>d</sup> anything that has an evil which vitiates it, yet is not able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not thereupon know that of a thing so constituted there can be no destruction?" "That seems likely," he said. "Well, then," said I, "has not the soul something that makes it evil?" "Indeed it has," he said, "all the things that we were just now enumerating, injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and ignorance." "Does any one of these things dissolve and destroy it? And reflect, lest we be misled by supposing that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus: Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it no longer is a body at all,<sup>e</sup> in like manner in all the

<sup>b</sup> γε vi termini. Cf. 379 A, *Phaedo* 106 D.

<sup>c</sup> See *What Plato Said*, p. 490, on *Lysis* 216 c.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 529, note a, on 478 D.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Aristot. Pol.* 1309 b 28 μηδὲ ῥίνα ποιήσει φάλσεσθαι.

νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας,  
 D τῷ προσκαθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης, εἰς τὸ  
 μὴ εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται—οὐχ οὕτως; Ναί. Ἴθι δὴ,  
 καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει, ἄρα  
 ἐνούσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι  
 καὶ προσκαθῆσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραίνει, ἕως  
 ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ;  
 Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι ἐκεῖνό γε  
 ἄλογον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπο-  
 λλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ μή. Ἄλογον. Ἐννόει  
 E γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς  
 τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἢ ἂν ἦ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, εἴτε  
 παλαιότης εἴτε σαπρότης εἴτε ἠτισοῦν οὔσα, οὐκ  
 οἴομεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπόλλυσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν  
 ἐμποιῇ ἡ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων τῷ σώματι  
 σώματος μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ δι' ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ  
 τῆς αὐτοῦ κακίας νόσου οὔσης ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπὸ  
 610 δὲ σιτίων πονηρίας ἄλλων ὄντων ἄλλο ὄν τὸ σῶμα,  
 ὑπ' ἄλλοτρίου κακοῦ μὴ ἐμποιήσαντος τὸ ἐμφυτον  
 κακόν, οὐδέποτε ἀξιώσομεν διαφθείρεσθαι. Ὁρθό-  
 τατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.<sup>1</sup>

X. Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν  
 μὴ σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ,

<sup>1</sup> ὀρθότατα . . . λέγεις Adam: ὀρθότατ' ἂν . . . λέγεις  
 AFDM: ὀρθότατ' αὐ . . . λέγεις Stephanus: ὀρθότατ' ἂν . . .  
 λέγεις Hermann.

<sup>a</sup> The argument that follows is strictly speaking a fallacy  
 in that it confounds the soul with the physical principle of  
 life. Cf. on 335 c and on 352 e, *Gorg.* 477 b-c, and *supra*,  
 Introd. p. lxvii. But Dean Inge, "Platonism and Human  
 Immortality" (*Aristot. Soc.*, 1919, p. 288) says: "Plato's argu-  
 ment, in the tenth book of the *Republic*, for the immortality  
 of the soul, has found a place in scholastic theology, but is  
 supposed to have been discredited by Kant. I venture to  
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examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil which, by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity. Is not that so?" "Yes." "Come, then, and consider the soul in the same way.<sup>a</sup> Do injustice and other wickedness dwelling in it, by their indwelling and attachment to it, corrupt and wither it till they bring it to death and separate it from the body?" "They certainly do not do that," he said. "But surely," said I, "it is unreasonable to suppose that the vice of something else destroys a thing while its own does not." "Yes, unreasonable." "For observe, Glaucon," said I, "that we do not think it proper to say of the body either that it is destroyed by the badness of foods themselves, whether it be staleness or rottenness or whatever it is;<sup>b</sup> but when the badness of the foods themselves engenders in the body the defect of body, then we shall say that it is destroyed *owing* to these foods, but *by*<sup>c</sup> its own vice, which is disease. But the body being one thing and the foods something else, we shall never expect the body to be destroyed by their badness, that is by an alien evil that has not produced in it the evil that belongs to it by nature." "You are entirely right," he replied.

X. "On the same principle," said I, "if the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the think that his argument, that the soul can only be destroyed by an enemy (so to speak) *in pari materia*, is sound. Physical evils, including death, cannot touch the soul. And wickedness does not, in our experience, dissolve the soul, nor is wickedness specially apparent when the soul (if it perishes at death) would be approaching dissolution." Cf. 610 c. Someone might object that wickedness does destroy the soul, conceived as a spiritual principle.

<sup>b</sup> Plato generally disregards minor distinctions when they do not affect his point.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 610 d.



- μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν ὑπ' ἄλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἄνευ τῆς  
ιδίας ποιηρίας ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρου κακῷ  
ἕτερον. Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. Ἡ τοίνυν ταῦτα  
B ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν, ἢ ἕως ἂν ἡ  
ἀνέλεγκτα, μή ποτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδ' αὐ  
ὑπ' ἄλλης νόσου μηδ' αὐ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μηδ' εἴ τις  
ὅ τι σμικρότατα ὄλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι, ἔνεκα  
τούτων μηδὲν μᾶλλον ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι,  
πρὶν ἂν τις ἀποδείξῃ, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα  
τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆ ἐκείνη ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ἀνοσιω-  
τέρα γίνεται· ἄλλοτρίου δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ  
γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου ἐκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγιγνομένου,  
C μῆτε ψυχὴν μῆτε ἄλλο μηδὲν ἐῶμεν φάναι τινὰ  
ἀπόλλυσθαι. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οὐδεὶς  
ποτε δείξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνησκόντων ἀδικώτεροι  
αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θάνατον γίνονται. Ἐὰν δέ γέ  
τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι καὶ  
λέγειν, ὡς ποιηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος γίνεται  
ὁ ἀποθνήσκων, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους  
τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξιῶσομέν που, εἰ ἀληθῆ  
λέγει ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον  
D τῷ ἔχοντι ὥσπερ νόσον, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τούτου<sup>1</sup>  
ἀποκτιννύντος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἀποθνήσκειν τοὺς  
λαμβάνοντας αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θᾶπτον,  
τοὺς δ' ἥττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν

<sup>1</sup> τούτου scr. Mon. adopted by Hermann, Jowett and Campbell, and Adam: τοῦ AFDM, followed by Burnet.

<sup>a</sup> For the challenge to refute or accept the argument cf. *Soph.* 259 A, 257 A, *Gorg.* 467 B-C, 482 B, 508 A-B, *Phileb.* 60 D-E.

<sup>b</sup> Or "to take the bull by the horns." For ὁμόσε ἰέναι see

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soul's badness we shall never expect the soul to be destroyed by an alien evil apart from its own defect—one thing, that is, by the evil of another." "That is reasonable," he said. "Either, then, we must refute this and show that we are mistaken, or,<sup>a</sup> so long as it remains unrefuted, we must never say that by fever or any other disease, or yet by the knife at the throat or the chopping to bits of the entire body, there is any more likelihood of the soul perishing because of these things, until it is proved that owing to these affections of the body the soul itself becomes more unjust and unholy. But when an evil of something else occurs in a different thing and the evil that belongs to the thing is not engendered in it, we must not suffer it to be said that the soul or anything else is in this way destroyed." "But you may be sure," he said, "that nobody will ever prove this, that the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death." "But if anyone," said I, "dares to come to grips with the argument<sup>b</sup> and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul's immortality, that a dying man does become more wicked and unjust,<sup>c</sup> we will postulate that, if what he says is true, injustice must be fatal to its possessor as if it were a disease, and that those who catch it die because it kills them by its own inherent nature, those who have most of it quickest, and those who have less more slowly, and not, as now

*What Plato Said*, p. 457, on *Euthyph.* 3 c. Cf. *ἔγγυς ἰόντες Phaedo* 95 B.

<sup>a</sup> Herbert Spencer nearly does this: "Death by starvation from inability to catch prey shows a falling short of conduct from its ideal." It recalls the argument with which Socrates catches Callicles in *Gorg.* 498 E, that if all pleasures are alike those who feel pleasure are good and those who feel pain are bad.

διὰ τοῦτο ὑπ' ἄλλων δίκην ἐπιτιθέντων ἀποθνήσκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι. Μὰ Δί', ἣ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄρα πάνδεινον φανείται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἔσται τῷ λαμβάνοντι· ἀπαλλαγὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κακῶν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἶμαι αὐτὴν φανήσεσθαι πᾶν τοῦναντίον τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποκτινῦσαν, εἴπερ οἶόν τε, τὸν δ' ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσαν, καὶ πρὸς γ' ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον· οὕτω πόρρω που, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐσκήνηται τοῦ θανάσιμος εἶναι. Καλῶς, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ὅποτε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἦ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκείον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν, σχολῆ τό γε ἐπ' ἄλλου ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. Σχολῆ γ', ἔφη, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκός. Οὐκοῦν ὅποτε μῆδ' ὑφ' ἐνός 611 ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκείου μήτε ἄλλοτρίου, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αἰεὶ ὂν εἶναι, εἰ δ' αἰεὶ ὂν, ἀθάνατον. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

XI. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω· εἰ δ' ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αἰεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν που ἐλάττους γένοιτο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε αὖ πλείους· εἰ γὰρ ὅτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἴσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα.

<sup>a</sup> For the future indicative after *ei*, usually minatory or monitory in tone, cf. Aristoph. *Birds* 759, *Phileb.* 25 D.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 107 c, 84 B, Blaydes on Aristoph. *Acharn.* 757.

<sup>c</sup> *μάλα* is humorous, as in 506 D, *Euthydem.* 298 D, *Symp.* 189 A.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Horace, *Epist.* i. 2. 32 "ut iugulent hominem surgunt de nocte latrones."

<sup>e</sup> For the metaphor cf. *Proverbs* viii. 12 σοφία κατεσκήνωσα βουλήν. Plato personifies injustice, as he does justice in 612 D, σκιαγραφία in 602 D, bravery in *Laches* 194 A, κολα-

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in fact happens, that the unjust die owing to this but by the action of others who inflict the penalty." "Nay, by Zeus," he said, "injustice will not appear a very terrible thing after all if it is going to be <sup>a</sup> fatal to its possessor, for that would be a release from all troubles.<sup>b</sup> But I rather think it will prove to be quite the contrary, something that kills others when it can, but renders its possessor very lively indeed,<sup>c</sup> and not only lively but wakeful,<sup>d</sup> so far, I ween, does it dwell<sup>e</sup> from deadliness." "You say well," I replied; "for when the natural vice and the evil proper to it cannot kill and destroy the soul, still less<sup>f</sup> will the evil appointed for the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or anything else, except that for which it is appointed."<sup>g</sup> "Still less indeed," he said, "in all probability." "Then since it is not destroyed by any evil whatever, either its own or alien, it is evident that it must necessarily exist always, and that if it always exists it is immortal." "Necessarily," he said.

XI. "Let this, then," I said, "be assumed to be so. But if it is so, you will observe that these souls must always be the same. For if none perishes they could not, I suppose, become fewer nor yet more numerous.<sup>h</sup> For if any class of immortal things increased you are aware that its increase would come from the mortal and all things would end by becoming immortal."<sup>i</sup>

*στικῆ* in *Soph.* 229 A, *κολακευτικῆ* *Gorg.* 464 c, *σμικρότης* *Parmen.* 150 A, *πνηρία* *Apol.* 39 A-B, and many other abstract conceptions. See further *Phileb.* 63 A-B, 15 D, 24 A, *Rep.* 465 A-B, *Laws* 644 c, *Cratyl.* 438 D.

<sup>f</sup> *σχολή*: cf. 354 c, *Phaedo* 106 D.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. 345 D.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Carveth Read, *Man and His Superstitions*, p. 104: "Plato thought that by a sort of law of psychic conservation there must always be the same number of souls in the world. There must therefore be reincarnation. . . ."

<sup>i</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 72 C-D.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε τοῦτο  
 Β οἰώμεθα, ὃ γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἑάσει, μήτε γε αὖ τῇ  
 ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχὴν, ὥστε  
 πολλῆς ποικιλίας καὶ ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ δια-  
 φορᾶς γέμειν αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτό. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.  
 Οὐ ράδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀἴδιον εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ  
 πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεκρημένον συνθέσει,  
 ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχὴ. Οὐκ οὖν εἰκός γε.  
 Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ, καὶ ὃ ἄρτι λόγος  
 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν· οἷον δ' ἐστὶ τῇ ἀλη-  
 C θείᾳ, οὐ λελωρημένον δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι ὑπὸ τε  
 τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν,  
 ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα, ἀλλ' οἷόν ἐστι καθαρὸν  
 γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἱκανῶς λογισμῶ διαθεατέον,  
 καὶ πολὺ κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὐρήσει καὶ ἐναργέστερον  
 δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἂ  
 νῦν διήλθομεν. νῦν δὲ εἶπομεν μὲν ἀληθῆ περὶ  
 αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαίνεται· τεθεάμεθα  
 D μέντοι διακείμενον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον  
 Γλαῦκον ὀρῶντες οὐκ ἄν ἔτι ραδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν  
 τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ

<sup>a</sup> The idea of self-contradiction is frequent in Plato. See *What Plato Said*, p. 505, on *Gorg.* 482 b-c.

<sup>b</sup> σύνθετον: cf. *Phaedo* 78 c, Plotinus, *Enneades* i. 1. 12, Berkeley, *Principles*, § 141: "We have shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended; and it is consequently incorruptible. . . . Changes, decay and dissolutions . . . cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance." See also Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1, pp. 828-829.

<sup>c</sup> 603 D. See also Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon*, pp. 90 f.

<sup>d</sup> Such as are given in the *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, and perhaps elsewhere.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. also *Phaedo* 82 e, 83 d-e, 81 c, and *Wisdom of Solomon* ix. 14 φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν, καὶ βρῖθει τὸ



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“ You say truly.” “ But,” said I, “ we must not suppose this, for reason will not suffer it ; nor yet must we think that in its truest nature the soul is the kind of thing that teems with infinite diversity and unlikeness and contradiction in and with itself.<sup>a</sup>” “ How am I to understand that ? ” he said. “ It is not easy,” said I, “ for a thing to be immortal that is composed of many elements<sup>b</sup> not put together in the best way, as now appeared to us<sup>c</sup> to be the case with the soul.” “ It is not likely.” “ Well, then, that the soul is immortal our recent argument and our other<sup>d</sup> proofs would constrain us to admit. But to know its true nature we must view it not marred by communion with the body<sup>e</sup> and other miseries as we now contemplate it, but consider adequately in the light of reason what it is when it is purified, and then you will find it to be a far more beautiful thing and will more clearly distinguish justice and injustice and all the matters that we have now discussed. But though we have stated the truth of its present appearance, its condition as we have now contemplated it resembles that of the sea-god Glaucus<sup>f</sup> whose first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his

γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα, “ for the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things.”

<sup>f</sup> See schol. Hermann vi. 362, Eurip. *Or.* 364 f., Apollonius, *Argon.* 1310 ff., Athenaeus 296 B and D, *Anth. Pal.* vi. 164, Frazer on Pausanias ix. 22. 7, Gädecker, *Glaukos der Meeresgott*, Göttingen, 1860. Cf. Lionel Johnson's poem :

Ah, Glaucus, soul of man!  
 Encrusted by each tide  
 That since the seas began  
 Hath surged against thy side.

σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετρίφθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, ἄλλα δὲ προσπεφυκέναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ μᾶλλον θηρίῳ εἰκέναι ἢ οἷος ἦν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα διακειμένην ὑπὸ μυρίων κακῶν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἐκεῖσε βλέπειν. Ποῖ; ἦ δ' ὄς. Εἰς τὴν Ε φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐννοεῖν ὧν ἄπτεται καὶ οἷων ἐφίεται ὁμιλιῶν, ὡς ξυγγενῆς οὖσα τῷ τε θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ αἰεὶ ὄντι, καὶ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισπομένη καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐκκομισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ πόντου, ἐν ᾧ νῦν ἐστὶ, καὶ περικρουσθεῖσα πέτρας τε καὶ 612 ὄστρεα, ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ ἅτε γῆν ἐστιωμένη γειρὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἐστιάσεων. καὶ τότε ἂν τις ἴδοι αὐτῆς τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν, εἴτε πολυειδῆς εἴτε μονοειδῆς εἴτε ὅπη ἔχει καὶ ὅπως· νῦν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἶδη, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπιεικῶς αὐτῆς διεληλύθαμεν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

XII. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσά-  
Β μεθα<sup>1</sup> ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς  
δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπηρέγκαμεν, ὥσπερ Ἡσιόδον

<sup>1</sup> ἀπελυσάμεθα AFD Stobaeus: ἀπεδυσάμεθα M, defended by Stallbaum.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 42 c προσφύντα.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 250 c ὄστρεον τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι, *Phaedo* 110 A.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 79 D, *Laws* 899 D, and *supra* 494 D τὸ συγγενὲς τῶν λόγων.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 55 c περικρούωμεν, *supra* 519 A περιεκόπη.

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body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves, and other parts have attached themselves<sup>a</sup> to him, accretions of shells<sup>b</sup> and sea-weed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature—even such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon.” “Where?” said he. “To its love of wisdom. And we must note the things of which it has apprehensions, and the associations for which it yearns, as being itself akin to the divine<sup>c</sup> and the immortal and to eternal being, and so consider what it might be if it followed the gleam unreservedly and were raised by this impulse out of the depths of this sea in which it is now sunk, and were cleansed and scraped free<sup>d</sup> of the rocks and barnacles which, because it now feasts on earth, cling to it in wild profusion of earthy and stony accretion by reason of these feasting that are accounted happy.<sup>e</sup> And then one might see whether in its real nature<sup>f</sup> it is manifold<sup>g</sup> or single in its simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how.<sup>h</sup> But for the present we have, I think, fairly well described its sufferings and the forms it assumes in this human life of ours.” “We certainly have,” he said.

XII. “Then,” said I, “we have met all the other demands of the argument, and we have not invoked the rewards and reposes of justice as you said Homer

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Charm.* 158 A, *Laws* 695 A, 783 A. See *λεγόμενα αγαθά supra* 491 C, 495 A, *Laws* 661 C.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 246 A. In *Tim.* 72 D Plato says that only God knows the truth about the soul. See *Laws* 641 D, and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 42.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 271 A.

<sup>h</sup> *ἄπῃ καὶ ὄπῃ*: cf. 621 B, *Phaedo* 100 D, *Tim.* 37 A-B, *Laws* 652 A, 834 E, 899 A and B.

τε καὶ Ὅμηρον ὑμεῖς ἔφατε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον εὖρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, εἴαν τ' ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον, εἴαν τε μή, καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτῳ δακτυλίῳ τὴν Ἄϊδος κυνήν; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν ἐστι πρὸς ἐκείνοις καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ C τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅσους τε καὶ οἴους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν, ζῶντός τε ἔτι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀποδώσετέ μοι ἂ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ; Τί μάλιστα; Ἔδωκα ὑμῖν τὸν δίκαιον δοκεῖν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἄδικον δίκαιον. ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἠγείσθε, καὶ εἰ μὴ δυνατόν εἶη ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὅμως δοτέον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἔνεκα, ἵνα αὐτῇ D δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν κριθείη. ἦ οὐ μνημονεύεις; Ἀδικοίην μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἰ μή. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ

<sup>a</sup> *Supra* 363 B-C.

<sup>b</sup> 359 D f.

<sup>c</sup> *Cf.* 367 E.

<sup>d</sup> *Iliad* v. 845, Blaydes on Aristoph. *Acharn.* 390.

<sup>e</sup> *Cf. Soph.* 243 A, *Laws* 801 E ἀνευ φθόνων, Eurip. *Hippol.* 497 οὐκ ἐπίφθονον, Aeschines, *De falsa legatione* 167 (49). Friedländer, *Platon*, ii. p. 406 does object and finds the passage inconsistent with the idealism of 592 and with *Laws* 899 D ff. and 905 B. *Cf.* Renan, *Averroes*, pp. 156-157, Guyau, *Esquisse d'une morale*, pp. 140-141. See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 80 and n. 612, *Idea of Justice in Plato's Republic*, pp. 197-198. Gomperz, ignoring this passage and interpreting the *Republic* wholly from 367 E, strangely argues that *Phaedo* 107 c proves that the *Phaedo* must have been composed at a time when Plato was less sure of the coincidence of justice and happiness.

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and Hesiod<sup>a</sup> do, but we have proved that justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do justice whether it possess the ring of Gyges<sup>b</sup> or not,<sup>c</sup> or the helmet of Hades<sup>d</sup> to boot.” “Most true,” he said. “Then,” said I, “Glaucon, there can no longer be any objection,<sup>e</sup> can there, to our assigning to justice and virtue generally, in addition, all the various rewards and wages that they bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the man still lives and after his death?” “There certainly can be none,” he said. “Will you, then, return to me what you borrowed<sup>f</sup> in the argument?” “What, pray?” “I granted to you that the just man should seem and be thought to be unjust and the unjust just; for you thought that, even if the concealment of these things from gods and men was an impossibility in fact, nevertheless it ought to be conceded for the sake of the argument,<sup>g</sup> in order that the decision might be made between absolute justice and absolute injustice. Or do you not remember?” “It would be unjust of me,<sup>h</sup>” he said, “if I did not.” “Well, then, now that they have been compared and judged, I demand back from you in behalf of justice the repute

A religious thinker may in his theodicy justify the ways of God to man by arguing that worldly happiness is not the real happiness, and yet elsewhere remark that, as a rule, the righteous is not forsaken even in this world. Cf. *Psalm xxxvii.* 25 ff., *Prov.* x. 3 and *passim*. See Renan, *Hist. du Peuple d'Israel*, ii. p. 376: “Il en est de ces passages comme de tant de préceptes de l'Évangile, insensés si on en fait des articles de code, excellents si on n'y voit que l'expression hyperbolique de hauts sentiments moraux.”

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Polit.* 267 A.

<sup>g</sup> τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα: not the same as λόγον ἕνεκα. See on 581 c, p. 374, note a.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ 608 D.



παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμολογεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖσθαι οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ τὰ νικητήρια κομίσηται, ἃ ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν κτωμένην δίδωσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ διδοῦσα ἐφάνη καὶ οὐκ ἐξαπατῶσα τοὺς τῷ ὄντι λαμβάνοντας αὐτήν. Δίκαια, ἔφη, **Ε** αἰτεῖ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀποδώσετε, ὅτι θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἶός ἐστιν; Ἀποδώσομεν, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ λανθάνετον, ὃ μὲν θεοφιλῆς ἂν εἴη, ὃ δὲ θεομισῆς, ὡσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὁμολογοῦμεν. Ἔστι ταῦτα. **Τ**ῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ **613** θεῶν γίνεται, πάντα γίνεσθαι ὡς οἶόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας ὑπήρχεν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν τ' ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσῃ ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὅς ἂν προθυμείσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς **Β** ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου. Οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τὰναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι; Σφόδρα γε. Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ θεῶν

<sup>a</sup> For the idiom ὡσπερ ἔχει δόξης cf. 365 A ὡς . . . ἔχουσι τιμῆς, 389 C ὅπως . . . πράξεως ἔχει, Thucyd. i. 22 ὡς . . . μνήμης ἔχοι. For the thought cf. Isoc. viii. 33.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 22 B and E.

<sup>c</sup> γε *vi termini*. Cf. 379 A and *Class. Phil.* x. p. 335.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. 365 D.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 39 E.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. 352 B.

<sup>g</sup> This recalls the faith of Socrates in *Apol.* 41 C-D and

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that she in fact enjoys <sup>a</sup> from gods and men, and I ask that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that she may gather in the prizes <sup>b</sup> which she wins from the seeming and bestows on her possessors, since she has been proved to bestow the blessings that come from the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek and win her." "That is a just demand," he said. "Then," said I, "will not the first of these restorations be that the gods certainly <sup>c</sup> are not unaware <sup>d</sup> of the true character of each of the two, the just and the unjust?" "We will restore that," he said. "And if they are not concealed, the one will be dear to the gods <sup>e</sup> and the other hateful to them, as we agreed in the beginning.<sup>f</sup>" "That is so." "And shall we not agree that all things that come from the gods work together for the best <sup>g</sup> for him that is dear to the gods, apart from the inevitable evil caused by sin in a former life <sup>h</sup>?" "By all means." "This, then, must be our conviction about the just man, that whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other supposed evil, for him all these things will finally prove good, both in life and in death. For by the gods assuredly that man will never be neglected who is willing and eager to be righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened unto god <sup>i</sup> so far as that is possible for man." "It is reasonable," he said, "that such a one should not be neglected by his like.<sup>j</sup>" "And must we not think the opposite of the unjust man?" "Most emphatically." "Such then are the prizes of victory

*Phaedo* 63 B-C, and anticipates the theodicy of *Laws* 899 D ff., 904 D-E ff.

<sup>a</sup> Besides obvious analogies with Buddhism, this recalls Empedocles *fr.* 115, Diels i.<sup>3</sup> p. 267.

<sup>i</sup> Cf. *ἰσοτιμία θεῶν Theaet.* 176 B, and *What Plato Said*, p. 578, *supra* p. 72, note d. <sup>j</sup> Cf. *Laws* 716 C-D, 904 E.

τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἶη νικητήρια τῷ δικαίῳ. Κατὰ γοῦν  
 ἐμὴν δόξαν, ἔφη. Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρ' ἀνθρώ-  
 πων; ἄρ' οὐχ ὧδε ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ὄν τιθέναι; οὐχ  
 οἱ μὲν δεινοὶ τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς  
 ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν  
 ἄνω μή; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀξέως ἀποπηδῶσι, τελευ-  
 C τῶντες δὲ καταγέλαστοι γίνονται, τὰ ὦτα ἐπὶ  
 τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντες καὶ ἀστεφάνωτοι ἀποτρέχοντες·  
 οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δρομικοὶ εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες τὰ τε  
 ἄθλα λαμβάνουσι καὶ στεφανοῦνται. οὐχ οὕτω  
 καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ πολὺ ξυμβαίνει· πρὸς  
 τέλος ἐκάστης πράξεως καὶ ὀμιλίας καὶ τοῦ βίου  
 εὐδοκιμοῦσί τε καὶ τὰ ἄθλα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων  
 φέρονται; Καὶ μάλα. Ἄνέξει ἄρα λέγοντος ἐμοῦ  
 D περὶ τούτων, ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγες περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων;  
 ἐρῶ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι, ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύ-  
 τεροι γένωνται, ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν πόλει ἄρχουσί τε ἂν  
 βούλωνται τὰς ἀρχάς, γαμοῦσί τε ὀπόθεν ἂν βού-  
 λωνται, ἐκδιδόασί τε εἰς οὓς ἂν ἐθέλωσι, καὶ πάντα,  
 ἃ σὺ περὶ ἐκείνων, ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω περὶ τῶνδε· καὶ  
 αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ  
 εἰάν νεοὶ ὄντες λάθωσιν, ἐπὶ τέλος τοῦ δρόμου  
 αἰρεθέντες καταγέλαστοί εἰσι καὶ γέροντες γιγνό-  
 μενοι ἄθλιοι προπηλακίζονται ὑπὸ ξένων τε καὶ

<sup>a</sup> For the order cf. *Laws* 913 B λεγόμενον εὖ, Thucyd. i. 71. 7, Vahlen, *Op. Acad.* i. 495-496. For the figure of the race cf. Eurip. *El.* 955, 1 *Corinthians* ix. 24 f., *Heb.* xii. 1, *Gal.* ii. 2, v. 7, *Phil.* ii. 16.

<sup>b</sup> English idiom would say, "with their tails between their legs." Cf. Horace, *Sat.* i. 9. 20 "dimitto auriculas." For the idea cf. also *Laws* 730 c-d, Demosth. ii. 10, and for

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which the gods bestow upon the just." "So I think, at any rate," he said. "But what," said I, "does he receive from men? Is not this the case, if we are now to present the reality? Do not your smart but wicked men fare as those racers do who run well<sup>a</sup> from the scratch but not back from the turn? They bound nimbly away at the start, but in the end are laughed to scorn and run off the field uncrowned and with their ears on their shoulders.<sup>b</sup> But the true runners when they have come to the goal receive the prizes and bear away the crown. Is not this the usual outcome for the just also, that towards the end of every action and association and of life as a whole they have honour and bear away the prizes from men?" "So it is indeed." "Will you, then; bear with me if I say of them all that you said<sup>c</sup> of the unjust? For I am going to say that the just, when they become older, hold the offices in their own city if they choose, marry from what families they will, and give their children in marriage to what families they please, and everything that you said of the one I now repeat of the other; and in turn I will say of the unjust that the most of them, even if they escape detection in youth, at the end of their course are caught and derided, and their old age<sup>d</sup> is made miserable by the contumelies of strangers and townsfolk.

*εις τέλος, Laws 899 E πρὸς τέλος, Hesiod, Works and Days 216 εἰς τέλος ἐξεληθοῦσα, Eurip. Ion 1621 εἰς τέλος γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐσθλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀξίων,* "for the good at last shall overcome, at last attain their right." (Way, Loeb tr.)

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Vol. I. pp. 125-127, 362 B-C.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Macbeth* v. iii. 24:

And that which should accompany old age,  
As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends,  
I must not look to have.

Ε ἀστῶν, μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων, [εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται.]<sup>1</sup> πάντα ἐκείνα οἴου καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι ὡς πάσχουσιν. ἀλλ' ὁ λέγω, ὄρα εἰ ἀνέξει. Καὶ πάνυ, ἔφη· δίκαια γὰρ λέγεις.

XIII. Ἄ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ζῶντι τῷ δικαίῳ  
 614 παρὰ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀθλά τε καὶ μισθοὶ  
 καὶ δῶρα γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς  
 αὐτὴ παρείχετο ἢ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαυτ' ἂν εἴη. Καὶ  
 μάλ', ἔφη, καλά τε καὶ βέβαια. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ, οὐδέν ἐστι πλήθει οὐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκείνα,  
 ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἐκάτερον περιμένει. χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ  
 ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ  
 ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι. Λέγοις ἄν,  
 Β ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ' ἠϊδιον ἀκούοντι. Ἄλλ' οὐ  
 μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ,  
 ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἡρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ  
 γένος Παμφύλου· ὃς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας,  
 ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων τῶν νεκρῶν ἤδη διεφθαρ-  
 μένων, ὑγιῆς μὲν ἀνηρέθη, κομισθεὶς δ' οἴκαδε

<sup>1</sup> Ast, followed by Hermann and Stallbaum, omits *εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται*, "then they will be racked and branded": Jowett and Campbell and Burnet keep it.

<sup>a</sup> He turns the tables here as in *Gorg.* 527 A. The late punishment of the wicked became an ethical commonplace. Cf. Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* 1, also *Job* and *Psalms passim*.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. 361 E ἀγροικότερος, and *Gorg.* 473 c.

<sup>c</sup> i.e. the just and unjust man.

<sup>d</sup> τελέως: cf. 361 A.

<sup>e</sup> See Proclus, *In Remp.*, Kroll ii. 96 ff., Macrob. in *Somnium Scip.* i. 2. The Epicurean Colotes highly dis-



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They are lashed and suffer all things <sup>a</sup> which you truly said are unfit for ears polite.<sup>b</sup> Suppose yourself to have heard from me a repetition of all that they suffer. But, as I say, consider whether you will bear with me." "Assuredly," he said, "for what you say is just."

XIII. "Such then while he lives are the prizes, the wages, and the gifts that the just man receives from gods and men in addition to those blessings which justice herself bestowed." "And right fair and abiding rewards," he said. "Well, these," I said, "are nothing in number and magnitude compared with those that await both <sup>c</sup> after death. And we must listen to the tale of them," said I, "in order that each may have received in full <sup>d</sup> what is due to be said of him by our argument." "Tell me," he said, "since there are not many things to which I would more gladly listen." "It is not, let me tell you," said I, "the tale <sup>e</sup> to Alcinous told <sup>f</sup> that I shall unfold, but the tale of a warrior bold,<sup>g</sup> Er, the son of Armenius, by race a Pamphylian.<sup>h</sup> He once upon a time was slain in battle, and when the corpses were taken up on the tenth day already decayed, was found intact, approved of Plato's method of putting his beliefs in this form. See Chassang, *Histoire du roman*, p. 15. See also Dieterich, *Nekyia*, pp. 114 ff., and Adam *ad loc.*

<sup>f</sup> *Odyssey* ix.-xii. The term also became proverbial for a lengthy tale. See K. Tümpel, Ἀλκίνοῦ ἀπόλογος, *Philologus* 52. 523 ff.

<sup>g</sup> Plato puns on the name Alcinous. For other puns on proper names see *supra* on 580 v. See Arthur Platt, "Plato's *Republic*, 614 v.," *Class. Review*, 1911, pp. 13-14. For the ἀλλὰ μὲν without a corresponding δέ he compares Aristoph. *Acharn.* 428 οὐ Βελλεροφόντης· ἀλλὰ κάκείνος μὲν ἦ χωλός . . . (which Blaydes changed to ἀλλὰ μὴν), *Odyssey* xv. 405 and *Eryxias* 398 v.

<sup>h</sup> Perhaps we might say, "of the tribe of Everyman." For the question of his identity see Platt, *loc. cit.*

μέλλων θάπτεσθαι δωδεκαταίος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω, ἀναβίους δ' ἔλεγεν ἅ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι. ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τέ γῆς δύο εἶναι χάσματα ἐχομένω ἀλλήλοιον καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα καταντικρῦ· δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι, οὓς, ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὀπισθεν

D σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν. ἑαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόν-

<sup>a</sup> Thomas Browne, *Urn Burial*, ch. iii., "Plato's historian of the other world lies twelve days incorrupted, while his soul was viewing the large stations of the dead." See also Rohde, *Psyche* ii.<sup>6</sup> pp. 92-93.

<sup>b</sup> Stories of persons restored to life are fairly common in ancient literature. There are Eurydice and Alcestis in Greek mythology, in the Old Testament the son of the widow revived by Elijah (1 *Kings* xvii. 17 ff. Cf. 2 *Kings* iv. 34 ff. and xiii. 21), in the New Testament the daughter of Jairus (*Matt.* ix. 23 f.), the son of the widow of Nain (*Luke* vii. 11 ff.), and Lazarus (*John* xi.). But none of these recount their adventures. Cf. Tennyson, "In Memoriam," xxxi.:

Where wert thou, brother, those four days? . . .

The rest remaineth unreveal'd;

He told it not; or something seal'd

The lips of that Evangelist.

Cf. also *Luke* xvi. 31 "If they hear not Moses and the prophets neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." But in that very parable Lazarus is shown in Abraham's bosom and the rich man in torment. See further, Proclus, *In Remp.* ii. pp. 113-116, Rohde, *Psyche* ii.<sup>6</sup> p. 191.

<sup>c</sup> For the indirect reflexive cf. p. 507, note *f*, on 617 E.

<sup>d</sup> For the description of the place of judgement cf. also

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and having been brought home, at the moment of his funeral, on the twelfth day <sup>a</sup> as he lay upon the pyre, revived, <sup>b</sup> and after coming to life related what, he said, he had seen in the world beyond. He said that when his soul <sup>c</sup> went forth from his body he journeyed with a great company and that they came to a mysterious region <sup>d</sup> where there were two openings side by side in the earth, and above and over against them in the heaven two others, and that judges were sitting <sup>e</sup> between these, and that after every judgement they bade the righteous journey to the right and upwards through the heaven with tokens attached <sup>f</sup> to them in front of the judgement passed upon them, and the unjust to take the road to the left <sup>g</sup> and downward, they too wearing behind signs of all that had befallen them, and that when he himself drew near they told

*Gorg.* 524 A. Cf. *Phaedo* 107 D, 113 D, where there is no description but simply the statement that the souls are brought to a place and judged. On the topography of the myth in general cf. Bréhier, *La Philos. de Plot.* pp. 28-29: "Voyez, par exemple, la manière dont Numénius . . . interprète le mythe du X<sup>e</sup> livre de la *République*, et comment il précise, avec la lourdeur d'un théologien, les traits que la poésie de Platon avait abandonnés à l'imagination du lecteur. Le lieu du jugement devient le centre du monde; le ciel platonicien devient la sphère des fixes; le 'lieu souterrain' où sont punies les âmes, ce sont les planètes; la 'bouche du ciel,' par laquelle les âmes descendront à la naissance, est le tropique du Cancer; et c'est par le Capricorne qu'elles remontent."

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 523 E f., 524 E-525 B, 526 B-C.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 526 B, Dante, *Inferno*, v. 9 f.:

E quel conoscitor delle peccata  
vede qual luogo d'inferno è da essa;  
cignesi con la coda tante volte  
quantunque gradi vuol che giù sia messa.

<sup>g</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 525 A-B, 526 B. For "right" and "left" cf. the story of the last judgement, *Matt.* xxv. 33-34 and 41.

τος εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ διακελεύοντό οἱ ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. ὄραν δὴ ταύτη μὲν καθ' ἑκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπειδὴ αὐταῖς δικασθεῖν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐτέρω ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι ἐκ τῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου καταβαίνειν ἐτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθαρὰς·

Ε καὶ τὰς αἰεὶ ἀφικνουμένας ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πορείας φαίνεσθαι ἤκειν, καὶ ἀσμένας εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα ἀπιούσας οἷον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηναῖσθαι, καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τε ἀλλήλας ὅσαι γινώριμαι, καὶ πυνθάνεσθαι τὰς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἠκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἐτέρων τὰ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ παρ' ἐκείναις· διηγείσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις τὰς μὲν ὀδυ-

615 ρομένας τε καὶ κλαιούσας, ἀναμιμνησκομένας ὅσα τε καὶ οἶα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ—εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη—τὰς δ' αὖ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγείσθαι καὶ θεὰς ἀμηχανοὺς τὸ κάλλος. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὧ Γλαύκων, πολλοῦ χρόνου διηγῆσασθαι· τὸ δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον ἔφη τόδε εἶναι, ὅσα πώποτε τινα ἠδίκησαν καὶ ὅσους ἕκαστοι, ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων δίκην δεδωκέναι ἐν μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου δεκάκις, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι κατὰ

Β ἑκατονταετηρίδα ἐκάστην, ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσού-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. the rich man's request that a messenger be sent to his brethren, *Luke* xvi. 27-31.

<sup>b</sup> ἐκεῖ: so in 330 D, 365 A, 498 C, *Phaedo* 61 E, 64 A, 67 B, 68 E, *Apol.* 40 E, 41 C, *Crito* 54 B, *Symp.* 192 E. In 500 D and *Phaedr.* 250 A it refers to the world of the ideas, in 516 C and 520 C to the world of the cave.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 524 A.

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him that he must be the messenger<sup>a</sup> to mankind to tell them of that other world,<sup>b</sup> and they charged him to give ear and to observe everything in the place. And so he said that here he saw, by each opening of heaven and earth, the souls departing after judgement had been passed upon them, while, by the other pair of openings, there came up from the one in the earth souls full of squalor and dust, and from the second there came down from heaven a second procession of souls clean and pure, and that those which arrived from time to time appeared to have come as it were from a long journey and gladly departed to the meadow<sup>c</sup> and encamped<sup>d</sup> there as at a festival,<sup>e</sup> and acquaintances greeted one another, and those which came from the earth questioned the others about conditions up yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared with those others. And they told their stories to one another, the one lamenting and wailing as they recalled how many and how dreadful things they had suffered and seen in their journey beneath the earth<sup>f</sup>—it lasted a thousand years<sup>g</sup>—while those from heaven related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond words. To tell it all, Glaucon, would take all our time, but the sum, he said, was this. For all the wrongs they had ever done to anyone and all whom they had severally wronged they had paid the penalty<sup>h</sup> in turn tenfold for each, and the measure of this was by periods of a hundred years each,<sup>i</sup> so that on the assumption

<sup>a</sup> Cf. 621 A, 610 E, and *John* i. 14 ἐσκήνωσεν.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 421 B.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.* 256 D, *Epist.* vii. 335 B-C.

<sup>g</sup> *Phaedr.* 249 A, *Virgil, Aen.* vi. 748.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 113 D-E.

<sup>i</sup> The ideal Hindu length of life is said to be 100 years.



του τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου, ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ ἔκτισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν· καὶ οἷον εἴ τινες πολλῶν<sup>1</sup> θανάτων ἦσαν αἴτιοι, ἢ πόλεις προδόντες ἢ στρατόπεδα καὶ εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβληκότες, ἢ τινος ἄλλης κακουχίας μεταίτιοι, πάντων τούτων δεκαπλασίας ἀλγηδόνας ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου κομίσαιντο, καὶ αὖ εἴ τινας εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ

C δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσοι γεγονότες εἶεν, κατὰ ταῦτά τὴν ἀξίαν κομίζουσι. τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων περὶ ἄλλα ἔλεγεν οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης· εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρος φόνου μείζους ἔτι τοὺς μισθοὺς διηγείτο. ἔφη γὰρ δὴ παραγενέσθαι ἐρωτωμένῳ ἑτέρῳ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου ὅπου εἴη Ἄρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας. ὁ δὲ Ἄρδιαῖος οὗτος τῆς Παμφυλίας ἐν τινι πόλει τύραννος ἐγεγόνει, ἥδη χιλιοστὸν ἔτος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, γέροντά τε πατέρα ἀπο-

D κτείνας καὶ πρεσβύτερον ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλά τε καὶ ἀνόσια εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἐλέγετο. ἔφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ἦκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἦξει δεῦρο.

XIV. Ἐθεασάμεθα γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων. ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἡμεν μέλλοντες ἀνίεσαι καὶ τὰλλα πάντα πεπονθότες,

<sup>1</sup> πολλῶν scr. Ven. 184, Hermann and Adam: πολλοῖς D Stobaeus: πολλοὶ AFM.

<sup>a</sup> For the words cf. *Tim.* 76 E εὐθὺς γενομένοις. Plato does not take up the problem of infant damnation! Warburton says, "and I make no doubt but the things not worthy to be remembered was the doctrine of infants in purgatory, which appears to have given Plato much scandal, who did not at that time at least reflect upon its original and use." See also Mozley, *Augustinian Doctrine of Pre-*

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that this was the length of human life the punishment might be ten times the crime ; as for example that if anyone had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed cities and armies and reduced them to slavery, or had been participant in any other iniquity, they might receive in requital pains tenfold for each of these wrongs, and again if any had done deeds of kindness and been just and holy men they might receive their due reward in the same measure ; and other things not worthy of record he said of those who had just been born<sup>a</sup> and lived but a short time ; and he had still greater requitals to tell of piety and impiety towards the gods and parents<sup>b</sup> and of self-slaughter. For he said that he stood by when one was questioned by another ' Where is Ardiaeus<sup>c</sup> the Great ? ' Now this Ardiaeos had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia just a thousand years before that time and had put to death his old father and his elder brother, and had done many other unholy deeds, as was the report. So he said that the one questioned replied, ' He has not come,' said he, ' nor will he be likely to come here.

XIV. " For indeed this was one of the dreadful sights we beheld ; when we were near the mouth and about to issue forth and all our other sufferings were

*destination*, p. 307, *apud* Seebohm, *The Oxford Reformers* (3rd ed.), p. 495 : " Augustine had laid down that the punishment of such children was the mildest of all punishment in hell. . . . Aquinas laid down the further hypothesis that this punishment was not pain of body or mind, but want of the Divine vision." Cf. Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 427, *Anth. Pal.* ix. 359. 10 *θανεῖν αὐτίκα τικτόμενον*. Stallbaum and Ast think *ἀποθανόντων* dropped out of the text after *γενομένων*.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 113 E-114 A, where there is a special penalty for murderers and parricides.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Archelaus in *Gorg.* 471.

ἐκεῖνόν τε κατέιδομεν ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἄλλους, σχεδόν  
 τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους τυράννους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ  
 E ἰδιῶταί τινες τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων· οὓς  
 οἰομένους ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι οὐκ ἔδέχετο τὸ στόμιον,  
 ἀλλ' ἐμυκάτο, ὅποτε τις τῶν οὕτως ἀνιάτως  
 ἐχόντων εἰς πονηρίαν ἢ μὴ ἰκανῶς δεδωκῶς δίκην  
 ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνιέναι. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ἄγριοι,  
 διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες  
 τὸ φθέγμα τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες ἤγον, τὸν δὲ  
 616 Ἄρδιαῖον καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες χεῖράς τε καὶ  
 πόδας καὶ κεφαλὴν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδεί-  
 ραντες, εἶλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ' ἀσπαλάθων  
 κνάπτοντες καὶ τοῖς αἰετοῖσι παριούσι σημαίνοντες, ὧν  
 ἔνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμενοι  
 ἄγοντο. ἔνθα δὲ φόβων, ἔφη, πολλῶν καὶ παντο-  
 दाπῶν σφίσι γεγονότων, τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ  
 γένοιτο ἐκάστω τὸ φθέγμα, ὅτε ἀναβαῖνοι, καὶ  
 ἀσμενέστατα ἕκαστον σιγήσαντος ἀναβῆναι. καὶ  
 τὰς μὲν δὲ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας τινὰς  
 B εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὰς εὐεργεσίας ταύταις ἀντιστρόφους·  
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἕκαστοῖς ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι  
 γένοιτο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὀγδόῃ πο-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 525 d-526 a, Dante, *Inferno* xii. 100 ff., Spenser, *F.Q.* I. v. 51:

But most of all which in that dungeon lay  
 Fell from high Princes courtes or Ladies bowres.

Lang, "Helen of Troy":

Oh, Paris, what is power? Tantalus  
 And Sisyphus were kings long time ago,  
 But now they lie in the Lake Dolorous;  
 The halls of hell are noisy with their woe.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Gorg.* 525 c, and *What Plato Said*, p. 536, on *Phaedo*  
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ended, we suddenly caught sight of him and of others, the most of them, I may say, tyrants.<sup>a</sup> But there were some of private station, of those who had committed great crimes. And when these supposed that at last they were about to go up and out, the mouth would not receive them, but it bellowed when anyone of the incurably wicked<sup>b</sup> or of those who had not completed their punishment tried to come up. And thereupon, he said, 'savage men of fiery aspect<sup>c</sup> who stood by and took note of the voice laid hold on them<sup>d</sup> and bore them away. But Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot and head and flung down and flayed them and dragged them by the wayside, carding them on thorns and signifying to those who from time to time passed by for what cause they were borne away, and that they were to be hurled into Tartarus.<sup>e</sup>' And then, though many and manifold dread things had befallen them, this fear exceeded all—lest each one should hear the voice when he tried to go up, and each went up most gladly when it had kept silence. And the judgements and penalties were somewhat after this manner, and the blessings were their counterparts. But when seven days had elapsed for each group in the meadow, they were required to rise up on the eighth and journey on, and they came

113 ε. Biggs, *Christian Platonists*, ii. p. 147—"At the first assize there will be found those who like Ardiaeus are incurable."

<sup>c</sup> This naturally suggests the devils of Dante (*Inferno* xxi. 25 ff.) and other mediaeval literature. See Dieterich, *Nekyia*, p. 4 and pp. 60 f.

<sup>d</sup> See Rogers on Aristoph. *Knights* 262. Cf. Herod. i. 92 ἐπὶ κνάφου ἔλκων διέφθειρε.

<sup>e</sup> *Il.* viii. 13 f., Hesiod, *Theog.* 682, 721, etc., Pind. *Pyth.* i. 15 f., Eurip. *Orest.* 265 μέσον μ' ὀχμάξεις ὡς βάλης εἰς Τάρταρον.

- ρεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὄθεν καθορᾶν ἄνωθεν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον φῶς εὐθύ, οἶον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ ἴριδι προσφερῆ, λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον. εἰς δ' ἀφικέσθαι
- C προελθόντας ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα· εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ξύνδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἶον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν τριήρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν ξυνέχον τὴν περιφοράν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων τεταμένον Ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον, δι' οὗ πάσας ἐπιστρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς· οὗ τὴν μὲν ἡλακάτην τε καὶ τὸ ἄγκιστρον εἶναι ἐξ ἀδάμαντος, τὸν δὲ σφόνδυλον μικτὸν ἐκ τε τούτου καὶ ἄλλων γενῶν. τὴν δὲ τοῦ σφονδύλου φύσιν εἶναι
- D τοιάνδε· τὸ μὲν σχῆμα οἷαπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐνθάδε, νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔλεγε τοιόνδε αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐν ἐνὶ μεγάλῳ σφονδύλῳ κοίλῳ καὶ ἐξεγλυμμένῳ διαμπερὲς ἄλλος τοιοῦτος ἐλάττων ἐγκέοιτο ἀρμόττων, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀρμόττοντες· καὶ οὕτω δὴ τρίτον ἄλλον καὶ τέταρτον καὶ ἄλλους τέτταρας. ὁκτώ γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ξύμπαντας σφονδύλους, ἐν ἀλλήλοις

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Knights* 279, Acts xxvii. 17.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* ii. 3 § 9, p. 35, vol. ii. Budé ed. "Mais (dira-t-on) rappelons-nous 'le fuseau'; pour les anciens, c'était un fuseau matériel que tournent en filant les Moires; pour Platon, il représente le ciel des fixes; or les Moires et la Nécessité, leur mère, en le faisant tourner, filent le destin de chaque être à sa naissance; par elle, les êtres engendrés arrivent à la naissance," etc. St. Paulinus Nolanus calls it a *deliramentum*. Tannery, *Science hellène*, p. 238, thinks it alludes to the system of Parmenides. "Le fuseau central de la Nécessité l'indique suffisamment; si la présence



## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

in four days to a spot whence they discerned, extended from above throughout the heaven and the earth, a straight light like a pillar, most nearly resembling the rainbow, but brighter and purer. To this they came after going forward a day's journey, and they saw there at the middle of the light the extremities of its fastenings stretched from heaven; for this light was the girdle of the heavens like the undergirders<sup>a</sup> of triremes, holding together in like manner the entire revolving vault. And from the extremities was stretched the spindle of Necessity,<sup>b</sup> through which all the orbits turned. Its staff and its hook were made of adamant, and the whorl of these and other kinds was commingled. And the nature of the whorl was this: Its shape was that of those in our world, but from his description we must conceive it to be as if in one great whorl, hollow and scooped out, there lay enclosed, right through, another like it but smaller, fitting into it as boxes that fit into one another,<sup>c</sup> and in like manner another, a third, and a fourth, and four others, for there were eight of the whorls in all, lying within one another, showing their

des sirènes est une marque de pythagorisme, elle peut seulement signifier soit les relations de Parménide avec l'école soit plutôt l'origine des déterminations particulières que donne Platon et qui évidemment ne remontent pas à l'Éléate." Cf. *ibid.* p. 246. For various details of the picture cf. Milton, the Genius's speech in "Arcades" (quoted and commented on in E. M. W. Tillyard, *Milton*, p. 376).

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philos.* pp. 216-217 "In Plato's Myth of Er, which is certainly Pythagorean in its general character, we do not hear of spheres but of the 'lips' of concentric whorls fitted into one another like a nest of boxes . . ." With 616-617 cf. *Laws* 822 A-B, *Tim.* 36 D, Dante, *Convivio*, ii. 3. 5 ff. The names of the planets occur first in *Epinomis* 987 B-C.

Ε ἐγκειμένους, κύκλους ἄνωθεν τὰ χεῖλη φαίνοντας, νῶτον συνεχές ἐνὸς σφονδύλου ἀπεργαζομένους περὶ τὴν ἡλακάτην· ἐκείνην δὲ διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὀγδῶου διαμπερές ἐηλάσθαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον τὸν τοῦ χεῖλους κύκλον ἔχει, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἕκτου δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὀγδῶου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἑβδόμου, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ πέμπτου, ἑβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὄγδοον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου. καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου ποικίλον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἑβδόμου λαμπρότατον, τὸν δὲ  
 617 τοῦ ὀγδῶου τὸ χρῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔχει προσλάμποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις, ξανθότερα ἐκείνων, τρίτον δὲ λευκότερον χρῶμα ἔχει, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπέρυθρον, δεύτερον δὲ λευκότητι τὸν ἕκτον. κυκλείσθαι δὲ δὴ στρεφόμενον τὸν ἄτρακτον ὄλον μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν φορᾶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὄλῳ περιφερομένῳ τοὺς μὲν ἐντὸς ἑπτὰ κύκλους τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ ὄλῳ ἡρέμα περιφέρεισθαι, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τάχιστα μὲν ἰέναι τὸν  
 Β ὄγδοον, δευτέρους δὲ καὶ ἅμα ἀλλήλοις τὸν τε ἑβδομον καὶ ἕκτον καὶ πέμπτον· τρίτον<sup>1</sup> δὲ φορᾶ ἰέναι, ὡς σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ἐπανακυκλούμενον τὸν τέταρτον· τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ πέμπτον τὸν δεύτερον. στρέφεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐφ' ἐκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρήνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἰεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνον<sup>2</sup>. ἐκ πασῶν

<sup>1</sup> See note b, p. 503.

<sup>2</sup> ἕνα τόνον AM Proclus: ἀνὰ τόνον D: ἀνατόνον F: ἀνάτονον mss. recce.

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

rims as circles from above and forming the continuous back of a single whorl about the shaft, which was driven home through the middle of the eighth. Now the first and outmost whorl had the broadest circular rim, that of the sixth was second, and third was that of the fourth, and fourth was that of the eighth, fifth that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh that of the third, eighth that of the second; and that of the greatest was spangled, that of the seventh brightest, that of the eighth took its colour from the seventh, which shone upon it. The colours of the second and fifth were like one another and more yellow than the two former. The third had the whitest colour, and the fourth was of a slightly ruddy hue; the sixth was second in whiteness. The staff turned as a whole in a circle with the same movement, but within the whole as it revolved the seven inner circles revolved gently in the opposite direction to the whole,<sup>a</sup> and of these seven the eighth moved most swiftly, and next and together with one another the seventh, sixth and fifth; and third<sup>b</sup> in swiftness, as it appeared to them, moved the fourth with returns upon itself, and fourth the third and fifth the second. And the spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and up above on each of the rims of the circles a Siren stood, borne around in its revolution and uttering one sound, one note, and from all the eight there was

had an orbital motion from west to east is attributed by Aetios ii. 16. 3 to Alkmaion (96), which certainly implies that Pythagoras did not hold it. As we shall see (152) it is far from clear that any of the Pythagoreans did. It seems rather to be Plato's discovery." Cf. *ibid.* p. 352.

<sup>b</sup> The best mss. have τὸν before τρίτον. It is retained by some editors, but Schleiermacher rejected it and Adam and Burnet omit it.

δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἄρμονίαν ξυμφωνεῖν. ἄλλας  
 C δὲ καθημένας πέριξ δι' ἴσου τρεῖς, ἐν θρόνῳ  
 ἐκάστην, θυγατέρας τῆς Ἀνάγκης Μοίρας λευ-  
 χειμονούσας, στέμματα ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν ἐχούσας,  
 Λάχεσιν τε καὶ Κλωθῶ καὶ Ἄτροπον, ὑμνεῖν  
 πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἄρμονίαν, Λάχεσιν μὲν  
 τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθῶ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ  
 μέλλοντα. καὶ τὴν μὲν Κλωθῶ τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ  
 ἐφαπτομένην συνεπιστρέφειν τοῦ ἀτράκτου τὴν ἕξω  
 περιφορὰν, διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, τὴν δὲ Ἄτροπον  
 τῇ ἀριστερᾷ τὰς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ὡσαύτως· τὴν δὲ  
 D Λάχεσιν ἐν μέρει ἐκατέρας ἐκατέρα τῇ χειρὶ  
 ἐφάπτεσθαι.

XV. Σφᾶς οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀφικέσθαι, εὐθὺς δεῖν  
 ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν. προφήτην οὖν τινὰ σφᾶς  
 πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τάξει διαστήσαι, ἔπειτα λαβόντα ἐκ  
 τῶν τῆς Λαχέσεως γονάτων κλήρους τε καὶ βίων  
 παραδείγματα, ἀναβάντα ἐπὶ τι βῆμα ὑψηλὸν  
 εἰπεῖν· Ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος.

<sup>a</sup> The music of the spheres. Cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* iii. 9. 26, Mayor, vol. iii. p. 86, Macrob. on *Somn. Scip.* ii. 3, Ritter-Preller (9th ed.), pp. 69-70 (§§ 81-82), K. Gronau, *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese*, pp. 59-61. Aristotle's comment, *De caelo* 290 b 12 ff., is that the notion of a music of the spheres is pretty and ingenious, but not true. He reports the (Pythagorean?) explanation that we do not hear it because we have been accustomed to it from birth. See Carl v. Jan, "Die Harmonie der Sphären," *Philologus*, lii. 13 ff. Cf. Shakes. *Merchant of Venice*, v. i. 60:

There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st  
 But in his motion like an angel sings,  
 Still quiring to the young ey'd cherubims . . .

Milton, "Arcades" (Tillyard, p. 60. *Ibid.* p. 375, he says that Plato is referred to in Milton's academic exercise *De sphaerarum concentu*); Pope, *Essay on Man*, i. 201-202:

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

the concord of a single harmony.<sup>a</sup> And there were other three who sat round about at equal intervals, each one on her throne, the Fates,<sup>b</sup> daughters of Necessity, clad in white vestments with filleted heads, Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, who sang in unison with the music of the Sirens, Lachesis singing the things that were, Clotho the things that are, and Atropos the things that are to be. And Clotho with the touch of her right hand helped to turn the outer circumference of the spindle, pausing from time to time. Atropos with her left hand in like manner helped to turn the inner circles, and Lachesis alternately with either hand lent a hand to each.

XV. "Now when they arrived they were straightway bidden to go before Lachesis, and then a certain prophet<sup>c</sup> first marshalled them in orderly intervals, and thereupon took from the lap of Lachesis lots and patterns of lives and went up to a lofty platform and spoke, 'This is the word of Lachesis, the maiden

If Nature thundered in his opening ears  
And stunned him with the music of the spheres.

*Complete Poems of Henry More*, p. 77. Addison rationalizes the thought:

The spacious firmament on high . . .  
What though in solemn silence all  
Move round the dark terrestrial ball;  
What though no real voice or sound  
Amidst their radiant orbs be found?  
In reason's ear they all rejoice  
And utter forth a glorious voice,  
For ever singing as they shine:  
The hand that made us is divine.

<sup>b</sup> Pictured in Michelangelo's *Le Parche*. Cf. Catullus 64. 306 ff.; Lowell, "Villa Franca": "Spin, Clotho, spin, Lachesis twist and Atropos sever."

<sup>c</sup> See *What Plato Said*, p. 550, on *Phaedr.* 235 c.



ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ  
 Ἐ γένους θανατηφόρου. οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται,  
 ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε. πρῶτος δ' οὐ  
 λαχὼν πρῶτος αἰρείσθω βίον, ᾧ συνέσται ἐξ  
 ἀνάγκης. ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ  
 ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἔξει.  
 αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. ταῦτα εἰπόντα  
 ῥῦψαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν  
 πεσόντα ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖσθαι, πλὴν οὐ· ἔ δὲ οὐκ  
 ἔάν τῷ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ δῆλον εἶναι, ὀπόστος εἰλήχει.  
 618 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὐθις τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα  
 εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σφῶν θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, πολὺ  
 πλείω τῶν παρόντων, εἶναι δὲ παντοδαπά· ζῶων  
 τε γὰρ πάντων βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους  
 ἅπαντας· τυραννίδας τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, τὰς  
 μὲν διατελεῖς, τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ διαφθειρομένας  
 καὶ εἰς πενίας τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 923 A, Pindar, *Pyth.* viii. 95, Aesch. *Prom.* 83, 547, Aristot. *Hist. an.* 552 b 18 f., Cic. *Tusc.* i. 39. 94, Plut. *Cons. ad Apol.* 6 (104 A) ἀνθρώπων . . . ἐφήμερα τὰ σώματα, *ibid.* 27 (115 D) ἐφήμερον σπέρμα. See also Stallbaum *ad loc.*, and for the thought Soph. *Ajax* 125-126, *Iliad* vi. 146, Mimmernus ii. 1, Soph. *fr.* 12 and 859 (Nauck), *Job* vii. 6, viii. 9, ix. 25, xiv. 2, xxi. 17, etc.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Swinburne, "The Life of Man" (from *Atalanta in Calydon*):

Life the shadow of death.

*ibid.*

With life before and after  
 And death beneath and above,  
 For a day and a night and a morrow,  
 That his strength might endure for a span.

and "The Garden of Proserpine": "Here life hath death for neighbour."

## THE RÉPUBLIQUE, BOOK X

daughter of Necessity, "Souls that live for a day,<sup>a</sup> now is the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where birth is the beacon of death<sup>b</sup>. No divinity<sup>c</sup> shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity. Let him to whom falls the first lot first select a life to which he shall cleave of necessity. But virtue has no master over her,<sup>d</sup> and each shall have more or less of her as he honours her or does her despite. The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless.<sup>e</sup>" So saying, the prophet flung the lots out among them all, and each took up the lot that fell by his side, except himself; him they did not permit.<sup>f</sup> And whoever took up a lot saw plainly what number he had drawn. And after this again the prophet placed the patterns of lives before them on the ground, far more numerous than the assembly. They were of every variety, for there were lives of all kinds of animals and all sorts of human lives, for there were tyrannies among them, some uninterrupted till the end<sup>g</sup> and others destroyed midway and issuing in penuries and exiles and beg-

<sup>a</sup> Zeller-Nestle, p. 166, says that this looks like intentional correction of *Phaedo* 107 D. Cf. *Phaedo* 113 D and *Lysias* ii. 78 ὃ τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοῖραν εἰληχῶς ἀπαραίτητος. Arnobius, *Adversus gentes*, ii. 64, says that similarly Christ offers us redemption but does not force it upon us.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. Milton's "Love Virtue; she alone is free" (*Comus*).

<sup>e</sup> Justin Martyr, *Apol.* xlv. 8, quotes this. Cf. *Tim.* 42 D, Dieterich, *Nekyia*, p. 115, *Odyssey* i. 32 f., Bacchylides xiv. 51 f. (Jebb, p. 366) Ζεὺς . . . οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἀχέων, etc., Manitius, *Gesch. d. lat. Lit. d. Mittelalters*, ii. p. 169. For the problem of evil in Plato see *What Plato Said*, p. 578 on *Theæt.* 176 A, and for the freedom of the will *ibid.* pp. 644-645 on *Laws* 904 c.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. *Symp.* 175 c, where the words are the same but the construction different. For the indirect reflexive cf. 614 B οὐ ἐκβῆναι, *Symp.* 176 D, *Symp.* 223 B εἰ δὲ ἕπνον λαβεῖν.

<sup>g</sup> For διατελείς cf. *Laws* 661 D τυραννίδα διὰ τέλους.

τελευτώσας· εἶναι δὲ καὶ δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν βίους, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ εἴδεσι καὶ κατὰ κάλλη καὶ τὴν ἄλλην  
 Β ἰσχύν τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ γένεσι καὶ προγόνων ἀρεταῖς, καὶ ἀδοκίμων κατὰ ταῦτά, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν· ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν οὐκ ἐνεῖναι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλον ἐλομένην βίον ἀλλοίαν γίνεσθαι· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις, τὰ δὲ νόσοις, τὰ δὲ ὑγείαις μεμίχθαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων. ἔνθα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπων,  
 C καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητῆς καὶ μαθητῆς ἔσται, εἴαν ποθεν οἶός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν, τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατόν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν αἰεὶ πανταχοῦ αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ρηθέντα, ξυντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου πῶς ἔχει, εἰδέναι, τί κάλλος πενία ἢ πλούτῳ κραθὲν  
 D καὶ μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἕξεως κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐγένειαι καὶ δυσγένειαι καὶ ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχύες καὶ ἀσθένειαι καὶ εὐμάθειαι καὶ δυσμάθειαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν

<sup>a</sup> For the idiom ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν cf. *Phaedo* 91 E, *Laws* 771 E, 928 E, *Lysias* vi. 35.

<sup>b</sup> μεσοῦν *Phaedr.* 241 D.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 107 c, 114 D, *Gorg.* 526 E, *Eurip. Medea* 235

## THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

garies ; and there were lives of men of repute for their forms and beauty and bodily strength otherwise and prowess and the high birth and the virtues of their ancestors, and others of ill repute in the same things, and similarly of women. But there was no determination of the quality of soul, because the choice of a different life inevitably<sup>a</sup> determined a different character. But all other things were commingled with one another and with wealth and poverty and sickness and health and the intermediate<sup>b</sup> conditions. —And there, dear Glaucon, it appears, is the supreme hazard<sup>c</sup> for a man. And this is the chief reason why it should be our main concern that each of us, neglecting all other studies, should seek after and study this thing<sup>d</sup> —if in any way he may be able to learn of and discover the man who will give him the ability and the knowledge to distinguish the life that is good from that which is bad, and always and everywhere to choose the best that the conditions allow, and, taking into account all the things of which we have spoken and estimating the effect on the goodness of his life of their conjunction or their severance, to know how beauty commingled with poverty or wealth and combined with what habit of soul operates for good or for evil, and what are the effects of high and low birth and private station and office and strength and weakness and quickness of apprehension and dullness and all similar natural and acquired habits of the soul, when

ἀγῶν μέγιστος, Thucyd. i. 32. ὁ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος, Aristoph. *Clouds* 955 νῦν γὰρ ἅπας . . . κίνδυνος ἀνείται, *Frogs* 882 ἀγῶν . . . ὁ μέγας, Antiphon v. 43 ἐν ᾧ μοι ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἦν. For the expression cf. *Gorg.* 470 εἰ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *supra* 443-444, 591 E-592 A, *Gorg.* 527 B f., *Laws* 662 B f., 904 A ff.

ἐπικτήτων τί ξυγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐργάζεται, ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι συλλογισάμενον αἰρεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα, τὸν τε χεῖρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον, χεῖρω μὲν καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκείσε ἄξει, εἰς τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίνεσθαι, ἀμείνω δὲ ὅστις εἰς τὸ δικαιοτέραν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἑάσει· ἑωράκαμεν γάρ, ὅτι ζῶντί τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι αὕτη κρατίστη αἴρεσις. ἀδαμαντίνως δὴ δεῖ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα εἰς Ἄιδου ἰέναι, ὅπως ἂν ἦ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἀνέκπληκτος ὑπὸ πλούτων τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς τυραννίδας καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας πράξεις πολλὰ μὲν ἐργάσῃται καὶ ἀνήκεστα κακά, ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸς μείζω πάθη, ἀλλὰ γνῶ τὸν μέσον αἰεὶ τῶν τοιούτων βίον αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἐκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βίῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα οὕτω γὰρ εὐδαιμονέστατος γίνεται ἄνθρωπος.

XVI. Καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τότε ὁ ἐκείθεν ἄγγελος ἠγγελλε τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως εἰπεῖν· καὶ τελευταίῳ ἐπιόντι, ξὺν νῶ ἐλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι κείται βίος ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός. μήτε ὁ ἄρχων αἰρέσεως ἀμελείτω μήτε ὁ τελευτῶν ἀθυμείτω· εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα ἔφη εὐθὺς ἐπιόντα τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἐλέσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας οὐ πάντα ἰκανῶς ἀνασκεψάμενον ἐλέσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λαθεῖν

<sup>a</sup> The singular verb is used after plural subjects, because the subjects are united in the writer's mind into one general idea. Cf. *Rep.* 363 A, *Laws* 925 E, *Symp.* 188 B.

<sup>b</sup> See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 25, *Laws* 661-662, and for the word *supra* 360 B, *Gorg.* 509 A.



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blended and combined with one another,<sup>a</sup> so that with consideration of all these things he will be able to make a reasoned choice between the better and the worse life, with his eyes fixed on the nature of his soul, naming the worse life that which will tend to make it more unjust and the better that which will make it more just. But all other considerations he will dismiss, for we have seen that this is the best choice, both for life and death. And a man must take with him to the house of death an adamantine <sup>b</sup> faith in this, that even there he may be undazzled <sup>c</sup> by riches and similar trumpery, and may not precipitate himself into tyrannies and similar doings and so work many evils past cure and suffer still greater himself, but may know how always to choose in such things the life that is seated in the mean <sup>d</sup> and shun the excess in either direction, both in this world so far as may be and in all the life to come; for this is the greatest happiness for man.

XVI. "And at that time also the messenger from that other world reported that the prophet spoke thus: 'Even for him who comes forward last, if he make his choice wisely and live strenuously, there is reserved an acceptable life, no evil one. Let not the foremost in the choice be heedless nor the last be discouraged.' When the prophet had thus spoken he said that the drawer of the first lot at once sprang to seize the greatest tyranny,<sup>e</sup> and that in his folly and greed he chose it without sufficient examination, and failed to observe that it involved the fate of eating

<sup>c</sup> Cf. 576 D.

<sup>d</sup> An anticipation of the Aristotelian doctrine, *Eth. Nic.* 1106 b 6 f. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 629, on *Laws* 691 c.

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Isoc. Epist.* vi. 12, *Xen. Hiero* 7. 2 *δμῶς προπετῶς φέρεσθε εἰς αὐτήν.*

ἐνοῦσαν εἰμαρμένην, παίδων αὐτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακά· ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν σκέψασθαι, κόπτεσθαι τε καὶ οὐδύρεσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν, οὐκ ἐμμένοντα τοῖς προρρηθείσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου· οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἂνθ' ἑαυτοῦ. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἠκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένη πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα,

D ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀλίσκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἠκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους· τῶν δ' ἐκ τῆς γῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἅτε αὐτούς τε πεπονηκότας ἄλλους τε ἑωρακότας, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς τὰς αἱρέσεις ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ δὴ καὶ μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην. ἐπεὶ εἴ τις αἰεί, ὁπότε εἰς τὸν

E ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ καὶ ὁ κληρὸς αὐτῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταίοις πίπτει, κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν. ταύτην γὰρ δὴ ἔφη τὴν θεῖαν ἀξίαν εἶναι ἰδεῖν, ὡς ἕκασται αἱ ψυχαὶ ἠροῦντο τοὺς

620 βίους· ἐλεεινήν τε γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοίαν καὶ θαυμασίαν· κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἰρεῖσθαι. ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἔφη τὴν ποτε Ὀρφέως γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἰρουμένην,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 532, on *Phaedo* 90 D.

<sup>b</sup> *Phaedo* 82 B.

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his own children, and other horrors, and that when he inspected it at leisure he beat his breast and bewailed his choice, not abiding by the forewarning of the prophet. For he did not blame himself<sup>a</sup> for his woes, but fortune and the gods and anything except himself. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence, participating in virtue by habit<sup>b</sup> and not by philosophy; and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffering. But the most of those who came up from the earth, since they had themselves suffered and seen the sufferings of others, did not make their choice precipitately. For which reason also there was an interchange of good and evil for most of the souls, as well as because of the chances of the lot. Yet if at each return to the life of this world a man loved wisdom sanely, and the lot of his choice did not fall out among the last, we may venture to affirm, from what was reported thence, that not only will he be happy here but that the path of his journey thither and the return to this world will not be underground and rough but smooth and through the heavens. For he said that it was a sight worth seeing to observe how the several souls selected their lives. He said it was a strange, pitiful, and ridiculous spectacle, as the choice was determined for the most part by the habits of their former lives.<sup>c</sup> He saw the soul that had been Orpheus', he said, selecting the life of a

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 81 E ff., *Phaedr.* 248-249, *Tim.* 42 A-D, 91 D ff. For the idea of reincarnation in Plato see *What Plato Said*, p. 529, on *Phaedo* 81 E-82 B.

μισει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ' ἐκείνων θάνατον οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικί γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι· ἰδεῖν δὲ τὴν Θαμύρου ἀηδόνος ἐλομένην· ἰδεῖν δὲ καὶ κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἴρεσιν, καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως, Β εἰκοστὴν δὲ λαχοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἐλέσθαι λέοντος βίον· εἶναι δὲ τὴν Αἴαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου, φεύγουσαν ἀνθρωπον γενέσθαι, μεμνημένην τῆς τῶν ὄπλων κρίσεως· τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ Ἀγαμέμνονος· ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους διὰ τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον. ἐν μέσοις δὲ λαχοῦσαν τὴν Ἀταλάντης ψυχὴν, κατιδοῦσαν μεγάλας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός, οὐ δύνασθαι παρελθεῖν, C ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὴν Ἐπειοῦ τοῦ Πανοπέως εἰς τεχνικῆς γυναικὸς ἰοῦσαν φύσιν· πόρρω δ' ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θερσίτου πίθηκον ἐνδυομένην· κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσεως, λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην, αἴρησομένην ἵεναι· μνήμη δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιουῶσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρός ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ μόγις εὔρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν

<sup>a</sup> Urwiek, *The Message of Plato*, p. 213, says: "If Plato knew anything at all of Indian allegory, he must have known that the swan (Hamsa) is in Hinduism the invariable symbol of the immortal Spirit; and to say, as he does, that Orpheus chose the life of a swan, refusing to be born again of a woman, is just an allegorical way of saying that he passed on into the spiritual life. . . ." One is tempted to cap this with Donne:

Oh, do not die, for I shall hate  
All women so when thou art gone  
That thee I shall not celebrate  
When I remember thou wert one.

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swan,<sup>a</sup> because from hatred of the tribe of women, owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling to be conceived and born of a woman. He saw the soul of Thamyras<sup>b</sup> choosing the life of a nightingale; and he saw a swan changing to the choice of the life of man, and similarly other musical animals. The soul that drew the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion; it was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, which, because it remembered the adjudication of the arms of Achilles, was unwilling to become a man. The next, the soul of Agamemnon, likewise from hatred of the human race because of its sufferings, substituted the life of an eagle.<sup>c</sup> Drawing one of the middle lots the soul of Atalanta caught sight of the great honours attached to an athlete's life and could not pass them by but snatched at them. After her, he said, he saw the soul of Epeius,<sup>d</sup> the son of Panopeus, entering into the nature of an arts and crafts woman. Far off in the rear he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites<sup>e</sup> clothing itself in the body of an ape. And it fell out that the soul of Odysseus drew the last lot of all and came to make its choice, and, from memory of its former toils having flung away ambition, went about for a long time in quest of the life of an ordinary citizen who minded his own business,<sup>f</sup> and with difficulty found it lying in some corner disregarded by the others, and upon seeing it said

<sup>b</sup> Like Orpheus a singer. He contended with the Muses in song and was in consequence deprived by them of sight and of the gift of song. Cf. also *Ion* 533 B-C, *Laws* 829 D-E, *Iliad* ii. 595.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 114 ff.

<sup>d</sup> Who built the Trojan horse. See Hesychius *s.v.*

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *Iliad* ii. 212 ff.

<sup>f</sup> For ἀπράγμονος cf. on 565 A, p. 316, note b.



D ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξε καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων ὡσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἰέναι καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς τὰ ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ δίκαια εἰς τὰ ἥμερα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ πάσας μίξεις μίγνυσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ἠρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔλαχον, ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνην δ'

E ἐκάστῳ, ὃν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ζυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἰρεθέντων. ὃν πρῶτον μὲν ἄγειν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν Κλωθῶ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χειρὰ τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τῆς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δίνης, κυροῦντα ἦν λαχὼν εἴλετο μοῖραν ταύτης δ' ἐφαιψάμενον αὐθις ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀτρόπου ἄγειν νῆσιν, ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιοῦντα· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δὴ ἀμεταστρεπτὶ ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς  
 621 Ἀνάγκης ἰέναι θρόνον, καὶ δι' ἐκείνου διεξελθόντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διηλθον, πορεύεσθαι ἅπαντας εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίου διὰ καύματός τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν δένδρων τε καὶ ὅσα γῆ φύει· σκηναῖσθαι οὖν σφᾶς ἤδη ἐσπέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν,

<sup>a</sup> *Phaedr.* 249 specifies that only beasts who had once been men could return to human form.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *supra* 617 E, and for daemons in Plato *What Plato Said*, pp. 546-547, on *Symp.* 202 E, Dieterich, *Nekyia*, p. 59.

<sup>c</sup> δίνης: cf. *Cratyl.* 439 C and *Phaedo* 99 B.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Laws* 960 C.

<sup>e</sup> τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα: cf. *Laws* 957 E, *Theaet.* 169 C, and the Platonic epigram on Dion, *Anth. Pal.* vii. 99 Μοῖραι ἐπέκλωσαν,

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that it would have done the same had it drawn the first lot, and chose it gladly. And in like manner, of the other beasts some entered into men <sup>a</sup> and into one another, the unjust into wild creatures, the just transformed to tame, and there was every kind of mixture and combination. But when, to conclude, all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of their lots, they were marshalled and went before Lachesis. And she sent with each, as the guardian of his life and the fulfiller of his choice, the genius <sup>b</sup> that he had chosen, and this divinity led the soul first to Clotho, under her hand and her turning <sup>c</sup> of the spindle to ratify the destiny of his lot and choice; and after contact with her the genius again led the soul to the spinning of Atropos <sup>d</sup> to make the web of its destiny <sup>e</sup> irreversible, and then without a backward look it passed beneath the throne of Necessity. And after it had passed through that, when the others also had passed, they all journeyed to the Plain of Oblivion, <sup>f</sup> through a terrible and stifling heat, for it was bare of trees and all plants, and there they camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness, <sup>g</sup>

*Od.* i. 17, iii. 208, etc., *Aesch. Eumen.* 335, *Callinus* f. 9 *Μοῖραι ἐπικλώσωσ'.*

<sup>i</sup> *Cf.* *Aristoph. Frogs* 186.

<sup>g</sup> In later literature it is the river that is called Lethe. *Cf.* *Aeneid* vi. 714 f., *Milton, Par. L.* ii.:

Lethe, the river of oblivion, rolls  
Her wat'ry labyrinth, whereof who drinks,  
Forthwith his former state and being forgets.

*Keats, "Ode on Melancholy":* "No, no! go not to Lethe,"  
*Tennyson, "The Two Voices":*

As old mythologies relate,  
Some draught of Lethe might await  
The slipping thro' from state to state.

οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σωζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρου· τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ πίνοντα πάντων ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι.

Β ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντήν τε καὶ σεισμόν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐξαπίνης ἄλλον ἄλλη φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἄττοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας. αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος κωλυθῆναι πιεῖν· ὅπη μέντοι καὶ ὅπως εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκοιτο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἔωθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ. καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ

Γ ἀπόλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν εὖ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μίανθησόμεθα· ἀλλ' ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα, νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν καὶ δυνατὴν πάντα μὲν κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθὰ, τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ ἀεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ

<sup>a</sup> In *Tim.* 41 D-E each soul is given a star as its vehicle. Cf. Aristoph. *Peace* 833 f. ὡς ἀστέρες γιγνόμεθ' ὅταν τις ἀποθάνῃ . . . with the Platonic epigram to Ἄστηρ: . . . νῦν δὲ θανῶν

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whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all required to drink a measure of the water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all things. And after they had fallen asleep and it was the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars.<sup>a</sup> Er himself, he said, was not allowed to drink of the water, yet how and in what way he returned to the body he said he did not know, but suddenly recovering his sight<sup>b</sup> he saw himself at dawn lying on the funeral pyre.—And so, Glaucon, the tale was saved,<sup>c</sup> as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us<sup>d</sup> if we believe it, and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted from the world.<sup>e</sup> But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever,

λάμπεις Ἐσπερος ἐν φθιμένοις. There is an old superstition in European folklore to the effect that when a star falls a soul goes up to God. Cf. also Rohde, *Psyche*, ii.<sup>6</sup> p. 131.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus* 243 B ἀνέβλεψεν.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Phileb.* 14 A, *Laws* 645 B, *Theaet.* 164 D.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 58 B ἔσωσε τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. σώζειν is here used in its higher sense, approaching the idea of salvation, not as in *Gorg.* 511 c f., 512 D-E, *Laws* 707 D, where Plato uses it contemptuously in the tone of "whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it."

<sup>e</sup> Cf. *James* i. 27, *Phaedo* 81 B, 2 *Peter* iii. 14, and the Emperor Julian's last speech "animum . . . immaculatum conservavi." Cf. *Marius the Epicurean*, pp. 15-16: "A white bird, she told him once, looking at him gravely, a bird which he must carry in his bosom across a crowded public place—his own soul was like that."

ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὦμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε  
 μένοντες ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἐπειδὴν τὰ ἄθλα αὐτῆς  
 D κομιζώμεθα, ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περιαιρούμενοι,  
 καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιέτει πορεία, ἦν δι-  
 εληλύθαμεν, εὖ πράττωμεν.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Laws* 693 B ἐαυτῇ φίλην, *Rep.* 589 B, Horace, *Epist.*  
 i. 3. 29 "si nobis vivere cari," Wordsworth:

Hence lives he to his inner self endeared.

Jowett's "dear to one another" misses the point. Cf. my  
 review of Lemercier, *Les Pensées de Marc-Aurèle*, in *Class.*  
*Phil.* vii. p. 115: "In iii. 4, in *fine*, the words οἷγε οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ  
 ἐαυτοῖς ἀρέσκονται are omitted because 'les gens que méprise  
 Marc-Aurèle sont loin de mépriser eux-mêmes.' This is to  
 forget that Seneca's 'omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui'



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that we may be dear to ourselves<sup>a</sup> and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we receive our reward, as the victors in the games<sup>b</sup> go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well.<sup>c</sup>”

is good Stoic doctrine, and that the idea that only the wise and good man can be dear to himself is found in the last sentence of Plato's *Republic*.” Cf. also Soph. *O.C.* 309 *τίς γὰρ ἑσθλὸς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος;*

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Vol. I. p. 480, note *c*, on 465 D.

<sup>c</sup> For the thought cf. *Gorg.* 527 c *εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας*. Cf. Vol. I. p. 104, note *b*, on 353 E. The quiet solemnity of *εὐ πράττωμεν* illustrates the same characteristic of style that makes Plato begin his *Laws* with the word *θεός*, and Dante close each of the three sections of the *Divine Comedy* with “*stelle*.”



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